COMMENTARIES

ON THE

LAWS

OF

ENGLAND.

IN FOUR BOOKS.

BY

SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNT.
ONE OF THE JUSTICES OF HIS MAJESTY'S
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

THE TWELFTH EDITION.

WITH THE LAST CORRECTIONS OF THE AUTHOR;

ADDITIONS BY RICHARD BURN, LL. D.

AND CONTINUED TO THE PRESENT TIME,

BY JOHN WILLIAMS, ESQ.

DUBLIN:
PRINTED FOR L. WHITE, WILLIAM JONES,
AND JOHN RICE.

1794.

Tx
B631c
ed12w

DEC 16 1914

TO

THE QUEEN's MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY,

THE FOLLOWING VIEW

OF THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION

OF ENGLAND,

THE IMPROVEMENT AND PROTECTION OF WHICH

HAVE DISTINGUISHED THE REIGN

OF HER MAJESTY's ROYAL CONSORT,

IS,

WITH ALL GRATITUDE AND HUMILITY,

MOST RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED

BY HER DUTIFUL

AND MOST OBEDIENT

SERVANT,

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE.

PREFACE.

THE following ſheets contain the ſubſtance of a courſe of lectures on the laws of England, which were read by the author in the univerſity of OXFORD. *His original plan took its riſe in the year* 1753; *and notwithſtanding the novelty of ſuch an attempt in this age and country, and the prejudices uſually conceived againſt any innovations in the eſtabliſhed mode of education, he had the ſatisfaction to find (and he acknowledges it with a mixture of pride and gratitude) that his endeavours were encouraged and patronized by thoſe, both in the univerſity and out of it, whoſe good opinion and eſteem he was principally deſirous to obtain.*

The death of Mr. VINER *in* 1756, *and his ample benefactions to the univerſity for promoting the ſtudy of the law, produced about two years afterwards a regular and public eſtabliſhment of what the author had privately undertaken. The knowledge of our laws and conſtitution was adopted as a liberal ſcience by general academical authority:*

competent endowments were decreed for the support of a lecturer, and the perpetual encouragement of students; and the compiler of the ensuing commentaries had the honour to be elected the first Vinerian professor.

In this situation he was led, both by duty and inclination, to investigate the elements of the law, and the grounds of our civil polity, with greater assiduity and attention than many have thought it necessary to do. And yet all, who of late years have attended the public administration of justice, must be sensible that a masterly acquaintance with the general spirit of laws and the principles of universal jurisprudence, combined with an accurate knowledge of our own municipal constitutions, their original, reason, and history, hath given a beauty and energy to many modern judicial decisions, with which our ancestors were wholly unacquainted. If, in the pursuit of these inquiries, the author hath been able to rectify any errors which either himself or others may have heretofore imbibed, his pains will be sufficiently answered: and, if in some points he is still mistaken, the candid and judicious reader will make due allowances for the difficulties of a search so new, so extensive, and so laborious.

2 Nov. 1765.

POSTSCRIPT.

NOTWITHSTANDING the diffidence expreſſed in the foregoing Preface, no ſooner was the work completed, but many of its poſitions were vehemently attacked by zealots of all (even oppoſite) denominations, religious as well as civil; by ſome with a greater, by others with a leſs degree of acrimony. To ſuch of theſe animadverters as have fallen within the author's notice (for he doubts not but ſome have eſcaped it) he owes at leaſt this obligation; that they have occaſioned him from time to time to reviſe his work, in reſpect to the particulars objected to; to retract or expunge from it what appeared to be really erroneous; to amend or ſupply it when inaccurate or defective: to illuſtrate and explain it when obſcure. But, where he thought the objections ill-founded, he hath left and ſhall leave the book to defend itſelf: being fully of opinion, that if his principles be falſe and his doctrines unwarrantable, no apology from himſelf can make them right; if founded in truth and rectitude, no cenſure from others can make them wrong.

ADVERTISEMENT

Concerning the ninth edition.

THE editor judges it indiſpenſible to preſerve the author's text intire. The alterations which will be found therein, ſince the publication of the laſt edition, were made by the author himſelf, as may appear from a corrected copy in his own hand-writing *. What the editor hath chiefly attended to is, to note the alterations made by ſubſequent acts of parliament. Theſe, together with ſome few other neceſſary obſervations, in order to prevent confuſion, are inſerted ſeparate and diſtinct at the bottom of the page.

RI. BURN.

July 20, 1783.

* To be ſeen at Mr. Caddell's in the Strand.

ADVERTISEMENT

Concerning this edition.

IN this edition, as in the laſt, the author's text is preſerved intire. The editor hath added not only the alterations made by acts of parliament ſubſequent to the publication of the laſt edition, but alſo references to the Term Reports, which have been ſince publiſhed. Some manuſcript caſes in the editor's poſſeſſion are alſo noticed in this edition, wherein the authority of ſome paſſages in theſe commentaries hath been denied. Theſe, together with ſome notes and obſervations of his own, the editor hath inſerted ſeparate and diſtinct at the bottom of the page. The notes added in the tenth edition, are encloſed in brackets, thus [ ], and marked with Italic references; and thoſe added to the preſent edition, thus ( ).

Temple, Jan. 12, 1791.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

Of the STUDY, NATURE, *and* EXTENT, *of the* LAWS *of* ENGLAND.

SECT. I.

On the STUDY *of the* LAW. Page 3

SECT. II.

Of the NATURE *of* LAWS *in general.* 38

SECT. III.

Of the LAWS *of* ENGLAND. 63

SECT. IV.

Of the COUNTRIES *subject to the* LAWS *of* ENGLAND. 93

BOOK I.

Of the RIGHTS *of* PERSONS.

CHAP. I.

Of the absolute RIGHTS *of* INDIVIDUALS. 123

CHAP. II.

Of the PARLIAMENT. 148

CHAP. III.

Of the KING, *and his* TITLE. 194

CONTENTS.

Page

CHAP. IV.

Of the KING's *royal* FAMILY, 224

CHAP. V.

Of the COUNCILS *belonging to the* KING. 235

CHAP. VI.

Of the KING's DUTIES. 242

CHAP. VII.

Of the KING's PREROGATIVE. 246

CHAP. VIII.

Of the KING's REVENUE. 292

CHAP. IX.

Of subordinate MAGISTRATES. 356

CHAP. X.

Of the PEOPLE, *whether* ALIENS, DENIZENS, *or* NATIVES. 386

CHAP. XI.

Of the CLERGY. 397

CHAP. XII.

Of the CIVIL STATE. 419

CHAP. XIII.

Of the MILITARY *and* MARINE STATES. 432

CHAP. XIV.

Of MASTER *and* SERVANT. 448

CHAP. XV.

Of HUSBAND *and* WIFE. 459

CHAP. XVI.

Of PARENT *and* CHILD. 472

CHAP. XVII.

Of GUARDIAN *and* WARD. 487

CHAP. XVIII.

Of CORPORATIONS. 494

INTRODUCTION.

OF THE

STUDY, NATURE, AND EXTENT

OF THE

LAWS OF ENGLAND.

INTRODUCTION.

SECTION THE FIRST.

ON THE STUDY OF THE LAW*.

MR. VICE-CHANCELLOR, AND GENTLEMEN OF THE UNIVERSITY,

THE general expectation of ſo numerous and reſpectable an audience, the novelty, and (I may add) the importance of the duty required from this chair, muſt unavoidably be productive of great diffidence and apprehenſions in him who has the honour to be placed in it. He muſt be ſenſible how much will depend upon his conduct in the infancy of a ſtudy which is now firſt adopted by public academical authority; which has generally been reputed (however unjuſtly) of a dry and unfruitful nature; and of which the theoretical, elementary parts have hitherto received a very moderate ſhare of cultivation. He cannot but reflect that, if either his plan of inſtruction be crude and injudicious, or the execution of it lame and ſuperficial, it will caſt a damp upon the farther progreſs of this moſt uſeful and moſt rational branch of learning; and may defeat for a time the public-ſpirited deſign of our wiſe and munificent benefactor. And this he muſt more

* Read in Oxford at the opening of the Vinerian Lectures; 25 Oct. 1758.

eſpecially dread, when he feels by experience how unequal his abilities are (unaſſiſted by preceding examples) to complete, in the manner he could wiſh, ſo extenſive and arduous a taſk; ſince he freely confeſſes, that his former more private attempts have fallen very ſhort of his own ideas of perfection. And yet the candour he has already experienced, and this laſt tranſcendant mark of regard, his preſent nomination by the free and unanimous ſuffrage of a great and learned univerſity, (an honour to be ever remembered with the deepeſt and moſt affectionate gratitude) theſe teſtimonies of your public judgment muſt entirely ſuperſede his own, and forbid him to believe himſelf totally inſufficient for the labour at leaſt of this employment. One thing he will venture to hope for, and it certainly ſhall be his conſtant aim, by diligence and attention to atone for his other defects; eſteeming, that the beſt return which he can poſſibly make for your favourable opinion of his capacity, will be his unwearied endeavours in ſome little degree to deſerve it.

The ſcience thus committed to his charge, to be cultivated, methodized, and explained in a courſe of academical lectures, is that of the laws and conſtitution of our own country: a ſpecies of knowledge, in which the gentlemen of England have been more remarkably deficient than thoſe of all Europe beſides. In moſt of the nations on the continent, where the civil or imperial law under different modifications is cloſely interwoven with the municipal laws of the land, no gentleman, or at leaſt no ſcholar, thinks his education is completed, till he has attended a courſe or two of lectures, both upon the inſtitutes of Juſtinian and the local conſtitutions of his native ſoil, under the very eminent profeſſors that abound in their ſeveral univerſities. And in the northern parts of our own iſland, where alſo the municipal laws are frequently connected with the civil, it is difficult to meet with a perſon of liberal education, who is deſtitute of a competent knowledge in that ſcience, which is to be the guardian of his natural rights and the rule of his civil conduct.

Nor have the imperial laws been totally neglected even in the Engliſh nation. A general acquaintance with their deciſions has ever been deſervedly conſidered as no ſmall accompliſhment of a gentleman; and a faſhion has prevailed, eſpecially of late, to tranſport the growing hopes of this iſland to foreign univerſities, in Switzerland, Germany, and Holland; which, though infinitely inferior to our own in every other conſideration, have been looked upon as better nurſeries of the civil, or (which is nearly the ſame) of their own municipal law. In the mean time it has been the peculiar lot of our admirable ſyſtem of laws, to be neglected, and even unknown, by all but one practical profeſſion; though built upon the ſoundeſt foundations, and approved by the experience of ages.

Far be it from me to derogate from the ſtudy of the civil law, conſidered (apart from any binding authority) as a collection of written reaſon. No man is more thoroughly perſuaded of the general excellence of its rules, and the uſual equity of its deciſions, nor is better convinced of its uſe as well as ornament to the ſcholar, the divine, the ſtateſman, and even the common lawyer. But we muſt not carry our veneration ſo far as to ſacrifice our Alfred and Edward to the names of Theodoſius and Juſtinian: we muſt not prefer the edict of the prætor, or the reſcript of the Roman emperor, to our own immemorial cuſtoms, or the ſanctions of an Engliſh parliament; unleſs we can alſo prefer the deſpotic monarchy of Rome and Byzantium, for whoſe meridians the former were calculated, to the free conſtitution of Britain, which the latter are adapted to perpetuate.

Without detracting therefore from the real merit which abounds in the imperial law, I hope I may have leave to aſſert, that if an Engliſhman muſt be ignorant of either the one or the other, he had better be a ſtranger to the Roman than the Engliſh inſtitutions. For I think it an undeniable poſition, that a competent knowledge of the laws of that ſociety,

in which we live, is the proper accompliſhment of every gentleman and ſcholar; an highly uſeful, I had almoſt ſaid eſſential, part of liberal and polite education. And in this I am warranted by the example of antient Rome; where, as Cicero informs us[1], the very boys were obliged to learn the twelve tables by heart, as a *carmen neceſſarium* or indiſpenſable leſſon, to imprint on their tender minds an early knowledge of the laws and conſtitution of their country.

But as the long and univerſal neglect of this ſtudy, with us in England, ſeems in ſome degree to call in queſtion the truth of this evident poſition, it ſhall therefore be the buſineſs of this introductory diſcourſe, in the firſt place to demonſtrate the utility of ſome general acquaintance with the municipal law of the land, by pointing out its particular uſes in all conſiderable ſituations of life. Some conjectures will then be offered with regard to the cauſes of neglecting this uſeful ſtudy; to which will be ſubjoined a few reflections on the peculiar propriety of reviving it in our own univerſities.

And, firſt, to demonſtrate the utility of ſome acquaintance with the laws of the land, let us only reflect a moment on the ſingular frame and polity of that land, which is governed by this ſyſtem of laws. A land, perhaps the only one in the univerſe, in which political or civil liberty is the very end and ſcope of the conſtitution[2]. This liberty, rightly underſtood, conſiſts in the power of doing whatever the laws permit[3]; which is only to be effected by a general conformity of all orders and degrees to thoſe equitable rules of action, by which the meaneſt individual is protected from the inſults and oppreſſion of the greateſt. As therefore every ſubject is intereſted in the preſervation of the laws, it is incumbent upon every man to be acquainted with thoſe at leaſt, with which he is immediately concerned; leſt he incur the cenſure, as well as inconvenience, of living in ſociety without knowing the obligations

[1] *De Legg.* 2. 23.

[2] Monteſq. *Eſp. L.* l. 11. c. 5.

[3] *Facultas ejus, quod cuique facere libet, niſi quid vi, aut jure prohibetur. Inſt.* 1. 3. 1.

which it lays him under. And thus much may ſuffice for perſons of inferior condition, who have neither time nor capacity to enlarge their views beyond that contracted ſphere in which they are appointed to move. But thoſe, on whom nature and fortune have beſtowed more abilities and greater leiſure, cannot be ſo eaſily excuſed. Theſe advantages are given them, not for the benefit of themſelves only, but alſo of the public: and yet they cannot, in any ſcene of life, diſcharge properly their duty either to the public or themſelves, without ſome degree of knowledge in the laws. To evince this the more clearly, it may not be amiſs to deſcend to a few particulars.

Let us therefore begin with our gentlemen of independent eſtates and fortune, the moſt uſeful as well as conſiderable body of men in the nation; whom even to ſuppoſe ignorant in this branch of learning is treated by Mr. Locke[a] as a ſtrange abſurdity. It is their landed property, with its long and voluminous train of deſcents and conveyances, ſettlements, entails, and incumbrances, that forms the moſt intricate and moſt extenſive object of legal knowledge. The thorough comprehenſion of theſe, in all their minute diſtinctions, is perhaps too laborious a taſk for any but a lawyer by profeſſion: yet ſtill the underſtanding of a few leading principles, relating to eſtates and conveyancing, may form ſome check and guard upon a gentleman's inferior agents, and preſerve him at leaſt from very groſs and notorious impoſition.

Again, the policy of all laws has made ſome forms neceſſary in the wording of laſt wills and teſtaments, and more with regard to their atteſtation. An ignorance in theſe muſt always be of dangerous conſequence, to ſuch as by choice or neceſſity compile their own teſtaments without any technical aſſiſtance. Thoſe who have attended the courts of juſtice are the beſt witneſſes of the confuſion and diſtreſſes that are hereby occaſioned in families; and of the difficulties that ariſe in diſcerning the true mean-

[a] Education, §. 187.

ing of the teſtator, or ſometimes in diſcovering any meaning at all: ſo that in the end his eſtate may often be veſted quite contrary to theſe his enigmatical intentions, becauſe perhaps he has omitted one or two formal words, which are neceſſary to aſcertain the ſenſe with indiſputable legal preciſion, or has executed his will in the preſence of fewer witneſſes than the law requires.

But to proceed from private concerns to thoſe of a more public conſideration. All gentlemen of fortune are, in conſequence of their property, liable to be called upon to eſtabliſh the rights, to eſtimate the injuries, to weigh the accuſations, and ſometimes to diſpoſe of the lives of their fellow-ſubjects, by ſerving upon juries. In this ſituation they have frequently a right to decide, and that upon their oaths, queſtions of nice importance, in the ſolution of which ſome legal ſkill is requiſite; eſpecially where the law and the fact, as it often happens, are intimately blended together. And the general incapacity, even of our beſt juries, to do this with any tolerable propriety, has greatly debaſed their authority; and has unavoidably thrown more power into the hands of the judges, to direct, control, and even reverſe their verdicts, than perhaps the conſtitution intended.

But it is not as a juror only that the Engliſh gentleman is called upon to determine queſtions of right; and diſtribute juſtice to his fellow-ſubjects: it is principally with this order of men that the commiſſion of the peace is filled. And here a very ample field is opened for a gentleman to exert his talents, by maintaining good order in his neighbourhood; by puniſhing the diſſolute and idle; by protecting the peaceable and induſtrious; and, above all, by healing petty differences and preventing vexatious proſecutions. But, in order to attain theſe deſirable ends, it is neceſſary that the magiſtrate ſhould underſtand his buſineſs; and have not only the will, but the power alſo, (under which muſt be included the knowlege) of adminiſtering legal and effectual juſtice. Elſe, when he has miſtaken his authority,

through paſſion, through ignorance, or abſurdity, he will be the object of contempt from his inferiors, and of cenſure from thoſe to whom he is accountable for his conduct.

Yet farther; moſt gentlemen of conſiderable property, at ſome period or other in their lives, are ambitious of repreſenting their country in parliament: and thoſe, who are ambitious of receiving ſo high a truſt, would alſo do well to remember its nature and importance. They are not thus honourably diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of their fellow ſubjects, merely that they may privilege their perſons, their eſtates, or their domeſtics; that they may liſt under party banners; may grant or with-hold ſupplies; may vote with or vote againſt a popular or unpopular adminiſtration; but upon conſiderations far more intereſting and important. They are the guardians of the Engliſh conſtitution; the makers, repealers, and interpreters of the Engliſh laws; delegated to watch, to check, and to avert every dangerous innovation, to propoſe, to adopt, and to cheriſh any ſolid and well-weighed improvement; bound by every tie of nature, of honour, and of religion, to tranſmit that conſtitution and thoſe laws to their poſterity, amended if poſſible, at leaſt without any derogation. And how unbecoming muſt it appear in a member of the legiſlature to vote for a new law, who is utterly ignorant of the old! what kind of interpretation can he be enabled to give, who is a ſtranger to the text upon which he comments!

Indeed it is perfectly amazing, that there ſhould be no other ſtate of life, no other occupation, art, or ſcience, in which ſome method of inſtruction is not looked upon as requiſite, except only the ſcience of legiſlation, the nobleſt and moſt difficult of any. Apprenticeſhips are held neceſſary to almoſt every art, commercial or mechanical: a long courſe of reading and ſtudy muſt form the divine, the phyſician, and the practical profeſſor of the laws: but every man of ſuperior fortune thinks himſelf *born* a legiſlator. Yet Tully was of a different opinion; "it is neceſſary,

" ſays he [3], for a ſenator to be thoroughly acquaint-
" ed with the conſtitution: and this, he declares, is
" a knowlege of the moſt extenſive nature; a mat-
" ter of ſcience, of diligence, of reflexion; without
" which no ſenator can poſſibly be fit for his office."

The miſchiefs that have ariſen to the public from inconſiderate alterations in our laws, are too obvious to be called in queſtion; and how far they have been owing to the defective education of our ſenators, is a point well worthy the public attention. The common law of England has fared like other venerable edifices of antiquity, which raſh and unexperienced workmen have ventured to new-dreſs and refine, with all the rage of modern improvement. Hence frequently its ſymmetry has been deſtroyed, its proportions diſtorted, and its majeſtic ſimplicity exchanged for ſpecious embelliſhments and fantaſtic novelties. For, to ſay the truth, almoſt all the perplexed queſtions, almoſt all the niceties, intricacies, and delays, (which have ſometimes diſgraced the Engliſh, as well as other courts of juſtice) owe their original not to the common law itſelf, but to innovations that have been made in it by acts of parliament; " overladen (as ſir Edward Coke expreſſes it [4]) " with proviſoes and additions, and many times on " a ſudden penned or corrected by men of none or " very little judgment in law." This great and well-experienced judge declares, that in all his time he never knew two queſtions made upon rights merely depending upon the common law; and warmly laments the confuſion introduced by ill-judging and unlearned legiſlators. " But if," he ſubjoins, " acts of parliament were after the old " faſhion penned, by ſuch only as perfectly knew " what the common law was before the making of " any act of parliament concerning that matter, as " alſo how far forth former ſtatutes had provided " remedy for former miſchiefs, and defects diſco-

[3] *De Legg.* 3. 18. *Eſt ſenatori neceſſarium noſce rempublicam; idque late patet:—genus hoc omne ſcientiæ, diligentiæ memoriæ eſt; ſine quo paratus eſſe ſenator nullo pacto poteſt.*

[4] 2 Rep. pref.

"vered by experience; then ſhould very few queſ-
"tions in law ariſe, and the learned ſhould not ſo
"often and ſo much perplex their heads to make
"atonement and peace, by conſtruction of law, be-
"tween inſenſible and diſagreeing words, ſentences
"and proviſoes, as they now do." And if this inconvenience was ſo heavily felt in the reign of queen Elizabeth, you may judge how the evil is encreaſed in later times, when the ſtatute book is ſwelled to ten times a larger bulk: unleſs it ſhould be found, that the penners of our modern ſtatutes have proportionably better informed themſelves in the knowlege of the common law.

What is ſaid of our gentlemen in general, and the propriety of their application to the ſtudy of the laws of their country, will hold equally ſtrong or ſtill ſtronger with regard to the nobility of this realm, except only in the article of ſerving upon juries. But, inſtead of this, they have ſeveral peculiar provinces of far greater conſequence and concern; being not only by birth hereditary counſellors of the crown, and judges upon their honour of the lives of their brother peers, but alſo arbiters of the property of all their fellow ſubjects, and that in the laſt reſort. In this their judicial capacity they are bound to decide the niceſt and moſt critical points of the law: to examine and correct ſuch errors as have eſcaped the moſt experienced ſages of the profeſſion, the lord keeper and the judges of the courts at Weſtminſter. Their ſentence is final, deciſive, irrevocable: no appeal, no correction, not even a review can be had: and to their determination, whatever it be, the inferior courts of juſtice muſt conform: otherwiſe the rule of property would no longer be uniform and ſteady.

Should a judge in the moſt ſubordinate juriſdiction be deficient in the knowledge of the law, it would reflect infinite contempt upon himſelf, and diſgrace upon thoſe who employ him. And yet the conſequence of his ignorance is comparatively very trifling and ſmall: his judgment may be examined, and his errors rectified, by other courts. But how much

more ſerious and affecting is the caſe of a ſuperior judge, if without any ſkill in the laws he will boldly venture to decide a queſtion, upon which the welfare and ſubſiſtence of whole families may depend! where the chance of his judging right, or wrong, is barely equal; and where, if he chances to judge wrong, he does an injury of the moſt alarming nature, an injury without poſſibility of redreſs!

Yet, vaſt as this truth is, it can no where be ſo properly repoſed, as in the noble hands where our excellent conſtitution has placed it: and therefore placed it, becauſe, from the independence of their fortune and the dignity of their ſtation, they are preſumed to employ that leiſure which is the conſequence of both, in attaining a more extenſive knowlege of the laws than perſons of an inferior rank: and becauſe the founders of our polity relied upon that delicacy of ſentiment, ſo peculiar to noble birth; which, as on the one hand it will prevent either intereſt or affection from interfering in queſtions of right, ſo on the other it will bind a peer in honour, an obligation which the law eſteems equal to another's oath, to be maſter of thoſe points upon which it is his birthright to decide.

The Roman pandects will furniſh us with a piece of hiſtory not unapplicable to our preſent purpoſe. Servius Sulpicius, a gentleman of the patrician order, and a celebrated orator, had occaſion to take the opinion of Quintus Mutius Scaevola, the then oracle of the Roman law; but, for want of ſome knowlege in that ſcience, could not ſo much as underſtand even the technical terms, which his friend was obliged to make uſe of. Upon which Mutius Scaevola could not forbear to upbraid him with this memorable reproof[5], "that it was a ſhame for a patrician, a nobleman, and an orator of cauſes, to "be ignorant of that law in which he was ſo peculiarly concerned." This reproach made ſo deep an impreſſion on Sulpicius, that he immediately ap-

[5] *Ff.* 1. 2. 2. §. 43. *Turpe eſſe patricio, et nobili, et cauſas oranti, jus in quo verſaretur ignorare.*

plied himself to the study of the law; wherein he arrived to that proficiency, that he left behind him about an hundred and fourscore volumes of his own compiling upon the subject; and became, in the opinion of Cicero[6], a much more complete lawyer than even Mutius Scaevola himself.

I would not be thought to recommend to our English nobility and gentry, to become as great lawyers as Sulpicius; though he, together with this character, sustained likewise that of an excellent orator, a firm patriot, and a wise indefatigable senator: but the inference which arises from the story is this, that ignorance of the laws of the land hath ever been esteemed dishonourable in those, who are entrusted by their country to maintain, to administer, and to amend them.

But surely there is little occasion to enforce this argument any farther to persons of rank and distinction, if we of this place may be allowed to form a general judgment from those who are under our inspection: happy, that while we lay down the rule, we can also produce the example. You will therefore permit your professor to indulge both a public and private satisfaction, by bearing this open testimony; that, in the infancy of these studies among us, they were favoured with the most diligent attendance, and pursued with the most unwearied application, by those of the noblest birth and most ample patrimony: some of whom are still the ornaments of this seat of learning; and others at a greater distance continue doing honour to its institutions, by comparing our polity and laws with those of other kingdoms abroad, or exerting their senatorial abilities in the councils of the nation at home.

Nor will some degree of legal knowlege be found in the least superfluous to persons of inferior rank: especially those of the learned professions. The clergy in particular, besides the common obligations they are under in proportion to their rank and fortune, have also abundant reason, considered merely as clergymen, to be acquainted with many branches

[6] *Brut.* 41.

of the law, which are almoſt peculiar and appropriated to themſelves alone. Such are the laws relating to advowſons, inſtitutions, and inductions; to ſimony, and ſimoniacal contracts; to uniformity, reſidence, and pluralities; to tithes and other eccleſiaſtical dues; to marriages (more eſpecially of late) and to a variety of other ſubjects, which are conſigned to the care of their order by the proviſions of particular ſtatutes. To underſtand theſe aright, to diſcern what is warranted or enjoined, and what is forbidden by law, demands a ſort of legal apprehenſion; which is no otherwiſe to be acquired, than by uſe and a familiar acquaintance with legal writers.

For the gentlemen of the faculty of phyſic, I muſt frankly own that I ſee no ſpecial reaſon, why they in particular ſhould apply themſelves to the ſtudy of the law; unleſs in common with other gentlemen, and to complete the character of general and extenſive knowlege; a character which their profeſſion, beyond others, has remarkably deſerved. They will give me leave however to ſuggeſt, and that not ludicrouſly, that it might frequently be of uſe to families upon ſudden emergencies, if the phyſician were acquainted with the doctrine of laſt wills and teſtaments, at leaſt ſo far as relates to the formal part of their execution.

But thoſe gentlemen who intend to profeſs the civil and eccleſiaſtical laws, in the ſpiritual and maritime courts of this kingdom, are of all men (next to common lawyers) the moſt indiſpenſably obliged to apply themſelves ſeriouſly to the ſtudy of our municipal laws. For the civil and canon laws, conſidered with reſpect to any intrinſic obligation, have no force or authority in this kingdom; they are no more binding in England, than our laws are binding at Rome. But as far as theſe foreign laws, on account of ſome peculiar propriety, have in ſome particular caſes, and in ſome particular courts, been introduced and allowed by our laws, ſo far they oblige, and no farther; their authority being wholly founded upon that permiſſion and adoption. In which we are not ſingular in our notions: for even in Holland, where the imperial law is much cultivated and its deciſions

pretty generally followed, we are informed by Van Leeuwen[7], that "it receives its force from cuſtom "and the conſent of the people, either tacitly or "expreſsly given: for otherwiſe, he adds, we "ſhould no more be bound by this law, than by "that of the Almains, the Franks, the Saxons, the "Goths, the Vandals, and other of the antient na-"tions." Wherefore, in all points in which the different ſyſtems depart from each other, the law of the land takes place of the law of Rome, whether antient or modern, imperial or pontifical. And, in thoſe of our Engliſh courts wherein a reception has been allowed to the civil and canon laws, if either they exceed the bounds of that reception, by extending themſelves to other matters, than are permitted to them; or if ſuch courts proceed according to the deciſions of thoſe laws, in caſes wherein it is controlled by the law of the land, the common law in either inſtance both may, and frequently does, prohibit and annul their proceedings[8]: and it will not be a ſufficient excuſe for them to tell the king's courts at Weſtminſter, that their practice is warranted by the laws of Juſtinian or Gregory, or is conformable to the decrees of the Rota or imperial chamber. For which reaſon it becomes highly neceſſary for every civilian and canoniſt, that would act with ſafety as a judge, or with prudence and reputation as an advocate, to know in what caſes and how far the Engliſh laws have given ſanction to the Roman: in what points the latter are rejected; and where they are both ſo intermixed and blended together as to form certain ſupplemental parts of the common law of England, diſtinguiſhed by the titles of the king's maritime, the king's military, and the king's eccleſiaſtical law. The propriety of which inquiry the univerſity of Oxford has for more than a century ſo thoroughly ſeen, that in her ſtatutes[9] ſhe appoints, that one of the three queſtions to be annually diſcuſſed at the act by the juriſt-inceptors ſhall

[7] *Dedicatio corporis juris civilis. Edit.* 1663.

[8] Hale Hiſt. C. L. c. 2. Selden *in Fletam.* 5 Rep, Caudrey's Caſe, 2 Inſt. 599.

[9] *Tit. VII. Sect.* 2. §. 2.

relate to the common law; ſubjoining this reaſon, "*quia juris civilis ſtudioſos decet haud imperitos eſſe ju-*"*ris municipalis, et differentias exteri patriique juris*"*notas habere.*" And the ſtatutes[o] of the univerſity of Cambridge ſpeak expreſsly to the ſame effect.

From the general uſe and neceſſity of ſome acquaintance with the common law, the inference were extremely eaſy with regard to the propriety of the preſent inſtitution, in a place to which gentlemen of all ranks and degrees reſort, as the fountain of all uſeful knowlege. But how it has come to paſs that a deſign of this ſort has never before taken place in the univerſity, and the reaſon why the ſtudy of our laws has in general fallen into diſuſe, I ſhall previouſly proceed to inquire.

Sir John Forteſcue, in his panegyric on the laws of England, (which was written in the reign of Henry VI.) puts[1] a very obvious queſtion in the mouth of the young prince, whom he is exhorting to apply himſelf to that branch of learning; "why the "laws of England, being ſo good, ſo fruitful, and "ſo commodious, are not taught in the univerſities, "as the civil and canon laws are?" In anſwer to which he gives[2] what ſeems, with due deference be it ſpoken, a very jejune and unſatisfactory reaſon; being in ſhort, that "as the proceedings at common "law were in his time carried on in three different "tongues, the Engliſh, the Latin, and the French, "that ſcience muſt be neceſſarily taught in thoſe "three ſeveral languages; but that in the univerſi-"ties all ſciences were taught in the Latin tongue "only:" and therefore he concludes, "that they "could not be conveniently taught or ſtudied in our "univerſities." But without attempting to examine ſeriouſly the validity of this reaſon, (the very ſhadow of which by the wiſdom of your late conſtitutions is entirely taken away) we perhaps may find out a better, or at leaſt a more plauſible account, why the ſtudy of the municipal laws has been baniſh-

[o] *Doctor legum mox a doctoratu dabit operam legibus Angliæ, ut non ſit imperitus earum legum quas habet ſua patria, et differentias exteri patriique juris noſcat.* Stat. Eliz. *R.* c. 14. Cowel. *Inſtitut. in proëmio.*

[1] c. 47. [2] c. 48.

ed from these seats of science, than what the learned chancellor thought it prudent to give to his royal pupil.

That antient collection of unwritten maxims and customs, which is called the common law, however compounded or from whatever fountains derived, had subsisted immemorially in this kingdom; and, though somewhat altered and impaired by the violence of the times, had in great measure weathered the rude shock of the Norman conquest. This had endeared it to the people in general, as well because its decisions were universally known, as because it was found to be excellently adapted to the genius of the English nation. In the knowlege of this law consisted great part of the learning of those dark ages; it was then taught, says Mr. Selden [2], in the monasteries, *in the universities*, and in the families of the principal nobility. The clergy in particular, as they then engrossed almost every other branch of learning, so (like their predecessors the British Druids [3]) they were peculiarly remarkable for their proficiency in the study of the law. *Nullus clericus nisi causidicus*, is the character given of them soon after the conquest by William of Malmsbury [4]. The judges therefore were usually created out of the sacred order [5], as was likewise the case among the Normans [6]; and all the inferior offices were supplied by the lower clergy, which has occasioned their successors to be denominated *clerks* to this day.

But the common law of England, being not committed to writing, but only handed down by tradition, use, and experience, was not so heartily relished by the foreign clergy; who came over hither in shoals during the reign of the conqueror and his two sons, and were utter strangers to our constitution as well as our language. And an accident, which soon after happened, had nearly completed its ruin. A

2 *In Fletam.* 7. 7.

3 Cæsar *de bello Gal.* 6. 12.

4 *de gest. reg. l.* 4.

5 Dugdale *Orig. jurid. c.* 8.

6 *Les juges sont sages personnes et autentiques,—sicome les archevesques, evesques, les chanoines des eglises cathedraulx, et les autres personnes qui ont dignitez in saincte eglise; les abbez, les prieurs conventaulx, et les gouverneurs des eglises, &c. Grand Coustumier, ch.* 9.

copy of Juſtinian's pandects, being newly [7] diſcovered at Amalfi, ſoon brought the civil law into vogue all over the weſt of Europe, where before it was quite laid aſide [8] and in a manner forgotten; though ſome traces of its authority remained in Italy [9] and the eaſtern provinces of the empire [10]. This now became in a particular manner the favourite of the popiſh clergy, who borrowed the method and many of the maxims of their canon law from this original. The ſtudy of it was introduced into ſeveral univerſities abroad, particularly that of Bologna; where exerciſes were performed, lectures read, and degrees conferred in this faculty, as in other branches of ſcience: and many nations on the continent, juſt then beginning to recover from the convulſions conſequent upon the overthrow of the Roman empire, and ſettling by degrees into peaceable forms of government, adopted the civil law, (being the beſt written ſyſtem then extant) as the baſis of their ſeveral conſtitutions; blending and interweaving it among their own feodal cuſtoms, in ſome places with a more extenſive, in others a more confined authority [1].

Nor was it long before the prevailing mode of the times reached England. For Theobald, a Norman abbot, being elected to the ſee of Canterbury [2], and extremely addicted to this new ſtudy, brought over with him in his retinue many learned proficients therein; and among the reſt Roger ſirnamed Vacarius, whom he placed in the univerſity of Oxford [3], to teach it to the people of this country. But it did not meet with the ſame eaſy reception in England, where a mild and rational ſyſtem of laws had been long eſtabliſhed, as it did upon the continent; and though the monkiſh clergy (devoted to the will of a foreign primate) received it with eagerneſs and zeal, yet the laity, who were more intereſted to preſerve the old conſtitution, and had already ſeverely felt the effect of many Norman innovations, continued

7 *circ. A. D.* 1130.
8 *LL. Wiſigoth.* 2. 1. 9.
9 *Capitular. Hludov. Pii.* 4. 102
10 Selden *in Fletam.* 5. 5.
1 Domat's treatiſe of law. c. 13. §. 9. *Epiſtol. Innocent. III. in M. Paris ad A. D.* 1254.
2 *A. D.* 1138.
3 Gervaſ. Dorobern. *Act. Pontif. Cantuar. col.* 1665.

wedded to the uſe of the common law. King Stephen immediately publiſhed a proclamation [4], forbidding the ſtudy of the laws, then newly imported from Italy; which was treated by the monks [5] as a piece of impiety, and, though it might prevent the introduction of the civil law proceſs into our courts of juſtice, yet did not hinder the clergy from reading and teaching it in their own ſchools and monaſteries.

From this time the nation ſeems to have been divided into two parties; the biſhops and clergy, many of them foreigners, who applied themſelves wholly to the ſtudy of the civil and canon laws, which now came to be inſeparably interwoven with each other; and the nobility and laity, who adhered with equal pertinacity to the old common law: both of them reciprocally jealous of what they were unacquainted with, and neither of them perhaps allowing the oppoſite ſyſtem that real merit which is abundantly to be found in each. This appears, on the one hand, from the ſpleen with which the monaſtic writers [6] ſpeak of our municipal laws upon all occaſions; and, on the other, from the firm temper which the nobility ſhewed at the famous parliament of Merton: when the prelates endeavoured to procure an act, to declare all baſtards legitimate in caſe the parents intermarried at any time afterwards; alleging this only reaſon, becauſe holy church, (that is, the canon law) declared ſuch children legitimate: but "all the "earls and barons (ſays the parliament roll [7]) with "one voice anſwered, that they would not change "the laws of England, which had hitherto been uſed "and approved." And we find the ſame jealouſy prevailing above a century afterwards [8], when the nobility declared with a kind of prophetic ſpirit, "that the realm of England hath never been unto "this hour, neither by the conſent of our lord the "king and the lords of parliament ſhall it ever be,

4 Rog. Bacon. *citat. per* Selden *in Fletam.* 7. 6. *in Forteſc.* c. 33. & 8 Rep. Pref.

5 Joan. Sarisburiens. *Polycrat.* 8. 22.

6 *Idem, ibid.* 5, 16. Polydor. Virgil. *Hiſt. l.* 9.

7 *Stat. Merton.* 20 *Henry III.* c. 9. *Et omnes comites et barones una voce reſpondeunt, quod nolunt leges Angliæ mutare, quæ hucuſque uſitatæ ſunt et approbatæ.*

8 11 Ric. II.

" ruled or governed by the civil law[9]." And of this temper between the clergy and laity many more inſtances might be given.

While things were in this ſituation, the clergy, finding it impoſſible to root out the municipal law, began to withdraw themſelves by degrees from the temporal courts: and to that end, very early in the reign of king Henry III. epiſcopal conſtitutions were publiſhed[o], forbidding all eccleſiaſtics to appear as advocates *in foro ſæculari*: nor did they long continue to act as judges there, not caring to take the oath of office which was then found neceſſary to be adminiſtered, that they ſhould in all things determine according to the law and cuſtom of this realm[1]; though they ſtill kept poſſeſſion of the high office of chancellor, an office then of little juridical power; and afterwards, as its buſineſs increaſed by degrees, they modelled the proceſs of the court at their own diſcretion.

But wherever they retired, and wherever their authority extended, they carried with them the ſame zeal to introduce the rules of the civil, in excluſion of the municipal law. This appears in a particular manner from the ſpiritual courts of all denominations, from the chancellor's courts in both our univerſities, and from the high court of chancery before-mentioned; in all of which the proceedings are to this day in a courſe much conformed to the civil law: for which no tolerable reaſon can be aſſigned, unleſs that theſe courts were all under the immediate direction of the popiſh eccleſiaſtics, among whom it was a point of religion to exclude the municipal law; pope Innocent IV. having forbidden[2] the very reading of it by the clergy, becauſe its deciſions were not founded on the imperial conſtitutions, but merely on the cuſtoms of the laity. And if it be conſidered, that our univerſities began about that period to receive their preſent form of ſcholaſtic diſcipline; that they were then, and continued to be till the

[9] Selden. *Jan. Anglor. l.* 2. §. 43. *in Fortеſc. c.* 33.

[o] Spelman. *Concil. A. D.* 1217. Wilkins, *vol.* 1. *p.* 574, 599.

[1] Selden. *in Fletam.* 9. 3.

[2] M. Paris *ad A. D.* 1254.

time of the reformation, entirely under the influence of the popiſh clergy; (Sir John Maſon the firſt proteſtant, being alſo the firſt lay chancellor of Oxford) this will lead us to perceive the reaſon, why the ſtudy of the Roman laws was in thoſe days of bigotry [3] purſued with ſuch alacrity in theſe ſeats of learning; and why the common law was entirely deſpiſed, and eſteemed little better than heretical.

And, ſince the reformation, many cauſes have conſpired to prevent its becoming a part of academical education. As, firſt, long uſage and eſtabliſhed cuſtom; which, as in every thing elſe, ſo eſpecially in the forms of ſcholaſtic exerciſe, have juſtly great weight and authority. Secondly, the real intrinſic merit of the civil law, conſidered upon the footing of reaſon and not of obligation, which was well known to the inſtructors of our youth; and their total ignorance of the merit of the common law, though its equal at leaſt, and perhaps an improvement on the other. But the principal reaſon of all, that has hindered the introduction of this branch of learning, is, that the ſtudy of the common law, being baniſhed from hence in the times of popery, has fallen into a quite different channel, and has hitherto been wholly cultivated in another place.

[3] There cannot be a ſtronger inſtance of the abſurd and ſuperſtitious veneration that was paid to theſe laws, than that the moſt learned writers of the times thought they could not form a perfect character, even of the bleſſed virgin, without making her a civilian and a canoniſt. Which Albertus Magnus, the renowned dominican doctor of the thirteenth century, thus proves in his *Summa de laudibus chriſtiferæ virginis (divinum magis quam humanum opus) qu.* 23. §. 5. "*Item* "*quod jura civilia, & leges, &* "*decreta ſcivit in ſummo, proba-*"*tur hoc modo: ſapientia advo-*"*cati manifeſtatur in tribus; u-*"*num, quod obtincat omnia contra* "*judicem juſtum & ſapientem;* "*ſecundo, quod contra adverſari-*"*um aſtutum & ſagacem; tertio,* "*quod in cauſa deſperata: ſed* "*beatiſſima virgo, contra judicem* "*ſapientiſſimum, Dominum; con-*"*tra adverſarium callidiſſimum,* "*dyabolum; in cauſa noſtra deſ-*"*perata; ſententiam optatam ob-*"*tinuit.*" To which an eminent franciſcan, two centuries afterwards, Bernardinus de Buſti (*Mariale, part* 4. *ſerm.* 9.) very gravely ſubjoins this note. "*Nec videtur incongruum mulie-*"*res habere peritiam juris. Le-*"*gitur enim de uxore Joannis An-*"*dreæ gloſſatoris, quod tantam* "*peritiam in utroque jure habuit,* "*ut publice in ſcholis legere auſa* "*ſit.*"

But as the long uſage and eſtabliſhed cuſtom, of ignorance of the laws of the land, begin now to be thought unreaſonable; and as by theſe means the merit of thoſe laws will probably be more generally known; we may hope that the method of ſtudying them will ſoon revert to its antient courſe, and the foundations at leaſt of that ſcience will be laid in the two univerſities; without being excluſively confined to the channel which it fell into at the times I have juſt been deſcribing.

For, being then entirely abandoned by the clergy, a few ſtragglers excepted, the ſtudy and practice of it devolved of courſe into the hands of laymen: who entertained upon their parts a moſt hearty averſion to the civil law[4], and made no ſcruple to profeſs their contempt, nay even their ignorance[5] of it, in the moſt public manner. But ſtill, as the balance of learning was greatly on the ſide of the clergy, and as the common law was no longer *taught*, as formerly, in any part of the kingdom, it muſt have been ſubjected to many inconveniencies, and perhaps would have been gradually loſt and overrun by the civil, (a ſuſpicion well juſtified from the frequent tranſcripts of Juſtinian to be met with in Bracton and Fleta) had it not been for a peculiar incident which happened at a very critical time, and contributed greatly to its ſupport.

The incident which I mean was the fixing the court of common pleas, the grand tribunal for diſputes of property, to be held in one certain ſpot; that the ſeat

[4] Forteſc. *de laud. LL. c.* 25.

[5] This remarkably appeared in the caſe of the abbot of Torun, *M.* 22 *Edw. III.* 24. who had cauſed a certain prior to be ſummoned to anſwer at Avignon for erecting an oratory *contra inhibitionem novi operis*; by which Selden (*in Flet.* 8. 5.) very juſtly underſtands to be meant the title *de novi operis nuntiatione* both in the civil and canon laws, (*Ff.* 39. 1. *C.* 8. 11. and *Decretal.* not *Extrav.* 5. 32.) whereby the erection of any new buildings in prejudice of more antient ones was prohibited. But Skipwith the king's ſerjeant, and afterwards chief baron of the exchequer, declares them to be flat nonſenſe; "*in ceux parolx*, "contra inhibitionem novi ope-"ris, *ny ad pas entendment*:" and juſtice Schardelow mends the matter but little by informing him, that they ſignify a reſtitution *in their law*: for which reaſon he very ſagely reſolves to pay no ſort of regard to them. "*Ceo n'eſt que* "*un reſtitution en lour ley, pur* "*que a ceo n'avomus regard, &c.*

of ordinary juſtice might be permanent and notorious to all the nation. Formerly that, in conjunction with all the other ſuperior courts, was held before the king's capital juſticiary of England, in the *aula regis*, or ſuch of his palaces wherein his royal perſon reſided; and removed with his houſhold from one end of the kingdom to the other. This was found to occaſion great inconvenience to the ſuitors; to remedy which it was made an article of the great charter of liberties, both that of king John and king Henry III.[6] that "common pleas ſhould no longer follow the "king's court, but be held in ſome certain place;" in conſequence of which they have ever ſince been held (a few neceſſary removals in times of the plague excepted) in the palace of Weſtminſter only. This brought together the profeſſors of the municipal law, who before were diſperſed about the kingdom, and formed them into an aggregate body; whereby a ſociety was eſtabliſhed of perſons, who, (as Spelman[7] obſerves) addicted themſelves wholly to the ſtudy of the laws of the land, and no longer conſidering it as a mere ſubordinate ſcience for the amuſement of leiſure hours, ſoon raiſed thoſe laws to that pitch of perfection, which they ſuddenly attained under the auſpices of our Engliſh Juſtinian, king Edward I.

In conſequence of this lucky aſſemblage, they naturally fell into a kind of collegiate order, and, being excluded from Oxford and Cambridge, found it neceſſary to eſtabliſh a new univerſity of their own. This they did by purchaſing at various times certain houſes (now called the inns of court and of chancery) between the city of Weſtminſter, the place of holding the king's courts, and the city of London; for advantage of ready acceſs to the one, and plenty of proviſions in the other[8]. Here exerciſes were performed, lectures read, and degrees were at length conferred in the common law, as at other univerſities in the canon and civil. The degrees were thoſe of barriſters (firſt ſtiled apprentices[9] from *apprendre*, to

[6] *c.* 11.

[7] *Gloſſar.* 334.

[8] Forteſc. *c.* 48.

[9] Apprentices or barriſters ſeem to have been firſt appointed by an ordinance of king Edward I. in parliament, in the 20th year of his reign. (Spelm. *Gloſſ.* 37. Dugdale, *Orig. juriſ.* 55.)

learn) who anſwered to our batchelors: as the ſtate and degree of a ſerjeant[o], *ſervientis ad legem*, did to that of doctor.

The crown ſeems to have ſoon taken under its protection this infant ſeminary of common law; and, the more effectually to foſter and cheriſh it, king Henry III. in the nineteenth year of his reign iſſued out an order directed to the mayor and ſheriffs of London, commanding that no regent of any law ſchools *within* that city ſhould for the future teach law therein[1]. The word, law, or *leges*, being a general term, may create ſome doubt at this diſtance of time whether the teaching of the civil law, or the common, or both, is hereby reſtrained. But in either caſe it tends to the ſame end. If the civil law only is prohibited, (which is Mr. Selden's[2] opinion) it is then a retaliation upon the clergy, who had excluded the common law from *their* ſeats of learning. If the municipal law be alſo included in the reſtriction, (as Sir Edward Coke[3] underſtands it, and which the word ſeems to import) then the intention is evidently this; by preventing private teachers within the walls of the city, to collect all the common law-

[o] The firſt mention which I have met with in our law books of ſerjeants or countors, is in the ſtatute of Weſtm. 1. 3 Edw. I. c. 29. and in Horn's Mirror, *c.* 1. §. 10. *c.* 2. §. 5. *c.* 3. §. 1. in the ſame reign. But M. Paris in his life of John II. abbot of St. Alban's, which he wrote in 1255, 39 Henry III. ſpeaks of advocates at the common law, or countors, *(quos banci narratores vulgariter appellamus)* as of an order of men well known. And we have an example of the antiquity of the coif in the ſame author's hiſtory of England, *A. D.* 1259. in the caſe of one William de Buſſy; who, being called to account for his great knavery and mal-practices, claimed the benefit of his orders or clergy, which till then remained an entire ſecret; and to that end *voluit ligamenta coifæ ſuæ ſolvere ut palam monſtraret ſe tonſuram habere clericalem; ſed non eſt permiſſus.——Satelles vero cum arripiens, non per coifæ ligamina ſed per guttur eum apprehendens, traxit ad carcerem.* And hence Sir H. Spelman conjectures, *(Gloſſar.* 335.) that coifs were introduced to hide the tonſure of ſuch renegade clerks, as were ſtill tempted to remain in the ſecular courts in the quality of advocates or judges, notwithſtanding their prohibition by canon.

[1] *Ne aliquis ſcholas regens de legibus in eadem civitate de cætero ibidem leges doceat.*

[2] *in Flet.* 8. 2.

[3] 2 Inſt. proëm.

yers into the one public univerſity, which was newly inſtituted in the ſuburbs.

In this juridical univerſity (for ſuch it is inſiſted to have been by Forteſcue [4] and Sir Edward Coke [5]) there are two ſorts of collegiate houſes; one called inns of chancery, in which the younger ſtudents of the law were uſually placed, "learning and ſtudying," ſays Forteſcue [6], the originals, and as it were "the elements of the law; who, profiting therein, "as they grew to ripeneſs ſo were they admitted in-"to the greater inns of the ſame ſtudy, called the "inns of court." And in theſe inns of both kinds, he goes on to tell us, the knights and barons, with other grandees and noblemen of the realm, did uſe to place their children, though they did not deſire to have them thoroughly learned in the law, or to get their living by its practice: and that in his time there were about two thouſand ſtudents at theſe ſeveral inns, all of whom he informs us were *filii nobilium*, or gentlemen born.

Hence it is evident, that (though under the influence of the monks our univerſities neglected this ſtudy, yet) in the time of Henry VI. it was thought highly neceſſary and was the univerſal practice, for the young nobility and gentry to be inſtructed in the originals and elements of the laws. But by degrees this cuſtom has fallen into diſuſe; ſo that in the reign of queen Elizabeth Sir Edward Coke [7] does not reckon above a thouſand ſtudents, and the number at preſent is very conſiderably leſs. Which ſeems principally owing to theſe reaſons: firſt, becauſe the inns of chancery, being now almoſt totally filled by the inferior branch of the profeſſion, are neither commodious nor proper for the reſort of gentlemen of any rank or figure; ſo that there are very rarely any young ſtudents entered at the inns of chancery; ſecondly, becauſe in the inns of court all ſorts of regimen and academical ſuperintendence, either with regard to morals or ſtudies, are found impracticable and therefore entirely neglected: laſtly, becauſe perſons of birth and fortune, after having finiſhed their

[4] c. 49. [5] 3 Rep. pref. [6] 3 Rep. pref. [7] *Ibid.*

uſual courſes at the univerſities, have ſeldom leiſure or reſolution ſufficient to enter upon a new ſcheme of ſtudy at a new place of inſtruction. Wherefore few gentlemen now reſort to the inns of court, but ſuch for whom the knowledge of practice is abſolutely neceſſary; ſuch, I mean, as are intended for the profeſſion: the reſt of our gentry, (not to ſay our nobility alſo) having uſually retired to their eſtates, or viſited foreign kingdoms, or entered upon public life, without any inſtruction in the laws of the land, and indeed with hardly any opportunity of gaining inſtruction, unleſs it can be afforded them in theſe ſeats of learning.

And that theſe are the proper places for affording aſſiſtances of this kind to gentlemen of all ſtations and degrees, cannot (I think) with any colour of reaſon be denied. For not one of the objections, which are made to the inns of court and chancery, and which I have juſt now enumerated, will hold with regard to the univerſities. Gentlemen may here aſſociate with gentlemen of their own rank and degree. Nor are their conduct and ſtudies left entirely to their own diſcretion; but regulated by a diſcipline ſo wiſe and exact, yet ſo liberal, ſo ſenſible and manly, that their conformity to its rules (which does at preſent ſo much honour to our youth) is not more the effect of conſtraint, than of their own inclinations and choice. Neither need they apprehend too long an avocation hereby from their private concerns and amuſements, or (what is a more noble object) the ſervice of their friends and their country. This ſtudy will go hand in hand with their own purſuits: it will obſtruct none of them; it will ornament and aſſiſt them all.

But if, upon the whole, there are any, ſtill wedded to monaſtic prejudice, that can entertain a doubt how far this ſtudy is properly and regularly *academical*, ſuch perſons I am afraid either have not conſidered the conſtitution and deſign of an univerſity, or elſe think very meanly of it. It muſt be a deplorable narrowneſs of mind, that would confine theſe ſeats of inſtruction to the limited views of one or two learned profeſſions. To the praiſe of this age be it ſpoken, a more open and generous way of thinking begins

now univerſally to prevail. The attainment of liberal and genteel accompliſhments, though not of the intellectual ſort, has been thought by our wiſeſt and moſt affectionate patrons [8], and very lately by the whole univerſity [9], no ſmall improvement of our antient plan of education: and therefore I may ſafely affirm that nothing (how *unuſual* ſoever) is, under due regulations, improper to be *taught* in this place, which is proper for a gentleman to *learn*. But that a ſcience, which diſtinguiſhes the criterions of right and wrong; which teaches to eſtabliſh the one, and prevent, puniſh, or redreſs the other; which employs in its theory the nobleſt faculties of the ſoul, and exerts in its practice the cardinal virtues of the heart: a ſcience, which is univerſal in its uſe and extent, accommodated to each individual, yet comprehending the whole community; that a ſcience like this ſhould ever have been deemed unneceſſary to be ſtudied in an univerſity, is matter of aſtoniſhment and concern. Surely, if it were not before an object of academical knowledge, it was high time to make it one: and to thoſe who can doubt the propriety of its reception among us (if any ſuch there be) we may return an anſwer in their own way; that ethics are confeſſedly a branch of academical learning, and Ariſtotle *himſelf has ſaid*, ſpeaking of the laws of his own country, that juriſprudence or the knowledge of thoſe laws is the principal and moſt perfect branch of ethics [o].

From a thorough conviction of this truth, our munificent benefactor Mr. VINER, having employed above half a century in amaſſing materials for new-

[8] Lord chancellor Clarendon, in his dialogue of education, among his tracts, p. 325. appears to have been very ſolicitous, that it might be made "a part of the ornament of "our learned academies to "teach the qualities of riding, "dancing, and fencing, at "thoſe hours when more ſeri-"ous exerciſes ſhould be in-"termitted."

[9] By accepting in full convocation the remainder of lord Clarendon's hiſtory from his noble deſcendants, on condition to apply the profits ariſing from its publication to the eſtabliſhment of a *manage* in the univerſity.

[o] Τελειοτατη μαλιστα αρετη, ὁτι της τελειας αρετης χρησις ἐστι. *Ethic. ad Nicomach. l. 5. c. 3.*

modelling and rendering more commodious the rude ſtudy of the laws of the land, conſigned both the plan and execution of theſe his public-ſpirited deſigns to the wiſdom of his parent univerſity. Reſolving to dedicate his learned labours "to the be-"nefit of poſterity and the perpetual ſervice of his "country [1]," he was ſenſible he could not perform his reſolution in a better and more effectual manner, than by extending to the youth of this place thoſe aſſiſtances, of which he ſo well remembered and ſo heartily regretted the want. And the ſenſe, which the univerſity has entertained of this ample and moſt uſeful benefaction, muſt appear beyond a doubt, from their gratitude in receiving it with all poſſible marks of eſteem [2]; from their alacrity and unexampled diſpatch in carrying it into execution [3]; and, above all, from the laws and conſtitutions by which they have effectually guarded it from the neglect and abuſe to which ſuch inſtitutions are liable [4]. We have ſeen an

[1] See the preface to the eighteenth volume of his abridgment.

[2] Mr. Viner is enrolled among the public benefactors of the univerſity by decree of convocation.

[3] Mr. Viner died June 5, 1756. His effects were collected and ſettled, near a volume of his work printed, almoſt the whole diſpoſed of, and the accounts made up, in a year and a half from his deceaſe, by the very diligent and worthy adminiſtrators with the will annexed, (Dr. Weſt and Dr. Good of Magdalene, Dr. Whalley of Oriel, Mr. Buckler of All Souls, and Mr. Betts of Univerſity college) to whom that care was conſigned by the univerſity. Another half year was employed in conſidering and ſettling a plan of the propoſed inſtitution, and in framing the ſtatutes thereupon, which were finally confirmed by convocation on the 3d of July, 1758. The profeſſor was elected on 20th Oct. following, and two ſcholars on the ſucceeding day. And, laſtly, it was agreed at the annual audit in 1761, to eſtabliſh a fellowſhip; and a fellow was accordingly elected in January following. The reſidue of this fund, ariſing from the ſale of Mr. Viner's abridgment, will probably be ſufficient hereafter to found another fellowſhip and ſcholarſhip, or three more ſcholarſhips, as ſhall be thought moſt expedient.

[4] The ſtatutes are in ſubſtance as follow.

1. That the accounts of this benefaction be ſeparately kept and annually audited by the delegates of accounts and profeſſor, and afterwards reported to convocation.

2. That a profeſſorſhip of the laws of England be eſtabliſhed, with a ſalary of two hundred pounds per annum; the profeſſor to be elected by convocation, and to be at the time of

univerſal emulation, who beſt ſhould underſtand, or moſt faithfully purſue, the deſigns of our generous

his election at leaſt a maſter of arts or batchelor of civil law in the univerſity of Oxford, of ten years ſtanding from his matriculation; and alſo a barriſter at law of four years ſtanding at the bar.

3. That ſuch profeſſor (by himſelf, or by deputy to be previouſly approved by convocation) do read one ſolemn public lecture on the laws of England, and in the Engliſh language, in every academical term, at certain ſtated times previous to the commencement of the common law term; or forfeit twenty pounds for every omiſſion to Mr. Viner's general fund: and alſo (by himſelf, or by deputy to be approved, if occaſional, by the vice-chancellor and proctors; or if permanent, both the cauſe and the deputy to be annually approved by convocation) do yearly read one complete courſe of lectures on the laws of England and in the Engliſh language, conſiſting of ſixty lectures at the leaſt; to be read during the univerſity term time, with ſuch proper intervals that not more than four lectures may fall within any ſingle week: that the profeſſor do give a month's notice of the time when the courſe is to begin, and do read *gratis* to the ſcholars of Mr. Viner's foundation; but may demand of other auditors ſuch gratuity as ſhall be ſettled from time to time by decree of convocation; and that, for every of the ſaid ſixty lectures omitted, the profeſſor, on complaint made to the vice-chancellor within the year, do forfeit forty ſhillings to Mr. Viner's general fund; the proof of his having performed his duty to lie upon the ſaid profeſſor.

4. That every profeſſor do continue in his office during life, unleſs in caſe of ſuch miſbehaviour as ſhall amount to bannition by the univerſity ſtatutes; or unleſs he deſerts the profeſſion of the law by betaking himſelf to another profeſſion; or, unleſs, after one admonition by the vice-chancellor and proctors for notorious neglect, he is guilty of another flagrant omiſſion: in any of which caſes he be deprived by the vice-chancellor, with conſent of the houſe of convocation.

5. That ſuch a number of fellowſhips with the ſtipend of fifty pounds *per annum*, and ſcholarſhips with a ſtipend of thirty pounds, be eſtabliſhed, as the convocation ſhall from time to time ordain, according to the ſtate of Mr. Viner's revenues.

6. That every fellow be elected by convocation, and at the time of election be unmarried, and at leaſt a maſter of arts or batchelor of civil law, and a member of ſome college or hall in the univerſity of Oxford; the ſcholars of this foundation or ſuch as have been ſcholars (if qualified and approved of by convocation) to have the preference; that, if not a barriſter when choſen, he be called to the bar within one year after his election; but do reſide in the univerſity two months in every year, or in caſe of non-reſidence do forfeit the ſtipend of that year to Mr. Viner's general fund.

7. That every ſcholar be elected by convocation, and at

patron: and with pleaſure we recollect, that thoſe who are moſt diſtinguiſhed by their quality, their fortune, their ſtation, their learning, or their experience, have appeared the moſt zealous to promote the ſucceſs of Mr. Viner's eſtabliſhment.

The advantages that might reſult to the ſcience of the law itſelf, when a little more attended to in theſe ſeats of knowledge, perhaps would be very conſiderable. The leiſure and abilities of the learned in theſe retirements might either ſuggeſt expedients, or execute thoſe dictated by wiſer heads [5], for improving

the time of election be unmarried, and a member of ſome college or hall in the univerſity of Oxford, who ſhall have been matriculated twenty-four calendar months at the leaſt; that he do take the degree of bachelor of civil law with all convenient ſpeed; (either proceeding in arts or otherwiſe) and previous to his taking the ſame, between the ſecond and eighth year from his matriculation, be found to attend two courſes of the profeſſor's lectures, to be certified under the profeſſor's hand; and within one year after taking the ſame to be called to the bar: that he do annually reſide ſix months till he is of four years ſtanding, and four months from that time till he is maſter of arts or batchelor of civil law; after which he be bound to reſide two months in every year; or, in caſe of non-reſidence, do forfeit the ſtipend of that year to Mr. Viner's general fund.

8. That the ſcholarſhips do become void in caſe of non-attendance on the profeſſor, or not taking the degree of bachelor of civil law, being duly admoniſhed ſo to do by the vice-chancellor and proctors: and that both fellowſhips and ſcholarſhips do expire at the end of ten years after each reſpective election; and become void in caſe of groſs miſbehaviour, non-reſidence for two years together, marriage, not being called to the bar within the time before limited, (being duly admoniſhed ſo to be by the vice-chancellor, and proctors) or deſerting the profeſſion of the law by following any other profeſſion: and that in any of theſe caſes the vice-chancellor, with conſent of convocation, do declare the place actually void.

9. That in caſe of any vacancy of the profeſſorſhip, fellowſhips, or ſcholarſhips, the profits of the current year be ratably divided between the predeceſſor or his repreſentatives, and the ſucceſſor; and that a new election be had within one month afterwards, unleſs by that means the time of election ſhall fall within any vacation, in which caſe it be deferred to the firſt week in the next full term. And that before any convocation ſhall be held for ſuch election, or for any other matter relating to Mr. Viner's benefaction, ten days public notice be given to each college and hall of the convocation, and the cauſe of convoking it.

[5] See lord Bacon's propoſals and offer of a digeſt.

its method, retrenching its ſuperfluities, and reconciling the little contrarieties, which the practice of many centuries will neceſſarily create in any human ſyſtem: a taſk, which thoſe, who are deeply employed in buſineſs and the more active ſcenes of the profeſſion, can hardly condeſcend to engage in. And as to the intereſt, or (which is the ſame) the reputation of the univerſities themſelves, I may venture to pronounce, that if ever this ſtudy ſhould arrive to any tolerable perfection either here or at Cambridge, the nobility and gentry of this kingdom would not ſhorten their reſidence upon this account, nor perhaps entertain a worſe opinion of the benefits of academical education. Neither ſhould it be conſidered as a matter of light importance, that while we thus extend the *pomœria* of univerſity learning, and adopt a new tribe of citizens within theſe philoſophical walls, we intereſt a very numerous and very powerful profeſſion in the preſervation of our rights and revenues.

For I think it paſt diſpute that thoſe gentlemen, who reſort to the inns of court with a view to purſue the profeſſion, will find it expedient (whenever it is practicable) to lay the previous foundations of this, as well as every other ſcience, in one of our learned univerſities. We may appeal to the experience of every ſenſible lawyer, whether any thing can be more hazardous or diſcouraging than the uſual entrance on the ſtudy of the law. A raw and unexperienced youth, in the moſt dangerous ſeaſon of life, is tranſplanted on a ſudden into the midſt of allurements to pleaſure, without any reſtraint or check but what his own prudence can ſuggeſt; with no public direction in what courſe to purſue his inquiries; no private aſſiſtance to remove the diſtreſſes and difficulties, which will always embarraſs a beginner. In this ſituation he is expected to ſequeſter himſelf from the world, and by a tedious lonely proceſs to extract the theory of laws from a maſs of undigeſted learning; or elſe by an aſſiduous attendance on the courts to pick up theory and practice together, ſufficient to qualify him for the ordinary run of buſineſs. How little therefore is it to be wondered at,

that we hear of ſo frequent miſcarriages; that ſo many gentlemen of bright imaginations grow weary of ſo unpromiſing a ſearch[6], and addict themſelves wholly to amuſements, or other leſs innocent purſuits; and that ſo many perſons of moderate capacity confuſe themſelves at firſt ſetting out, and continue ever dark and puzzled during the remainder of their lives.

The evident want of ſome aſſiſtance in the rudiments of legal knowlege has given birth to a practice, which, if ever it had grown to be general, muſt have proved of extremely pernicious conſequence. I mean the cuſtom by ſome ſo very warmly recommended, of dropping all liberal education, as of no uſe to ſtudents in the law: and placing them in its ſtead, at the deſk of ſome ſkilful attorney; in order to initiate them early in all the depths of practice, and render them more dextrous in the mechanical part of buſineſs. A few inſtances of particular perſons, (men of excellent learning, and unblemiſhed integrity) who, in ſpite of this method of education, have ſhone in the foremoſt ranks of the bar, have afforded ſome kind of ſanction to this illiberal path to the profeſſion, and biaſſed many parents, of ſhort-ſighted judgment, in its favour: not conſidering, that there are ſome geniuſes, formed to overcome all diſadvantages, and that from ſuch particular inſtances no general rules can be formed; nor obſerving, that thoſe very perſons have frequently recommended by the moſt forcible of all examples, the diſpoſal of their own offspring, a very different foundation of legal ſtudies, a regular academical education. Perhaps too, in return, I could now direct their eyes to our principal ſeats of juſtice, and ſuggeſt a few hints in favour of univerſity learning[7]:—but in theſe all who hear me, I know, have already prevented me.

[6] Sir Henry Spelman, in the preface to his gloſſary, has given us a very lively picture of his own diſtreſs upon this occaſion. "*Emiſit me mater Lon-*
"*dinum, juris noſtri capeſſendi*
"*gratia; cujus cum veſtibulum*
"*ſalutaſſem, reperiſſemque lin-*
"*guam peregrinam, dialectum*
"*barbaram, methodum inconcin-*
"*nam, molem non ingentem ſolum*
"*ſed perpetuis humeris ſuſtinen-*
"*dam, excidit mihi (fateor)*
"*animus, &c.*"

[7] The four higheſt judicial offices were at that time filled

Making therefore due allowance for one or two ſhining exceptions, experience may teach us to foretell that a lawyer thus educated to the bar, in ſubſervience to attorneys and ſolicitors [8], will find he has begun at the wrong end. If practice be the whole he is taught, practice muſt alſo be the whole he will ever know: if he be uninſtructed in the elements and firſt principles upon which the rule of practice is founded, the leaſt variation from eſtabliſhed precedents will totally diſtract and bewilder him: *ita lex ſcripta eſt* [9] is the utmoſt his knowlege will arrive at: he muſt never aſpire to form, and ſeldom expect to comprehend, any arguments drawn *a priori*, from the ſpirit of the laws and the natural foundations of juſtice.

Nor is this all; for, (as few perſons of birth, or fortune, or even of ſcholaſtic education, will ſubmit to the drudgery of ſervitude and the manual labour of copying the traſh of an office) ſhould this infatuation prevail to any conſiderable degree, we muſt rarely expect to ſee a gentleman of diſtinction or learning at the bar. And what the conſequence may be, to have the interpretation and enforcement of the laws (which include the entire diſpoſal of our properties, liberties, and lives) fall wholly into the hands of obſcure or illiterate men, is matter of very public concern.

The inconveniences here pointed out can never be effectually prevented, but by making academical education a previous ſtep to the profeſſion of the common law, and at the ſame time making the rudiments of the law a part of academical education. For ſciences are of a ſociable diſpoſition, and flouriſh beſt in the neighbourhood of each other: nor is there any branch of learning, but may be helped and improved by aſſiſtances drawn from other arts. If therefore the ſtudent in our laws hath formed both his ſentiments and ſtyle, by peruſal and imitation of the pureſt claſſical writers, among whom the hiſtorians and orators will beſt deſerve his regard; if he can reaſon

by gentlemen, two of whom had been fellows of All Souls college; another, ſtudent of Chriſt church; and the fourth a fellow of Trinity college, Cambridge.

[8] See Kennet's Life of Somner, p. 67.

[9] *Ff.* 40. 9. 12.

with preciſion, and ſeparate argument from fallacy, by the clear ſimple rules of pure unſophiſticated logic; if he can fix his attention, and ſteadily purſue truth through any the moſt intricate deduction, by the uſe of mathematical demonſtrations; if he has enlarged his conceptions of nature and art, by a view of the ſeveral branches of genuine, experimental philoſophy; if he has impreſſed on his mind the ſound maxims of the law of nature, the beſt and moſt authentic foundation of human laws: if, laſtly, he has contemplated thoſe maxims reduced to a practical ſyſtem in the laws of imperial Rome; if he has done this or any part of it, (though all may be eaſily done under as able inſtructors as ever graced any ſeats of learning) a ſtudent thus qualified may enter upon the ſtudy of the law with incredible advantage and reputation. And if, at the concluſion, or during the acquiſition of theſe accompliſhments, he will afford himſelf here a year or two's farther leiſure, to lay the foundation of his future labours in a ſolid ſcientifical method, without thirſting too early to attend that practice which it is impoſſible he ſhould rightly comprehend, he will afterwards proceed with the greateſt eaſe, and will unfold the moſt intricate points with an intuitive rapidity and clearneſs.

I ſhall not inſiſt upon ſuch motives as might be drawn from principles of œconomy, and are applicable to particulars only: I reaſon upon more general topics. And therefore to the qualities of the head, which I have juſt enumerated, I cannot but add thoſe of the heart; affectionate loyalty to the king, a zeal for liberty and the conſtitution, a ſenſe of real honour, and well-grounded principles of religion; as neceſſary to form a truly valuable Engliſh lawyer, a Hyde, a Hale, or a Talbot. And, whatever the ignorance of ſome, or unkindneſs of others, may have heretofore untruly ſuggeſted, experience will warrant us to affirm, that theſe endowments of loyalty and public ſpirit, of honour and religion; are no where to be found in more high perfection, than in the two univerſities of this kingdom.

Before I conclude, it may perhaps be expected, that I lay before you a ſhort and general account of

the method I propoſe to follow, in endeavouring to execute the truſt you have been pleaſed to repoſe in my hands. And in theſe ſolemn lectures, which are ordained to be read at the entrance of every term, (more perhaps to do public honour to this laudable inſtitution, than for the private inſtruction of individuals [o]) I preſume it will beſt anſwer the intent of our benefactor and the expectation of this learned body, if I attempt to illuſtrate at times ſuch detached titles of the law, as are the moſt eaſy to be underſtood, and moſt capable of hiſtorical or critical ornament. But in reading the complete courſe, which is annually conſigned to my care, a more regular method will be neceſſary; and, till a better is propoſed, I ſhall take the liberty to follow the ſame that I have already ſubmitted to the public [1]. To fill up and finiſh that outline with propriety and correctneſs, and to render the whole intelligible to the uninformed minds of beginners, (whom we are too apt to ſuppoſe acquainted with terms and ideas, which they never had opportunity to learn) this muſt be my ardent endeavour, though by no means my promiſe, to accompliſh. You will permit me, however, very briefly to deſcribe, rather what I conceive an academical expounder of the laws ſhould do, than what I have ever known to be done.

He ſhould conſider his courſe as a general map of the law, marking out the ſhape of the country, its connexions and boundaries, its greater diviſions and principal cities: it is not his buſineſs to deſcribe minutely the ſubordinate limits, or to fix the longitude and latitude of every inconſiderable hamlet. His attention ſhould be engaged, like that of the readers in Forteſcue's inns of chancery, "in tracing out "the originals and as it were the elements of the "law." For if, as Juſtinian [2] has obſerved, the ten-

[o] See Lowth's *Oratio Crewiana*, p. 365.

[1] The analyſis of the laws of England, *A. D.* 1756, and exhibiting the order and principal diviſions of the enſuing Commentaries; which were originally ſubmitted to the univerſity in a private courſe of lectures, *A. D.* 1753.

[2] *Incipientibus nobis exponere jura populi Romani, ita videntur tradi poſſe commodiſſime, ſi primo levi ac ſimplici via ſingula tradantur: alioqui, ſi ſtatim ab initio rudem adhuc et infirmum animum*

der underſtanding of the ſtudent be loaded at the firſt with a multitude and variety of matter, it will either occaſion him to deſert his ſtudies, or will carry him heavily through them, with much labour, delay, and deſpondence. Theſe originals ſhould be traced to their fountains, as well as our diſtance will permit; to the cuſtoms of the Britons and Germans, as recorded by Cæſar and Tacitus; to the codes of the northern nations on the continent, and more eſpecially to thoſe of our own Saxon princes; to the rules of the Roman law either left here in the days of Papinian, or imported by Vacarius and his followers: but, above all, to that inexhauſtible reſervoir of legal antiquities and learning, the feodal law, or, as Spelman[3] has entitled it, the law of nations in our weſtern orb. Theſe primary rules and fundamental principles ſhould be weighed and compared with the precepts of the law of nature, and the practice of other countries; ſhould be explained by reaſons, illuſtrated by examples, and confirmed by undoubted authorities; their hiſtory ſhould be deduced, their changes and revolutions obſerved, and it ſhould be ſhewn how far they are connected with, or have at any time been affected by, the civil tranſactions of the kingdom.

A plan of this nature, if executed with care and ability, cannot fail of adminiſtering a moſt uſeful and rational entertainment to ſtudents of all ranks and profeſſions; and yet it muſt be confeſſed that the ſtudy of the laws is not merely a matter of amuſement; for, as a very judicious writer[4] has obſerved upon a ſimilar occaſion, the learner "will be conſiderably "diſappointed, if he looks for entertainment with-"out the expence of attention." An attention, however, not greater than is uſually beſtowed in maſtering the rudiments of other ſciences, or ſometimes in purſuing a favourite recreation or exerciſe. And this

ſtudioſi multitudine ac varietate rerum oneravimus, duorum alterum, aut deſertorem ſtudiorum efficiemus, aut cum magno labore, ſæpe etiam cum diffidentia (quæ plerumque juvenes avertit) ſerius ad id perducemus, ad quod, leviore via ductus, ſine magno labore, et ſine ulla diffidentia maturius perduci potuiſſet. Inſt. l. 1. 2.

3 Of parliaments, 57.

4 Dr. Taylor's pref. to Elem. of civil law.

attention is not equally neceſſary to be exerted by every ſtudent upon every occaſion. Some branches of the law, as the formal proceſs of civil ſuits, and the ſubtile diſtinctions incident to landed property, which are the moſt difficult to be thoroughly underſtood, are the leaſt worth the pains of underſtanding, except to ſuch gentlemen as intend to purſue the profeſſion. To others I may venture to apply, with a ſlight alteration, the words of Sir John Forteſcue [s], when firſt his royal pupil determines to engage in this ſtudy. "It will not be neceſſary for a "gentleman, as ſuch, to examine with a cloſe ap"plication the critical niceties of the law. It will "fully be ſufficient, and he may well enough be de"nominated a lawyer, if under the inſtruction of a "maſter he traces up the principles and grounds of "the law, even to their original elements. There"fore in a very ſhort period, and with very little "labour, he may be ſufficiently informed in the laws "of his country, if he will but apply his mind in "good earneſt to receive and apprehend them. For, "though ſuch knowlege as is neceſſary for a judge "is hardly to be acquired by the lucubrations of "twenty years, yet, with a genius of tolerable per"ſpicacity, that knowlege which is fit for a perſon "of birth or condition may be learned in a ſingle "year, without neglecting his other improvements."

To the few therefore (the very few I am perſuaded,) that entertain ſuch unworthy notions of an univerſity, as to ſuppoſe it intended for mere diſſipation of thought; to ſuch as mean only to while away the aukward interval from childhood to twenty-one, between the reſtraints of the ſchool and the licentiouſneſs of politer life, in a calm middle ſtate of mental and of moral inactivity; to theſe Mr. Viner gives no invitation to an entertainment which they never can reliſh. But to the long and illuſtrious train of noble and ingenuous youth, who are not more diſtinguiſhed among us by their birth and poſſeſſions, than by the regularity of their conduct and their thirſt after uſeful knowlege, to theſe our benefactor has conſe-

[s] *De laud. Leg.* c. 8.

erated the fruits of a long and laborious life, worn out in the duties of his calling: and will joyfully reflect (if ſuch reflections can be now the employment of his thoughts) that he could not more effectually have benefited poſterity, or contributed to the ſervice of the public, than by founding an inſtitution which may inſtruct the riſing-generation in the wiſdom of our civil polity, and inſpire them with a deſire to be ſtill better acquainted with the laws and conſtitution of their country.

SECTION THE SECOND.

OF THE NATURE OF LAWS IN GENERAL.

LAW, in its moſt general and comprehenſive ſenſe, ſignifies a rule of action; and is applied indiſcriminately to all kinds of action, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational. Thus we ſay, the laws of motion, of gravitation, of optics, or mechanics, as well as the laws of nature and of nations. And it is that rule of action which is preſcribed by ſome ſuperior, and which the inferior is bound to obey.

Thus when the ſupreme Being formed the univerſe, and created matter out of nothing, he impreſſed certain principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without which it would ceaſe to be. When he put that matter into motion, he eſtabliſhed certain laws of motion, to which all moveable bodies muſt conform. And to deſcend from the greateſt operations to the ſmalleſt, when a workman forms a clock, or other piece of mechaniſm, he eſtabliſhes at his own pleaſure certain arbitrary laws for its direction; as that the hand ſhould deſcribe a given ſpace in a given time; to which law as long as the work conforms, ſo long it continues in perfection, and anſwers the end of its formation.

If we farther advance, from mere inactive matter to vegetable and animal life, we ſhall find them ſtill governed by laws; more numerous indeed, but equally fixed and invariable. The whole progreſs of plants,

from the ſeed to the root, and from thence to the ſeed again;—the method of animal nutrition, digeſtion, ſecretion, and all other branches of vital œconomy;—are not left to chance, or the will of the creature itſelf, but are performed in a wondrous involuntary manner, and guided by unerring rules laid down by the great creator.

This then is the general ſignification of law, a rule of action dictated by ſome ſuperior being; and, in thoſe creatures that have neither the power to think, nor to will, ſuch laws muſt be invariably obeyed, ſo long as the creature itſelf ſubſiſts, for its exiſtence depends on that obedience. But laws, in their more confined ſenſe, and in which it is our preſent buſineſs to conſider them, denote the rules, not of action in general, but of *human* action or conduct: that is, the precepts by which man, the nobleſt of all ſublunary beings, a creature endowed with both reaſon and freewill, is commanded to make uſe of thoſe faculties in the general regulation of his behaviour.

Man, conſidered as a creature, muſt neceſſarily be ſubject to the laws of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. A being, independent of any other, has no rule to purſue, but ſuch as he preſcribes to himſelf; but a ſtate of dependence will inevitably oblige the inferior to take the will of him, on whom he depends, as the rule of his conduct: not indeed in every particular, but in all thoſe points wherein his dependence conſiſts. This principle therefore has more or leſs extent and effect, in proportion as the ſuperiority of the one and the dependence of the other is greater or leſs, abſolute or limited. And conſequently, as man depends abſolutely upon his maker for every thing, it is neceſſary that he ſhould in all points conform to his maker's will.

This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, eſtabliſhed certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; ſo, when he created man, and endued him with free-will to conduct himſelf in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that

free-will is in ſome degree regulated and reſtrained, and gave him alſo the faculty of reaſon to diſcover the purport of thoſe laws.

Conſidering the creator only as a being of infinite *power*, he was able unqueſtionably to have preſcribed whatever laws he pleaſed to his creature, man, however unjuſt or ſevere. But as he is alſo a being of infinite *wiſdom*, he has laid down only ſuch laws as were founded in thoſe relations of juſtice, that exiſted in the nature of things antecedent to any poſitive precept. Theſe are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himſelf in all his diſpenſations conforms; and which he has enabled human reaſon to diſcover, ſo far as they are neceſſary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are theſe principles: that we ſhould live honeſtly, ſhould hurt nobody, and ſhould render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Juſtinian[6] has reduced the whole doctrine of law.

But if the diſcovery of theſe firſt principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of right reaſon, and could not otherwiſe be obtained than by a chain of metaphyſical diſquiſitions, mankind would have wanted ſome inducement to have quickened their inquiries, and the greater part of the world would have reſted content in mental indolence, and ignorance its inſeparable companion. As therefore the creator is a being, not only of infinite *power*, and *wiſdom*, but alſo of infinite *goodneſs*, he has been pleaſed ſo to contrive the conſtitution and frame of humanity, that we ſhould want no other prompter to inquire after and purſue the rule of right, but only our own ſelf-love, that univerſal principle of action. For he has ſo intimately connected, ſo inſeparably interwoven the laws of eternal juſtice with the happineſs of each individual, that the latter cannot be obtained but by obſerving the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In conſequence of which mutual connection of juſtice and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a

[6] *Juris præcepta ſunt hæc, honeſte vivere, alterum non lædere ſuum cuique tribuere. Juſt* 1. 1. 3.

multitude of abſtracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitneſs or unfitneſs of things, as ſome have vainly ſurmiſed; but has graciouſly reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept, "that man ſhould purſue his own true and ſubſtantial happineſs." This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law. For the ſeveral articles into which it is branched in our ſyſtems, amount to no more than demonſtrating, that this or that action tends to man's real happineſs, and therefore very juſtly concluding that the performance of it is a part of the law of nature; or, on the other hand, that this or that action is deſtructive of man's real happineſs, and therefore that the law of nature forbids it.

This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himſelf, is of courſe ſuperior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and ſuch of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.

But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each individual, it is ſtill neceſſary to have recourſe to reaſon: whoſe office it is to diſcover, as was before obſerved, what the law of nature directs in every circumſtance of life; by conſidering, what method will tend the moſt effectually to our own ſubſtantial happineſs. And if our reaſon were always, as in our firſt anceſtor before his tranſgreſſion, clear and perfect, unruffled by paſſions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by diſeaſe or intemperance, the taſk would be pleaſant and eaſy; we ſhould need no other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reaſon is corrupt, and his underſtanding full of ignorance and error.

This has given manifold occaſion for the benign interpoſition of divine providence; which, in compaſſion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindneſs of human reaſon, hath been pleaſed, at ſundry

times and in divers manners, to diſcover and enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy ſcriptures. Theſe precepts, when revealed, are found upon compariſon to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their conſequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the knowlege of theſe truths was attainable by reaſon, in its preſent corrupted ſtate; ſince we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the wiſdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the ſame original with thoſe of the law of nature, ſo their intrinſic obligation is of equal ſtrength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that moral ſyſtem, which is framed by ethical writers, and denominated the natural law. Becauſe one is the law of nature, expreſsly declared ſo to be by God himſelf; the other is only what, by the aſſiſtance of human reaſon, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority: but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.

Upon theſe two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to ſay, no human laws ſhould be ſuffered to contradict theſe. There are, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found neceſſary for the benefit of ſociety to be reſtrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greateſt force and efficacy: for, with regard to ſuch points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in ſubordination to, the former. To inſtance in the caſe of murder: this is expreſsly forbidden by the divine, and demonſtrably by the natural law; and from theſe prohibitions ariſes the true unlawfulneſs of this crime. Thoſe human laws that annex a puniſhment to it, do not at all increaſe its moral guilt, or ſuperadd any freſh obliga-

tion *in foro conſcientiæ* to abſtain from its perpetration. Nay, if any human law ſhould allow or injoin us to commit it, we are bound to tranſgreſs that human law, or elſe we muſt offend both the natural and the divine. But with regard to matters that are in themſelves indifferent, and are not commanded or forbidden by thoſe ſuperior laws; ſuch, for inſtance, as exporting of wool into foreign countries; here the inferior legiſlature has ſcope and opportunity to interpoſe, and to make that action unlawful which before was not ſo.

If man were to live in a ſtate of nature, unconnected with other individuals, there would be no occaſion for any other laws, than the law of nature, and the law of God. Neither could any other law poſſibly exiſt: for a law always ſuppoſes ſome ſuperior who is to make it; and in a ſtate of nature we are all equal, without any other ſuperior but him who is the author of our being. But man was formed for ſociety; and, as is demonſtrated by the writers on this ſubject[7], is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it. However, as it is impoſſible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great ſociety, they muſt neceſſarily divide into many; and form ſeparate ſtates, commonwealths, and nations, entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourſe. Hence ariſes a third kind of law, to regulate this mutual intercourſe, called "the law of nations:" which, as none of theſe ſtates will acknowledge a ſuperiority in the other, cannot be dictated by any; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between theſe ſeveral communities: in the conſtruction alſo of which compacts we have no other rule to reſort to, but the law of nature; being the only one to which all the communities are equally ſubject: and therefore the civil law[8] very juſtly obſerves, that *quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines conſtituit, vocatur jus gentium.*

[7] Puffendorf, l. 7. c. 1. compared with Barbeyrac's commentary.

[8] *Inſt.* 1. 1. 9.

Thus much I thought it neceſſary to premiſe concerning the law of nature, the revealed law, and the law of nations, before I proceeded to treat more fully of the principal ſubject of this ſection, municipal or civil law; that is, the rule by which particular diſtricts, communities, or nations are governed; being thus defined by Juſtinian [9], "*jus civile eſt quod* "*quiſque ſibi populus conſtituit.*" I call it *municipal* law, in compliance with common ſpeech; for, though ſtrictly that expreſſion denotes the particular cuſtoms of one ſingle *municipium* or free town, yet it may with ſufficient propriety be applied to any one ſtate or nation, which is governed by the ſame laws and cuſtoms.

Municipal law, thus underſtood, is properly defined to be "a rule of civil conduct preſcribed by the "ſupreme power in a ſtate, commanding what is "right and prohibiting what is wrong." Let us endeavour to explain it's ſeveral properties, as they ariſe out of this definition.

And, firſt, it is a *rule:* not a tranſient ſudden order from a ſuperior, to or concerning a particular perſon; but ſomething permanent, uniform, and univerſal. Therefore a particular act of the legiſlature to confiſcate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treaſon, does not enter into the idea of a municipal law: for the operation of this act is ſpent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the community in general; it is rather a ſentence than a law. But an act to declare that the crime of which Titius is accuſed ſhall be deemed high treaſon; this has permanency, uniformity, and univerſality, and therefore is properly a *rule.* It is alſo called a *rule*, to diſtinguiſh it from *advice* or *counſel*, which we are at liberty to follow or not, as we ſee proper, and to judge upon the reaſonableneſs or unreaſonableneſs of the thing adviſed: whereas our obedience to the *law* depends not upon *our approbation*, but upon the *maker's will.* Counſel is only matter of perſuaſion, law is matter of injunction: counſel acts only upon the willing, law upon the unwilling alſo.

It is alſo called a *rule*, to diſtinguiſh it from a *compact* or *agreement*; for a compact is a promiſe proceed-

[9] *Inſt.* 1. 2. 1.

ing *from* us, law is a command directed *to* us. The language of a compact is, "I will, or will not, do this;" that of a law is, "thou ſhalt, or ſhalt not, do "it." It is true there is an obligation which a compact carries with it, equal in point of conſcience to that of a law; but then the original of the obligation is different. In compacts, we ourſelves determine and promiſe what ſhall be done, before we are obliged to do it; in laws, we are obliged to act without ourſelves determining or promiſing any thing at all. Upon theſe accounts law is defined to be "a *rule.*"

Municipal law is alſo a "a rule *of civil conduct.*" This diſtinguiſhes municipal law from the natural, or revealed; the former of which is the rule of *moral* conduct, and the latter not only the rule of moral conduct, but alſo the rule of faith. Theſe regard man as a creature, and point out his duty to God, to himſelf, and to his neighbour, conſidered in the light of an individual. But municipal or civil law regards him alſo as a citizen, and bound to other duties towards his neighbour, than thoſe of mere nature and religion: duties, which he has engaged in by enjoying the benefits of the common union; and which amount to no more, than that he do contribute, on his part, to the ſubſiſtence and peace of the ſociety.

It is likewiſe "a rule *preſcribed.*" Becauſe a bare reſolution, confined in the breaſt of the legiſlator, without manifeſting itſelf by ſome external ſign, can never be properly a law. It is requiſite that this reſolution be notified to the people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by univerſal tradition and long practice, which ſuppoſes a previous publication, and is the caſe of the common law of England. It may be notified, *viva voce*, by officers appointed for that purpoſe, as is done with regard to proclamations, and ſuch acts of parliament as are appointed to be publicly read in churches and other aſſemblies. It may laſtly be notified by writing, printing or the like; which is the general courſe taken with all our acts of parliament. Yet, whatever way is made uſe of, it

is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in the moſt public and perſpicuous manner; not like Caligula, who (according to Dio Caſſius) wrote his laws in a very ſmall character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the more effectually to enſnare the people. There is ſtill a more unreaſonable method than this, which is called making of laws *ex poſt facto;* when after an action (indifferent in itſelf) is committed, the legiſlator then for the firſt time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a puniſhment upon the perſon who has committed it. Here it is impoſſible that the party could foreſee that an action, innocent when it was done, ſhould be afterwards converted to guilt by a ſubſequent law; he had therefore no cauſe to abſtain from it; and all puniſhment for not abſtaining muſt of conſequence be cruel and unjuſt [8]. All laws ſhould be therefore made to commence *in futuro*, and be notified before their commencement; which is implied in the term "*preſcribed.*" But when this rule is in the uſual manner notified, or preſcribed, it is then the ſubject's buſineſs to be thoroughly acquainted therewith; for if ignorance, of what he *might* know, were admitted as a legitimate excuſe, the laws would be of no effect, but might always be eluded with impunity.

But farther: municipal law is "a rule of civil conduct preſcribed *by the ſupreme power in a ſtate.*" For legiſlature, as was before obſerved, is the greateſt act of ſuperiority that can be exerciſed by one being over another. Wherefore it is requiſite to the very eſſence of a law, that it be made by the ſupreme power. Sovereignty and legiſlature are indeed convertible terms; one cannot ſubſiſt without the other.

This will naturally lead us, into a ſhort inquiry concerning the nature of ſociety and civil government; and the natural, inherent right that belongs to the ſovereignty of a ſtate, wherever that ſovereignty be lodged, of making and enforcing laws.

[8] Such laws among the Romans were denominated *privilegia*, or private laws, of which Cicero (*de leg.* 3. 19. and in his oration *pro domo*, 17.) thus ſpeaks: "*Vetant leges ſacratæ, vetant duodecim tabulæ, leges privatis hominibus irrogari; id enim eſt privilegium. Nemo unquam tulit, nihil eſt crudelius, nihil perniciosus, nihil quod minus hæc civitas ferre poſſit.*"

The only true and natural foundations of ſociety are the wants and the fears of individuals. Not that we can believe, with ſome theoretical writers, that there ever was a time when there was no ſuch thing as ſociety, either natural or civil; and that from the impulſe of reaſon, and through a ſenſe of their wants and weakneſſes, individuals met together in a large plain, entered into an original contract, and choſe the talleſt man preſent to be their governor. This notion of an actually exiſting unconnected ſtate of nature, is too wild to be ſeriouſly admitted: and beſides it is plainly contradictory to the revealed accounts of the primitive origin of mankind, and their preſervation two thouſand years afterwards; both which were effected by the means of ſingle families. Theſe formed the firſt natural ſociety, among themſelves; which, every day extending it's limits, laid the firſt though imperfect rudiments of civil or political ſociety: and when it grew too large to ſubſiſt with convenience in that paſtoral ſtate wherein the patriarchs appear to have lived, it neceſſarily ſubdivided itſelf by various migrations into more. Afterwards, as agriculture increaſed, which employs and can maintain a much greater number of hands, migrations became leſs frequent: and various tribes, which had formerly ſeparated, reunited again; ſometimes by compulſion and conqueſt, ſometimes by accident, and ſometimes perhaps by compact. But, though ſociety had not its formal beginning from any convention of individuals, actuated by their wants and their fears; yet it is the *ſenſe* of their weakneſs and imperfection that *keeps* mankind together, that demonſtrates the neceſſity of this union, and that therefore is the ſolid and natural foundation, as well as the cement, of civil ſociety. And this is what we mean by the original contract of ſociety; which, tho' perhaps in no inſtance it has ever been formally expreſſed at the firſt inſtitution of a ſtate, yet in nature and reaſon muſt always be underſtood and implied, in the very act of aſſociating together: namely, that the whole ſhould protect all its parts, and that every part ſhould pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community ſhould guard

the rights of each individual member, and that (in return for this protection) each individual ſhould ſubmit to the laws of the community; without which ſubmiſſion of all it was impoſſible that protection could be certainly extended to any.

For when civil ſociety is once formed, government at the ſame time reſults of courſe, as neceſſary to preſerve and to keep that ſociety in order. Unleſs ſome ſuperior be conſtituted, whoſe commands and deciſions all the members are bound to obey, they would ſtill remain as in a ſtate of nature, without any judge upon earth to define their ſeveral rights, and redreſs their ſeveral wrongs. But, as all the members which compoſe the ſociety were naturally equal, it may be aſked, in whoſe hands are the reins of government to be entruſted? To this the general anſwer is eaſy; but the application of it to particular caſes has occaſioned one half of thoſe miſchiefs, which are apt to proceed from miſguided political zeal. In general, all mankind will agree that government ſhould be repoſed in ſuch perſons, in whom thoſe qualities are moſt likely to be found, the perfection of which is among the attributes of him who is emphatically ſtiled the ſupreme being; the three grand requiſites, I mean, of wiſdom, of goodneſs, and of power: wiſdom, to diſcern the real intereſt of the community; goodneſs, to endeavour always to purſue that real intereſt; and ſtrength, or power, to carry this knowledge and intention into action. Theſe are the natural foundations of ſovereignty, and theſe are the requiſites that ought to be found in every well-conſtituted frame of government.

How the ſeveral forms of government we now ſee in the world at firſt actually began, is matter of great uncertainty, and has occaſioned infinite diſputes. It is not my buſineſs or intention to enter into any of them. However they began, or by what right ſoever they ſubſiſt, there is and muſt be in all of them a ſupreme, irreſiſtible, abſolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the *jura ſummi imperii*, or the rights of ſovereignty, reſide. And this authority is placed in thoſe hands, wherein (according to the opinion of the founders of ſuch reſpective ſtates, either expreſs-

ly given, or collected from their tacit approbation) the qualities requiſite for ſupremacy, wiſdom, goodneſs, and power, are the moſt likely to be found.

The political writers of antiquity will not allow more than three regular forms of government; the firſt, when the ſovereign power is lodged in an aggregate aſſembly conſiſting of all the free members of a community, which is called a democracy; the ſecond, when it is lodged in a council, compoſed of ſelect members, and then it is ſtiled an ariſtocracy; the laſt, when it is entruſted in the hands of a ſingle perſon, and then it takes the name of a monarchy. All other ſpecies of government, they ſay, are either corruptions of, or reducible to, theſe three.

By the ſovereign power, as was before obſerved, is meant the making of laws; for wherever that power reſides, all others muſt conform to, and be directed by it, whatever appearance the outward form and adminiſtration of the government may put on. For it is at any time in the option of the legiſlature to alter that form and adminiſtration by a new edict or rule, and to put the execution of the laws into whatever hands it pleaſes; by conſtituting one, or a few, or many executive magiſtrates: and all the other powers of the ſtate muſt obey the legiſlative power in the diſcharge of their ſeveral functions, or elſe the conſtitution is at an end.

In a democracy, where the right of making laws reſides in the people at large, public virtue, or goodneſs of intention, is more likely to be found, than either of the other qualities of government. Popular aſſemblies are frequently fooliſh in their contrivance, and weak in their execution; but generally mean to do the thing that is right and juſt, and have always a degree of patriotiſm or public ſpirit. In ariſtocracies there is more wiſdom to be found, than in the other frames of government; being compoſed, or intended to be compoſed, of the moſt experienced citizens: but there is leſs honeſty than in a republic, and leſs ſtrength than in a monarchy. A monarchy is indeed the moſt powerful of any; for by the entire conjunction of the legiſla-

tive and executive powers all the ſinews of government are knit together, and united in the hand of the prince: but then there is imminent danger of his employing that ſtrength to improvident or oppreſſive purpoſes.

Thus theſe three ſpecies of government have, all of them, their ſeveral perfections and imperfections. Democracies are uſually the beſt calculated to direct the end of a law; ariſtocracies to invent the means by which that end ſhall be obtained; and monarchies to carry thoſe means into execution. And the antients, as was obſerved, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government but theſe three: for though Cicero [1] declares himſelf of opinion, "*eſſe optime conſtitutam rempublicam, quæ ex* "*tribus generibus illis, regali, optimo, et populari, ſit* "*modice confuſa;*" yet Tacitus treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a viſionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be laſting or ſecure [2].

But, happily for us of this iſland, the Britiſh conſtitution has long remained, and I truſt will long continue, a ſtanding exception to the truth of this obſervation. For, as with us, the executive power of the law is lodged in a ſingle perſon, they have all the advantages of ſtrength and diſpatch, that are to be found in the moſt abſolute monarchy: and as the legiſlature of the kingdom is entruſted to three diſtinct powers, entirely independent of each other; firſt, the king; ſecondly, the lords ſpiritual and temporal, which is an ariſtocratical aſſembly of perſons ſelected for their piety, their birth, their wiſdom, their valour, or their property: and, thirdly, the houſe of commons, freely choſen by the people from among themſelves, which makes it a kind of democracy; as this aggregate body, actuated by

[1] In his fragments *de rep. l.* 2.

[2] "*Cunctas nationes et* "*urbes populus aut primores,* "*aut ſinguli regunt; delecta ex* "*his et conſtituta reipublicæ for-*"*ma laudari facilius quam evi-*"*nire, vel, ſi evenit, haud diu-*"*turna eſſe poteſt.*" *Ann. l.* 4.

different ſprings, and attentive to different intereſts, compoſes the Britiſh parliament, and has the ſupreme diſpoſal of every thing; there can no inconvenience be attempted by either of the three branches, but will be withſtood by one of the other two; each branch being armed with a negative power, ſufficient to repel any innovation which it ſhall think inexpedient or dangerous.

Here then is lodged the ſovereignty of the Britiſh conſtitution; and lodged as beneficially as is poſſible for ſociety. For in no other ſhape could we be ſo certain of finding the three great qualities of government ſo well and ſo happily united. If the ſupreme power were lodged in any one of the three branches ſeparately, we muſt be expoſed to the inconveniences of either abſolute monarchy, ariſtocracy, or democracy; and ſo want two of the three principal ingredients of good polity, either virtue, wiſdom or power. If it were lodged in any two of the branches; for inſtance, in the king and houſe of lords, our laws might be providently made, and well executed, but they might not have always the good of the people in view: if lodged in the king and commons, we ſhould want that circumſpection and mediatory caution, which the wiſdom of the peers is to afford: if the ſupreme rights of legiſlature were lodged in the two houſes only, and the king had no negative upon their proceedings, they might be tempted to incroach upon the royal prerogative, or perhaps to aboliſh the kingly office, and thereby weaken (if not totally deſtroy) the ſtrength of the executive power. But the conſtitutional government of this iſland is ſo admirably tempered and compounded, that nothing can endanger or hurt it, but deſtroying the equilibrium of power between one branch of the legiſlature and the reſt. For if ever it ſhould happen that the independence of any one of the three ſhould be loſt, or that it ſhould become ſubſervient to the views of either of the other two, there would ſoon be an end of our conſtitution. The legiſlature would be changed

from that, which (upon the ſuppoſition of an original contract, either actual or implied) is preſumed to have been originally ſet up by the general conſent and fundamental act of the ſociety: and ſuch a change, however effected, is according to Mr. Locke[3] (who perhaps carries his theory too far) at once an entire diſſolution of the bands of government; and the people are thereby reduced to a ſtate of anarchy, with liberty to conſtitute to themſelves a new legiſlative power.

Having thus curſorily conſidered the three uſual ſpecies of government, and our own ſingular conſtitution, ſelected and compounded from them all, I proceed to obſerve, that, as the power of making laws conſtitutes the ſupreme authority, ſo wherever the ſupreme authority in any ſtate reſides, it is the right of that authority to make laws; that is, in the words of our definition, *to preſcribe the rule of civil action*. And this may be diſcovered from the very end and inſtitution of civil ſtates. For a ſtate is a collective body, compoſed of a multitude of individuals, united for their ſafety and convenience, and intending to act together as one man. If it therefore is to act as one man, it ought to act by one uniform will. But inaſmuch as political communities are made up of many natural perſons, each of whom has his particular will and inclination, theſe ſeveral wills cannot by any *natural* union be joined together, or tempered and diſpoſed into a laſting harmony, ſo as to conſtitute and produce that one uniform will of the whole. It can therefore be no otherwiſe produced, that by a *political* union; by the conſent of all perſons to ſubmit their own private wills to the will of one man, or of one or more aſſemblies of men, to whom the ſupreme authority is entruſted: and this will of that one man, or aſſemblage of men, is in different ſtates, according to their different conſtitutions, underſtood to be *law*.

Thus far as to the *right* of the ſupreme power to make laws; but farther, it is its *duty* likewiſe. For

[3] On government, part ii. §. 212.

ſince the reſpective members are bound to conform themſelves to the will of the ſtate, it is expedient that they receive directions from the ſtate declaratory of that its will. But as it is impoſſible, in ſo great a multitude, to give injunctions to every particular man, relative to each particular action, it is therefore incumbent on the ſtate to eſtabliſh general rules, for the perpetual information and direction of all perſons in all points, whether of poſitive or negative duty. And this, in order that every man may know what to look upon as his own, what as another's; what abſolute and what relative duties are required at his hands; what is to be eſteemed honeſt, diſhoneſt, or indifferent; what degree every man retains of his natural liberty; what he has given up as the price of the benefits of ſociety; and after what manner each perſon is to moderate the uſe and exerciſe of thoſe rights which the ſtate aſſigns him, in order to promote and ſecure the public tranquillity.

From what has been advanced, the truth of the former branch of our definition is (I truſt) ſufficiently evident; that, "*municipal law is a rule of civil* "*conduct preſcribed by the ſupreme power in a ſtate.*" I proceed now to the latter branch of it; that it is a rule ſo preſcribed, "*commanding what is right, and* "*prohibiting what is wrong.*"

Now in order to do this completely, it is firſt of all neceſſary that the boundaries of right and wrong be eſtabliſhed and aſcertained by law. And when this is once done, it will follow of courſe that it is likewiſe the buſineſs of the law, conſidered as a rule of civil conduct, to enforce theſe rights and to reſtrain or redreſs theſe wrongs. It remains therefore only to conſider in what manner the law is ſaid to aſcertain the boundaries of right and wrong; and the methods which it takes to command the one and prohibit the other.

For this purpoſe every law may be ſaid to conſiſt of ſeveral parts: one, *declaratory*; whereby the rights to be obſerved, and the wrongs to be eſchewed, are

clearly defined and laid down: another, *directory*; whereby the ſubject is inſtructed and enjoined to obſerve thoſe rights, and to abſtain from the commiſſion of thoſe wrongs: a third, *remedial*; whereby a method is pointed out to recover a man's private rights, or redreſs his private wrongs: to which may be added a fourth, uſually termed the *ſanction*, or *vindicatory* branch of the law; whereby it is ſignified what evil or penalty ſhall be incurred by ſuch as commit any public wrongs, and tranſgreſs or neglect their duty.

With regard to the firſt of theſe, the *declaratory* part of the municipal law, this depends not ſo much upon the law of revelation or of nature, as upon the wiſdom and will of the legiſlator. This doctrine, which before was ſlightly touched, deſerves a more particular explication. Thoſe rights then which God and nature have eſtabliſhed, and are therefore called natural rights; ſuch as are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually inveſted in every man than they are; neither do they receive any additional ſtrength when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no human legiſlature has power to abridge or deſtroy them, unleſs the owner ſhall himſelf commit ſome act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or natural *duties* (ſuch as, for inſtance, the worſhip of God, the maintenance of children, and the like) receive any ſtronger ſanction from being alſo declared to be duties by the law of the land. The caſe is the ſame as to crimes and miſdemeſnors, that are forbidden by the ſuperior laws, and therefore ſtiled *mala in ſe*, ſuch as murder, theft, and perjury; which contract no additional turpitude from being declared unlawful by the inferior legiſlature. For that legiſlature in all theſe caſes acts only, as was before obſerved, in ſubordination to the great lawgiver, tranſcribing and publiſhing his precepts. So that upon the whole, the declaratory part of the municipal law has no force or operation at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and intrinſically right or wrong.

But, with regard to things in themſelves indifferent, the caſe is entirely altered. Theſe become either right or wrong, juſt or unjuſt, duties or miſdemeſnors, according as the municipal legiſlator ſees proper, for promoting the welfare of the ſociety, and more effectually carrying on the purpoſes of civil life. Thus our own common law has declared, that the goods of the wife do inſtantly upon marriage become the property and right of the huſband; and our ſtatute law has declared all monopolies a public offence: yet that right, and this offence, have no foundation in nature; but are merely created by the law for the purpoſe of civil ſociety. And ſometimes, where the thing itſelf has its riſe from the law of nature, the particular circumſtances and mode of doing it become right or wrong, as the laws of the land ſhall direct. Thus, for inſtance, in civil duties; obedience to ſuperiors is the doctrine of revealed as well as natural religion; but who thoſe ſuperiors ſhall be, and in what circumſtances, or to what degrees they ſhall be obeyed, it is the province of human laws to determine. And ſo as to injuries or crimes, it muſt be left to our own legiſlature to decide, in what caſes the ſeiſing another's cattle ſhall amount to a treſpaſs or a theft; and where it ſhall be a juſtifiable action, as when a landlord takes them by way of diſtreſs for rent.

Thus much for the *declaratory* part of the municipal law: and the *directory* ſtands much upon the ſame footing; for this virtually includes the former, the declaration being uſually collected from the direction. The law that ſays, "thou ſhalt not ſteal," implies a declaration that ſtealing is a crime. And we have ſeen [4] that, in things naturally indifferent, the very eſſence of right and wrong depends upon the direction of the laws to do or to omit them.

The *remedial* part of a law is ſo neceſſary a conſequence of the former two, that laws muſt be very vague and imperfect without it. For in vain would

[4] See page 43.

rights be declared, in vain directed to be obſerved, if there were no method of recovering and aſſerting thoſe rights, when wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly, when we ſpeak of the protection of the law. When, for inſtance, the *declaratory* part of the law has ſaid, "that the field "or inheritance, which belonged to Titius's father, "is veſted by his death in Titius;" and the *directory* part has "forbidden any one to enter on ano-"ther's property, without the leave of the owner:" if Gaius after this will preſume to take poſſeſſion of the land, the *remedial* part of the law will then interpoſe it's office; will make Gaius reſtore the poſſeſſion to Titius, and alſo pay him damages for the invaſion.

With regard to the *ſanction* of laws, or the evil that may attend the breach of public duties; it is obſerved, that human legiſlators have for the moſt part choſen to make the ſanction of their laws rather *vindicatory* than *remuneratory*, or to conſiſt rather in puniſhments, than in actual particular rewards. Becauſe, in the firſt place, the quiet enjoyment and protection of all our civil rights and liberties, which are the ſure and general conſequence of obedience to the municipal law, are in themſelves the beſt and moſt valuable of all rewards. Becauſe alſo, were the exerciſe of every virtue to be enforced by the propoſal of particular rewards, it were impoſſible for any ſtate to furniſh ſtock enough for ſo profuſe a bounty. And farther, becauſe the dread of evil is a much more forcible principle of human actions than the proſpect of good [5]. For which reaſons, though a prudent beſtowing of rewards is ſometimes of exquiſite uſe, yet we find that thoſe civil laws, which enforce and enjoin our duty, do ſeldom, if ever, propoſe any privilege or gift to ſuch as obey the law; but do conſtantly come armed with a penalty denounced againſt tranſgreſſors, either expreſsly defining the nature and quantity of the puniſhment, or elſe leaving it to the diſcretion of the judges, and

[5] Locke, Hum. Und. b. 2. c. 21.

thoſe who are entruſted with the care of putting the laws in execution.

Of all the parts of a law the moſt effectual is the *vindicatory*. For it is but loſt labour to ſay, "do this, "or avoid that," unleſs we alſo declare, "this ſhall "be the conſequence of your non-compliance." We muſt therefore obſerve, that the main ſtrength and force of a law conſiſts in the penalty annexed to it. Herein is to be found the principal obligation of human laws.

Legiſlators and their laws are ſaid to *compel* and *oblige*; not that by any natural violence they ſo conſtrain a man, as to render it impoſſible for him to act otherwiſe than as they direct, which is the ſtrict ſenſe of obligation: but becauſe, by declaring and exhibiting a penalty againſt offenders, they bring it to paſs that no man can eaſily chooſe to tranſgreſs the law; ſince, by reaſon of the impending correction, compliance is in a high degree preferable to diſobedience. And, even where rewards are propoſed as well as puniſhments threatened, the obligation of the law ſeems chiefly to conſiſt in the penalty: for rewards, in their nature, can only *perſuade* and *allure*; nothing is *compulſory* but puniſhment.

It is true, it hath been holden, and very juſtly, by the principal of our ethical writers, that human laws are binding upon men's conſciences. But if that were the only, or moſt forcible obligation, the good only would regard the laws, and the bad would ſet them at defiance. And, true as this principle is, it muſt ſtill be underſtood with ſome reſtriction. It holds, I apprehend, as to *rights*; and that, when the law has determined the field to belong to Titius, it is matter of conſcience no longer to withhold or to invade it. So alſo in regard to *natural duties*, and ſuch offences as are *mala in ſe*: here we are bound in conſcience, becauſe we are bound by ſuperior laws, before thoſe human laws were in being, to perform the one and abſtain from the other. But in relation to thoſe laws which enjoin only *poſitive duties*, and forbid only ſuch things as are not *mala in ſe* but *mala*

prohibitia merely, without any intermixture of moral guilt, annexing a penalty to non-compliance[6], here I apprehend conſcience is no farther concerned, than by directing a ſubmiſſion to the penalty, in caſe of our breach of thoſe laws; for otherwiſe the multitude of penal laws in the ſtate would not only be looked upon as an impolitic, but would alſo be a very wicked thing; if every ſuch law were a ſnare for the conſcience of the ſubject. But in theſe caſes the alternative is offered to every man; "either abſtain "from this, or ſubmit to ſuch a penalty;" and his conſcience will be clear, whichever ſide of the alternative he thinks proper to embrace. Thus, by the ſtatutes for preſerving the game, a penalty is denounced againſt every unqualified perſon that kills a hare, and againſt every perſon who poſſeſſes a partridge in Auguſt. And ſo too, by other ſtatutes, pecuniary penalties are inflicted for exerciſing trades without ſerving an apprenticeſhip thereto, for not burying the dead in woollen, for not performing ſtatute-work on the public-roads, and for innumerable other poſitive miſdemeſnors. Now theſe prohibitory laws do not make the tranſgreſſion a moral offence, or ſin: the only obligation in conſcience is to ſubmit to the penalty, if levied. It muſt however be obſerved, that we are here ſpeaking of laws that are ſimply and purely penal, where the thing forbidden or enjoined is wholly a matter of indifference, and where the penalty inflicted is an adequate compenſation for the civil inconvenience ſuppoſed to ariſe from the offence. But where diſobedience to the law involves in it alſo any degree of public miſchief or private injury, there it falls within our former diſtinction, and is alſo an offence againſt conſcience[7].

I have now gone through the definition laid down of a municipal law; and have ſhewn that it is "a "rule—of civil conduct—preſcribed—by the ſu"preme power in a ſtate—commanding what is

[6] See Vol. II. page 420.

[7] *Lex pure pœnalis obligat tantum ad pœnam, non item ad culpam; lex pœnalis mixta et ad culpam obligat, et ad pœnam.* [Sanderſon *de conſcient. obligat. præl.* viii. §. 17. 24.]

"right, and prohibiting what is wrong;" in the explication of which I have endeavoured to interweave a few useful principles, concerning the nature of civil government, and the obligation of human laws. Before I conclude this section, it may not be amiss to add a few observations concerning the *interpretation* of laws.

When any doubt arose upon the construction of the Roman laws, the usage was to state the case to the emperor in writing, and take his opinion upon it. This was certainly a bad method of interpretation. To interrogate the legislature to decide particular disputes, is not only endless, but affords great room for partiality and oppression. The answers of the emperor were called his rescripts, and these had in succeeding cases the force of perpetual laws; though they ought to be carefully distinguished, by every rational civilian, from those general constitutions, which had only the nature of things for their guide. The emperor Macrinus, as his historian Capitolinus informs us, had once resolved to abolish these rescripts, and retain only the general edicts; he could not bear that the hasty and crude answers of such princes as Commodus and Caracalla should be reverenced as laws. But Justinian thought otherwise[8], and he has preserved them all. In like manner the canon laws, or decretal epistles of the popes, are all of them rescripts in the strictest sense. Contrary to all true forms of reasoning, they argue from particulars to generals.

The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by *signs* the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. Let us take a short view of them all.

1. Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general

[8] *Inst.* 1. 2. 6.

and popular uſe. Thus the law mentioned by Puffendorf [9], which forbad a layman to *lay hands* on a prieſt, was adjudged to extend to him, who had hurt a prieſt with a weapon. Again; terms of art, or technical terms, muſt be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, and ſcience. So in the act of ſettlement, where the crown of England is limited "to the princeſs Sophia, and "the heirs of her body, being proteſtants," it becomes neceſſary to call in the aſſiſtance of lawyers, to aſcertain the preciſe idea of the words "*heirs of* "*her body*;" which in a legal ſenſe comprize only certain of her lineal deſcendants.

2. If words happen to be ſtill dubious, we may eſtabliſh their meaning from the *context*; with which it may be of ſingular uſe to compare a word, or a ſentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the conſtruction of an act of parliament. Of the ſame nature and uſe is the compariſon of a law with other laws, that are made by the ſame legiſlator, that have ſome affinity with the ſubject, or that expreſsly relate to the ſame point. Thus, when the law of England declares murder to be felony, without benefit of clergy, we muſt reſort to the ſame law of England, to learn what the benefit of clergy is: and when the common law cenſures ſimoniacal contracts, it affords great light to the ſubject to conſider what the canon law has adjudged to be ſimony.

3. As to the *ſubject-matter*, words are always to be underſtood as having a regard thereto; for that is always ſuppoſed to be in the eye of the legiſlator, and all his expreſſions directed to that end. Thus, when a law of our Edward III. forbids all eccleſiaſtical perſons to purchaſe *proviſions* at Rome, it might ſeem to prohibit the buying of grain and other victual; but when we conſider that the ſtatute was made to expreſs the uſurpations of the papal ſee, and that the nominations to benefices by the pope were called

[9] L. of N. and N. 5. 12. 3.

provisions, we shall see that the restraint is intended to be laid upon such provisions only.

4. As to the *effects* and *consequence*, the rule is, that where words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of them. Therefore the Bolognian law, mentioned by Puffendorf [o], which enacted "that whoever drew blood in the "streets should be punished with the utmost severi-"ty," was held after long debate not to extend to the surgeon, who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street with a fit.

5. But, lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the *reason* and *spirit* of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it. For when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with it. An instance of this is given in a case put by Cicero, or whoever was the author of the treatise inscribed to Herennius [1]. There was a law, that those who in a storm forsook the ship should forfeit all property therein; and that the ship and lading should belong entirely to those who staid in it. In a dangerous tempest all the mariners forsook the ship, except only one sick passenger, who by reason of his disease was unable to get out and escape. By chance the ship came safe to port. The sick man kept possession, and claimed the benefit of the law. Now here all the learned agree, that the sick man is not within the reason of the law; for the reason of making it was, to give encouragement to such as should venture their lives to save the vessel: but this is a merit, which he could never pretend to, who neither staid in the ship upon that account, nor contributed any thing to its preservation.

From this method of interpreting laws, by the reason of them, arises what we call *equity*; which is thus defined by Grotius [2], "the correction of that,

[o] *l.* 5. *c.* 12. §. 8. [1] *l.* 1. *c.* 11. [2] *de æquitate.* §. 3.

"wherein the law (by reaſon of its univerſality) is "deficient." For ſince in laws all caſes cannot be foreſeen or expreſſed, it is neceſſary, that when the general decrees of the law come to be applied to particular caſes, there ſhould be ſomewhere a power veſted of defining thoſe circumſtances, which (had they been foreſeen) the legiſlator himſelf would have expreſſed. And theſe are the caſes, which according to Grotius, "*lex non exacte definit, ſed arbitrio boni* "*viri permittit.*"

Equity thus depending, eſſentially, upon the particular circumſtances of each individual caſe, there can be no eſtabliſhed rules and fixed precepts of equity laid down, without deſtroying its very eſſence, and reducing it to a poſitive law. And, on the other hand, the liberty of conſidering all caſes in an equitable light muſt not be indulged too far; leſt thereby we deſtroy all law, and leave the deciſion of every queſtion entirely in the breaſt of the judge. And law, without equity, though hard and diſagreeable, is much more deſirable for the public good, than equity without law: which would make every judge a legiſlator, and introduce moſt infinite confuſion; as there would then be almoſt as many different rules of action laid down in our courts, as there are differences of capacity and ſentiment in the human mind.

SECTION THE THIRD.

OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

THE municipal law of England, or the rule of civil conduct prescribed to the inhabitants of this kingdom, may with sufficient propriety be divided into two kinds; the *lex non scripta*, the unwritten, or common law; and the *lex scripta*, the written, or statute law.

The *lex non scripta*, or unwritten law, includes not only *general customs*, or the common law properly so called; but also the *particular customs* of certain parts of the kingdom; and likewise those *particular laws*, that are by custom observed only in certain courts and jurisdictions.

When I call these parts of our law *leges non scriptæ*, I would not be understood as if all those laws were at present merely *oral*, or communicated from the former ages to the present solely by word of mouth. It is true indeed that, in the profound ignorance of letters which formerly overspread the whole western world, all laws were entirely traditional; for this plain reason, because the nations among which they prevailed had but little idea of writing. Thus the British as well as the Gallic druids committed all their laws as well as learning to memory [1]; and it is said of the primitive Saxons here, as well as their brethren on the continent, that *leges solæ memoria et usu retinebant* [2]. But, with us at present, the monuments and evidences of our legal customs are contained in the records of the several courts of justice, in books of reports and judicial decisions, and in the treatises of learned sages of the profession, preserved and handed down to us from the times of highest antiquity. However I therefore stile these parts of our law *leges non scriptæ*, because their origi-

[1] Cæs. *de b. G. lib.* 6. *c.* 13. [2] Spelm. *Gl*, 362.

nal inſtitution and authority are not ſet down in writing, as acts of parliament are, but they receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by long and immemorial uſage, and by their univerſal reception throughout the kingdom. In like manner as Aulus Gellius defines the *jus non ſcriptum* to be that, which is "*tacito et illiterato hominum conſenſu et* "*moribus expreſſum.*"

Our ancient lawyers, and particularly Forteſcue [3], inſiſt with abundance of warmth, that theſe cuſtoms are as old as the primitive Britons; and continued down, through the ſeveral mûtations of government and inhabitants, to the preſent time, unchanged and unadulterated. This may be the caſe as to ſome: but in general, as Mr. Selden in his notes obſerves, this aſſertion muſt be underſtood with many grains of allowance; and ought only to ſignify, as the truth ſeems to be, that there never was any formal exchange of one ſyſtem of laws for another: though doubtleſs by the intermixture of adventitious nations, the Romans, the Picts, the Saxons, the Danes, and the Normans, they muſt have inſenſibly introduced and incorporated many of their own cuſtoms with thoſe that were before eſtabliſhed; thereby in all probability improving the texture and wiſdom of the whole, by the accumulated wiſdom of divers particular countries. Our laws, ſaith lord Bacon [4], are mixed as our language: and, as our language is ſo much the richer, the laws are the more complete.

And indeed our antiquaries and early hiſtorians do all poſitively aſſure us, that our body of laws is of this compounded nature. For they tell us, that in the time of Alfred the local cuſtoms of the ſeveral provinces of the kingdom were grown ſo various, that he found it expedient to compile his *domebook* or *liber judicialis*, for the general uſe of the whole kingdom. This book is ſaid to have been extant ſo late as the reign of king Edward the fourth, but is now unfortunately loſt. It contained, we may probably ſuppoſe, the principal maxims of the com-

[3] *c.* 17. [4] See his propoſals of a digeſt.

mon law, the penalties for misdemesnors, and the forms of judical proceedings. Thus much may at least be collected from that injunction to observe it, which we find in the laws of King Edward the elder, the son of Alfred [5]. "*Omnibus qui reipublicæ præ-*
"*sunt etiam atque etiam mando, ut omnibus æquos se*
"*præbeant judices, perinde ac in judiciali libro (Saxonice,*
"dom-bec) *scriptum habetur; nec quicquam formident*
"*quin jus commune (Saxonice,* folcrihte) *audacter li-*
"*bereque dicant.*"

But the irruption and establishment of the Danes in England, which followed soon after, introduced new customs, and caused this code of Alfred in many provinces to fall into disuse; or at least to be mixed and debased with other laws of a coarser alloy. So that about the beginning of the eleventh century there were three principal systems of laws, prevailing in different districts. 1. The *Mercen-Lage*, or Mercian laws, which were observed in many of the midland counties, and those bordering on the principality of Wales, the retreat of the antient Britons; and therefore very probably intermixed with the British or Druidical customs. 2. The *West-Saxon-Lage*, or laws of the west Saxons, which obtained in the counties to the south and west of the island, from Kent to Devonshire. These were probably much the same with the laws of Alfred above-mentioned, being the municipal law of the far most considerable part of his dominions, and particularly including Berkshire, the seat of his peculiar residence. 3. The *Dane-Lage*, or Danish law, the very name of which speaks its original and composition. This was principally maintained in the rest of the midland counties, and also on the eastern coast, the part most exposed to the visits of that piratical people. As for the very northern provinces, they were at that time under a distinct government [6].

Out of these three laws, Roger Hoveden [7] and Ranulphus Cestrensis [8] inform us, king Edward the confessor extracted one uniform law or digest of laws, to be observed throughout the whole kingdom;

[5] *c.* 1.
[6] Hal. Hist. 55.
[7] *in Hen. II.*
[8] *in Edw. Confessor.*

though Hoveden and the author of an old manuſcript chronicle [9] aſſure us likewiſe, that this work was projected and begun by his grandfather king Edgar. And indeed a general digeſt of the ſame nature has been conſtantly found expedient, and therefore put in practice by other great nations, which were formed from an aſſemblage of little provinces, governed by peculiar cuſtoms. As in Portugal, under king Edward, about the beginning of the fifteenth century [o]: in Spain under Alonzo X, who about the year 1250 executed the plan of his father St. Ferdinand, and collected all the provincial cuſtoms into one uniform law, in the celebrated code entitled *las partidas* [1]: and in Sweden, about the ſame æra; when a univerſal body of common law was compiled out of the particular cuſtoms eſtabliſhed by the laghmen of every province, and entitled the *land's lagh*, being analogous to the *common law* of England [2].

Both theſe undertakings, of king Edgar and Edward the confeſſor, ſeem to have been no more than a new edition, or freſh promulgation, of Alfred's code or dome-book, with ſuch additions and improvements as the experience of a century and a half had ſuggeſted. For Alfred is generally ſtiled by the ſame hiſtorians the *legum Anglicanarum conditor*, as Edward the confeſſor is the *reſtitutor*. Theſe however are the laws which our hiſtories ſo often mention under the name of the laws of Edward the confeſſor; which our anceſtors ſtruggled ſo hardly to maintain, under the firſt princes of the Norman line; and which ſubſequent princes ſo frequently promiſed to keep and reſtore, as the moſt popular act they could do, when preſſed by foreign emergencies or domeſtic diſcontents. Theſe are the laws, that ſo vigorouſly withſtood the repeated attacks of the civil law; which eſtabliſhed in the twelfth century a new Roman empire over moſt of the ſtates of the continent: ſtates that have loſt, and perhaps upon that account, their political liberties; while the free conſtitution of England perhaps upon the ſame

[9] *in Seld. ad Eadmer.* 6.
[o] Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxii. 135.
[1] *Ibid.* xx. 211.
[2] *Ibid.* xxxiii. 21. 58.

account, has been rather improved than debaſed. Theſe, in ſhort, are the laws which gave riſe and original to that collection of maxims and cuſtoms, which is now known by the name of the common law. A name either given to it in contradiſtinction to other laws, as the ſtatute law, the civil law, the law merchant and the like; or, more probably, as a law common to all the realm, the *jus commune* or *folk-right* mentioned by king Edward the elder, after the abolition of the ſeveral provincial cuſtoms and particular laws before-mentioned.

But though this is the moſt likely foundation of this collection of maxims and cuſtoms, yet the maxims and cuſtoms, ſo collected, are of higher antiquity than memory or hiſtory can reach: nothing being more difficult than to aſcertain the preciſe beginning and firſt ſpring of an antient and long eſtabliſhed cuſtom. Whence it is, that in our law, the goodneſs of a cuſtom depends upon its having been uſed time out of mind; or, in the ſolemnity of our legal phraſe, time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. This it is that gives it its weight and authority: and of this nature are the maxims and cuſtoms which compoſe the common law, or *lex non ſcripta*, of this kingdom.

This unwritten, or common, law is properly diſtinguiſhable into three kinds; 1. General cuſtoms; which are the univerſal rule of the whole kingdom, and form the common law, in its ſtricter, and more uſual ſignification. 2. Particular cuſtoms; which for the moſt part affect only the inhabitants of particular diſtricts. 3. Certain particular laws; which by cuſtom are adopted and uſed by ſome particular courts of pretty general and extenſive juriſdiction.

I. As to general cuſtoms, or the common law, properly ſo called; this is that law, by which proceedings and determinations in the king's ordinary courts of juſtice are guided and directed. This, for the moſt part, ſettles the courſe in which lands deſcend by inheritance; the manner and form of acquiring and transferring property; the ſolemnities and obligation of contracts; the rules

of expounding wills, deeds, and acts of parliament, the reſpective remedies of civil injuries; the ſeveral ſpecies of temporal offences, with the manner and degree of puniſhment: and an infinite number of minuter particulars, which diffuſe themſelves as extenſively as the ordinary diſtribution of common juſtice requires. Thus, for example, that there ſhall be four ſuperior courts of record, the chancery, the king's bench, the common pleas, and the exchequer;—that the eldeſt ſon alone is heir to his anceſtor;—that property may be acquired and transferred by writing;—that a deed is of no validity unleſs ſealed and delivered;—that wills ſhall be conſtrued more favourably, and deeds more ſtrictly;—that money lent upon bond is recoverable by action of debt;—that breaking the public peace is an offence, and puniſhable by fine and impriſonment;—all theſe are doctrines that are not ſet down in any written ſtatute or ordinance, but depend merely upon immemorial uſage, that is upon common law, for their ſupport.

Some have divided the common law into two principal grounds or foundations: 1. Eſtabliſhed cuſtoms; ſuch as that, where there are three brothers, the eldeſt brother ſhall be heir to the ſecond, in excluſion of the youngeſt: and 2. Eſtabliſhed rules and maxims; as, "that the king can do no wrong, "that no man ſhall be bound to accuſe himſelf," and the like. But I take theſe to be one and the ſame thing. For the authority of theſe maxims reſt entirely upon general reception and uſage, and the only method of proving, that this or that maxim is a rule of the common law, is by ſhewing, that it hath been always the cuſtom to obſerve it.

But here a very natural, and very material queſtion ariſes: how are theſe cuſtoms or maxims to be known, and by whom is their validity to be determined. The anſwer is, by the judges in the ſeveral courts of juſtice. They are the depoſitaries of the laws; the living oracles, who muſt decide in all caſes of doubt, and who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land. Their knowledge of that law is derived from experience and ſtudy; from the

"*viginti annorum lucubrationes*," which Forteſcue [3] mentions; and from being long perſonally accuſtomed to the judicial deciſions of their predeceſſors. And indeed theſe judicial deciſions are the principal and moſt authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the exiſtence of ſuch a cuſtom as ſhall form a part of the common law. The judgment itſelf, and all the proceedings previous thereto, are carefully regiſtered and preſerved, under the name of *records*, in public repoſitories ſet apart for that particular purpoſe; and to them frequent recourſe is had, when any critical queſtion ariſes, in the determination of which former precedents may give light or aſſiſtance. And therefore, even ſo early as the conqueſt, we find the "*præteritorum memoria eventorum*" reckoned up as one of the chief qualifications of thoſe, who were held to be "*legibus patriæ optime inſtituti* [4]." For it is an eſtabliſhed rule to abide by former precedents, where the ſame points come again in litigation; as well to keep the ſcale of juſtice even and ſteady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion; as alſo becauſe the law in that caſe being ſolemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule which it is not in the breaſt of any ſubſequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private ſentiments; he being ſworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and cuſtoms of the land: not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one. Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former determination is moſt evidently contrary to reaſon; much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine law. But even in ſuch caſes the ſubſequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from miſrepreſentation. For if it be found that the former deciſion is manifeſtly abſurd or unjuſt, it is declared, not that ſuch a ſentence was *bad law*, but that it was *not law*; that is, that it is not the

[3] cap. 8. [4] Seld. review of Tith. c. 8.

eſtabliſhed cuſtom of the realm, as has been erroneouſly determined. And hence it is that our lawyers are with juſtice ſo copious in their encomiums on the reaſon of the common law; that they tell us, that the law is the perfection of reaſon, that it always intends to conform thereto, and that what is not reaſon is not law. Not that the particular reaſon of every rule in the law can at this diſtance of time be always preciſely aſſigned; but it is ſufficient that there be nothing in the rule flatly contradictory to reaſon, and then the law will preſume it to be well founded [5]. And it hath been an antient obſervation in the laws of England, that whenever a ſtanding rule of law, of which the reaſon perhaps could not be remembered or diſcerned, hath been wantonly broken in upon by ſtatutes or new reſolutions, the wiſdom of the rule hath in the end appeared from the inconveniences that have followed the innovation.

The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules muſt be followed, unleſs flatly abſurd or unjuſt: for though their reaſon be not obvious at firſt view, yet we owe ſuch a deference to former times, as not to ſuppoſe that they acted wholly without conſideration. To illuſtrate this doctrine by examples. It has been determined, time out of mind, that a brother of the half blood ſhall never ſucceed as heir to the eſtate of his half brother, but it ſhall rather eſcheat to the king, or other ſuperior lord. Now this is a poſitive law, fixed and eſtabliſhed by cuſtom, which cuſtom is evinced by judicial deciſions; and therefore can never be departed from by any modern judge without a breach of his oath and the law. For herein is nothing repugnant to natural juſtice: though the artificial reaſon of it, drawn from the feodal law, may not be quite obvious to every body. And therefore, though a modern judge, on account of a ſuppoſed hardſhip

[5] Herein agreeing with the civil law, *Ff.* 1. 3. 20, 21. "*Non omnium, quæ a majoribus noſtris conſtituta ſunt, ratio red-di poteſt. Et ideo rationes eorum, quæ conſtituuntur, inquiri non oportet: alioquin multa ex his, quæ certa ſunt, ſubvertuntur.*"

upon the half brother, might wiſh it had been otherwiſe ſettled, yet it is not in his power to alter it. But if any court were now to determine, that an elder brother of the half blood might enter upon and ſeiſe any lands that were purchaſed by his younger brother, no ſubſequent judges would ſcruple to declare that ſuch prior determination was unjuſt, was unreaſonable, and therefore was *not law*. So that *the law*, and the *opinion of the judge*, are not always convertible terms, or one and the ſame thing; ſince it ſometimes may happen, that the judge may *miſtake* the law. Upon the whole, however, we may take it as a general rule, "that the deciſions of courts of juſtice "are the evidence of what is common law:" in the ſame manner as in the civil law, what the emperor had once determined, was to ſerve for a guide for the future[6].

The deciſions therefore of courts are held in the higheſt regard, and are not only preſerved as authentic records in the treaſuries of the ſeveral courts, but are handed out to public view in the numerous volumes of *reports* which furniſh the lawyer's library. Theſe reports are hiſtories of the ſeveral caſes, with a ſhort ſummary of the proceedings which are preſerved at large in the records, the arguments on both ſides, and the reaſons the court gave for its judgment; taken down in ſhort notes by perſons preſent at the determination. And theſe ſerve as indexes to, and alſo to explain, the records; which always, in matters of conſequence and nicety, the judges direct to be ſearched. The reports are extant in a regular ſeries from the reign of king Edward the ſecond inclusive; and from his time to that of Henry the eighth were taken by the prothonotaries, or chief ſcribes of the court, at the expence of the crown, and publiſhed *annually*, whence they are known under the denomination of the *year books*. And it is much to be wiſhed that this beneficial cuſtom had, under proper

[6] "*Si imperialis majeſtas cauſam cognitionaliter examinaverit, et partibus coram ſe conſtitutis ſententiam dixerit, omnes omnino judices, qui ſub noſtro imperio ſunt, ſciant hanc eſſe legem, non ſolum illi cauſæ pro qua producta eſt, ſed et in omnibus ſimilibus.*" C. 1. 14. 12.

regulations, been continued to this day: for, though king James I. at the inſtance of Lord Bacon appointed two reporters [6] with a handſome ſtipend for this purpoſe, yet that wiſe inſtitution was ſoon neglected; and, from the reign of Henry VIII. to the preſent time, this taſk has been executed by many private and contemporary hands; who ſometimes through haſte and inaccuracy, ſometimes through miſtake and want of ſkill, have publiſhed very crude and imperfect (perhaps contradictory) accounts of one and the ſame determination. Some of the moſt valuable of the antient reports are thoſe publiſhed by lord chief juſtice Coke; a man of infinite learning in his profeſſion, though not a little infected with the pedantry and quaintneſs of the times he lived in, which appear ſtrongly in all his works. However his writings are ſo highly eſteemed, that they are generally cited without the author's name [7].

Beſides theſe reporters, there are alſo other authors, to whom great veneration and reſpect is paid by the ſtudents of the common law. Such are Glanvil and Bracton, Britton and Fleta, Hengham and Littleton, Statham, Brooke, Fitzherbert, and Staundforde, with ſome others of antient date; whoſe treatiſes are cited as authority, and are evidence that caſes have formerly happened, in which ſuch and ſuch points were determined, which are now become ſettled and firſt principles. One of the laſt of theſe methodical writers in point of time, whoſe works are of any intrinſic authority in the courts of juſtice, and do not entirely depend on the ſtrength of their quotations from older authors, is the ſame learned judge we have juſt mentioned, Sir Edward Coke; who hath written four volumes of inſtitutes, as he is

[6] *Pat.* 15 *Jac. I. p.* 18. 17 Rym. 26.

[7] His reports, for inſtance, are ſtiled, κατ' ἐξοχην *the reports*; and in quoting them we uſually ſay, 1 or 2 Rep. not 1 or 2 Coke's Rep. as in citing other authors. The reports of judge Croke are alſo cited in a peculiar manner, by the name of thoſe princes, in whoſe reigns the caſes reported in his three volumes were determined; *viz.* queen Elizabeth, king James, and king Charles the firſt; as well as by the number of each volume. For ſometimes we call them 1, 2, and 3 Cro. but more commonly Cro. Eliz. Cro. Jac. and Cro. Car.

pleaſed to call them, though they have little of the inſtitutional method to warrant ſuch a title. The firſt volume is a very extenſive comment upon a little excellent treatiſe of tenures, compiled by judge Littleton in the reign of Edward IV. This comment is a rich mine of valuable common law learning, collected and heaped together from the ancient reports and year books, but greatly defective in method[8]. The ſecond volume is a comment upon many old acts of parliament, without any ſyſtematical order; the third a more methodical treatiſe of the pleas of the crown; and the fourth an account of the ſeveral ſpecies of courts[9].

And thus much for the firſt ground and chief corner ſtone of the laws of England, which is general immemorial cuſtom, or common law, from time to time declared in the deciſions of the courts of juſtice: which deciſions are preſerved among our public records, explained in our reports, and digeſted for general uſe in the authoritative writings of the venerable ſages of the law.

The Roman law, as practiſed in the times of its liberty, paid alſo a great regard to cuſtom; but not ſo much as our law: it only then adopting it, when the written law was deficient. Though the reaſons alledged in the digeſt [o] will fully juſtify our practice, in making it of equal authority with, when it is not contradicted by, the written law. "For ſince, ſays "Julianus, the written law binds us for no other "reaſon but becauſe it is approved by the judgment "of the people, therefore thoſe laws which the peo- "ple have approved without writing ought alſo to "bind every body. For where is the difference, "whether the people declare their aſſent to a law "by ſuffrage, or by a uniform courſe of acting ac- "cordingly?" Thus did they reaſon while Rome

[8] It is uſually cited either by the name of Co. Litt. or as 1 Inſt.

[9] Theſe are cited as 2, 3, or 4 Inſt. without any author's name. An honorary diſtinction, which, we obſerved, is paid to the works of no other writer; the generality of reports and other tracts being quoted in the name of the compiler, as 2 Ventris, 4 Leonard, 1 Siderfin, and the like.

[o] *Ff.* 1. 3. 32.

had ſome remains of her freedom: but when the imperial tyranny came to be fully eſtabliſhed, the civil laws ſpeak a very different language. "*Quod* "*principi placuit legis habet vigorem, cum populus, ei et* "*in eum omne ſuum imperium et poteſtatem conferat,*" ſays Ulpian [1]. "*Imperator ſolus et conditor et inter-*"*pres legis exiſtimatur,*" ſays the code [2]: and again, "*ſacrilegii inſtar eſt reſcripto principis obviari* [3]." And indeed it is one of the characteriſtic marks of Engliſh liberty, that our common law depends upon cuſtom; which carries this internal evidence of freedom along with it, that it probably was introduced by the voluntary conſent of the people.

II. The ſecond branch of the unwritten laws of England are particular cuſtoms, or laws which affect only the inhabitants of particular diſtricts.

Theſe particular cuſtoms, or ſome of them, are without doubt the remains of that multitude of local cuſtoms before-mentioned, out of which the common law, as it now ſtands, was collected at firſt by king Alfred, and afterwards by king Edgar and Edward the confeſſor: each diſtrict mutually ſacrificing ſome of its own ſpecial uſages, in order that the whole kingdom might enjoy the benefit of one uniform and univerſal ſyſtem of laws. But, for reaſons that have been now long forgotten, particular counties, cities, towns, manors, and lordſhips, were very early indulged with the privilege of abiding by their own cuſtoms, in contradiction to the reſt of the nation at large: which privilege is confirmed to them by ſeveral acts of parliament [4].

Such is the cuſtom of gavelkind in Kent and ſome other parts of the kingdom (though perhaps it was alſo general till the Norman conqueſt) which ordains, among other things, that not the eldeſt ſon only of the father ſhall ſucceed to his inheritance, but all the ſons alike: and that, though the anceſtor be attainted and hanged, yet the heir ſhall ſucceed to his

[1] *Ff.* 1. 4. 1.
[2] *C.* 1. 14. 12.
[3] *C.* 1. 23. 5.
[4] *Mag. Chart.* 9 Hen. III. c. 9. —— 1 Edw. III. ſt. 2. c. 9.—14 Edw. III. ſt. 1. c. 1.—and 2 Hen. IV. c. 1.

eſtate, without any eſcheat to the lord.—Such is the cuſtom that prevails in divers antient boroughs, and therefore called borough-engliſh, that the youngeſt ſon ſhall inherit the eſtate, in preference to all his elder brothers.—Such is the cuſtom in other boroughs, that a widow ſhall be entitled, for her dower, to all her huſband's lands; whereas at the common law ſhe ſhall be endowed of one-third part only.—Such alſo are the ſpecial and particular cuſtoms of manors, of which every one has more or leſs, and which bind all the copyhold and cuſtomary tenants that hold of the ſaid manors.—Such likewiſe is the cuſtom of holding divers inferior courts, with power of trying cauſes, in cities and trading towns; the right of holding which, when no royal grant can be ſhewn, depends entirely upon immemorial and eſtabliſhed uſage.—Such, laſtly, are many particular cuſtoms within the city of London, with regard to trade, apprentices, widows, orphans, and a variety of other matters. All theſe are contrary to the general law of the land, and are good only by ſpecial uſage; though the cuſtoms of London are alſo confirmed by act of parliament[5].

To this head may moſt properly be referred a particular ſyſtem of cuſtoms uſed only among one ſet of the king's ſubjects, called the cuſtom of merchants or *lex mercatoria*: which, however different from the general rules of the common law, is yet ingrafted into it, and made a part of it[6]; being allowed, for the benefit of trade, to be of the utmoſt validity in all commerical tranſactions: for it is a maxim of law, that "*cuilibet in ſua arte credendum eſt.*"

The rules relating to particular cuſtoms regard either the *proof* of their exiſtence; their *legality* when proved; or their uſual method of *allowance*. And firſt, we will conſider the rules of *proof*.

As to gavelkind and borough-engliſh, the law takes particular notice of them,[7], and there is no occaſion to prove that ſuch cuſtoms actually exiſt, but only that the lands in queſtion are ſubject thereto. All other private cuſtoms muſt be particularly plead-

[5] 8 Rep. 126. Cro. Car. 347. [6] Winch. 24. [7] Co. Lit. 175.

ed [8], and as well the exiſtence of ſuch cuſtoms muſt be ſhewn, as that the thing in diſpute is within the cuſtom alleged. The trial in both caſes (both to ſhew the exiſtence of the cuſtom, as, "that in the "manor of Dale lands ſhall deſcend only to the "heirs male, and never to the heirs female;" and alſo to ſhew "that the lands in queſtion are within "that manor") is by a jury of twelve men, and not by the judges; except the ſame particular cuſtom has been before tried, determined, and recorded in the ſame court [9].

The cuſtoms of London differ from all others in point of trial: for, if the exiſtence of the cuſtom be brought in queſtion, it ſhall not be tried by a jury, but by certificate from the lord mayor and aldermen by the mouth of their *(a)* recorder [o], unleſs it be ſuch a cuſtom as the corporation is itſelf intereſted in, as a right of taking toll, *&c.* for then the law permits them not to certify on their own behalf [1].

When a cuſtom is actually proved to exiſt, the next inquiry is into the *legality* of it; for, if it is not a good cuſtom, it ought to be no longer uſed. "*Ma-*"*lus uſus abolendus eſt*" is an eſtabliſhed maxim of the law [2]. To make a particular cuſtom good, the following are neceſſary requiſites.

1. That it have been uſed ſo long, that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. So that, if any one can ſhew the beginning of it, it is no good cuſtom. For which reaſon no cuſtom can prevail againſt an expreſs act of parliament; ſince the ſtatute itſelf is a proof of a time when ſuch a cuſtom did not exiſt [3].

[8] Litt. §. 265.
[9] Dr. & St. 1. 10.
[o] Cro. Car. 516.
[1] Hob. 85.
[2] Lit. §. 212. 4 Inſt. 274.
[3] Co. Litt. 113.

(a) [If any cuſtom has been already certified by the recorder, the judges will take notice thereof in future, and therefore they will not ſuffer it to be certified over again. Blaqueire and others, aſſignees of Sampſon and another, againſt Hawkins, aſſignee of Woldridge, a bankrupt. Douglas, 363.]

2. It must have been *continued*. Any interruption would cause a temporary ceasing: the revival gives it a new beginning, which will be within time of memory, and thereupon the custom will be void. But this must be understood with regard to an interruption of the *right*; for an interruption of the *possession* only, for ten or twenty years, will not destroy the custom[4]. As if the inhabitants of a parish have a customary right of watering their cattle at a certain pool, the custom is not destroyed, though they do not use it for ten years; it only becomes more difficult to prove: but if the *right* be any how discontinued for a day, the custom is quite at an end.

3. It must have been *peaceable*, and acquiesced in; not subject to contention and dispute[5]. For as customs owe their original to common consent, their being immemorially disputed, either at law or otherwise, is a proof that such consent was wanting.

4. Customs must be *reasonable*[6]; or rather, taken negatively, they must not be unreasonable. Which is not always, as sir Edward Coke says[7], to be understood of every unlearned man's reason, but of artificial and legal reason, warranted by authority of law. Upon which account a custom may be good, though the particular reason of it cannot be assigned; for it sufficeth, if no good legal reason can be assigned against it. Thus a custom in a parish, that no man shall put his beasts into the common till the third of October, would be good; and yet it would be hard to shew the reason why that day in particular is fixed upon, rather than the day before or after. But a custom, that no cattle shall be put in till the lord of the manor has first put in his, is unreasonable, and therefore bad: for peradventure the lord will never put in his; and then the tenants will lose all their profits[8].

5. Customs ought to be *certain*. A custom, that lands shall descend to the most worthy of the owner's blood, is void; for how shall this worth be de-

4 Co. Litt. 114.
5 *Ibid.*
6 Litt. §. 212.
7 1 Inst. 62.
8 Co. Copyh. §. 33.

termined? but a cuſtom to deſcend to the next male of the blood, excluſive of females, is certain, and therefore good [9]. A cuſtom to pay two-pence an acre in lieu of tithes, is good; but to pay ſometimes two-pence and ſometimes three-pence, as the occupier of the land pleaſes, is bad for its uncertainty. Yet a cuſtom to pay a year's improved value for a fine on a copyhold eſtate, is good; though the value is a thing uncertain: for the value may at any time be aſcertained; and the maxim of law is, *id certum eſt, quod certum reddi poteſt.*

6. Cuſtoms, though eſtabliſhed by conſent, muſt be (when eſtabliſhed) *compulſory;* and not left to the option of every man, whether he will uſe them or no. Therefore a cuſtom, that all the inhabitants ſhall be rated towards the maintenance of a bridge, will be good; but a cuſtom, that every man is to contribute thereto at his own pleaſure, is idle and abſurd, and indeed no cuſtom at all.

7. Laſtly, cuſtoms muſt be *conſiſtent* with each other: one cuſtom cannot be ſet up in oppoſition to another. For if both are really cuſtoms, then both are of equal antiquity, and both eſtabliſhed by mutual conſent; which to ſay of contradictory cuſtoms is abſurd. Therefore, if one man preſcribes that by cuſtom he has a right to have windows looking into another's garden; the other cannot claim a right by cuſtom to ſtop or obſtruct thoſe windows: for theſe two contradictory cuſtoms cannot both be good, nor both ſtand together. He ought rather to deny the exiſtence of the former cuſtom [o] (*b*).

Next, as the *allowance* of ſpecial cuſtoms. Cuſtoms, in derogation of the common law, muſt be conſtrued ſtrictly. Thus by the cuſtom of gavelkind, an infant of fifteen years may by one ſpecies of conveyance (called a deed of feoffment) convey away his lands in fee ſimple, or for ever. Yet this cuſtom does not impower him to uſe any other con-

[9] 1 Roll. Abr. 565. [o] 9 Rep. 58.

(*b*) [See the caſe of Wigleſworth againſt Dalliſon and another, reported in Douglas, 190.]

veyance, or even to leaſe them for ſeven years: for the cuſtom muſt be ſtrictly purſued[1]. And, moreover, all ſpecial cuſtoms muſt ſubmit to the king's prerogative. Therefore, if the king purchaſes lands of the nature of gavelkind, where all the ſons inherit equally; yet, upon the king's demiſe, his eldeſt ſon ſhall ſucceed to thoſe lands alone[2]. And thus much for the ſecond part of the *leges non ſcriptæ*, or thoſe particular cuſtoms which affect particular perſons or diſtricts only.

III. The third branch of them are thoſe peculiar laws, which by cuſtom are adopted and uſed only in certain peculiar courts and juriſdictions. And by theſe I underſtand the civil and canon laws.

It may ſeem a little improper at firſt view to rank theſe laws under the head of *leges non ſcriptæ*, or unwritten laws, ſeeing they are ſet forth by authority in their pandects, their codes, and their inſtitutions; their councils, decrees, and decretals; and enforced by an immenſe number of expoſitions, deciſions, and treatiſes of the learned in both branches of the law. But I do this, after the example of ſir Matthew Hale[3], becauſe it is moſt plain that it is not on account of their being *written* laws, that either the canon law, or the civil law, have any obligation within this kingdom; neither do their force and efficacy depend upon their own intrinſic authority; which is the caſe of our written laws, or acts of parliament. They bind not the ſubjects of England, becauſe their materials were collected from popes or emperors; were digeſted by Juſtinian, or declared to be authentic by Gregory. Theſe conſiderations give them no authority here; for the legiſlature of England doth not, nor ever did, recognize any foreign power, as ſuperior or equal to it in this kingdom; or as having the right to give law to any, the meaneſt of its ſubjects. But all the ſtrength that either the papal or imperial laws have obtained in this realm (or indeed in any other kingdom in

[1] Co. Cop. §. 33. Co. Litt. 15.

[3] Hiſt. C. L. c. 2.

Europe) is only becauſe they have been admitted and received by immemorial uſage and cuſtom in ſome particular caſes, and ſome particular courts; and then they form a branch of the *leges non ſcriptæ*, or cuſtomary laws; or elſe, becauſe they are in ſome other caſes introduced by conſent of parliament, and then they owe their validity to the *leges ſcriptæ*, or ſtatute law. This is expreſsly declared in thoſe remarkable words of the ſtatute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 21. addreſſed to the king's royal majeſty.—" This " your Grace's realm, recognizing no ſuperior un- " der God but only your Grace, hath been and is " free from ſubjection to any man's laws, but only " to ſuch as have been deviſed, made, and ordain- " ed *within* this realm for the wealth of the ſame; " or to ſuch other as, by ſufferance of your grace " and your progenitors, the people of this your " realm have taken at their free liberty, by their " own conſent to be uſed among them; and have " bound themſelves by long uſe and cuſtom to the " obſervance of the ſame; not as to the obſervance " of the laws of any foreign prince, potentate, or " prelate; but as to the *cuſtomed* and antient laws of " this realm, originally eſtabliſhed as laws of the " ſame, by the ſaid ſufferance, conſents, and cuſ- " tom; and none otherwiſe."

By the civil law, abſolutely taken, is generally underſtood the civil or municipal law of the Roman empire, as comprized in the inſtitutes, the code, and the digeſt of the emperor Juſtinian, and the novel conſtitutions of himſelf and ſome of his ſucceſſors. Of which, as there will frequently be occaſion to cite them, by way of illuſtrating our own laws, it may not be amiſs to give a ſhort and general account.

The Roman law, (founded firſt upon the regal conſtitutions of their ancient kings, next upon the twelve tables of the *decemviri*, then upon the laws or ſtatutes enacted by the ſenate or people, the edicts of the prætor, and the *reſponſa prudentum* or opinions of learned lawyers, and laſtly upon the imperial decrees, or conſtitutions of ſucceſſive emperors) had

grown to so great a bulk, or as Livy expresses it [4], "*tam immensus aliarum super alias asservatarum legum* "*cumulus*," that they were computed to be many camels' load by an author who preceded Justinian [5]. This was in part remedied by the collections of three private lawyers, Gregorius, Hermogenes, and Papirius; and then by the emperor Theodosius the younger, by whose orders a code was compiled, *A. D.* 438, being a methodical collection of all the imperial constitutions then in force; which Theodosian code was the only book of civil law received as authentic in the western part of Europe, till many centuries after; and to this it is probable that the Franks and Goths might frequently pay some regard, in framing legal constitutions for their newly erected kingdoms. For Justinian commanded only in the eastern remains of the empire; and it was under his auspices that the present body of civil law was compiled and finished by Tribonian and other lawyers, about the year 533. This consists of, 1. The institutes; which contain the elements or first principles of the Roman law, in four books. 2. The digests, or pandects, in fifty books; containing the opinions and writings of eminent lawyers, digested in a systematical method. 3. A new code, or collection of imperial constitutions, in twelve books; the lapse of a whole century having rendered the former code, of Theodosius, imperfect. 4. The novels, or new constitutions, posterior in time to the other books, and amounting to a supplement to the code; containing new decrees of successive emperors, as new questions happened to arise. These form the body of Roman law, or *corpus juris civilis*, as published about the time of Justinian; which however fell soon into neglect and oblivion, till about the year 1130, when a copy of the digests was found at Amalfi in Italy: which accident, concurring with the policy of the Roman ecclesiastics [6], suddenly gave new vogue and authority to the civil law, introduced it into several nations,

[4] *l.* 3. *c.* 24.
[5] Taylor's elements of civil law, 17.
[6] See §. 1. page 18.

and occaſioned that mighty inundation of voluminous comments, with which this ſyſtem of law, more than any other, is now loaded.

The canon law is a body of Roman eccleſiaſtical law, relative to ſuch matters as that church either has, or pretends to have, the proper juriſdiction over. This is compiled from the opinions of the antient Latin fathers, the decrees of general councils, and the decretal epiſtles and bulles of the holy ſee. All which lay in the ſame diſorder and confuſion as the Roman civil law; till, about the year 1151, one Gratian an Italian monk, animated by the diſcovery of Juſtinian's pandects, reduced the eccleſiaſtical conſtitutions alſo into ſome method, in three books; which he entitled *concordia diſcordantium canonum*, but which are generally known by the name of *decretum Gratiani*. Theſe reached as low as the time of pope Alexander III. The ſubſequent papal decrees, to the pontificate of Gregory IX, were publiſhed in much the ſame method under the auſpices of that pope, about the year 1230, in five books; entitled *decretalia Gregorii noni*. A ſixth book was added by Boniface VIII. about the year 1298, which is called *ſextus decretalium*. The Clementine conſtitutions, or decrees of Clement V, were in like manner authenticated in 1317 by his ſucceſſor John XXII; who alſo publiſhed twenty conſtitutions of his own, called the *extravagantes Joannis*: all which in ſome meaſure anſwer to the novels of the civil law. To theſe have been ſince added ſome decrees of later popes in five books, called *extravagantes communes*. And all theſe together, Gratian's decree, Gregory's decretals, the ſixth decretal, the Clementine conſtitutions, and the extravagants of John and his ſucceſſors, form the *corpus juris canonici*, or body of the Roman canon law.

Beſides theſe pontifical collections, which during the times of popery were received as authentic in this iſland, as well as in other parts of chriſtendom, there is alſo a kind of national canon law, compoſed of *legatine* and *provincial* conſtitutions, and adapted only to the exigencies of this church and kingdom. The *legatine* conſtitutions were eccleſiaſtical laws,

enacted in national ſynods, held under the cardinals Otho and Othobon, legates from pope Gregory IX and pope Clement IV, in the reign of king Henry III, about the year 1220 and 1268. The *provincial* conſtitutions are principally the decrees of provincial ſynods, held under divers archbiſhops of Canterbury, from Stephen Langton in the reign of Henry III to Henry Chichele in the reign of Henry V; and adopted alſo by the province of York[7] in the reign of Henry VI. At the dawn of the reformation, in the reign of king Henry VIII, it was enacted in parliament[8] that a review ſhould be had of the canon law; and, till ſuch review ſhould be made, all canons, conſtitutions, ordinances, and ſynodals provincial, being then already made, and not repugnant to the law of the land or the king's prerogative, ſhould ſtill be uſed and executed. And, as no ſuch review has yet been perfected, upon this ſtatute now depends the authority of the canon law in England.

As for the canons enacted by the clergy under James I, in the year 1603, and never confirmed in parliament, it has been ſolemnly adjudged upon the principles of the law and the conſtitution, that where they are not merely declaratory of the antient canon law, but are introductory of new regulations, they do not bind the laity[9]; whatever regard the clergy may think proper to pay them.

There are four ſpecies of courts, in which the civil and canon laws are permitted (under different reſtrictions) to be uſed. 1. The courts of the archbiſhops and biſhops, and their derivative officers, uſually called in our law courts chriſtian, *curia chriſtianitatis*, or the eccleſiaſtical courts. 2. The military courts. 3. The courts of admiralty. 4. The courts of the two univerſities. In all, their reception in general, and the different degrees of that reception, are grounded entirely upon cuſtom; corroborated in the latter inſtance by act of parliament, ratifying

[7] Burn's eccl. law, pref. viii.
[8] Statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19; revived and confirmed by 1 Eliz. c. 1.
[9] Stra. 1057.

thoſe charters which confirm the cuſtomary law of the univerſities. The more minute conſideration of theſe will fall properly under that part of theſe commentaries which treats of the juriſdiction of courts. It will ſuffice at preſent to remark a few particulars relative to them all, which may ſerve to inculcate more ſtrongly the doctrine laid down concerning them[o].

1. And, firſt, the courts of common law have the ſuperintendency over theſe courts; to keep them within their juriſdictions, to determine wherein they exceed them, to reſtrain and prohibit ſuch exceſs, and (in caſe of contumacy) to puniſh the officer who executes, and in ſome caſes the judge who enforces, the ſentence ſo declared to be illegal.

2. The common law has reſerved to itſelf the expoſition of all ſuch acts of parliament, as concern either the extent of theſe courts or the matters depending before them. And therefore if theſe courts either refuſe to allow theſe acts of parliament, or will expound them in any other ſenſe than what the common law puts upon them, the king's courts at Weſtminſter will grant prohibitions to reſtrain and control them.

3. An appeal lies from all theſe courts to the king, in the laſt reſort; which proves that the juriſdiction exerciſed in them is derived from the crown of England, and not from any foreign potentate, or intrinſic authority of their own. And, from theſe three ſtrong marks and enſigns of ſuperiority, it appears beyond a doubt, that the civil and canon laws, though admitted in ſome caſes by cuſtom in ſome courts, are only ſubordinate, and *leges ſub graviori lege*; and that, thus admitted, reſtrained, altered, new-modelled, and amended, they are by no means with us a diſtinct and independent ſpecies of laws, but are inferior branches of the cuſtomary or unwritten laws of England, properly called the king's eccleſiaſtical, the king's military, the king's maritime, or the king's academical, laws.

[o] Hale Hiſt. c. 2.

Let us next proceed to the *leges ſcriptæ*, the written laws of the kingdom; which are ſtatutes, acts, or edicts, made by the king's majeſty, by and with the advice and conſent of the lords ſpiritual and temporal and commons in parliament aſſembled[1]. The oldeſt of theſe now extant, and printed in our ſtatute books, is the famous *magna charta*, as confirmed in parliament 9 Hen. III: though doubtleſs there were many acts before that time, the records of which are now loſt, and the determinations of them perhaps at preſent currently received for the maxims of the old common law.

The manner of making theſe ſtatutes will be better conſidered hereafter, when we examine the conſtitution of parliaments. At preſent we will only take notice of the different kinds of ſtatutes; and of ſome general rules with regard to their conſtruction[2].

Firſt, as to their ſeveral kinds. Statutes are either *general* or *ſpecial*, *public* or *private*. A general or pub-

[1] 8 Rep. 20.

[2] The method of citing theſe acts of parliament is various. Many of our antient ſtatutes are called after the name of the place where the parliament was held that made them; as the ſtatutes of Merton and Marlebergé, of Weſtminſter, Gloceſter, and Wincheſter. Others are denominated entirely from their ſubject; as the ſtatute of Wales and Ireland, the *articuli cleri*, and the *prærogativa regis*. Some are diſtinguiſhed by their initial words, a method of citing very antient: being uſed by the Jews in denominating the books of the pentateuch; by the chriſtian church in diſtinguiſhing their hymns and divine offices; by the Romaniſts in deſcribing their papal bulles; and in ſhort by the whole body of antient civilians and canoniſts, among whom this method of citation generally prevailed, not only with regard to chapters, but inferior ſections alſo; in imitation of all which we ſtill call ſome of our old ſtatutes by their initial words, as the ſtatute of *quia emptores*, and that of *circumſpecte agatis*. But the moſt uſual method of citing them, eſpecially ſince the time of Edward the ſecond, is by naming the year of the king's reign in which the ſtatute was made, together with the chapter, or particular act, according to it's numeral order, as, 9 Geo. II. c. 4. For all the acts of one ſeſſion of parliament taken together make properly but one ſtatute: and therefore when two ſeſſions have been held in one year, we uſually mention ſtat. 1. or 2. Thus the bill of rights is cited, as 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. ſignifying that it is the ſecond chapter or act, of the ſecond ſtatute, or the laws made in the ſecond ſeſſion of parliament, in the firſt year of king William and queen Mary.

lic act is an universal rule, that regards the whole community: and of this the courts of law are bound to take notice judicially and *ex officio*; without the statute being particularly pleaded, or formally set forth by the party who claims an advantage under it. Special or private acts are rather exceptions than rules, being those which only operate upon particular persons, and private concerns; such as the Romans entitled *senatus-decreta*, in contradistinction to the *senatus consulta*, which regarded the whole community[3]: and of these (which are not promulgated with the same notoriety as the former) the judges are not bound to take notice, unless they be formally shewn and pleaded. Thus, to shew the distinction, the statute 13 Eliz. c. 10. to prevent spiritual persons from making leases for longer terms than twenty-one years, or three lives, is a public act; it being a rule prescribed to the whole body of spiritual persons in the nation: but an act to enable the bishop of Chester to make a lease to A. B. for sixty years, is an exception to this rule; it concerns only the parties and the bishop's successors; and is therefore a private act.

Statutes also are either *declaratory* of the common law, or *remedial* of some defects therein. Declaratory, where the old custom of the kingdom is almost fallen into disuse, or become disputable; in which case the parliament has thought proper, *in perpetuum rei testimonium*, and for avoiding all doubts and difficulties, to declare what the common law is and ever hath been. Thus the statute of treasons, 25 Edw. III. cap. 2. doth not make any new species of treasons; but only for the benefit of the subject, declares and enumerates those several kinds of offences, which before were treason at the common law. Remedial statutes are those which are made to supply such defects, and abridge such superfluities, in the common law, as arise either from the general imperfection of all human laws, from change of time and circumstances, from the mistakes and unadvised determinations of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from any other cause whatsoever. And this being done,

[3] Gravin. *Orig.* 1. § 24.

either by enlarging the common law where it was too narrow and circumſcribed, or by reſtraining it where it was too lax and luxuriant, hath occaſioned another ſubordinate diviſion of remedial acts of parliament into *enlarging* and *reſtraining* ſtatutes. To inſtance again in the caſe of treaſon. Clipping the current coin of the kingdom was an offence not ſufficiently guarded againſt by the common law: therefore it was thought expedient by ſtatute 5 Eliz. c. 11. to make it high treaſon, which it was not at the common law: ſo that this was an *enlarging* ſtatute. At common law alſo ſpiritual corporations might leaſe out their eſtates for any term of years, till prevented by the ſtatute 13 Eliz. before-mentioned: this was therefore a *reſtraining* ſtatute.

Secondly, the rules to be obſerved with regard to the conſtruction of ſtatutes are principally theſe which follow.

1. There are three points to be conſidered in the conſtruction of all remedial ſtatutes; the old law, the miſchief, and the remedy: that is, how the common law ſtood at the making of the act; what the miſchief was, for which the common law did not provide; and what remedy the parliament hath provided to cure this miſchief. And it is the buſineſs of the judges ſo to conſtrue the act, as to ſuppreſs the miſchief and advance the remedy[4]. Let us inſtance again in the ſame reſtraining ſtatute of 13 Eliz. c. 10. By the common law, eccleſiaſtical corporations might let as long leaſes as they thought proper: the miſchief was, that they let long and unreaſonable leaſes, to the impoveriſhment of their ſucceſſors: the remedy applied by the ſtatute was by making void all leaſes by eccleſiaſtical bodies for longer terms than three lives or twenty-one years. Now in the conſtruction of this ſtatute it is held, that leaſes, though for a longer term, if made by a biſhop, are not void during the biſhop's continuance in his ſee; or, if made by a dean and chapter, they are not void during the continuance of the dean: for the act was made for the benefit and protection of the ſucceſſor[5].

[4] 3 Rep. 7. Co. Litt. 11. 42. 10 Rep. 58.
[5] Co. Lit. 45. 3 Rep. 60.

The miſchief is therefore ſufficiently ſuppreſſed by vacating them after the determination of the intereſt of the grantors; but the leaſes, during their continuance, being not within the miſchief, are not within the remedy.

2. A ſtatute, which treats of things or perſons of an inferior rank, cannot by any *general words* be extended to thoſe of a ſuperior. So a ſtatute, treating of "deans, prebendaries, parſons, vicars, *and others* "*having ſpiritual promotion*," is held not to extend to biſhops, though they have ſpiritual promotion; deans being the higheſt perſons named, and biſhops being of a ſtill higher order[6].

3. Penal ſtatutes muſt be conſtrued ſtrictly. Thus the ſtatute 1 Edw. VI. c. 12. having enacted that thoſe who are convicted of ſtealing *horſes* ſhould not have the benefit of clergy, the judges conceived that this did not extend to him that ſhould ſteal but one *horſe*, and therefore procured a new act for that purpoſe in the following year[7]. And, to come nearer our own times, by the ſtatute 14 Geo. II. c. 6. ſtealing ſheep, *or other cattle*, was made felony without benefit of clergy. But theſe general words, "or other "cattle," being looked upon as much too looſe to create a capital offence, the act was held to extend to nothing but mere ſheep. And therefore, in the next ſeſſions, it was found neceſſary to make another ſtatute, 15 Geo. II. c. 34. extending the former to bulls, cows, oxen, ſteers, bullocks, heifers, calves, and lambs by name.

4. Statutes againſt frauds are to be liberally and beneficially expounded. This may ſeem a contradiction to the laſt rule; moſt ſtatutes againſt frauds being in their conſequences penal. But this difference is here to be taken: where the ſtatute acts upon the offender, and inflicts a penalty, as the pillory or a fine, it is then to be taken ſtrictly: but when the ſtatute acts upon the offence, by ſetting aſide the fraudulent tranſaction, here it is to be conſtrued liberally. Upon this footing the ſtatute of 13 Eliz. c. 5. which

[6] 2 Rep. 46. [7] 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 33. Bac. Elem. c. 12.

avoids all gifts of goods, &c. made to defraud creditors *and others*, was held to extend by the general words to a gift made to defraud the queen of a forfeiture [8].

5. One part of a ſtatute muſt be ſo conſtrued by another, that the whole may (if poſſible) ſtand: *ut res magis valeat, quam pereat.* As if land be veſted in the king and his heirs by act of parliament, ſaving the right of A; and A has at that time a leaſe of it for three years: here A ſhall hold it for his term of three years, and afterwards it ſhall go to the king. For this interpretation furniſhes matter for every clauſe of the ſtatute to work and operate upon. But

6. A ſaving, totally repugnant to the body of the act, is void. If therefore an act of parliament veſts land in the king and his heirs, ſaving the right of all perſons whatſoever; or veſts the land of A in the king, ſaving the right of A; in either of theſe caſes the ſaving is totally repugnant to the body of the ſtatute, and (if good) would render the ſtatute of no effect or operation; and therefore the ſaving is void, and the land veſts abſolutely in the king [9].

7. Where the common law and a ſtatute differ, the common law gives place to the ſtatute; and an old ſtatute gives place to a new one. And this upon a general principle of univerſal law, that "*leges poſ-*"*teriores priores contrarias abrogant*: conſonant to which it was laid down by a law of the twelve tables at Rome, that "*quod populus poſtremum juſſit, id jus*"*ratum eſto.*" But this is to be underſtood, only when the latter ſtatute is couched in negative terms, or where it's matter is ſo clearly repugnant, that it neceſſarily implies a negative. As if a former act ſays, that a juror upon ſuch a trial ſhall have twenty pounds a year; and a new ſtatute afterwards enacts that he ſhall have twenty marks: here the latter ſtatute, though it does not expreſs, yet neceſſarily implies a negative, and virtually repeals the former. For if twenty marks be made qualification ſufficient, the former ſtatute which requires twenty pounds is at an end [o]. But if both

[8] 3 Rep. 82.
[9] 1 Rep. 47.
[o] Jenk. Cent. 2. 73.

acts be merely affirmative, and the ſubſtance ſuch that both may ſtand together, here the latter does not repeal the former, but they ſhall both have a concurrent efficacy. If by a former law an offence be indictable at the quarter-ſeſſions, and a latter law makes the ſame offence indictable at the aſſizes; here the juriſdiction of the ſeſſions is not taken away; but both have a concurrent juriſdiction, and the offender may be proſecuted at either; unleſs the new ſtatute ſubjoins expreſs negative words, as, that the offence ſhall be indictable at the aſſiſes, *and not elſewhere* [1].

8. If a ſtatute, that repeals another, is itſelf repealed afterwards, the firſt ſtatute is hereby revived, without any formal words for that purpoſe. So when the ſtatutes of 26 and 35 Henry VIII, declaring the king to be the ſupreme head of the church, were repealed by a ſtatute 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, and this latter ſtatute was afterwards repealed by an act of 1 Eliz. there needed not any expreſs words of revival in queen Elizabeth's ſtatute, but theſe acts of king Henry were impliedly and virtually revived [2].

9. Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of ſubſequent parliaments bind not. So the ſtatute 11 Henry VII. c. 1. which directs that no perſon for aſſiſting a king *de facto* ſhall be attainted of treaſon by act of parliament or otherwiſe, is held to be good only as to common proſecution for high treaſon; but will not reſtrain or clog any parliamentary attainders [3]. Becauſe the legiſlature, being in truth the ſovereign power, is always of equal, always of abſolute authority: it acknowledges no ſuperior upon earth, which the prior legiſlature muſt have been, if it's ordinances could bind a ſubſequent parliament. And upon the ſame principle Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, treats with a proper contempt theſe reſtraining clauſes, which endeavour to tie up the hands of ſucceeding legiſlatures. "When "you repeal the law itſelf, ſays he, you at the ſame

[1] 11 Rep. 63.
[2] 4 Inſt. 325.
[3] 4 Inſt. 43.

" time repeal the prohibitory clauſe, which guards " againſt ſuch repeal [4].

10. Laſtly, acts of parliament that are impoſſible to be performed are of no validity; and if there ariſe out of them collaterally any abſurd conſequences, manifeſtly contradictory to common reaſon, they are, with regard to thoſe collateral conſequences, void. I lay down the rule with theſe reſtrictions; though I know it is generally laid down more largely, that acts of parliament contrary to reaſon are void. But if the parliament will poſitively enact a thing to be done which is unreaſonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms of the conſtitution, that is veſted with authority to control it: and the examples uſually alleged in ſupport of this ſenſe of the rule do none of them prove, that, where the main object of a ſtatute is unreaſonable, the judges are at liberty to reject it; for that were to ſet the judicial power above that of the legiſlature, which would be ſubverſive of all government. But where ſome collateral matter ariſes out of the general words, and happens to be unreaſonable; there the judges are in decency to conclude that this conſequence was not foreſeen by the parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the ſtatute by equity, and only *quoad hoc* diſregard it. Thus if an act of parliament gives a man power to try all cauſes, that ariſe within his manor of Dale; yet if a cauſe ſhould ariſe in which he himſelf is party, the act is conſtrued not to extend to that, becauſe it is unreaſonable that any man ſhould determine his own quarrel [5]. But if we could conceive it poſſible for the parliament to enact, that he ſhould try as well his own cauſes as thoſe of other perſons, there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the legiſlature, when couched in ſuch evident and expreſs words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the legiſlature or no.

These are the ſeveral grounds of the laws of England: over and above which, equity is alſo frequently

[4] *Cum lex abrogatur, illud ipſum abrogatur, quo non eam abrogari oporteat. l.* 3. *ep.* 23.

[5] 8 Rep. 118.

called in to aſſiſt, to moderate, and to explain them. What equity is, and how impoſſible in its very eſſence to be reduced to ſtated rules, hath been ſhewn in the preceding ſection. I ſhall therefore only add, that (beſides the liberality of ſentiment with which our common law judges interpret acts of parliament, and ſuch rules of the unwritten laws as are not of a poſitive kind) there are alſo peculiar courts of equity eſtabliſhed for the benefit of the ſubject; to detect latent frauds and concealments, which the proceſs of the courts of law is not adapted to reach; to enforce the execution of ſuch matters of truſt and confidence, as are binding in conſcience, though not cognizable in a court of law; to deliver from ſuch dangers as are owing to misfortune or overſight; and to give a more ſpecific relief, and more adapted to the circumſtances of the caſe, than can always be obtained by the generality of the rules of the poſitive or common law. This is the buſineſs of our courts of equity, which however are only converſant in matters of property. For the freedom of our conſtitution will not permit, that in criminal caſes a power ſhould be lodged in any judge, to conſtrue the law otherwiſe than according to the letter. This caution, while it admirably protects the public liberty, can never bear hard upon individuals. A man cannot ſuffer *more* puniſhment than the law aſſigns, but he may ſuffer *leſs*. The laws cannot be ſtrained by partiality to inflict a penalty beyond what the letter will warrant; but, in caſes where the letter induces any apparent hardſhip, the crown has the power to pardon.

SECTION THE FOURTH.

OF THE COUNTRIES SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

THE kingdom of England, over which our municipal laws have juriſdiction, includes not, by the common law, either Wales, Scotland, or Ireland, or any other part of the king's dominions, except the territory of England only. And yet the civil laws and local cuſtoms of this territory do now obtain, in part or in all, with more or leſs reſtrictions, in theſe and many other adjacent countries; of which it will be proper firſt to take a review, before we conſider the kingdom of England itſelf, the original and proper ſubject of theſe laws.

Wales had continued independent of England, unconquered and uncultivated, in the primitive paſtoral ſtate which Cæſar and Tacitus aſcribe to Britain in general, for many centuries; even from the time of the hoſtile invaſions of the Saxons, when the antient and chriſtian inhabitants of the iſland retired to thoſe natural intrenchments, for protection from their pagan viſitants. But when theſe invaders themſelves were converted to chriſtianity, and ſettled into regular and potent governments, this retreat of the antient Britons grew every day narrower; they were over-run by little and little, gradually driven from one faſtneſs to another, and by repeated loſſes abridged of their wild independence. Very early in our hiſtory we find their princes doing homage to the crown of England; till at length in the reign of Edward the firſt, who may juſtly be ſtiled the conqueror of Wales, the line of their antient princes was aboliſhed, and the king of England's eldeſt ſon became, as a matter of courſe, their titular prince, the territory of Wales being then entirely re-annexed (by a kind of feodal reſumption) to the dominion of the

crown of England [1]; or, as the ſtatute of Rhudhlan [2] expreſſes it, "*terra Walliæ cum incolis ſuis, prius regi "jure feodali ſubjecta,* (of which homage was the ſign) "*jam in proprietatis dominium totaliter et cum integritate "converſa eſt, et coronæ regni Angliæ tanquam pars corpo-"ris ejuſdem annexa et unita.*" By the ſtatute alſo of Wales [3]; very material alterations were made in divers parts of their laws, ſo as to reduce them nearer to the Engliſh ſtandard, eſpecially in the forms of their judicial proceedings: but they ſtill retained very much of their original polity; particularly their rule of inheritance, *viz.* that their lands were divided equally among all the iſſue male, and did not deſcend to the eldeſt ſon alone. By other ſubſequent ſtatutes their provincial immunities were ſtill farther abridged: but the finiſhing ſtroke to their independency was given by the ſtatute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 26. which at the ſame time gave the utmoſt advancement to their civil proſperity, by admitting them to a thorough communication of laws with the ſubjects of England. Thus were this brave people gradually conquered into the enjoyment of true liberty; being inſenſibly put upon the ſame footing, and made fellow-citizens with their conquerors. A generous method of triumph, which the republic of Rome practiſed with great ſucceſs; till ſhe reduced all Italy to her obedience, by admitting the vanquiſhed ſtates to partake of the Roman privileges.

It is enacted by the ſtatute 27 Hen. VIII, 1. That the dominion of Wales ſhall be for ever united to the kingdom of England. 2. That all Welſhmen born ſhall have the ſame liberties as other the king's ſubjects. 3. That lands in Wales ſhall be inheritable according to the Engliſh tenures and rules of deſcent. 4. That the laws of England, and no other, ſhall be uſed in Wales: beſides many other regulations of the police of this principality. And the ſtatute 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 26. confirms the ſame, adds farther regulations, divides it into twelve ſhires, and, in ſhort, reduces it into the ſame order in which it ſtands at this day; differing from the kingdom of England in only a

[1] Vaugh. 400. [2] 10 Edw. I. [3] 12 Edw. I.

few particulars, and those too of the nature of privileges, (such as having courts within itself, independent of the process of Westminster-hall) and some other immaterial peculiarities, hardly more than are to be found in many counties of England itself.

The kingdom of Scotland, notwithstanding the union of the crowns on the accession of their king James VI. to that of England, continued an entirely separate and distinct kingdom for above a century more, though an union had been long projected; which was judged to be the more easy to be done, as both kingdoms were antiently under the same government, and still retained a very great resemblance, though far from an identity, in their laws. By an act of parliament 1 Jac. 1. c. 1. it is declared, that these two mighty, famous, and antient kingdoms were formerly one. And sir Edward Coke observes[4], how marvellous a conformity there was, not only in the religion and language of the two nations, but also in their antient laws, the descent of the crown, their parliaments, their titles of nobility, their officers of state and of justice, their writs, their customs, and even the language of their laws. Upon which account he supposes the common law of each to have been originally the same; especially as their most antient and authentic book, called *regiam majestatem*, and containing the rules of *their* ancient common law, is extremely similar to that of Glanvil, which contains the principles of *ours*, as it stood in the reign of Henry II. And the many diversities, subsisting between the two laws at present, may be well enough accounted for, from a diversity of practice in two large and uncommunicating jurisdictions, and from the acts of two distinct and independent parliaments, which have in many points altered and abrogated the old common law of both kingdoms.

However, sir Edward Coke, and the politicians of that time, conceived great difficulties in carrying on the projected union: but these were at length overcome, and the great work was happily effected

[4] 4 Inst. 345.

in 1707, 6 Anne; when twenty-five articles of union were agreed to by the parliaments of both nations: the purport of the moſt conſiderable being as follows:

1. That on the firſt of May 1707, and for ever after, the kingdoms of England and Scotland ſhall be united into one kingdom, by the name of Great Britain.

2. The ſucceſſion to the monarchy of Great Britain ſhall be the ſame as was before ſettled with regard to that of England.

3. The united kingdom ſhall be repreſented by one parliament.

4. There ſhall be a communication of all rights and privileges between the ſubjects of both kingdoms, except where it is otherwiſe agreed.

9. When England raiſes 2,000,000*l.* by a land tax, Scotland ſhall raiſe 48,000*l.*

16, 17. The ſtandards of the coin, of weights, and of meaſures, ſhall be reduced to thoſe of England, throughout the united kingdoms.

18. The laws relating to trade, cuſtoms and the exciſe ſhall be the ſame in Scotland as in England. But all the other laws of Scotland ſhall remain in force; though alterable by the parliament of Great Britain. Yet with this caution: that laws relating to public policy are alterable at the diſcretion of the parliament; laws relating to private right are not to be altered but for the evident utility of the people of Scotland.

22. Sixteen peers are to be choſen to repreſent the peerage of Scotland in parliament, and forty-five members to ſit in the houſe of commons.

23. The ſixteen peers of Scotland ſhall have all privileges of parliament: and all peers of Scotland ſhall be peers of Great Britain, and rank next after thoſe of the ſame degree at the time of the union, and ſhall have all privileges of peers, except ſitting in the houſe of lords and voting on the trial of a peer.

Theſe are the principal of the twenty-five articles of union, which are ratified and confirmed by ſtatute 5 Ann. c. 8. in which ſtatute there are alſo two acts of parliament recited, the one of Scotland,

whereby the church of Scotland and alſo the four univerſities of that kingdom, are eſtabliſhed for ever, and all ſucceeding ſovereigns are to take an oath inviolably to maintain the ſame; the other of England, 5 Ann. c. 6. whereby the acts of uniformity of 13 Eliz. and 13 Car. II. (except as the ſame had been altered by parliament at that time) and all other acts then in force for the preſervation of the church of England, are declared perpetual; and it is ſtipulated, that every ſubſequent king and queen ſhall take an oath inviolably to maintain the ſame within England, Ireland, Wales, and the town of Berwick upon Tweed. And it is enacted, that theſe two acts "ſhall "for ever be obſerved as fundamental and eſſential "conditions of the union."

Upon theſe articles and act of union, it is to be obſerved, 1. That the two kingdoms are now ſo inſeparably united, that nothing can ever diſunite them again; except the mutual conſent of both, or the ſucceſsful reſiſtance of either, upon apprehending an infringement of thoſe points which, when they were ſeparate and independent nations, it was mutually ſtipulated ſhould be "fundamental and eſſen-"tial conditions of the union[4]." 2. That whatever

[4] It may juſtly be doubted, whether even ſuch an infringement (though a manifeſt breach of good faith, unleſs done upon the moſt preſſing neceſſity) would of itſelf diſſolve the union: for the bare idea of a ſtate, without a power ſomewhere veſted to alter every part of it's laws, is the height of political abſurdity. The truth ſeems to be, that in ſuch an *incorporate union* (which is well diſtinguiſhed by a very learned prelate from a *fœderate alliance*, where ſuch an infringement would certainly reſcind the compact) the two contracting eſtates are totally annihilated, without any power of a revival; and a third ariſes from their conjunction, in which all the rights of ſovereignty, and particularly that of legiſlation, muſt of neceſſity reſide. (See Warburton's alliance. 195.) But the wanton or imprudent exertion of this right would probably raiſe a very alarming ferment in the minds of individuals; and therefore it is hinted above that ſuch an attempt might *endanger* (though by no means *deſtroy*) the union.

To illuſtrate this matter a little farther: an act of parliament to repeal or alter the act of uniformity in England, or to eſtabliſh epiſcopacy in Scotland, would doubtleſs in point of authority be ſufficiently valid and binding; and, notwithſtanding ſuch an act, the union would continue unbroken. Nay, each of theſe meaſures might be ſafely

elſe may be deemed "fundamental and eſſential conditions," the preſervation of the two churches, of England and Scotland, in the ſame ſtate that they were in at the time of the union, and the maintenance of the acts of uniformity which eſtabliſhed our common prayer, are expreſsly declared ſo to be. 3. That therefore any alteration in the conſtitution of either of thoſe churches, or in the liturgy of the church of England, (unleſs with the conſent of the reſpective churches, collectively or repreſentatively given,) would be an infringement of theſe "fundamental and eſſential conditions," and greatly endanger the union. 4. That the municipal laws of Scotland are ordained to be ſtill obſerved in that part of the iſland, unleſs altered by parliament; and, as the parliament has not yet thought proper, except in a few inſtances, to alter them, they ſtill (with regard to the particulars unaltered) continue in full force. Wherefore the municipal or common laws of England are, generally ſpeaking, of no force or validity in Scotland; and of conſequence, in the enſuing commentaries, we ſhall have very little occaſion to mention, any farther than ſometimes by way of illuſtration, the municipal laws of that part of the united kingdoms.

The town of Berwick upon Tweed was originally part of the kingdom of Scotland; and, as ſuch, was for a time reduced by king Edward I. into the poſſeſſion of the crown of England: and during ſuch it's ſubjection, it received from that prince a charter, which after it's ſubſequent ceſſion by Edward Balliol, to be for ever united to the crown and realm of England) was confirmed by king Edward III, with ſome additions; particularly that it ſhould be governed by the laws and uſages which it enjoyed during the time of king Alexander, that is, before it's reduction by Edward I. It's conſtitution was new mo-

and honourably purſued, if reſpectively agreeable to the ſentiments of the Engliſh church, or the kirk in Scotland. But it ſhould ſeem neither prudent, nor perhaps conſiſtent with good faith, to venture upon either of thoſe ſteps, by a ſpontaneous exertion of the inherent powers of parliament, or at the inſtance of mere individuals—So ſacred indeed are the laws abovementioned (for protecting each church and the Engliſh liturgy) eſteemed, that in the regency acts both of 1751 and 1765 the regents are expreſsly diſabled from aſſenting to the repeal or alteration of either theſe, or the act of ſettlement.

delled, and put upon an Engliſh footing by a charter of king James I: and all it's liberties, franchiſes, and cuſtoms, were confirmed in parliament by the ſtatutes 22 Edw. IV. c. 8. and 2 Jac. I. c. 28. Though therefore it hath ſome local peculiarities, derived from the antient laws of Scotland [5], yet it is clearly part of the realm of England, being repreſented by burgeſſes in the houſe of commons, and bound by all acts of the Britiſh parliament, whether ſpecially named or otherwiſe. And therefore it was (perhaps ſuperfluouſly) declared by ſtatute 20 Geo. II. c. 42. that, where England only is mentioned in any act of parliament, the ſame notwithſtanding hath and ſhall be deemed to comprehend the dominion of Wales and town of Berwick upon Tweed. And though certain of the king's writs or proceſſes of the courts of Weſtminſter do not uſually run into Berwick, any more than the principality of Wales, yet it hath been ſolemnly adjudged [6] that all prerogative writs (as thoſe of *mandamus*, prohibition, *habeas corpus*, *certiorari*, *&c.*) may iſſue to Berwick as well as to every other of the dominions of the crown of England, and that indictments and other local matters ariſing in the town of Berwick may be tried by a jury of the county of Northumberland.

As to Ireland, that is ſtill a diſtinct kingdom; though a dependant ſubordinate kingdom. It was only entitled the dominion or lordſhip of Ireland [7], and the king's ſtile was no other than *dominus Hiberniæ*, lord of Ireland, till the thirty-third year of king Henry the eighth; when he aſſumed the title of king, which is recognized by act of parliament 35 Hen. VIII. c. 3. But, as Scotland and England are now one and the ſame kingdom, and yet differ in their municipal laws; ſo England and Ireland are, on the other hand, diſtinct kingdoms, and yet in general agree in their laws. The inhabitants of Ireland are, for the moſt part, deſcended from the Engliſh, who planted it as a kind of colony, after the conqueſt of it

[5] Hale Hiſt. C. L. 183. 292. Stat. 11 Geo. I. c. 4. 1 Sid. 382. 462. 2 Show. 365. 4 Burr. 834.
[6] Cro. Jac. 543. 2 Roll. abr.
[7] *Stat. Hiberniæ.* 14 Hen. III.

by king Henry the ſecond; and the laws of England were then received and ſworn to by the Iriſh nation, aſſembled at the council of Liſmore[8]. And as Ireland, thus conquered, planted, and governed, ſtill continues in a ſtate of dependence, it muſt neceſſarily conform to, and be obliged by, ſuch laws as the ſuperior ſtate thinks proper to preſcribe.

At the time of this conqueſt the Iriſh were governed by what they called the Brehon law, ſo ſtiled from the Iriſh name of judges, who were denominated Brehons[9]. But king John in the twelfth year of his reign went into Ireland and carried over with him many able ſages of the law; and there by his letters patent, in right of the dominion of conqueſt, is ſaid to have ordained and eſtabliſhed that Ireland ſhould be governed by the laws of England[o]: which letters patent ſir Edward Coke[1] apprehends to have been there confirmed in parliament. But to this ordinance many of the Iriſh were averſe to conform, and ſtill ſtuck to their Brehon law: ſo that both Henry the third[2] and Edward the firſt[3] were obliged to renew the injunction; and at length in a parliament holden at Kilkenny, 40 Edw. III, under Lionel Duke of Clarence, the then lieutenant of Ireland, the Brehon law was formerly aboliſhed, it being unanimouſly declared to be indeed no law, but a lewd cuſtom crept in of later times. And yet, even in the reign of queen Elizabeth, the wild natives ſtill kept and preſerved their Brehon law; which is deſcribed[4] to have been "a rule of right unwritten, but delivered by tradition "from one to another, in which oftentimes there ap"peared great ſhew of equity in determining the "right between party and party, but in many things re"pugnant quite both to God's laws and man's." The latter part of this character is alone aſcribed to it, by

[8] Pryn. on 4 Inſt. 249.

[9] 4 Inſt. 358. Edm. Spenſer's ſtate of Ireland, p. 1513. edit. Hughes.

[o] Vaugh. 294. 2 Pryn. Rec. 85. 7 Rep. 23.

[1] 1 Inſt. 141.

[2] *A. R.* 30. 1 Raym. *Feod.* 442.

[3] *A. R.* 5.—*pro eo quod leges quibus utuntur Hybernici Deo deteſtabiles exiſtunt, et omni juri diſſonant, adeo quod leges cenſeri non debeant*;—*nobis et conſilio noſtro ſatis videtur expedire, eiſdem utendas concedere leges Anglicanas.* 3 Pryn. Rec. 1218.

[4] Edm. Spenſer. *ibid.*

the laws before-cited of Edward the firſt and his grandſon.

But as Ireland was a diſtinct dominion, and had parliaments of it's own, it is to be obſerved, that though the immemorial cuſtoms, or common law, of England were made the rule of juſtice in Ireland alſo, yet no acts of the Engliſh parliament, ſince the twelfth of king John, extended into that kingdom; unleſs it were ſpecially named, or included under general words, ſuch as, "within any of the king's dominions." And this is particularly expreſſed, and the reaſon given in the year books[5]: "a tax granted by the parliament of England ſhall not bind "thoſe of Ireland, becauſe they are not ſummoned to "our parliament;" and again, "Ireland hath a parliament of it's own, and maketh and altereth laws; "and our ſtatutes do not bind them, becauſe they do "not ſend knights to our parliament: but their perſons are the king's ſubjects, like as the inhabitants "of Calais, Gaſcoigne, and Guienne, while they continued under the king's ſubjection." The general run of laws, enacted by the ſuperior ſtate, are ſuppoſed to be calculated for it's own internal government, and do not extend to it's diſtant dependent countries; which, bearing no part in the legiſlature, are not therefore in its ordinary and daily contemplation. But, when the ſovereign legiſlative power ſees it neceſſary to extend it's care to any of it's ſubordinate dominions, and mentions them expreſsly by name or includes them under general words, there can be no doubt but then they are bound by it's laws[6].

The original method of paſſing ſtatutes in Ireland was nearly the ſame as in England, the chief governor holding parliaments at his pleaſure, which enacted ſuch laws as they thought proper[7]. But an ill uſe being made of this liberty, particularly by lord Gormanſtown, deputy-lieutenant in the reign of Edward IV[8], a ſet of ſtatutes were there enacted in the 10 Hen. VII. (ſir Edward Poynings being then lord deputy, whence they are called Poynings' laws) one of which[9], in order to reſtrain the power as well of

[5] 20 Hen. VI. 8. 2 Ric. III. 12.

[6] Yearbook 1 Hen. VII. 3. 7 Rep. 22. Calvin's caſe.

[7] Iriſh Stat. 11 Eliz. ſt. 3. c. 8.

[8] *Ibid.* 10 Hen. VII. c. 23.

[9] Cap. 4. expounded by 3 & 4 Ph. & M. c. 4.

the deputy as the Iriſh parliament, provides, 1. That, before any parliament be ſummoned or holden, the chief governor and council of Ireland ſhall certify to the king under the great ſeal of Ireland the conſiderations and cauſes thereof, and the articles of the acts propoſed to be paſſed therein. 2. That after the king in his council of England, ſhall have conſidered, approved, or altered the ſaid acts or any of them, and certified them back under the great ſeal of England, and ſhall have given licence to ſummon and hold a parliament, then the ſame ſhall be ſummoned and held; and therein the ſaid acts ſo certified, and no other, ſhall be propoſed, received, or rejected [o]. But as this precluded any law from being propoſed, but ſuch as were pre-conceived before the parliament was in being, which occaſioned many inconveniencies and made frequent diſſolutions neceſſary, it was provided by the ſtatute of Philip and Mary before-cited, that any new propoſitions might be certified to England in the uſual forms, even after the ſummons and during the ſeſſion of parliament. By this means however there was nothing left to the parliament in Ireland, but a bare negative or power of rejecting, not of propoſing or altering, any law. But the uſage now is, that bills are often framed in either houſe, under the denomination of "heads for a bill or bills:" and in that ſhape they are offered to the conſideration of the lord lieutenant and privy council: who, upon ſuch parliamentary intimation, or otherwiſe upon the application of private perſons, receive and tranſmit ſuch heads, or reject them without any tranſmiſſion to England. And with regard to Poynings' law in particular, it cannot be repealed or ſuſpended, unleſs the bill for that purpoſe before it be certified to England, be approved by both the houſes [1].

But the Iriſh nation, being excluded from the benefit of the Engliſh ſtatutes, were deprived of many good and profitable laws, made for the improvement of the common law: and the meaſure of juſtice in both kingdoms becoming thence no longer uniform, it was therefore enacted by another of Poynings' laws [2], that all acts of parliament, before made in

[o] 4 Inſt. 353.
[1] Iriſh Stat. 11 Eliz. ſt. 3. c. 38.
[2] cap. 22.

England, ſhould be of force within the realm of Ireland[3]. But, by the ſame rule, that no laws made in England, between king John's time and Poynings' law, were then binding in Ireland, it follows that no acts of the Engliſh parliament made ſince the 10 Hen. VII. do now bind the people of Ireland, unleſs ſpecially named or included under general words[3]. And on the other hand it is equally clear, that where Ireland is particularly named, or is included under general words, they are bound by ſuch acts of parliament. For this follows from the very nature and conſtitution of a dependent ſtate: dependence being very little elſe, but an obligation to conform to the will or law of that ſuperior perſon or ſtate, upon which the inferior depends. The original and true ground of this ſuperiority, in the preſent caſe, is what we uſually call, though ſomewhat improperly, the right of conqueſt: a right allowed by the law of nations, if not by that of nature; but which in reaſon and civil policy can mean nothing more, than that, in order to put an end to hoſtilities, a compact is either expreſsly or tacitly made between the conqueror and the conquered, that if they will acknowledge the victor for their maſter, he will treat them for the future as ſubjects, and not as enemies[4].

But this ſtate of dependance being almoſt forgotten, and ready to be diſputed by the Iriſh nation, it became neceſſary ſome years ago to declare how that matter really ſtood; and therefore by ſtatute 6 Geo. I. c. 5. it is declared, that the kingdom of Ireland ought to be ſubordinate to, and dependent upon, the imperial crown of Great Britain, as being inſeparably united thereto; and that the king's majeſty, with the conſent of the lords and commons of Great Britain in Parliament, hath power to make laws to bind the people of Ireland.

Thus we ſee how extenſively the laws of Ireland communicate with thoſe of England: and indeed ſuch communication is highly neceſſary, as the ultimate reſort from the courts of juſtice in Ireland is, as in Wales, to thoſe in England; a writ of error (in the nature of an appeal) lying from the king's bench

[3] 4 Inſt. 351. [4] 12 Rep. 112. [5] Puff. L. of N. viii. 6. 24.

in Ireland to the king's bench in England [6], as the appeal from the chancery in Ireland lies immediately to the houſe of lords here: it being expreſsly declared, by the ſame ſtatute 6 Geo. I. c. 5. that the peers of Ireland have no juriſdiction to affirm or reverſe any judgments or decrees whatſoever. The propriety, and even neceſſity, in all inferior dominions, of this conſtitution, "that though juſtice be in general adminiſtered by courts of their own, yet that the appeal in the laſt reſort ought to be to the courts of the ſuperior ſtate," is founded upon theſe two reaſons. 1. Becauſe otherwiſe the law, appointed or permitted to ſuch inferior dominion, might be inſenſibly changed within itſelf, without the aſſent of the ſuperior. 2. Becauſe otherwiſe judgments might be given to the diſadvantage or diminution of the ſuperiority; or to make the dependence to be only of the perſon of the king, and not of the crown of England [7]. [*a*]

[6] This was law in the time of Hen. VIII; as appears by the ancient book, entituled, *diverſity of courts, c. bank le roy.* 7 Vaugh. 402.

[*a*] Thus ſtood the matter till the 22d year of king Geo. III. The ſaid ſtatute of 6 Geo. I. c. 5. runs more at length thus: "Whereas the houſe of lords of Ireland have of late, againſt law, aſſumed to themſelves a power and juriſdiction to examine, correct, and amend the judgments and decrees of the courts of juſtice in the kingdom of Ireland: therefore, for the better ſecuring of the dependency of Ireland upon the crown of Great Britain, be it declared, that the ſaid kingdom of Ireland hath been, is, and of right ought to be, ſubordinate unto and dependent upon the imperial crown of Great Britain, as being inſeparably united and annexed thereunto: and that the king's majeſty, by and with the advice and conſent of the lords ſpiritual and temporal and commons of Great Britain in parliament aſſembled, had, hath, and of right ought to have, full power and authority to make laws and ſtatutes of ſufficient force and validity, to bind the kingdom and people of Ireland.—And be it further declared and enacted, that the houſe of lords of Ireland have not, nor of right ought to have, any juriſdiction, to judge of, affirm, or reverſe any judgment, ſentence, or decree, given or made in any court within the ſaid kingdom; and that all proceedings before the ſaid houſe of lords, upon any ſuch judgment, ſentence, or decree are, and are hereby declared to be, utterly null and void, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever."

But by 22 Geo. III. c. 53. the ſaid ſtatute of 6 Geo. I. is repealed, in the words following: "Whereas an act was paſſed

With regard to the other adjacent iſlands which are ſubject to the crown of Great Britain, ſome of them (as the Iſle of Wight, of Portland, of Thanet, &c.)

" in the ſixth year of the reign of his late majeſty king Geo. I. " entituled, " An act for the better ſecuring the dependency of " the kingdom of Ireland upon the crown of Great Britain," " may it pleaſe your moſt excellent majeſty, that it may be " enacted, and be it enacted by the king's moſt excellent ma- " jeſty, by and with the advice and conſent of the lords ſpiri- " tual and temporal and commons in this preſent parliament aſ- " ſembled, and by the authority of the ſame, that from and af- " ter the paſſing of this act, the above-mentioned act, and the " ſeveral matters and things therein contained, ſhall be, and " is, and are hereby repealed."

[And by 23 Geo. III. c. 28. it is ſtill further enacted in the following words: " Whereas, by an act of the laſt ſeſſion of this " preſent parliament (intituled, An act to repeal an act made in " the ſixth year of the reign of his late majeſty king George the firſt, " intituled, An act for the better ſecuring the dependency of the " kingdom of Ireland upon the crown of Great Britain) it was enact- " ed, that the ſaid laſt mentioned act, and all matters and things " therein contained, ſhould be repealed; and whereas doubts have " ariſen whether the proviſions of the ſaid act are ſufficient to ſecure " to the people of Ireland the rights claimed by them to be bound only " by laws enacted by his majeſty and the parliament of that kingdom, " in all caſes whatever, and to have all actions and ſuits at law or in " equity, which may be inſtituted in that kingdom, decided in his " majeſty's courts therein finally, and without appeal from thence: " therefore, for removing all doubts reſpecting the ſame, may it " pleaſe your majeſty, that it may be declared and enacted, and be it " declared and enacted by the king's moſt excellent majeſty, by and " with the advice and conſent of the lords ſpiritual and temporal " and commons in this preſent parliament aſſembled, and by " the authority of the ſame, That the ſaid right claimed by the " people of Ireland to be bound only by laws enacted by his " majeſty and the parliament of that kingdom, in all caſes " whatever, and to have all actions and ſuits at law or in equity, " which may be inſtituted in that kingdom, decided in his majeſty's " courts therein finally, and without appeal from thence, ſhall be, " and it is hereby declared to be eſtabliſhed, and aſcertained for ever, " and ſhall, at no time hereafter, be queſtioned or queſtionable."

Sect. 2. " And be it further enacted by the authority aforeſaid, that " no writ of error or appeal ſhall be received or adjudged, or any other " proceeding be had by or in any of his majeſty's courts in this " kingdom, in any action or ſuit at law or in equity inſtituted in " any of his majeſty's courts in the kingdom of Ireland; and that " all ſuch writs, appeals or proceedings ſhall be, and they are " hereby declared null and void to all intents and purpoſes; and " that all records, tranſcripts of records, or proceedings, which " have been tranſmitted from Ireland to Great Britain by virtue of " any writ of error or appeal, and upon which no judgment has

are comprized within ſome neighbouring county, and are therefore to be looked upon as annexed to the mother iſland, and part of the kingdom of England. But there are others which require a more particular conſideration.

And, firſt, the iſle of Man is a diſtinct territory from England, and is not governed by our laws: neither doth any act of parliament extend to it, unleſs it be particularly named therein; and then an act of parliament is binding there [8]. It was formerly a ſubordinate feudatory kingdom, ſubject to the kings of Norway; then to king John and Henry III of England; afterward to the kings of Scotland; and then again to the crown of England: and at length we find king Henry IV. claiming the iſland by right of conqueſt, and diſpoſing of it to the earl of Northumberland; upon whoſe attainder it was granted (by the name of the lordſhip of Man) to ſir John de Stanley by letters patent 7 Henry IV [9]. In his lineal deſcendants it continued for eight generations, till the death of Ferdinando earl of Derby, *A. D.* 1594; when a controverſy aroſe concerning the inheritance thereof, between his daughters and William his ſurviving brother: upon which, and a doubt that was ſtarted concerning the validity of the original patent [o], the iſland was ſeized into the queen's hands, and afterwards various grants were made of it by king James the firſt; all which being expired and ſurrendered it was granted afreſh in 7 Jac. I. to William earl of Derby, and the heirs male of his body, with remainder to his heirs general; which grant was the next year confirmed by act of parliament, with a reſtraint of the power of alienation by the ſaid earl and his iſſue male. On the death of James earl of Derby, *A. D.* 1735, the male line of earl William failing, the duke of Atholl ſucceeded to the iſland as heir general by a female

[8] 4 Inſt. 284. 2 And. 116.
[9] Selden. tit. hon. 1. 3.
[o] Camden. Eliz. *A. D.* 1594.

" been given or decree pronounced before the firſt day of June " 1782, ſhall, upon application made by, or in behalf of the party " in whoſe favour judgment was given or decree pronounced in Ire- " land, be delivered to ſuch party, or any perſon by him autho- " riſed to apply for and receive the ſame."]

branch. In the mean time, though the title of king had long been diſuſed, the earls of Derby, as lords of Man, had maintained a ſort of royal authority therein; by aſſenting or diſſenting to laws, and exerciſing an appellate juriſdiction. Yet though no Engliſh writ, or proceſs from the courts of Weſtminſter, was of any authority in Man, an appeal lay from a decree of the lord of the iſland to the king of Great Britain in council [1]. But the diſtinct juriſdiction of this little ſubordinate royalty being found inconvenient for the purpoſes of public juſtice, and for the revenue, (it affording a commodious aſylum for debtors, outlaws, and ſmugglers,) authority was given to the treaſury by ſtatute 12 Geo. I. c. 28. to purchaſe the intereſt of the then proprietors for the uſe of the crown: which purchaſe was at length compleated in the year 1765, and confirmed by ſtatutes 5 Geo. III. c. 26. and 39. whereby the whole iſland and all it's dependencies, ſo granted as aforeſaid, (except the landed property of the Atholl family, their manerial rights and emoluments, and the patronage of the biſhoprick [2] and other eccleſiaſtical benefices,) are unalienably veſted in the crown, and ſubjected to the regulations of the Britiſh exciſe and cuſtoms.

The iſlands of Jerſey, Guernſey, Sark, Alderney, and their appendages, were parcel of the duchy of Normandy, and were united to the crown of England by the firſt princes of the Norman line. They are governed by their own laws, which are for the moſt part the ducal cuſtoms of Normandy, being collected in an antient book of very great authority, entituled, *le grand cuſtumier*. The king's writ, or proceſs from the courts of Weſtminſter, is there of no force; but his commiſſion is. They are not bound by common acts of our parliaments, unleſs particularly named [3]. All cauſes are originally determined by their own officers, the bailiffs and jurats of the iſlands; but an appeal lies from them to the king and council, in the laſt reſort.

Beſides theſe adjacent iſlands, our more diſtant plantations in America, and elſewhere, are alſo in

[1] 1 P. Wms. 329.

[2] The biſhoprick of Man, or Sodor, or Sodor and Man, was formerly within the province of Canterbury, but annexed to that of York by ſtatute 33 Hen. VIII. c. 31.

[3] 4 Inſt. 286.

ſome reſpect ſubject to the Engliſh laws. Plantations or colonies, in diſtant countries, are either ſuch where the lands are claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them deſert and uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother country; or where, when already cultivated, they have been either gained by conqueſt, or ceded to us by treaties. And both theſe rights are founded upon the law of nature, or at leaſt upon that of nations. But there is a difference between theſe two ſpecies of colonies, with reſpect to the laws by which they are bound. For it hath been held[4], that if an uninhabited country be diſcovered and planted by Engliſh ſubjects, all the Engliſh laws then in being, which are the birthright of every ſubject[5], are immediately there in force. But this muſt be underſtood with very many and very great reſtrictions. Such coloniſts carry with them only ſo much of the Engliſh law, as is applicable to their own ſituation and the condition of an infant colony; ſuch, for inſtance, as the general rules of inheritance, and of protection from perſonal injuries. The artificial refinements and diſtinctions incident to the property of a great and commercial people, the laws of police and revenue, (ſuch eſpecially as are inforced by penalties) the mode of maintenance for the eſtabliſhed clergy, the juriſdiction of ſpiritual courts, and a multitude of other proviſions, are neither neceſſary nor convenient for them, and therefore are not in force. What ſhall be admitted and what rejected, at what times, and under what reſtrictions, muſt, in caſe of diſpute, be decided in the firſt inſtance by their own provincial judicature, ſubject to the reviſion and control of the king in council: the whole of their conſtitution being alſo liable to be new-modelled and reformed by the general ſuperintending power of the legiſlature in the mother country. But in conquered or ceded countries, that have already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change thoſe laws; but till he does actually change them, the ancient laws of the country remain, unleſs ſuch as are againſt the law of God, as in the caſe of an infidel country[6]. Our

[4] Salk. 411. 666. Show. Parl. C. 31. [*See alſo in the caſe of Campbell* v. *Hall. Cowp. Rep.* 204. *a great and*

[5] 2 P. Wms. 75.

[6] 7 Rep. 17. Calvin's Caſe.

American plantations are principally of this latter ſort, being obtained in the laſt century either by right of conqueſt and driving out the natives (with what natural juſtice I ſhall not at preſent enquire) or by treaties. And therefore the common law of England, as ſuch, has no allowance or authority there; they being no part of the mother country, but diſtinct (though dependent) dominions. They are ſubject however to the control of the parliament; though (like Ireland, Man, and the reſt) not bound by any acts of parliament, unleſs particularly named.

With reſpect to their interior polity, our colonies are properly of three ſorts. 1. Provincial eſtabliſhments, the conſtitutions of which depend on the reſpective commiſſions iſſued by the crown to the governors, and the inſtructions which uſually accompany thoſe commiſſions; under the authority of which, provincial aſſemblies are conſtituted, with the power of making local ordinances, not repugnant to the laws of England. 2. Proprietary governments, granted out by the crown to individuals, in the nature of feudatory principalities, with all the inferior regalities, and ſubordinate powers of legiſlation, which formerly belonged to the owners of counties palatine: yet ſtill with theſe expreſs conditions, that the ends for which the grant was made be ſubſtantially purſued, and that nothing be attempted which may derogate from the ſovereignty of the mother-country. 3. Charter governments, in the nature of civil corporations, with the power of making by-laws for their own interior regulation, not contrary to the laws of England; and with ſuch rights and authorities as are ſpecially given them in their ſeveral charters of incorporation. The form of government in moſt of them is borrowed from that of England. They have a governor named by the king, (or in ſome proprietary colonies by the proprietor,) who is his repreſentative or deputy. They have courts of juſtice of their own, from whoſe deciſions an appeal lies to the king

elaborate argument of Lord Mansfield, in delivering the judgment of the court of king's bench.]

and council here in England. Their general aſſemblies which are their houſe of commons, together with their council of ſtate being their upper houſe, with the concurrence of the king or his repreſentative the governor, make laws ſuited to their own emergencies. But it is particularly declared by ſtatute 7 & 8 W. III. c. 22. that all laws, bye-laws, uſages, and cuſtoms, which ſhall be in practice in any of the plantations, repugnant to any law, made or to be made in this kingdom relative to the ſaid plantations, ſhall be utterly void and of none effect. And, becauſe ſeveral of the colonies had claimed the ſole and excluſive right of impoſing taxes upon themſelves, the ſtatute 6 Geo. III. c. 12. expreſsly declares, that all his majeſty's colonies and plantations in America have been, are, and of right ought to be, ſubordinate to and dependent upon the imperial crown and parliament of Great Britain; who have full power and authority to make laws and ſtatutes of ſufficient validity to bind the colonies and people of America, ſubjects of the crown of Great Britain, in all caſes whatſoever. And, this authority has been ſince very forcibly exemplified, and carried into act, by the ſtatute 7 Geo. III. c. 59. for ſuſpending the legiſlation of New-York; and by ſeveral ſubſequent ſtatutes *(c)*.

Theſe are the ſeveral parts of the dominions of the crown of Great Britain, in which the municipal laws of England are not of force or authority, merely *as* the municipal laws of England. Moſt of them have probably copied the ſpirit of their own law

(c) [However, in the year 1782, by ſtatute 22 Geo. III. c. 46. his majeſty was impowered to conclude a peace with the colonies of New-Hampſhire, Maſſachuſetts-Bay, Rhode-Iſland, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jerſey, Pennſylvania, the Three Lower Counties on Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia in North-America, then in rebellion againſt their mother-country; and for that purpoſe, to repeal, or to ſuſpend, the operation of any acts of parliament ſo far as they related to the ſaid colonies. Accordingly a peace was ſoon after concluded, and the independence which the above-mentioned colonies had before declared was allowed to them; ſo that now they are as much independent of, and unconnected with, Great Britain, as any other foreign nation.]

from this original; but then it receives it's obligation, and authoritative force, from being the law of the country.

As to any foreign dominions which may belong to the perſon of the king by hereditary deſcent, by purchaſe, or other acquiſition, as the territory of Hanover, and his majeſty's other property in Germany; as theſe do not in any wiſe appertain to the crown of theſe kingdoms, they are entirely unconnected with the laws of England and do not communicate with this nation in any reſpect whatſoever. The Engliſh legiſlature had wiſely remarked the inconveniences that had formerly reſulted from dominions on the continent of Europe; from the Norman territory which William the conqueror brought with him, and held in conjunction with the Engliſh throne; and from Anjou, and it's appendages, which fell to Henry the ſecond by hereditary deſcent. They had ſeen the nation engaged for near four hundred years together in ruinous wars for defence of theſe foreign dominions; till, happily for this country, they were loſt under the reign of Henry the ſixth. They obſerved that, from that time, the maritime intereſts of England were better underſtood and more cloſely purſued: that, in conſequence of this attention, the nation, as ſoon as ſhe had reſted from her civil wars, began at this period to flouriſh all at once; and became much more conſiderable in Europe, than when her princes were poſſeſſed of a larger territory, and her councils diſtracted by foreign intereſts. This experience and theſe conſiderations gave birth to a conditional clauſe in the act [1] of ſettlement which veſted the crown in his preſent majeſty's illuſtrious houſe, "that in caſe the crown and "imperial dignity of this realm ſhall hereafter come "to any perſon not being a native of this kingdom of "England, this nation ſhall not be obliged to engage "in any war for the defence of any dominions or "territories which do not belong to the crown of Eng"land, without conſent of parliament."

[1] Stat. 12 & 13 Will. 3. c. 3.

We come now to consider the kingdom of England in particular, the direct and immediate subject of those laws, concerning which we are to treat in the ensuing commentaries. And this comprehends not only Wales and Berwick, of which enough has been already said, but also part of the sea. The main or high seas are part of the realm of England, for thereon our courts of admiralty have jurisdiction, as will be shewn hereafter; but they are not subject to the common law [2]. This main sea begins at the low-water-mark. But between the high-water-mark, and the low-water-mark, where the sea ebbs and flows, the common law and the admiralty have *divisum imperium*, an alternate jurisdiction; one upon the water, when it is full sea; the other upon the land when it is an ebb [3].

The territory of England is liable to two divisions; the one ecclesiastical, the other civil.

1. The ecclesiastical division is, primarily, into two provinces, those of Canterbury and York. A province is the circuit of an archbishop's jurisdiction. Each province contains divers dioceses, or sees of suffragan bishops; whereof Canterbury includes twenty-one, and York three: besides the bishoprick of the isle of Man, which was annexed to the province of York by king Henry VIII. Every diocese is divided into archdeaconries, whereof there are sixty in all; each archdeaconry into rural deaneries, which are the circuit of the archdeacon's and rural dean's jurisdiction, of whom hereafter; and every deanery is divided into parishes [4].

A parish is that circuit of ground which is committed to the charge of one parson, or vicar, or other minister having cure of souls therein. These districts are computed to be near ten thousand in number [5]. How antient the division of parishes is, may at present be difficult to ascertain; for it seems to be agreed on all hands, that in the early ages of christianity in this island, parishes were unknown, or at least

[2] Co. Litt. 260.
[3] Finch. L. 78.
[4] Co. Lit. 94.
[5] Gibson's *Britain.*

ſignified the ſame that a dioceſe does now. There was then no appropriation of eccleſiaſtical dues to any particular church; but every man was at liberty to contribute his tithes to whatever prieſt or church he pleaſed, provided only that he did it to ſome; or, if he made no ſpecial appointment or appropriation thereof, they were paid into the hands of the biſhop, whoſe duty it was to diſtribute them among the clergy, and for other pious purpoſes, according to his own diſcretion [6].

Mr. Camden [7] ſays, England was divided into pariſhes by archbiſhop Honorius about the year 630. Sir Henry Hobart [8] lays it down, that pariſhes were firſt erected by the council of Lateran, which was held *A. D.* 1179. Each widely differing from the other, and both of them perhaps from the truth; which will probably be found in the medium between the two extremes. For Mr. Selden has clearly ſhewn [9], that the clergy lived in common without any diviſion of pariſhes, long after the time mentioned by Camden. And it appears from the Saxon laws, that pariſhes were in being long before the date of that council of Lateran, to which they are aſcribed by Hobart.

We find the diſtinction of pariſhes, nay even of mother-churches, ſo early as in the laws of king Edgar, about the year 970. Before that time the conſecration of tithes was in general *arbitrary;* that is, every man paid his own (as was before obſerved) to what church or pariſh he pleaſed. But this being liable to be attended with either fraud, or at leaſt caprice, in the perſons paying; and with either jealouſies or mean compliances in ſuch as were competitors for receiving them; it was now ordered by the law of king Edgar [o], that "*dentur omnes decimæ prima-*"*riæ eccleſiæ ad quam parochia pertinet.*" However, if any thane, or great lord, had a church, within his own demeſnes, diſtinct from the mother church, in the nature of a private chapel; then, provided

[6] Seld. of tith. 9. 4. 2 Inſt. 646. Hob. 296.
[7] in his *Britannia.*
[8] Hob. 29.
[9] of tithes, c. 9.
[o] c. 1.

ſuch church had a cœmetery or conſecrated place of burial belonging to it, he might allot one third of his tithes for the maintenance of the officiating miniſter: but, if it had no cœmetery, the thane muſt himſelf have maintained his chaplain by ſome other means; for in ſuch caſe *all* his tithes were ordained to be paid to the *primariæ eccleſiæ* or mother church [1].

This proves that the kingdom was then generally divided into pariſhes; which diviſion happened probably not all at once, but by degrees. For it ſeems pretty clear and certain, that the boundaries of pariſhes were originally aſcertained by thoſe of a manor or manors: ſince it very ſeldom happens that a manor extends itſelf over more pariſhes than one, though there are often many manors in one pariſh. The lords, as chriſtianity ſpread itſelf, began to build churches upon their own demeſnes or waſtes, to accommodate their tenants in one or two adjoining lordſhips; and, in order to have divine ſervice regularly performed therein, obliged all their tenants to appropriate their tithes to the maintenance of the one officiating miniſter, inſtead of leaving them at liberty to diſtribute them among the clergy of the dioceſe in general; and this tract of land, the tithes whereof were ſo appropriated, formed a diſtinct pariſh. Which will well enough account for the frequent intermixture of pariſhes one with another. For, if a lord had a parcel of land detached from the main of his eſtate, but not ſufficient to form a pariſh of itſelf, it was natural for him to endow his newly erected church with the tithes of thoſe diſjointed lands; eſpecially if no church was then built in any lordſhip adjoining to thoſe outlying parcels.

Thus pariſhes were gradually formed, and pariſh churches endowed with the tithes that aroſe within the circuit aſſigned. But ſome lands, either becauſe they were in the hands of irreligious and careleſs owners, or were ſituate in foreſts and deſart places, or for other now unſearchable reaſons, were never united

[1] *Ibid. c.* 2. See alſo the laws of king Canute, *c.* 11. about the year 1030.

to any parish, and therefore continue to this day extraparochial; and their tithes are now by immemorial custom payable to the king instead of the bishop, in trust and confidence that he will distribute them for the general good of the church [1]: yet extraparochial wastes and marsh-lands, when improved and drained, are by the statute 17 Geo. II. c. 37. to be assessed to all parochial rates in the parish next adjoining. And thus much for the ecclesiastical division of this kingdom.

2. The civil division of the territory of England is into counties, of those counties into hundreds, of those hundreds into tithings, or towns. Which division, as it now stands, seems to owe its original to king Alfred: who, to prevent the rapines and disorders which formerly prevailed in the realm, instituted tithings; so called, from the Saxon, because *ten* freeholders with their families composed one. These all dwelt together, and were sureties or free pledges to the king for the good behaviour of each other; and if any offence was committed in their district, they were bound to have the offender forthcoming [2]. And therefore anciently no man was suffered to abide in England above forty days, unless he were enrolled in some tithing or decennary [3]. One of the principal inhabitants of the tithing is annually appointed to preside over the rest, being called the tithing-man, the headborough, (words which speak their own etymology) and in some countries the borsholder, or borough's-elder, being supposed the discreetest man in the borough, town, or tithing [4].

Tithings, towns, or vills, are of the same signification in law; and are said to have had, each of them, originally a church and celebration of divine service, sacraments, and burials [5]: though that seems to be

[1] 2 Inst. 647. 2 Rep. 44. Cro. Eliz. 512.

[2] *Flet.* 1. 47. This the laws of king Edward the confessor, *c.* 20. very justly entitled "*summa et maxima securitas, per quam omnes statu firmissimo sustinentur;—quæ hoc modo fiebat, quod sub decennali fidejussione debebant esse universi, &c.*"

[3] Mirr. c. 1. §. 3.

[4] Finch. L. 8.

[5] 1 Inst. 115.

rather an eccleſiaſtical, than a civil, diſtinction. The word *town* or *vill* is indeed, by the alteration of times and language, now become a generical term, comprehending under it the ſeveral ſpecies of cities, boroughs, and common towns. A city is a town incorporated, which is or hath been the ſee of a biſhop: and though the biſhoprick be diſſolved, as at Weſtminſter, *(a)* yet ſtill it remaineth a city [6]. A borough is now underſtood to be a town, either corporate or not, that ſendeth burgeſſes to parliament [7]. Other towns there are, to the number Sir Edward Coke ſays [8] of 8803, which are neither cities nor boroughs; ſome of which have the privileges of markets, and others not; but both are equally towns in law. To ſeveral of theſe towns there are ſmall appendages belonging, called hamlets; which are taken notice of in the ſtatute of Exeter [9], which makes frequent mention of entire vills, demi vills, and hamlets. Entire vills ſir Henry Spelman [o] conjectures to have conſiſted of ten freemen, or frank-pledges, demi-vills of five, and hamlets of leſs than five. Theſe little collections of houſes are ſometimes under the ſame adminiſtration as the town itſelf, ſometimes governed by ſeparate officers; in which laſt caſe they are, to ſome purpoſes in law, looked upon as diſtinct townſhips. Theſe towns, as was before hinted, contained each originally but one pariſh, and one tithing; though many of them now, by the encreaſe of inhabitants, are divided into ſeveral pariſhes and tithings; and, ſometimes, where there is but one pariſh there are two or more vills or tithings.

As ten families of freeholders made up a town or tithing, ſo ten tithings compoſed a ſuperior diviſion,

[6] Co. Lit. 109.
[7] Litt. §. 164.
[8] 1 Inſt. 116.
[9] 14 Edw. I.
[o] Gloſſ. 274.

(a) This is rather an unapt example of the truth of the poſition; for Weſtminſter is not a borough incorporate. Hargrave Co. Litt. 109. notes 2 and 3. See alſo the King v. Downs and another, 3 Term Rep. 560.

called a hundred, as conſiſting of ten times ten families. The hundred is governed by an high conſtable or bailiff, and formerly there was regularly held in it the hundred court for the trial of cauſes, though now fallen into diſuſe. In ſome of the more northern counties theſe hundreds are called wapentakes [1].

The ſubdiviſion of hundreds into tithings ſeems to be moſt peculiarly the invention of Alfred: the inſtitution of hundreds themſelves he rather introduced than invented. For they ſeem to have obtained in Denmark [2] and we find that in France a regulation of this ſort was made above two hundred years before; ſet on foot by Clotharius and Childebert, with a view of obliging each diſtrict to anſwer for the robberies committed in it's own diviſion. Theſe diviſions were, in that country, as well military as civil: and each contained a hundred freemen, who were ſubject to an officer called the *centenarius*; a number of which *centenarii* were themſelves ſubject to a ſuperior officer called the count or *comes* [3]. And indeed ſomething like this inſtitution of hundreds may be traced back as far as the antient Germans, from whom were derived both the Franks who became maſters of Gaul, and the Saxons who ſettled in England: for both the thing and the name, as a territorial aſſemblage of perſons, from which afterwards the territory itſelf might probably receive its denomination, were well known to that warlike people. "*Centeni ex ſingulis pagis* "*ſunt, idque ipſum inter ſuos vocantur; et quod primo* "*numerus fuit, jam nomen et honor eſt* [4].

An indefinite number of theſe hundreds make up a county or ſhire. Shire is a Saxon word ſignifying a diviſion; but a county, *comitatus*, is plainly derived from *comes*, the count of the Franks; that is, the earl, or alderman (as the Saxons called him) of the ſhire, to whom the government of it was intruſted. This he uſually exerciſed by his deputy, ſtill called in Latin *vice-comes*, and in Engliſh, the ſheriff, ſhrieve, or ſhire-reeve, ſignifying the officer of the ſhire; upon

[1] Seld. *in Forteſc. c.* 24.
[2] Seld. tit. of honour. 2. 5. 3.
[3] Monteſq. Sp. L. 30. 17.
[4] Tacit. *de morib. German.* 6.

whom by proceſs of time the civil adminiſtration of it is now totally devolved. In ſome counties there is an intermediate diviſion, between the ſhire and the hundreds, as lathes in Kent, and rapes in Suſſex, each of them containing about three or four hundred apiece. Theſe had formerly their lathe-reeves and rape-reeves, acting in ſubordination to the ſhire-reeve. Where a county is divided into *three* of theſe intermediate juriſdictions, they are called trithings[5], which were antiently governed by a trithing-reeve. Theſe trithings ſtill ſubſiſt in the large county of York, where by an eaſy corruption they are denominated ridings; the north, the eaſt, and the weſt-riding. The number of counties in England and Wales have been different at different times; at preſent they are forty in England, and twelve in Wales.

Three of theſe counties, Cheſter, Durham, and Lancaſter, are called counties palatine. The two former are ſuch by preſcription, or immemorial cuſtom; or at leaſt as old as the Norman conqueſt[6]: the latter was created by king Edward III, in favour of Henry Plantagenet, firſt earl and then duke of Lancaſter[7], whoſe heireſs being married to John of Gant the king's ſon, the franchiſe was greatly enlarged and confirmed in parliament[8], to honour John of Gant himſelf, whom, on the death of his father-in-law, the king had alſo created duke of Lancaſter[9]. Counties palatine are ſo called *a palatio*; becauſe the owners thereof, the earl of Cheſter, the biſhop of Durham, and the duke of Lancaſter, had in thoſe counties *jura regalia*, as fully as the king hath in his palace; *regalem poteſtatem in omnibus*, as Bracton expreſſes it[10]. They might pardon treaſons, murders, and felonies: they appointed all judges and juſtices of the peace; all writs and indictments ran in their names, as in other counties in the king's; and all offences were ſaid to be done againſt their peace,

[5] *LL.* Edw. *c.* 34
[6] Seld. tit. hon. 2. 5. 8.
[7] *Pat.* 25. *Edw. III. p.* 1. *m.* 18. Seld. *ibid.* Sandford's gen. hiſt. 112. 4 Inſt. 204.
[8] *Cart.* 36 *Edw. III. n.* 9.
[9] *Pat.* 51 *Edw. III. m.* 33. Plowd. 215. 7 Rym. 138.
[10] *l.* 3. *c.* 8. §. 4.

and not, as in other places, *contra pacem domini regis* [1]. And indeed by the antient law, in all peculiar juriſdictions, offences were ſaid to be done againſt his peace in whoſe court they were tried: in a court-leet, *contra pacem domini;* in the court of a corporation, *contra pacem ballivorum*: in the ſheriff's court or tourn, *contra pacem vice-comitis* [2]. Theſe palatine privileges (ſo ſimilar to the regal independent juriſdictions uſurped by the great barons on the continent, during the weak and infant ſtate of the firſt feodal kingdoms in Europe [3]) were in all probability originally granted to the counties of Cheſter and Durham, becauſe they bordered upon inimical countries, Wales and Scotland: in order that the inhabitants having juſtice adminiſtered at home, might not be obliged to go out of the county, and leave it open to the enemy's incurſions; and that the owners being encouraged by ſo large an authority, might be the more watchful in its defence. And upon this account alſo there were formerly two other counties palatine, Pembrokeſhire and Hexhamſhire; the latter now united with Northumberland: but theſe were aboliſhed by parliament, the former in 27 Hen. VIII, the latter in 14 Eliz. And in 27 Hen. VIII, likewiſe, the powers before mentioned of owners of counties palatine were abridged; the reaſon for their continuance in a manner ceaſing: though ſtill all writs are witneſſed in their names, and all forfeitures for treaſon by the common law accrue to them [4].

Of theſe three, the county of Durham is now the only one remaining in the hands of a ſubject. For the earldom of Cheſter, as Camden teſtifies, was united to the crown by Henry III, and has ever ſince given title to the king's eldeſt ſon. And the county palatine, or duchy, of Lancaſter was the property of Henry of Bolingbroke, the ſon of John of Gant, at the time when he wreſted the crown from king Richard II, and aſſumed the ſtile of king Henry IV. But

[1] 4 Inſt. 204.
[2] Seld. *in Heng. Magn. c.* 2.
[3] Robertſon, Cha. V. i. 60.
[4] 4 Inſt. 205.

he was too prudent to ſuffer this to be united to the crown; leſt if he loſt one, he ſhould loſe the other alſo. For, as Plowden [4] and ſir Edward Coke [5] obſerve, "he knew he had the duchy of Lancaſter by "ſure and indefeaſible title, but that his title to the "crown was not ſo aſſured: for that after the de-"ceaſe of Richard II the right of the crown was in "the heir of Lionel duke of Clarence, *ſecond* ſon of "Edward III; John of Gant, father to this "Henry IV, being but the *fourth* ſon." And therefore he procured an act of parliament, in the firſt year of his reign, ordaining that the duchy of Lancaſter, and all other his hereditary eſtates, with all their royalties and franchiſes, ſhould remain to him and his heirs for ever; and ſhould remain, deſcend, be adminiſtered, and governed, in like manner as if he never had attained the regal dignity: and thus they deſcended to his ſon and grandſon, Henry V and Henry VI; many new territories and privileges being annexed to the duchy by the former [6]. Henry VI being attainted in 1 Edw. IV, this duchy was declared in parliament to have become forfeited to the crown [7], and at the ſame time an act was made to incorporate the duchy of Lancaſter, to continue the county palatine (which might otherwiſe have determined by the attainder [8],) and to make the ſame parcel of the duchy: and, farther, to veſt the whole in king Edward IV and his heirs, *kings of England*, for ever; but under a ſeparate guiding and governance from the other inheritances of the crown. And in 1 Hen. VII another act was made, to reſume ſuch part of the duchy lands as had been diſmembered from it in the reign of Edward IV, and to veſt the inheritance of the whole in the king and his heirs for ever, as amply and largely, and in like manner,

[4] 215.
[5] 4 Inſt. 205.
[6] *Parl.* 2 *Hen. V. n.* 30. 3 *Hen. V. n.* 15.
[7] 1 Ventr. 155.
[8] 1 Ventr. 157.

form, and condition, ſeparate from the crown of England and poſſeſſion of the ſame, as the three Henries and Edward IV, or any of them, had and held the ſame [9].

The iſle of Ely is not a county palatine, though ſometimes erroneouſly called ſo, but only a royal franchiſe: the biſhop having, by grant of king Henry the firſt, *jura regalia* within the iſle of Ely; whereby he exerciſes a juriſdiction over all cauſes, as well criminal as civil [*].

There are alſo counties *corporate*: which are certain cities and towns, ſome with more, ſome with leſs territory annexed to them; to which out of ſpecial grace and favour the kings of England have granted the privilege to be counties of themſelves, and not to be comprized in any other counties; but to be governed by their own ſheriffs and other magiſtrates, ſo that no officers of the county at large have any power

[9] Some have entertained an opinion (Plowd. 220, 1, 2. Lamb. *Archeion.* 233. 4 Inſt. 206.) that by this act the right of the duchy veſted only in the *natural*, and not in the *political* perſon of king Henry VII, as formerly in that of Henry IV; and was deſcendible to his natural heirs, independent of the ſucceſſion to the crown. And, if this notion were well founded, it might have become a very curious queſtion at the time of the revolution in 1688, in whom the right of the duchy remained after king James's abdication, and previous to the attainder of the pretended prince of Wales. But it is obſervable, that in the ſame act the duchy of Cornwall is alſo veſted in king Henry VII and his heirs; which could never be intended in any event to be ſeparated from the inheritance of the crown. And indeed it ſeems to have been underſtood very early after the ſtatute of Henry VII, that the duchy of Lancaſter was by no means thereby made a ſeparate inheritance from the reſt of the royal patrimony; ſince it deſcended, with the crown, to the half-blood in the inſtances of queen Mary and queen Elizabeth: which it could not have done, as the eſtate of a mere duke of Lancaſter, in the common courſe of legal deſcent. The better opinion therefore ſeems to be that of thoſe judges, who held (Plowd. 221) that notwithſtanding the ſtatute of Hen. VII (which was only an act of reſumption) the duchy ſtill remained as eſtabliſhed by the act of Edward IV; ſeparate from the other poſſeſſions of the crown in order and government, but united in point of inheritance.

[*] 4 Inſt. 226.

to intermeddle therein. Such are London, York, Briſtol, Norwich, Coventry, and many others. And thus much of the countries ſubject to the laws of England.

COMMENTARIES

ON THE

LAWS OF ENGLAND.

BOOK THE FIRST.

OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS.

CHAPTER THE FIRST.

OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS.

THE objects of the laws of England are so very numerous and extensive, that in order to consider them with any tolerable ease and perspicuity, it will be necessary to distribute them methodically, under proper and distinct heads; avoiding as much as possible divisions too large and comprehensive on the one hand, and too trifling and minute on the other; both of which are equally productive of confusion.

Now, as municipal law is a rule of civil conduct, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong; or as Cicero [1], and after him our Bracton [2], have expreſſed it, *ſanctio juſta, jubens honeſta et prohibens contraria*; it follows that the primary and principal objects of the law are RIGHTS and WRONGS. In the proſecution therefore of theſe commentaries, I ſhall follow this very ſimple and obvious diviſion; and ſhall in the firſt place conſider the *rights* that are commanded, and ſecondly the *wrongs* that are forbidden, by the laws of England.

Rights are however liable to another ſubdiviſion: being either, firſt, thoſe which concern and are annexed to the perſons of men, and are then called *jura perſonarum* or the *rights of perſons*; or they are, ſecondly, ſuch as a man may acquire over external objects, or things unconnected with his perſon, which are ſtiled *jura rerum* or the *rights of things*. Wrongs alſo are diviſible into, firſt, *private wrongs*, which, being an infringement merely of particular rights, concern individuals only, and are called civil injuries; and ſecondly, *public wrongs*; which, being a breach of general and public rights, affect the whole community, and are called crimes and miſdemeſnors.

The objects of the laws of England falling into this fourfold diviſion, the preſent commentaries will therefore conſiſt of the four following parts: 1. *The rights of perſons*; with the means whereby ſuch rights may be either acquired or loſt. 2. *The rights of things*; with the means alſo of acquiring and loſing them. 3. *Private wrongs*, or civil injuries; with the means of redreſſing them by law. 4. *Public wrongs*, or crimes and miſdemeſnors; with the means of prevention and puniſhment.

We are now, firſt, to conſider the *rights of perſons*; with the means of acquiring and loſing them.

Now the rights of perſons that are commanded to be obſerved by the municipal law are of two ſorts:

[1] 11 *Philipp.* 12. [2] *l.* 1. *c.* 3.

firſt, ſuch as are due *from* every citizen, which are uſually called civil *duties*; and, ſecondly, ſuch as belong *to* him, which is the more popular acceptation of *rights* or *jura*: Both may indeed be comprized in this latter diviſion; for, as all ſocial duties are of a relative nature, at the ſame time that they are due *from* one man, or ſet of men, they muſt alſo be due *to* another. But I apprehend it will be more clear and eaſy, to conſider many of them as duties required from, rather than as rights belonging to, particular perſons. Thus, for inſtance, allegiance is uſually, and therefore moſt eaſily, conſidered as the duty of the people, and protection as the duty of the magiſtrate; and yet they are, reciprocally, the rights as well as duties of each other. Allegiance is the right of the magiſtrate, and protection the right of the people.

Perſons alſo are divided by the law into either natural perſons, or artificial. Natural perſons are ſuch as the God of nature formed us; artificial are ſuch as are created and deviſed by human laws for the purpoſes of ſociety and government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.

The rights of perſons conſidered in their natural capacities are alſo of two ſorts, abſolute and relative. Abſolute, which are ſuch as appertain and belong to particular men, merely as individuals or ſingle perſons: relative, which are incident to them as members of ſociety, and ſtanding in various relations to each other. The firſt, that is, abſolute rights, will be the ſubject of the preſent chapter.

By the abſolute *rights* of individuals we mean thoſe which are ſo in their primary and ſtricteſt ſenſe; ſuch as would belong to their perſons merely in a ſtate of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of ſociety or in it. But with regard to the abſolute *duties*, which man is bound to perform conſidered as a mere individual, it is not to be expected that any human municipal law ſhould at all explain or enforce them. For the end and intent of ſuch laws being only to regulate the behavi-

our of mankind, as they are members of ſociety, and ſtand in various relations to each other, they have conſequently no concern with any other but ſocial or relative duties. Let a man therefore be ever ſo abandoned in his principles, or vitious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedneſs to himſelf, and does not offend againſt the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws. But if he makes his vices public, though they be ſuch as ſeem principally to affect himſelf, (as drunkenneſs or the like) they then become, by the bad example they ſet, of pernicious effects to ſociety; and therefore it is then the buſineſs of human laws to correct them. Here the circumſtance of publication is what alters the nature of the caſe. *Public* ſobriety is a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws; *private* ſobriety is an abſolute duty, which, whether it be performed or not, human tribunals can never know: and therefore they can never enforce it by any civil ſanction. But with reſpect to *rights*, the caſe is different. Human laws define and enforce as well thoſe rights which belong to a man conſidered as an individual, as thoſe which belong to him conſidered as related to others.

For the principal aim of ſociety is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of thoſe abſolute rights, which were veſted in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preſerved in peace without that mutual aſſiſtance and intercourſe, which is gained by the inſtitution of friendly and ſocial communities. Hence it follows that the firſt and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate theſe *abſolute* rights of individuals. Such rights as are ſocial and *relative* reſult from, and are poſterior to, the formation of ſtates and ſocieties: ſo that to maintain and regulate theſe, is clearly a ſubſequent conſideration. And therefore the principal view of human laws is, or ought always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce, ſuch rights as are abſolute, which in themſelves are few and ſimple; and then ſuch rights as are relative, which, ariſing from a variety of connexions, will be far more nu-

merous and more complicated. These will take up a greater space in any code of laws, and hence may appear to be more attended to, though in reality they are not, than the rights of the former kind. Let us therefore proceed to examine how far all laws ought, and how far the laws of England actually do, take notice of these absolute rights, and provide for their lasting security.

The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of free-will. But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish. And this species of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man, that considers a moment, would wish to retain the absolute and uncontrouled power of doing whatever he pleases; the consequence of which is, that every other man would also have the same power; and then there would be no security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life. Political therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public[3]. Hence we may collect that the law,

[3] *Facultas ejus, quod cuique facere libet, nisi quid jure prohibetur.* *Inst.* 1. 3. 1.

which reſtrains a man from doing miſchief to his fellow-citizens, though it diminiſhes the natural, increaſes the civil liberty of mankind; but that every wanton and cauſeleſs reſtraint of the will of the ſubject, whether practiſed by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular aſſembly, is a degree of tyranny: nay, that even laws themſelves, whether made with or without our conſent, if they regulate and conſtrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without any good end in view, are regulations deſtructive of liberty: whereas if any public advantage can ariſe from obſerving ſuch precepts, the control of our private inclinations, in one or two particular points, will conduce to preſerve our general freedom in others of more importance; by ſupporting that ſtate of ſociety, which alone can ſecure our independence. Thus the ſtatute of king Edward IV [3], which forbad the fine gentlemen of thoſe times (under the degree of a lord) to wear pikes upon their ſhoes or boots of more than two inches in length, was a law that favoured of oppreſſion; becauſe, however ridiculous the faſhion then in uſe might appear, the reſtraining it by pecuniary penalties could ſerve no purpoſe of common utility. But the ſtatute of king Charles II [4], which preſcribes a thing ſeemingly as indifferent, (a dreſs for the dead, who are all ordered to be buried in woollen) is a law conſiſtent with public liberty; for it encourages the ſtaple trade, on which in great meaſure depends the univerſal good of the nation. So that laws, when prudently framed, are by no means ſubverſive but rather introductive of liberty; for (as Mr. Locke has well obſerved [5]) where there is no law there is no freedom. But then, on the other hand, that conſtitution or frame of government, that ſyſtem of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the ſubject entire maſter of his own conduct, except in thoſe points wherein the public good requires ſome direction or reſtraint.

The idea and practice of this political or civil liberty flouriſh in their higheſt vigour in theſe king-

[3] Edw. IV. c. 5.
[4] 30 Car. II ſt. 1. c. 3.
[5] on Gov. p. 2. §. 57.

doms, where it falls little ſhort of perfection, and can only be loſt or deſtroyed by the folly or demerits of it's owner: the legiſlature, and of courſe the laws of England, being peculiarly adapted to the preſervation of this ineſtimable bleſſing even in the meaneſt ſubject. Very different from the modern conſtitutions of other ſtates, on the continent of Europe, and from the genius of the imperial law; which in general are calculated to veſt an arbitrary and deſpotic power, of controlling the actions of the ſubject, in the prince, or in a few grandees. And this ſpirit of liberty is ſo deeply implanted in our conſtitution, and rooted even in our very ſoil, that a ſlave or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of the laws, and ſo far becomes a freeman[6]; though the maſter's right to his ſervice may *poſſibly* ſtill continue.

The abſolute rights of every Engliſhman, (which, taken in a political and extenſive ſenſe, are uſually called their liberties) as they are founded on nature and reaſon, ſo they are coeval with our form of government; though ſubject at times to fluctuate and change: their eſtabliſhment (excellent as it is) being ſtill human. At ſome times we have ſeen them depreſſed by overbearing and tyrannical princes; at other ſo luxuriant as even to tend to anarchy, a worſe ſtate than tyranny itſelf, as any government is better than none at all. But the vigour of our free conſtitution has always delivered the nation from theſe embarraſſments: and, as ſoon as the convulſions conſequent on the ſtruggle have been over, the balance of our rights and liberties has ſettled to it's proper level; and their fundamental articles have been from time to time aſſerted in parliament, as often as they were thought to be in danger.

Firſt, by the great charter of liberties, which was obtained, ſword in hand, from king John, and afterwards, with ſome alterations, confirmed in parliament by king Henry the third, his ſon. Which charter contained very few new grants; but, as ſir Edward Coke[7] obſerves, was for the moſt part de-

[6] Salk. 666. See ch. 14. [7] 2 Inſt. proem.

claratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England. Afterwards by the ſtatute called *confirmatio cartarum* [8], whereby the great charter is directed to be allowed as the common law; all judgments contrary to it are declared void; copies of it are ordered to be ſent to all cathedral churches, and read twice a year to the people; and ſentence of excommunication is directed to be as conſtantly denounced againſt all thoſe that by word, deed, or counſel, act contrary thereto, or in any degree infringe it. Next, by a multitude of ſubſequent corroborating ſtatutes (ſir Edward Coke, I think, reckons thirty-two [9],) from the firſt Edward to Henry the fourth. Then, after a long interval, by *the petition of right*, which was a parliamentary declaration of the liberties of the people, aſſented to by king Charles the firſt in the beginning of his reign. Which was cloſely followed by the ſtill more ample conceſſions made by that unhappy prince to his parliament, before the fatal rupture between them; and by the many ſalutary laws, particularly the *habeas corpus* act, paſſed under Charles the ſecond. To theſe ſucceeded *the bill of rights*, or declaration delivered by the lords and commons to the prince and princeſs of Orange 13 February 1688; and afterwards enacted in parliament, when they became king and queen: which declaration concludes in theſe remarkable words; "and "they do claim, demand, and inſiſt upon, all and "ſingular the premiſes, as their undoubted rights "and liberties." And the act of parliament itſelf [10] recognizes "all and ſingular the rights and liberties "aſſerted and claimed in the ſaid declaration to be the "true, antient, and indubitable rights of the people "of this kingdom." Laſtly, theſe liberties were again aſſerted at the commencement of the preſent century, in the *act of ſettlement* [11], whereby the crown was limited to his preſent majeſty's illuſtrious houſe: and ſome new proviſions were added, at the ſame fortunate æra, for better ſecuring our religion, laws, and liberties; which the ſtatute declares to be "the

[8] 25 Edw. I.
[9] 2 Inſt. proem.
[10] 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2.
[11] 12 & 13 W. III. c. 2.

"birthright of the people of England," according to the ancient doctrine of the common law. [2].

Thus much for the *declaration* of our rights and liberties. The rights themſelves, thus defined by theſe ſeveral ſtatutes, conſiſt in a number of private immunities; which will appear, from what has been premiſed, to be indeed no other, than either that *reſiduum* of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of ſociety to be ſacrificed to public convenience; or elſe thoſe civil privileges, which ſociety hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties ſo given up by individuals. Theſe therefore were formerly, either by inheritance or purchaſe, the rights of all mankind; but, in moſt other countries of the world being now more or leſs debaſed and deſtroyed, they at preſent may be ſaid to remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the rights of the people of England. And theſe may be reduced to three principal or primary articles; the right of perſonal ſecurity, the right of perſonal liberty, and the right of private property: becauſe, as there is no other known method of compulſion, or of abridging man's natural free will, but by an infringement or diminution of one or other of theſe important rights, the preſervation of theſe, inviolate, may juſtly be ſaid to include the preſervation of our civil immunities in their largeſt and moſt extenſive ſenſe.

I. The right of perſonal ſecurity conſiſts in a perſon's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.

1. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual, and it begins in contemplation of law as ſoon as an infant is able to ſtir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwiſe, killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and ſhe is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the antient law homicide or manſlaughter [3]. But the modern

[2] Plowd. 55.

[3] *Si aliquis mulierem pregnantem percuſſerit, vel ei venenum dederit, perquod fecerit abortivam; ſi puerperium jam formatum fuerit, et maxime ſi fuerit animatum, facit homicidium.* Bracton. *l.* 3. *c.* 21.

law doth not look upon this offence in quite ſo atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous miſdemeſnor [4].

An infant *in ventre ſa mere*, or in the mother's womb, is ſuppoſed in law to be born for many purpoſes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a ſurrender of a copyhold eſtate made to it. It may have a guardian aſſigned to it [5]; and it is enabled to have an eſtate limited to its uſe, and to take afterwards by ſuch limitation, as if it were then actually born [6]. And in this point the civil law agrees with ours [7].

2. A man's limbs (by which for the preſent we only underſtand thoſe members which may be uſeful to him in fight, and the loſs of which alone amounts to mayhem by the common law) are alſo the gift of the wiſe creator, to enable him to protect himſelf from external injuries in a ſtate of nature. To theſe therefore he has a natural inherent right; and they cannot be wantonly deſtroyed or diſabled without a manifeſt breach of civil liberty.

Both the life and limbs of a man are of ſuch high value, in the eſtimation of the law of England, that it pardons even homicide if committed *ſe defendendo*, or in order to preſerve them. For whatever is done by a man, to ſave either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the higheſt neceſſity and compulſion. Therefore if a man through fear of death or mayhem is prevailed upon to execute a deed, or do any other legal act; theſe, though accompanied with all other the requiſite ſolemnities, may be afterwards avoided, if forced upon him by a well-grounded apprehenſion of loſing his life, or even his limbs, in caſe of his non-compliance [8]. And the ſame is alſo a ſufficient excuſe for the commiſſion of many miſdemeſnors, as will appear in the fourth book. The conſtraint a man is under in theſe circumſtances is called in law *dureſs*, from the Latin *duritia*, of which there are two ſorts; dureſs of impriſonment, where

[4] 3 Inſt. 50.
[5] Stat. 12 Car. II. c. 24.
[6] Stat. 10 & 11 W. III. c. 16.
[7] *Qui in utero ſunt, in jure civili intelliguntur in rerum natura eſſe, cum de eorum commodo agatur. Ff.* 1. 5. 26.
[8] 2 Inſt. 483.

a man actually loſes his liberty, of which we ſhall preſently ſpeak; and dureſs *per minas* where the hardſhip is only threatened and impending, which is that we are now diſcourſing of. Dureſs *per minas* is either for fear of loſs of life, or elſe for fear of mayhem, or loſs of limb. And this fear muſt be upon ſufficient reaſon; "*non*," as Bracton expreſſes it, "*ſuſpicio cujuſlibet vani et meticuloſi hominis, ſed talis* "*qui poſſit cadere in virum conſtantem; talis enim debet* "*eſſe metus, qui in ſe contineat vitæ periculum, aut cor-* "*poris cruciatum*[9]. A fear of battery, or being beaten, though never ſo well grounded, is no dureſs; neither is the fear of having one's houſe burned, or one's goods taken away and deſtroyed; becauſe in theſe caſes, ſhould the threat be performed, a man may have ſatisfaction by recovering equivalent damages[0]: but no ſuitable atonement can be made for the loſs of life, or limb. And the indulgence ſhewn to a man under this, the principal, ſort of dureſs, the fear of loſing his life or limbs, agrees alſo with that maxim of the civil law; *ignoſcitur ei qui ſanguinem ſuum qualiter qualiter redemptum voluit*[1].

The law not only regards life and member, and protects every man in the enjoyment of them, but alſo furniſhes him with every thing neceſſary for their ſupport. For there is no man ſo indigent or wretched, but he may demand a ſupply ſufficient for all the neceſſities of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the ſeveral ſtatutes enacted for the relief of the poor, of which in their proper places. A humane proviſion; yet though dictated by the principles of ſociety, diſcountenanced by the Roman laws. For the edicts of the emperor Conſtantine commanding the public to maintain the children of thoſe who were unable to provide for them, in order to prevent the murder and expoſure of infants, an inſtitution founded on the ſame principle as our foundling hoſpitals, though comprized in the Theodoſian code[2]. were rejected in Juſtinian's collection.

9 *l.* 2. *c.* 5.
0 2 Inſt. 483.
1 *Ff.* 48. 21. 1.
2 *l.* 11. *c.* 27.

These rights, of life and member, can only be determined by the death of the person; which was formerly accounted to be either a civil or natural death.

The civil death commenced, if any man was banished or abjured the realm [3] by the process of the common law, or entered into religion; that is, went into a monastery, and became there a monk professed: in which cases he was absolutely dead in law, and his next heir should have his estate. For, such banished man was entirely cut off from society; and such a monk, upon his profession, renounced solemnly all secular concerns: and besides, as the popish clergy claimed an exemption from the duties of civil life and the commands of the temporal magistrate, the genius of the English laws would not suffer those persons to enjoy the benefits of society, who secluded themselves from it, and refused to submit to its regulations [4]. A monk was therefore accounted *civiliter mortuus*, and when he entered into religion might, like other dying men, make his testament and executors; or, if he made none, the ordinary might grant administration to his next of kin, as if he were actually dead intestate. And such executors and administrators had the same power, and might bring the same actions for debt due *to* the religious, and were liable to the same actions of those due *from* him, as if he were naturally deceased [5]. Nay, so far has this principle been carried, that when one was bound in a bond to an abbot and his successors, and afterwards made his executors and professed himself a monk of the same abbey, and in process of time was himself made abbot thereof; here the law gave him, in the capacity of abbot, an action of debt against his own executors to recover the money due [6]. In short, a monk or religious was so effectually dead in law, that a lease made even to a third person, during the life (generally) of one who afterwards became a monk, determined by such his entry into re-

3 Co. Litt. 133.

4 This was also a rule in the feodal law, *l.* 2. *t.* 21. *desiit esse miles seculi, qui factus est miles Christi; nec beneficium pertinet ad eum qui non debet gerere officium.*

5 Litt. §. 200.

6 Co. Litt. 133.

ligion; for which reaſon leaſes, and other conveyances for life, were uſually made to have and to hold for the term of one's *natural* life[7]. But, even in the times of popery, the law of England took no cognizance of *profeſſion* in any foreign country, becauſe the fact could not be tried in our courts[8]; and therefore, ſince the reformation, this diſability is held to be aboliſhed[9]: as is alſo the diſability of baniſhment, conſequent upon abjuration, by ſtatute 21 Jac. I. c. 28.

This natural life being, as was before obſerved, the immediate donation of the great creator, cannot legally be diſpoſed of or deſtroyed by any individual, neither by the perſon himſelf, nor by any other of his fellow-creatures, merely upon their own authority. Yet nevertheleſs it may, by the divine permiſſion, be frequently forfeited for the breach of thoſe laws of ſociety, which are enforced by the ſanction of capital puniſhments; of the nature, reſtrictions, expedience, and legality of which, we may hereafter more conveniently inquire in the concluding book of theſe commentaries. At preſent, I ſhall only obſerve, that whenever the *conſtitution* of a ſtate veſts in any man, or body of men, a power of deſtroying at pleaſure, without the direction of laws, the lives or members of the ſubject, ſuch conſtitution is in the higheſt degree tyrannical: and that whenever any *laws* direct ſuch deſtruction for light and trivial cauſes, ſuch laws are likewiſe tyrannical, though in an inferior degree: becauſe here the ſubject is aware of the danger he is expoſed to, and may by prudent caution provide againſt it. The ſtatute law of England does therefore very ſeldom, and the common law does never inflict any puniſhment extending to life or limb, unleſs upon the higheſt neceſſity: and the conſtitution is an utter ſtranger to an arbitrary power of killing or maiming the ſubject without the expreſs warrant of law. "*Nullus liber homo*," ſays the great charter[o], "*aliquo modo deſtruator, niſi per legale* "*judicium parium ſuorum aut per legem terræ.*" Which

[7] 2 Rep. 48. Co. Litt. 132.
[8] Co. Litt. 132.
[9] 1 Salk. 162.
[o] c. 29.

words, "*aliquo modo deſtruatur*," according to ſir Edward Coke [1], include a prohibition not only of *killing*, and *maiming*, but alſo of *torturing* (to which our laws are ſtrangers) and of every oppreſſion by colour of an illegal authority. And it is enacted by the ſtatute 5 Edw. III. c. 9. that no man ſhall be fore-judged of life or limb, contrary to the great charter and the law of the land: and again, by ſtatute 28 Edw. III. c. 3. that no man ſhall be put to death, without being brought to anſwer by due proceſs of law.

3. Beſides thoſe limbs and members that may be neceſſary to a man, in order to defend himſelf or annoy his enemy, the reſt of his perſon or body is alſo entitled, by the ſame natural right, to ſecurity from the corporal inſults of menaces, aſſaults, beating, and wounding; though ſuch inſults amount not to deſtruction of life or member.

4. The preſervation of a man's health from ſuch practices as may prejudice or annoy it; and

5. The ſecurity of his reputation or good name from the arts of detraction and ſlander, are rights to which every man is entitled, by reaſon and natural juſtice; ſince without theſe it is impoſſible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other advantage or right. But theſe three laſt articles (being of much leſs importance than thoſe which have gone before, and thoſe which are yet to come) it will ſuffice to have barely mentioned among the rights of perſons: referring the more minute diſcuſſion of their ſeveral branches, to thoſe parts of our commentaries which treat of the infringement of theſe rights, under the head of perſonal wrongs.

II. Next to perſonal ſecurity, the law of England regards, aſſerts, and preſerves the perſonal liberty of individuals. This perſonal liberty conſiſts in the power of loco-motion, of changing ſituation, or moving one's perſon to whatſoever place one's own inclination may direct; without impriſonment or reſtraint, unleſs by due courſe of law. Concerning which we may make the ſame obſervations as

[1] 2 Inſt. 48.

upon the preceding article; that it is a right ſtrictly natural; that the laws of England have never abridged it without ſufficient cauſe; and, that in this kingdom it cannot ever be abridged at the mere diſcretion of the magiſtrate, without the explicit permiſſion of the laws. Here again the language of the great charter[2] is, that no freeman ſhall be taken or impriſoned, but by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land. And many ſubſequent old ſtatutes[3] expreſsly direct, that no man ſhall be taken or impriſoned by ſuggeſtion or petition to the king or his council, unleſs it be by legal indictment, or the proceſs of the common law. By the petition of right, 3 Car. I, it is enacted, that no freeman ſhall be impriſoned or detained without cauſe ſhewn, to which he may make anſwer according to law. By 16 Car. I. c. 10. if any perſon be reſtrained of his liberty by order or decree of any illegal court, or by command of the king's majeſty in perſon, or by warrant of the council board, or of any of the privy council; he ſhall, upon demand of his council, have a writ of *habeas corpus*, to bring his body before the court of king's bench or common pleas; who ſhall determine whether the cauſe of his commitment be juſt, and thereupon do as to juſtice ſhall appertain. And by 31 Car. II. c. 2. commonly called the *habeas corpus act*, the methods of obtaining this writ are ſo plainly pointed out and enforced, that, ſo long as this ſtatute remains unimpeached, no ſubject of England can be long detained in priſon, except in thoſe caſes in which the law requires and juſtifies ſuch detainer. And, leſt this act ſhould be evaded by demanding unreaſonable bail, or ſureties for the priſoner's appearance, it is declared by 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. that exceſſive bail ought not to be required.

Of great importance to the public is the preſervation of this perſonal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of any, the higheſt, magiſtrate to impriſon arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought

[2] c. 29. III. ſt. 5. c. 4. 28 Edw. III. c. 3.
[3] 5 Edw. III. c. 9. 25 Edw.

proper, (as in France it is daily practiſed by the crown [4]) there would ſoon be an end of all other rights and immunities. Some have thought, that unjuſt attacks, even upon life, or property, at the arbitrary will of the magiſtrate, are leſs dangerous to the commonwealth, than ſuch as are made upon the perſonal liberty of the ſubject. To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiſcate his eſtate, without accuſation or trial, would be ſo groſs and notorious an act of deſpotiſm, as muſt at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom: but confinement of the perſon, by ſecretly hurrying him to gaol, where his ſufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a leſs public, a leſs ſtriking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government. And yet ſometimes, when the ſtate is in real danger, even this may be a neceſſary meaſure. But the happineſs of our conſtitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to determine when the danger of the ſtate is ſo great, as to render this meaſure expedient: for it is the parliament only, or legiſlative power, that whenever it ſeems proper, can authorize the crown, by ſuſpending the *habeas corpus* act for a ſhort and limited time, to impriſon ſuſpected perſons without giving any reaſon for ſo doing; as the ſenate of Rome was wont to have recourſe to a dictator, a magiſtrate of abſolute authority, when they judged the republic in any imminent danger. The decree of the ſenate, which uſually preceded the nomination of this magiſtrate, "*dent operam conſules, ne quid reſpublica detrimenti capiat,*" was called the *ſenatus conſultum ultimæ neceſſitatis.* In like manner this experiment ought only to be tried in caſes of extreme emergency; and in theſe the nation parts with it's liberty for a while, in order to preſerve it for ever.

The confinement of the perſon, in any wiſe, is an impriſonment. So that the keeping a man againſt his will in a private houſe, putting him in the ſtocks, arreſting or forcibly detaining him in the ſtreet, is

[4] I have been aſſured upon good authority, that, during the mild adminiſtration of cardinal Fleury, above 54000 *lettres de cachet* were iſſued, upon the ſingle ground of the famous bulle *unigenitus.*

an impriſonment [2]. And the law ſo much diſcourages unlawful confinement, that if a man is under *dureſs of impriſonment*, which we before explained to mean a compulſion by an illegal reſtraint of liberty, until he ſeals a bond or the like, he may allege this dureſs, and avoid the extorted bond. But if a man be lawfully impriſoned, and either to procure his diſcharge, or on any other fair account, ſeals a bond or a deed, this is not by dureſs of impriſonment, and he is not at liberty to avoid it [3]. To make impriſonment lawful, it muſt either be by proceſs from the courts of judicature, or by warrant from ſome legal officer having authority to commit to priſon; which warrant muſt be in writing, under the hand and ſeal of the magiſtrate, and expreſs the cauſes of the commitment, in order to be examined into (if neceſſary) upon a *habeas corpus*. If there be no cauſe expreſſed, the gaoler is not bound to detain the priſoner [4]. For the law judges in this reſpect, ſaith ſir Edward Coke, like Feſtus the Roman governor; that it is unreaſonable to ſend a priſoner, and not to ſignify withal the crimes alledged againſt him.

A natural and regular conſequence of this perſonal liberty, is, that every Engliſhman may claim a right to abide in his own country ſo long as he pleaſes; and not to be driven from it unleſs by the ſentence of the law. The king indeed, by his royal prerogative, may iſſue out his writ *ne exeat regnum*, and prohibit any of his ſubjects from going into foreign parts without licence [5]. This may be neceſſary for the public ſervice and ſafeguard of the commonwealth. But no power on earth, except the authority of parliament, can ſend any ſubject of England *out of* the land againſt his will; no, not even a criminal. For exile, and tranſportation, are puniſhments at preſent unknown to the common law; and, whenever the latter is now inflicted, it is either by the choice of the criminal himſelf to eſcape a capital puniſhment, or elſe by the expreſs direction of ſome modern act of parliament. To this purpoſe the great charter [6] declares that no freeman ſhall be

2 2 Inſt. 589.
3 2 Inſt. 482.
4 *Ibid.* 52, 53.
5 F. N. B. 85.
6 c. 29.

baniſhed, unleſs by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. And by the *habeas corpus* act, 31 Car. II. c. 2. (that ſecond *magna carta*, and ſtable bulwark of our liberties) it is enacted, that no ſubject of this realm, who is an inhabitant of England, Wales or Berwick, ſhall be ſent priſoner into Scotland, Ireland, Jerſey, Guernſey, or places beyond the ſeas; (where they cannot have the full benefit and protection of the common law) but that all ſuch impriſonments ſhall be illegal; that the perſon, who ſhall dare to commit another contrary to this law, ſhall be diſabled from bearing any office, ſhall incur the penalty of a *præmunire*, and be incapable of receiving the king's pardon: and the party ſuffering ſhall alſo have his private action againſt the perſon committing, and all his aiders, adviſers and abettors, and ſhall recover treble coſts; beſides his damages, which no jury ſhall aſſeſs at leſs than five hundred pounds.

The law is in this reſpect ſo benignly and liberally conſtrued for the benefit of the ſubject, that, though *within* the realm the king may command the attendance and ſervice of all his liegemen, yet he cannot ſend any man *out of* the realm, even upon the public ſervice; excepting ſailors and ſoldiers, the nature of whoſe employment neceſſarily implies an exception: he cannot even conſtitute a man lord deputy or lieutenant of Ireland againſt his will, nor make him a foreign ambaſſador[7]. For this might in reality be no more than an honourable exile.

III. The third abſolute right, inherent in every Engliſhman, is that of property: which conſiſts in the free uſe, enjoyment, and diſpoſal of all his acquiſitions, without any control or diminution, ſave only by the laws of the land. The original of private property is probably founded in nature, as will be more fully explained in the ſecond book of the enſuing commentaries: but certainly the modifications under which we at preſent find it, the method of conſerving it in the preſent owner, and of tranſlating it from man to man, are entirely derived from ſociety: and are ſome of thoſe civil advantages, in exchange for which eve-

[7] 2 Inſt. 46.

ry individual has reſigned a part of his natural liberty. The laws of England are therefore, in point of honour and juſtice, extremely watchful in aſcertaining and protecting this right. Upon this principle the great charter [8] has declared that no freeman ſhall be diſſeiſed, or diveſted, of his freehold, or of his liberties, or free cuſtoms, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. And by a variety of antient ſtatutes [9] it is enacted, that no man's lands or goods ſhall be ſeiſed into the king's hands, againſt the great charter, and the law of the land; and that no man ſhall be diſinherited, or put out of his franchiſes or freehold, unleſs he be duly brought to anſwer, and be forejudged by courſe of law; and if any thing be done to the contrary, it ſhall be redreſſed, and holden for none.

So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the leaſt violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road for inſtance, were to be made through the grounds of a private perſon, it might perhaps be extenſively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or ſet of men, to do this without conſent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Beſides the public good is in nothing more eſſentially intereſted, than in the protection of every individual's private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and ſimilar caſes the legiſlature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpoſe, and compel the individual to acquieſce. But how does it interpoſe and compel? Not by abſolutely ſtripping the ſubject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby ſuſtained. The public is now conſidered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legiſlature does

[8] c. 29. III. ſt. 5. c. 4. 28 Edw. III.

[9] 5 Edw. III. c. 9. 25 Edw. c. 3.

is to oblige the owner to alienate his poſſeſſions for a reaſonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legiſlature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legiſlature can perform.

Nor is this the only inſtance in which the law of the land has poſtponed even public neceſſity to the ſacred and inviolable rights of private property. For no ſubject of England can be conſtrained to pay any aids or taxes, even for the defence of the realm or the ſupport of government, but ſuch as are impoſed by his own conſent, or that of his repreſentatives in parliament. By the ſtatute 25 Edw. I. c. 5. and 6. it is provided, that the king ſhall not take any aids or taſks, but by the common aſſent of the realm. And what that common aſſent is, is more fully explained by 34 Edw. I. ſt. 4. c. 1. which [9] enacts, that no talliage or aid ſhall be taken without the aſſent of the archbiſhops, biſhops, earls, barons, knights, burgeſſes, and other freemen of the land: and again, by 14 Edw. III. ſt. 2. c. 1. the prelates, earls, barons, and commons, citizens, burgeſſes, and merchants, ſhall not be charged to make any aid, if it be not by the common aſſent of the great men and commons in parliament. And as this fundamental law had been ſhamefully evaded under many ſucceeding princes, by compulſive loans, and benevolences extorted without a real and voluntary conſent, it was made an article in the petition of right 3 Car. I, that no man ſhall be compelled to yield any gift, loan, or benevolence, tax, or ſuch like charge, without common conſent by act of parliament. And laſtly, by the ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. it is declared, that levying money for or to the uſe of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant of parliament; or for longer time, or in other manner, than the ſame is or ſhall be granted; is illegal.

In the three preceding articles we have taken a ſhort view of the principal abſolute rights which ap-

[9] See the introduction to the great charter, (*edit. Oxon.*) *ſub anno* 1297; wherein it is ſhewn that this ſtatute *de talliagio non concedendo*, ſuppoſed to have been made in 34 Edw. I, is in reality nothing more than a ſort of tranſlation into Latin of the *confirmatio cartarum*, 25 Edw. I, which was originally publiſhed in the Norman language.

pertain to every Engliſhman. But in vain would theſe rights be declared, aſcertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if the conſtitution had provided no other method to ſecure their actual enjoyment. It has therefore eſtabliſhed certain other auxiliary ſubordinate rights of the ſubject, which ſerve principally as outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of perſonal ſecurity, perſonal liberty, and private property. Theſe are,

1. The conſtitution, powers, and privileges of parliament, of which I ſhall treat at large in the enſuing chapter.

2. The limitation of the king's prerogative, by bounds, ſo certain, and notorious, that it is impoſſible he ſhould either miſtake or legally exceed them without the conſent of the people. Of this alſo I ſhall treat in it's proper place. The former of theſe keeps the legiſlative power in due health and vigour, ſo as to make it improbable that laws ſhould be enacted deſtructive of general liberty: the latter is a guard upon the executive power, by reſtraining it from acting either beyond or in contradiction to the laws, that are framed and eſtabliſhed by the other.

3. A third ſubordinate right of every Engliſhman is that of applying to the courts of juſtice for redreſs of injuries. Since the law is in England the ſupreme arbiter of every man's life, liberty, and property, courts of juſtice muſt at all times be open to the ſubject, and the law be duly adminiſtered therein. The emphatical words of *magna carta* [o], ſpoken in the perſon of the king, who in judgment of law (ſays ſir Edward Coke [1]) is ever preſent and repeating them in all his courts, are theſe: *nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel juſtitiam:* "and therefore "every ſubject," continues the ſame learned author, "for injury done to him *in bonis, in terris, vel perſona*, "by any other ſubject, be he eccleſiaſtical or tempo- "ral, without any exception, may take his remedy by "the courſe of the law, and have juſtice and right "for the injury done to him, freely without ſale, fully "without any denial, and ſpeedily without delay."

[o] c. 29. [1] 2 Inſt. 55.

It were endleſs to enumerate all the *affirmative* acts of parliament, wherein juſtice is directed to be done according to the law of the land; and what that law is, every ſubject knows, or may know, if he pleaſes; for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge but is permanent, fixed, and unchangeable, unleſs by authority of parliament. I ſhall however juſt mention a few *negative* ſtatutes, whereby abuſes, perverſions, or delays of juſtice, eſpecially by the prerogative, are reſtrained. It is ordained by the *magna carta*[2], that no freeman ſhall be outlawed, that is, put out of the protection and benefit of the laws, but according to the law of the land. By 2 Edw. III. c. 8. and 11 Ric. 2. c. 10. it is enacted that no commands or letters ſhall be ſent under the great ſeal, or the little ſeal, the ſignet, or privy ſeal, in diſturbance of the law; or to diſturb or delay common right; and, though ſuch commandments ſhould come, the judges ſhall not ceaſe to do right; which is alſo made a part of their oath by ſtatute 18 Edw. III. ſt. 4. And by 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. it is declared, that the pretended power of ſuſpending, or diſpenſing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, without conſent of parliament, is illegal.

Not only the ſubſtantial part, or judicial deciſions, of the law, but alſo the formal part, or method of proceeding cannot be altered but by parliament; for, if once thoſe outworks were demoliſhed, there would be an inlet to all manner of innovation in the body of the law itſelf. The king, it is true, may erect new courts of juſtice: but then they muſt proceed according to the old eſtabliſhed forms of the common law. For which reaſon it is declared in the ſtatute 16 Car. I. c. 10. upon the diſſolution of the court of ſtarchamber, that neither his majeſty, nor his privy council, have any juriſdiction, power, or authority by Engliſh bill, petition, articles, libels, (which were the courſe of proceeding in the ſtarchamber, borrowed from the civil law) or by any other arbitrary way whatſoever, to examine, or draw into queſtion, determine, or diſpoſe of the lands or goods of any ſubjects of this kingdom; but that the ſame ought to be tried and determined in the ordinary courts of juſtice, and by *courſe of law*.

[2] c. 29.

4. If there ſhould happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of the rights before-mentioned, which the ordinary courſe of law is too defective to reach, there ſtill remains a fourth ſubordinate right, appertaining to every individual, namely, the right of petitioning the king, or either houſe of parliament, for the redreſs of grievances. In Ruſſia we are told[2] that the czar Peter eſtabliſhed a law, that no ſubject might petition the throne, till he had firſt petitioned two different miniſters of ſtate. In caſe he had obtained juſtice from neither, he might then preſent a third petition to the prince; but upon pain of death, if found to be in the wrong. The conſequence of which was, that no one dared to offer ſuch third petition; and grievances ſeldom falling under the notice of the ſovereign, he had little opportunity to redreſs them. The reſtrictions, for ſome there are, which are laid upon petitioning in England, are of a nature extremely different; and while they promote the ſpirit of peace, they are no check upon that of liberty. Care only muſt be taken, leſt, under the pretence of petitioning, the ſubject be guilty of any riot or tumult; as happened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 1640: and, to prevent this, it is provided by the ſtatute 13 Car. II. ſt. 1. c. 5. that no petition to the king, or either houſe of parliament, for any alteration in church or ſtate, ſhall be ſigned by above twenty perſons, unleſs the matter thereof be approved by three juſtices of the peace, or the major part of the grand jury, in the country; and in London by the lord mayor, aldermen and common council: nor ſhall any petition be preſented by more than ten perſons at a time. But, under theſe regulations, it is declared by the ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. that the ſubject hath a right to petition; and that all commitments and proſecutions for ſuch petitioning are illegal.

5. The fifth and laſt auxiliary right of the ſubject, that I ſhall at preſent mention, is that of having arms for their defence, ſuitable to their condition and de-

[2] Monteſq. Sp. L. xii. 26.

grees, and ſuch as are allowed by law. Which is alſo declared by the ſame ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. and it is indeed a public allowance under due reſtrictions, of the natural right of reſiſtance and ſelf-preſervation, when the ſanctions of ſociety and laws are found inſufficient to reſtrain the violence of oppreſſion.

In theſe ſeveral articles conſiſts the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the liberties of Engliſhmen: liberties, more generally talked of, than thoroughly underſtood; and yet highly neceſſary to be perfectly known and conſidered by every man of rank or property, leſt his ignorance of the points whereon they are founded ſhould hurry him into faction and licentiouſneſs on the one hand, or a puſillanimous indifference and criminal ſubmiſſion on the other. And we have ſeen that theſe rights conſiſt, primarily, in the free enjoyment of perſonal ſecurity, of perſonal liberty, and of private property. So long as theſe remain inviolate, the ſubject is perfectly free; for every ſpecies of compulſive tyranny and oppreſſion muſt act in oppoſition to one or other of theſe rights, having no other object upon which it can poſſibly be employed. To preſerve theſe from violation, it is neceſſary that the conſtitution of parliament be ſupported in it's full vigour; and limits, certainly known, be ſet to the royal prerogative. And, laſtly, to vindicate theſe rights, when actually violated or attacked, the ſubjects of England are entitled, in the firſt place, to the regular adminiſtration and free courſe of juſtice in the courts of law; next to the right of petitioning the king and parliament for redreſs of grievances; and, laſtly, to the right of having and uſing arms for ſelf preſervation and defence. And all theſe rights and liberties it is our birthright to enjoy entire; unleſs where the laws of our country have laid them under neceſſary reſtraints. Reſtraints in themſelves ſo gentle and moderate, as will appear upon farther inquiry, that no man of ſenſe or probity would wiſh to ſee them ſlackened. For all of us have it in our choice to do every thing that a good man would deſire to do; and are reſtrained from

nothing, but what would be pernicious either to ourſelves or our fellow-citizens. So that this review of our ſituation may fully juſtify the obſervation of a learned French author, who indeed generally both thought and wrote in the ſpirit of genuine freedom [4]; and who hath not ſcrupled to profeſs, even in the very boſom of his native country, that the Engliſh is the only nation in the world, where political or civil liberty is the direct end of its conſtitution. Recommending therefore to the ſtudent in our laws a farther and more accurate ſearch into this extenſive and important title, I ſhall cloſe my remarks upon it with the expiring wiſh of the famous father Paul to his country, "ESTO PERPETUA!"

[4] Monteſq. Sp. L. xi. 5.

CHAPTER THE SECOND.

OF THE PARLIAMENT.

WE are next to treat of the rights and duties of perſons, as they are members of ſociety, and ſtand in various relations to each other. Theſe relations are either public or private: and we will firſt conſider thoſe that are public.

The moſt univerſal public relation, by which men are connected together, is that of government; namely, as governors and governed, or, in other words, as magiſtrates and people. Of magiſtrates ſome alſo are *ſupreme*, in whom the ſovereign power of the ſtate reſides; others are *ſubordinate*, deriving all their authority from the ſupreme magiſtrate, accountable to him for their conduct, and acting in an inferior ſecondary ſphere.

In all tyrannical governments the ſupreme magiſtracy, or the right of both *making* and of *enforcing* the laws, is veſted in one and the ſame man, or one and the ſame body of men; and wherever theſe two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty. The magiſtrate may enact tyrannical laws, and execute them in a tyrannical manner, ſince he is poſſeſſed, in quality of diſpenſer of juſtice, with all the power which he as legiſlator thinks proper to give himſelf. But, where the legiſlative and executive authority are in diſtinct hands, the former will take care not to entruſt the latter with ſo large a power, as may tend to the ſubverſion of its own independence, and therewith of the liberty of the ſubject. With us therefore in England this ſupreme power is divided into two branches; the one legiſlative, to wit, the parliament, conſiſting of king,

lords, and commons; the other executive, conſiſting of the king alone. It will be the buſineſs of this chapter to conſider the Britiſh parliament; in which the legiſlative power, and (of courſe) the ſupreme and abſolute authority of the ſtate, is veſted by our conſtitution.

The original or firſt inſtitution of parliaments is one of thoſe matters which lie ſo far hidden in the dark ages of antiquity, that the tracing of it out is a thing equally difficult and uncertain. The word, *parliament*, itſelf (*parlement* or *colloquium*, as ſome of our hiſtorians tranſlate it) is comparatively of modern date; derived from the French, and ſignifying an aſſembly that met and conferred together. It was firſt applied to general aſſemblies of the ſtates under Louis VII in France, about the middle of the twelfth century [1]. But it is certain that, long before the introduction of the Norman language into England, all matters of importance were debated, and ſettled in the great councils of the realm. A practice which ſeems to have been univerſal among the northern nations, particularly the Germans [2]; and carried by them into all the countries of Europe, which they overran at the diſſolution of the Roman empire. Relics of which conſtitution, under various modifications and changes, are ſtill to be met with in the diets of Poland, Germany, and Sweden, and the aſſembly of the ſtates in France [3]; for what is there now called the parliament is only the ſupreme court of juſtice, conſiſting of the peers, certain dignified eccleſiaſtics and judges; which neither is in practice, nor is ſuppoſed to be in theory, a general council of the realm.

With us in England this general council hath been held immemorially under the ſeveral names of *michel-ſynoth* or great council, *michel-gemote* or great meeting, and more frequently *wittena-gemote* or the meeting of

[1] Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxiii. 307. The firſt mention of it in our ſtatute law is in the preamble to the ſtatute of Weſtm. 1. 3 Edw. I. *A. D.* 1272.

[2] *De minoribus rebus principes conſultant, de majoribus omnes.* Tac. *de mor. Germ. c.* 11.

[3] Theſe were aſſembled for the laſt time, *A. D.* 1561. (See Whitelocke of parl. c. 72. or according to Robertſon, *A. D.* 1614. (Hiſt. Cha. V. i. 369.)

wiſe men. It was alſo ſtiled in Latin, *commune concilium regni, magnum concilium regis, curia magna, conventus magnatum vel procerum, aſſiſa generalis*, and ſometimes *communitas regni Angliæ*[4]. We have inſtances of its meeting to order the affairs of the kingdom, to make new laws, and to mend the old, or, as Fleta[5] expreſſes it, "*novis injuriis emerſis nova conſtituere remedia*," ſo early as the reign of Ina king of the weſt Saxons, Offa king of the Mercians, and Ethelbert king of Kent, in the ſeveral realms of the heptarchy. And, after their union, the mirror[6] informs us, that king Alfred ordained for a perpetual uſage, that theſe councils ſhould meet twice in the year, or oftener, if need be, to treat of the government of God's people; how they ſhould keep themſelves from ſin, ſhould live in quiet, and ſhould receive right. Our ſucceeding Saxon and Daniſh monarchs held frequent councils of this ſort, as appears from their reſpective codes of law; the titles whereof uſually ſpeak them to be enacted, either by the king with the advice of his wittena-gemote, or wiſe men, as "*hæc ſunt inſtituta, quæ Edgarus rex conſilio ſapientum ſuorum inſtituit;*" or to be enacted by thoſe ſages with the advice of the king, as, "*hæc ſunt judicia, quæ ſapientes conſilio regis Ethelſtani inſtituerunt;*" or laſtly, to be enacted by them both together, as, "*hæ ſunt inſtitutiones, quas rex Edmundus et epiſcopi ſui cum ſapientibus ſuis inſtituerunt.*"

There is alſo no doubt but theſe great councils were occaſionally held under the firſt princes of the Norman line. Glanvil, who wrote in the reign of Henry the ſecond, ſpeaking of the particular amount of the amercement in the ſheriff's court, ſays, it had never yet been aſcertained by the general aſſiſe, or aſſembly, but was left to the cuſtom of particular counties[7]. Here the general aſſiſe is ſpoken of as a meeting well known, and its ſtatutes or deciſions are put in a manifeſt contradiction to cuſtom, or the common law. And in

[4] Glanvil. *l.* 13. *c.* 32. *l.* 9. *c.* 10.—Pref. 9 Rep. 2 Init. 526.

[5] *l.* 2. *c.* 2.

[6] *c.* 1. §. 3.

[7] *Quanta eſſe debeat per nullam aſſiſam generalem determinatum eſt, ſed pro conſuetudine ſingulorum comitatuum debetur. l.* 9. *c.* 10.

Edward the third's time an act of parliament made in the reign of William the conqueror, was pleaded in the case of the abbey of St. Edmund's-bury, and judicially allowed by the court. [8]

Hence it indisputably appears, that parliaments, or general councils, are coeval with the kingdom itself. How those parliaments were constituted and composed is another question, which has been matter of great dispute among our learned antiquaries; and, particularly, whether the commons were summoned at all; or, if summoned, at what period they began to form a distinct assembly. But it is not my intention here to enter into controversies of this sort. I hold it sufficient that it is generally agreed, that in the main the constitution of parliament, as it now stands, was marked out so long ago as the seventeenth year of king John, *A. D.* 1215, in the great charter granted by that prince; wherein he promises to summon all archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons, personally; and all other tenants in chief under the crown, by the sheriffs and bailiffs; to meet at a certain place, with forty days notice, to assess aids and scutages when necessary. And this constitution has subsisted in fact at least from the year 1266, 49 Hen. III: there being still extant writs of that date, to summon knights, citizens, and burgesses to parliament. I proceed therefore to enquire wherein consists this constitution of parliament, as is now stands, and has stood for the space of at least five hundred years. And in the prosecution of this enquiry, I shall consider, first, the manner and time of its assembling: secondly, its constituent parts: thirdly, the laws and customs relating to parliament, considered as one aggregate body: fourthly and fifthly, the laws and customs relating to each house separately and distinctly taken: sixthly, the methods of proceeding, and of making statutes, in both houses: and lastly, the manner of the parliament's adjournment, prorogation and dissolution.

I. As to the manner and time of assembling. The parliament is regularly to be summoned by the king's

[8] Year book, 21 Edw. III. 60.

writ or letter iſſued out of chancery by advice of the privy council, at leaſt forty days before it begins to ſit. It is a branch of the royal prerogative, that no parliament can be convened by its own authority, or by the authority of any, except the king alone. And this prerogative is founded upon very good reaſon. For, ſuppoſing it had a right to meet ſpontaneouſly, without being called together, it is impoſſible to conceive that all the members, and each of the houſes, would agree unanimouſly upon the proper time and place of meeting; and if half of the members met, and half abſented themſelves, who ſhall determine which is really the legiſlative body, the part aſſembled or that which ſtays away? It is therefore neceſſary that the parliament ſhould be called together at a determinate time and place; and highly becoming its dignity and independence, that it ſhould be called together by none but one of its own conſtituent parts: and, of the three conſtituent parts, this office can only appertain to the king: as he is a ſingle perſon, whoſe will may be uniform and ſteady; the firſt perſon in the nation, being ſuperior to both houſes in dignity; and the only branch of the legiſlature that has a ſeparate exiſtence, and is capable of performing any act at a time when no parliament is in being [9]. Nor is it an exception to this rule, that, by ſome modern ſtatutes, on the demiſe of a king or queen, if there be then no parliament in being, the laſt parliament revives, and is to ſit again for ſix months, unleſs diſſolved by the ſucceſſor: for this revived parliament muſt have been originally ſummoned by the crown.

[9] By motives ſomewhat ſimilar to theſe the Republic of Venice was actuated, when towards the end of the ſeventh century it aboliſhed the tribunes of the people, who were annually choſen by the ſeveral diſtricts of the Venetian territory, and conſtituted a doge in their ſtead; in whom the executive power of the ſtate at preſent reſides. For which their hiſtorians have aſſigned theſe, as the principal reaſons. 1. The propriety of having the executive power a part of the legiſlative, or ſenate; to which the former annual magiſtrates were not admitted. 2. The neceſſity of having a ſingle perſon to convoke the great council when ſeparated. (Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxvii. 15.)

It is true, that by a ſtatute, 16 Car. I. c. 1. it was enacted, that, if the king neglected to call a parliament for three years, the peers might aſſemble and iſſue out writs for chooſing one; and, in caſe of neglect of the peers, the conſtituents might meet and elect one themſelves. But this, if ever put in practice would have been liable to all the inconveniencies I have juſt now ſtated: and the act itſelf was eſteemed ſo highly detrimental and injurious to the royal prerogative, that it was repealed by ſtatute 16 Car. II. c. 1. From thence therefore no precedent can be drawn.

It is alſo true, that the convention-parliament, which reſtored king Charles the ſecond, met above a month before his return; the lords by their own authority, and the commons in purſuance of writs iſſued in the name of the keepers of the liberty of England by authority of parliament: and that the ſaid parliament ſat till the twenty-ninth of December, full ſeven months after the reſtoration: and enacted many laws, ſeveral of which are ſtill in force. But this was for the neceſſity of the thing, which ſuperſedes all law; for if they had not ſo met, it was morally impoſſible that the kingdom ſhould have been ſettled in peace. And the firſt thing done after the king's return was to paſs an act declaring this to be a good parliament, notwithſtanding the defect of the king's writs [o]. So that, as the royal prerogative was chiefly wounded by their ſo meeting, and as the king himſelf, who alone had a right to object, conſented to wave the objection, this cannot be drawn into an example in prejudice of the rights of the crown. Beſides we ſhould alſo remember, that it was at that time a great doubt among the lawyers [l], whether even this healing act made it a good parliament; and held by very many in the negative: though it ſeems to have been too nice a ſcruple. And yet, out of abundant caution, it was thought neceſſary to confirm its acts in the next parliament, by ſtatute 13 Car. II. c. 7. & c. 14.

[o] Stat. 12 Car. II. c. 1. [l] 1 Sid. 1.

It is likewiſe true, that at the time of the revolution, *A. D.* 1688, the lords and commons by their own authority, and upon the ſummons of the prince of Orange, (afterwards king William) met in a convention, and therein diſpoſed of the crown and kingdom. But it muſt be remembered, that this aſſembling was upon a like principle of neceſſity as at the reſtoration; that is, upon a full conviction that king James the ſecond had abdicated the government, and that the throne was thereby vacant: which ſuppoſition of the individual members was confirmed by their concurrent reſolution, when they actually came together. And, in ſuch a caſe as the palpable vacancy of a throne, it follows *ex neceſſitate rei*, that the form of the royal writs muſt be laid aſide, otherwiſe no parliament can ever meet again. For, let us put another poſſible caſe, and ſuppoſe, for the ſake of argument, that the whole royal line ſhould at any time fail and become extinct, which would indiſputably vacate the throne: in this ſituation it ſeems reaſonable to preſume, that the body of the nation, conſiſting of lords and commons, would have a right to meet and ſettle the government; otherwiſe there muſt be no government at all. And upon this and no other principle did the convention in 1688 aſſemble. The vacancy of the throne was precedent to their meeting without any royal ſummons, not a conſequence of it. They did not aſſemble without writ, and then make the throne vacant; but, the throne being previouſly vacant by the king's abdication, they aſſembled without writ, as they muſt do if they aſſembled at all. Had the throne been full, their meeting would not have been regular; but as it was really empty, ſuch meeting became abſolutely neceſſary. And accordingly it is declared by ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 1. c. 1. that this convention was really the two houſes of parliament, notwithſtanding the want of writs or other defects of form. So that, notwithſtanding theſe two capital exceptions, which were juſtifiable only on a principle of neceſſity, (and each of which, by the way, induced a revolution in the government) the rule laid down is in general certain, that the king, only, can convoke a parliament.

And this by the ancient ſtatutes of the realm [2] he is bound to do every year, or oftener, if need be. Not that he is, or ever was, obliged by theſe ſtatutes to call a *new* parliament every year; but only to permit a parliament to ſit annually for the redreſs of grievances, and diſpatch of buſineſs, *if need be*. Theſe laſt words are ſo looſe and vague, that ſuch of our monarchs as were inclined to govern without parliaments, neglected the convoking them, ſometimes for a very conſiderable period, under pretence that there was no need of them. But, to remedy this, by the ſtatute 16 Car. II. c. 1. it is enacted, that the ſitting and holding of parliaments ſhall not be intermitted above three years at the moſt. And by the ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. it is declared to be one of the rights of the people, that for redreſs of all grievances, and for the amending, ſtrengthening, and preſerving the laws, parliaments ought to be held *frequently*. And this indefinitive *frequency* is again reduced to a certainty by ſtatute 6 W. & M. c. 2. which enacts, as the ſtatute of Charles the ſecond had done before, that a new parliament ſhall be called within three years [3] after the determination of the former.

II. The conſtituent parts of a parliament are the next objects of our enquiry, and theſe are, the king's majeſty, ſitting there in his royal political capacity, and the three eſtates of the realm; the lords ſpiritual, the lords temporal, (who ſit, together with the king, in one houſe) and the commons, who ſit by themſelves in another. And the king and theſe three eſtates, together, form the great corporation of body politic of the kingdom [4], of which the king is ſaid to be *caput, principium, et finis*. For upon their coming together the king meets them, either in perſon or by repreſentation; without which there can be no beginning of a parliament [5]; and he alſo has alone the power of diſſolving them.

[2] 4 Edw. III. c. 14. 36 Edw. III. c. 10.

[3] This is the ſame period, that is allowed in Sweden for intermitting their general diets, or parliamentary aſſemblies. Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxxiii. 15.

[4] 4 Inſt. 1, 2. Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 3. Hale of Parl. 1.

[5] 4 Inſt. 6.

It is highly neceſſary for preſerving the balance of the conſtitution, that the executive power ſhould be a branch, though not the whole of the legiſlative. The total union of them, we have ſeen, would be productive of tyranny: the total diſjunction of them, for the preſent, would in the end produce the ſame effects, by cauſing that union againſt which it ſeems to provide. The legiſlature would ſoon become tyrannical, by making continual encroachments, and gradually aſſuming to itſelf the rights of the executive power. Thus the long parliament of Charles the firſt, while it acted in a conſtitutional manner, with the royal concurrence, redreſſed many heavy grievances and eſtabliſhed many ſalutary laws. But when the two houſes aſſumed the power of legiſlation, in excluſion of the royal authority, they ſoon after aſſumed likewiſe the reins of adminiſtration: and, in conſequence of theſe united powers, overturned both church and ſtate, and eſtabliſhed a worſe oppreſſion than any they pretended to remedy. To hinder therefore any ſuch encroachments, the king is himſelf a part of the parliament: and, as this is the reaſon of his being ſo, very properly therefore the ſhare of legiſlation, which the conſtitution has placed in the crown, conſiſts in the power of *rejecting* rather than *reſolving*; this being ſufficient to anſwer the end propoſed. For we may apply to the royal negative, in this inſtance, what Cicero obſerves of the negative of the Roman tribunes, that the crown has not any power of *doing* wrong, but merely of *preventing* wrong from being done[6]. The crown cannot begin of itſelf any alterations in the preſent eſtabliſhed law; but it may approve or diſapprove of the alterations ſuggeſted and conſented to by the two houſes. The legiſlative therefore cannot abridge the executive power of any rights which it now has by law, without its own conſent; ſince the law muſt perpetually ſtand as it now does, unleſs all the powers will agree to alter it. And herein indeed conſiſts the true excellence of the Engliſh government, that all parts of it form a mutual check upon each other. In

[6] *Sulla—tribunis plebis ſua lege injuriæ faciendæ poteſtatem ademit, auxilii ferendi reliquit. De LL.* 3. 9.

the legiſlature, the people are a check upon the nobility, and the nobility a check upon the people; by the mutual privilege of rejecting what the other has reſolved; while the king is a check upon both, which preſerves the executive power from encroachments. And this very executive power is again checked and kept within due bounds by the two houſes, through the privilege they have of enquiring into, impeaching, and puniſhing the conduct (not indeed of the king [7], which would deſtroy his conſtitutional independence; but which is more beneficial to the public) of his evil and pernicious counſellors. Thus every branch of our civil polity ſupports and is ſupported, regulates and is regulated, by the reſt; for the two houſes naturally drawing in two directions of oppoſite intereſt, and the prerogative in another ſtill different from them both, they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper limits: while the whole is prevented from ſeparation, and artificially connected together by the mixed nature of the crown, which is a part of the legiſlative, and the ſole executive magiſtrate. Like three diſtinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of government in a direction different from what either, acting by itſelf, would have done; but at the ſame time in a direction partaking of each, and formed out of all; a direction which conſtitutes the true line of the liberty and happineſs of the community.

Let us now conſider theſe conſtituent parts of the ſovereign power, or parliament, each in a ſeparate view. The king's majeſty will be the ſubject in the next, and many ſubſequent chapters, to which we muſt at preſent refer.

The next in order are the ſpiritual lords. Theſe conſiſt of two arch-biſhops, and twenty-four biſhops; and at the diſſolution of monaſteries by Henry VIII, conſiſted likewiſe of twenty-ſix mitred abbots, and two priors [8]; a very conſiderable body, and in thoſe times equal in number to the temporal nobility [9]. All theſe hold, or are ſuppoſed to hold, certain ancient

[7] Stat. 12 Car. II. c. 30.
[8] Seld. tit. hon. 2. 5. 27.
[9] Co. Litt. 97.

baronies under the king; for William the conqueror thought proper to change the ſpiritual tenure of frank-almoign or free alms, under which the biſhops held their lands during the Saxon government, into the feodal or Norman tenure by barony; which ſubjected their eſtates to all civil charges and aſſeſſments, from which they were before exempt [o]; and in right of ſucceſſion to thoſe baronies, which were unalienable from their reſpective dignities, the biſhops and abbots were allowed their ſeats in the houſe of lords [1]. But though theſe lords ſpiritual are in the eye of the law a diſtinct eſtate from the lords temporal, and are ſo diſtinguiſhed in moſt of our acts of parliament, yet in practice they are uſually blended together under the one name of *the lords*; they intermix in their votes; and the majority of ſuch intermixture joins both eſtates. And from this want of a ſeparate aſſembly and ſeparate negative of the prelates, ſome writers have argued [2] very cogently, that the lords ſpiritual and temporal are now in reality only one eſtate [3]: which is unqueſtionably true in every effectual ſenſe, though the antient diſtinction between them ſtill nominally continues. For if a bill ſhould paſs their houſe, there is no doubt of its validity, though every lords ſpiritual ſhould vote againſt it: of which Selden [4], and ſir Edward Coke [5], give many inſtances: as, on the other hand, I preſume it would be equally good, if the lords temporal preſent were inferior to the biſhops in number, and every one of thoſe temporal lords gave his vote to reject the bill; though ſir Edward Coke ſeems to doubt [6] whether this would not be an *ordinance*, rather than an *act*, of parliament.

[o] Gilb. Hiſt. Exch. 55. Spelm. W. I. 291.

[1] Glanv. 7. 1. Co. Litt. 97. Seld. tit. hon. 2. 5. 19.

[2] Whitelocke on Parliam. c. 72, Warburt. Alliance. b. 2. c. 3.

[3] Dyer. 60.

[4] Baronage. p. 1. c. 6. The act of uniformity, 1 Eliz. c. 2. was paſſed with the diſſent of all the biſhops; (Gibſ. codes 286.) and therefore the ſtile *of lords ſpiritual* is omitted throughout the whole.

[5] 2 Inſt. 585, 6, 7. See Keilw. 184; where it is holden by the judges, 7 Hen. VIII. that the king may hold a parliament without any ſpiritual lords. This was alſo exemplified in fact in the two firſt parliaments of Charles II. wherein no biſhops were ſummoned, till after the repeal of the ſtatute 16 Car. I. c. 27. by ſtatute 13 Car. II. ſt. 1. c. 2.

[6] 4 Inſt. 25.

The lords temporal conſiſt of all the peers of the realm (the biſhops not being in ſtrictneſs held to be ſuch, but merely lords of parliament [7]) by whatever title of nobility diſtinguiſhed; dukes, marquiſſes, earls, viſcounts, or barons; of which dignities we ſhall ſpeak more hereafter. Some of theſe ſit by deſcent, as do all antient peers; ſome by creation, as do all new-made ones; others, ſince the union with Scotland, by election, which is the caſe of the ſixteen peers, who repreſent the body of the Scots nobility. Their number is indefinite, and may be encreaſed at will by the power of the crown: and once, in the reign of queen Anne, there was an inſtance of creating no leſs than twelve together; in contemplation of which in the reign of king George the firſt, a bill paſſed the houſe of lords, and was countenanced by the then miniſtry, for limiting the number of the peerage. This was thought by ſome to promiſe a great acquiſition to the conſtitution, by reſtraining the prerogative from gaining the aſcendant in that auguſt aſſembly, by pouring it at pleaſure an unlimited number of new created lords. But the bill was ill-reliſhed and miſcarried in the houſe of commons, whoſe leading members were then deſirous to keep the avenues to the other houſe as open and eaſy as poſſible.

The diſtinction of rank and honours is neceſſary in every well governed ſtate: in order to reward ſuch as are eminent for their ſervices to the public, in a manner the moſt deſirable to individuals, and yet without burden to the community; exciting thereby an ambitious yet laudable ardor, and generous emulation, in others. And emulation, or virtuous ambition, is a ſpring of action which, however dangerous or invidious in a mere republic or under a deſpotic ſway, will certainly be attended with good effects under a free monarchy; where without deſtroying its exiſtence, it's exceſſes may be continually reſtrained by that ſuperior power, from which all honour is derived. Such a ſpirit, when nationally diffuſed, gives life and vigour to the community; it ſets all the wheels of go-

[7] Stamford. P. C. 153.

vernment in motion, which, under a wiſe regulator, may be directed to any beneficial purpoſe; and thereby every individual may be made ſubſervient to the public good, while he principally means to promote his own particular views. A body of nobility is alſo more peculiarly neceſſary in our mixed and compounded conſtitution, in order to ſupport the rights of both the crown and the people, by forming a barrier to withſtand the encroachments of both. It creates and preſerves that gradual ſcale of dignity, which proceeds from the peaſant to the prince; riſing like a pyramid from a broad foundation, and diminiſhing to a point as it riſes. It is this aſcending and contracting proportion that adds ſtability to any government; for when the departure is ſudden from one extreme to another, we may pronounce that ſtate to be precarious. The nobility therefore are the pillars, which are reared from among the people, more immediately to ſupport the throne; and, if that falls, they muſt alſo be buried under its ruins. Accordingly, when in the laſt century the commons had determined to extirpate monarchy, they alſo voted the houſe of lords to be uſeleſs and dangerous. And ſince titles of nobility are thus expedient in the ſtate, it is alſo expedient that their owners ſhould form an independent and ſeparate branch of the legiſlature. If they were confounded with the maſs of the people, and like them had only a vote in electing repreſentatives, their privileges would ſoon be borne down and overwhelmed by the popular torrent, which would effectually level all diſtinctions. It is therefore highly neceſſary that the body of nobles ſhould have a diſtinct aſſembly, diſtinct deliberations, and diſtinct powers from the commons.

The commons conſiſt of all ſuch men of property in the kingdom, as have not ſeats in the houſe of lords: every one of which has a voice in parliament, either perſonally, or by his repreſentatives. In a free ſtate every man, who is ſuppoſed a free agent, ought to be in ſome meaſure his own governor; and therefore a branch at leaſt of the legiſlative power ſhould reſide in the whole body of the people. And this power,

when the territories of the ſtate are ſmall and its citizens eaſily known, ſhould be exerciſed by the people in their aggregate or collective capacity, as was wiſely ordained in the petty republics of Greece, and the firſt rudiments of the Roman ſtate. But this will be highly inconvenient, when the public territory is extended to any conſiderable degree, and the number of citizens is encreaſed. Thus when, after the ſocial war, all the burghers of Italy were admitted free citizens of Rome, and each had a voice in the public aſſemblies, it became impoſſible to diſtinguiſh the ſpurious from the real voter, and from that time all elections and popular deliberations grew tumultuous and diſorderly; which paved the way for Marius and Sylla, Pompey and Cæſar, to trample on the liberties of their country, and at laſt to diſſolve the commonwealth. In ſo large a ſtate as ours it is therefore very wiſely contrived, that the people ſhould do that by their repreſentatives, which it is impracticable to perform in perſon; repreſentatives, choſen by a number of minute and ſeparate diſtricts, wherein all the voters are, or eaſily may be, diſtinguiſhed. The counties are therefore repreſented by knights, elected by the proprietors of lands: the cities and boroughs are repreſented by citizens and burgeſſes, choſen by the mercantile part or ſuppoſed trading intereſt of the nation; much in the ſame manner as the burghers, in the diet of Sweden are choſen by the corporate towns, Stockholm ſending four, as London does with us, other cities two, and ſome only one[8]. The number of Engliſh repreſentatives is 513, and of Scots 45; in all 558. And every member, though choſen by one particular diſtrict, when elected and returned ſerves for the whole realm. For the end of his coming thither is not particular, but general; not barely to advantage his conſtituents, but the *common* wealth; to adviſe his majeſty (as appears from the writ of ſummons[9]) "*de communi conſilio ſuper negotiis quibuſdam arduis et* "*urgentibus, regem, ſtatum et defenſionem regni Angliæ* "*et eccleſiæ Anglicanæ concernentibus.*" And therefore he is not bound, like a deputy in the united provinces, to conſult with, or take the advice, of his conſtituents

[8] Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxxiii. 18. [9] 4 Inſt. 14.

upon any particular point, unleſs he himſelf thinks it proper or prudent ſo to do.

Theſe are the conſtituent parts of a parliament: the king, the lords ſpiritual and temporal, and the commons. Parts, of which each is ſo neceſſary, that the conſent of all three is required to make any new law that ſhall bind the ſubject. Whatever is enacted for law by one, or by two only, of the three is no ſtatute; and to it no regard is due, unleſs in matters relating to their own privileges. For though in the times of madneſs and anarchy, the commons once paſſed a vote [o], "that "whatever is enacted or declared for law by the com- "mons in parliament aſſembled hath the force of law; "and all the people of this nation are concluded there- "by, although the conſent and concurrence of the king "or houſe of peers be not had thereto;" yet, when the conſtitution was reſtored in all its forms, it was particularly enacted by ſtatute 13 Car. II. c. 1. that if any perſon ſhall maliciouſly or adviſedly affirm, that both or either of the houſes of parliament have any legiſlative authority without the king, ſuch perſon ſhall incur all the penalties of a *præmunire*.

III. We are next to examine the laws and cuſtoms relating to parliament, thus united together and conſidered as one aggregate body.

The power and juriſdiction of parliament, ſays ſir Edward Coke [p], is ſo tranſcendant and abſolute, that it cannot be confined, either for cauſes or perſons, within any bounds. And of this high court, he adds, it may be truly ſaid, "*ſi antiquitatem ſpectes, eſt vetuſtiſſi-* "*ma; ſi dignitatem, eſt honoratiſſima; ſi juriſdictionem,* "*eſt capaciſſima.*" It hath ſovereign and uncontrolable authority, in the making, confirming, enlarging, reſtraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all poſſible denominations, eccleſiaſtical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that abſolute deſpotic power, which muſt in all governments reſide ſomewhere, is entruſted by the conſtitution of theſe kingdoms. All miſchiefs and grievances, ope-

[o] 4 Jan. 1648. [p] 4 Inſt. 36.

rations and remedies, that tranſcend the ordinary courſe of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new model the ſucceſſion to the crown; as was done in the reign of Henry VIII and William III. It can alter the eſtabliſhed religion of the land; as was done in a variety of inſtances, in the reigns of king Henry VIII and his three children. It can change and create afreſh even the conſtitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themſelves; as was done by the act of union, and the ſeveral ſtatutes for triennial and ſeptennial elections. It can, in ſhort, do every thing that is not naturally impoſſible; and therefore ſome have not ſcrupled to call it's power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo. So that it is a matter moſt eſſential to the liberties of this kingdom, that ſuch members be delegated to this important truſt, as are moſt eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge; for it was a known apothegm of the great lord treaſurer Burleigh, "that England "could never be ruined but by a parliament:" and, as ſir Matthew Hale obſerves [2], this being the higheſt and greateſt court, over which none other can have juriſdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a miſgovernment ſhould any way fall upon it, the ſubjects of this kingdom are left without all manner of remedy. To the ſame purpoſe the preſident Monteſquieu, though I truſt too haſtily, preſages [3]; that as Rome, Sparta, and Carthage have loſt their liberty and periſhed, ſo the conſtitution of England will in time loſe it's liberty, will periſh: it will periſh, whenever the legiſlative power ſhall become more corrupt than the executive.

It muſt be owned that Mr. Locke [4], and other theoretical writers, have held, that "there remains "ſtill inherent in the people a ſupreme power to "remove or alter the legiſlative, when they find the "legiſlative act contrary to the truſt repoſed in them: "for, when ſuch truſt is abuſed, it is thereby forfeit-

[2] of parliaments, 49.
[3] Sp. L. 11. 6.
[4] on Gov. p. 2. §. 149. 227.

" ed, and devolves to thoſe who gave it." But however juſt this concluſion may be in theory, we cannot practically adopt it, nor take any *legal* ſteps for carrying it into execution, under any diſpenſation of government at preſent actually exiſting. For this devolution of power, to the people at large, includes in it a diſſolution of the whole form of government eſtabliſhed by that people; reduces all the members to their original ſtate of equality; and, by annihilating the ſovereign power, repeals all poſitive laws whatſoever before enacted. No human laws will therefore ſuppoſe a caſe, which at once muſt deſtroy all law, and compel men to build afreſh upon a new foundation; nor will they make proviſion for ſo deſperate an event, as muſt render all legal proviſions ineffectual[5]. So long therefore as the Engliſh conſtitution laſts, we may venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is abſolute and without control.

In order to prevent the miſchiefs that might ariſe, by placing this extenſive authority in hands that are either incapable, or elſe improper, to manage it, it is provided by the cuſtom and law of parliament[6], that no one ſhall ſit or vote in either houſe, unleſs he be twenty-one years of age. This is alſo expreſsly declared by ſtatute 7 & 8 W. III. c. 25. with regard to the houſe of commons; doubts having ariſen, from ſome contradictory adjudications, whether or no a minor was incapacitated from ſitting in that houſe[7]. It is alſo enacted by ſtatute 7 Jac. I. c. 6. that no member be permitted to enter into the houſe of commons, till he hath taken the oath of allegiance before the lord ſteward or his deputy: and by 30 Car. II. ſt. 2. and 1 Geo. I. c. 13. that no member ſhall vote or ſit in either houſe, till he hath in the preſence of the houſe taken the oath of allegiance, ſupremacy, and abjuration, and ſubſcribed and repeated the declaration againſt tranſubſtantiation, and invocation of ſaints, and the ſacrifice of the maſs. Aliens, unleſs naturalized, were likewiſe by the law of parliament incapable to ſerve therein[8]: and now it is

[5] See page 244.
[6] Whitelock, c. 50. 4 Inſt. 47.
[7] Com. Journ. 16 Dec. 1690.
[8] Com. Journ. 10 Mar. 1623. 18 Feb. 1625.

enacted, by ſtatute 12 & 13 W. III. c. 2. that no alien, even though he be naturalized, ſhall be capable of being a member of either houſe of parliament. And there are not only theſe ſtanding incapacities; but if any perſon is made a peer by the king, or elected to ſerve in the houſe of commons by the people, yet may the reſpective houſes upon complaint of any crime in ſuch perſon, and proof thereof, adjudge him diſabled and incapable to ſit as a member[9]: and this by the law and cuſtom of parliament.

For, as every court of juſtice hath laws and cuſtoms for it's direction, ſome the civil and canon, ſome the common law, others their own peculiar laws and cuſtoms, ſo the high court of parliament hath alſo it's own peculiar law, called the *lex et conſuetudo parliamenti*; a law which ſir Edward Coke[o] obſerves is "*ab omnibus quærenda, a multis ignorata* "*a paucis cognita.*" It will not therefore be expected that we ſhould enter into the examination of this law, with any degree of minuteneſs: ſince, as the ſame learned author aſſures us[1], it is much better to be learned out of the rolls of parliament, and other records, and by precedents, and continual experience, than can be expreſſed by any one man. It will be ſufficient to obſerve, that the whole of the law and cuſtom of parliament has it's original from this one maxim, "that whatever matter ariſes concerning "either houſe of parliament, ought to be examined, "diſcuſſed, and adjudged in that houſe to which it "relates, and not elſewhere[2]." Hence, for inſtance, the lords will not ſuffer the commons to interfere in ſettling the election of a peer of Scotland; the commons will not allow the lords to judge of the election of a burgeſs; nor will either houſe permit the ſubordinate courts of law to examine the merits of either caſe. But the maxims upon which they proceed, together with the method of proceeding, reſt entirely in the breaſt of the parliament itſelf; and are not defined and aſcertained by any particular ſtated laws

[9] Whitelocke of parl. c. 102. See Lord's Journ. 3 May 1620. 13 May 1624. 26 May 1725. Com. Journ. 14 Feb. 1580. 21 Jan. 1628. 9 Nov. 1640. 6 Mar. 1676. 6 Mar. 1711. 17 Feb. 1769.

[o] 1 Inſt. 11.

[1] 4 Inſt. 50. [2] 4 Inſt. 15.

The *privileges* of parliament are likewiſe very large and indefinite. And therefore when in 31 Hen. VI the houſe of lords propounded a queſtion to the judges concerning them, the chief juſtice, ſir John Forteſcue, in the name of his brethren, declared, "that they "ought not to make anſwer to that queſtion: for it "hath not been uſed aforetime that the juſtices ſhould "in any wiſe determine the privileges of the high "court of parliament. For it is ſo high and mighty "in it's nature, that it may make law: and that "which is law, it may make no law: and the deter-"mination and knowledge of that privilege belongs "to the lords of parliament, and not to the juſtices [3]." Privilege of parliament was principally eſtabliſhed, in order to protect it's members not only from being moleſted by their fellow-ſubjects, but alſo more eſpecially from being oppreſſed by the power of the crown. If therefore all the privileges of parliament were once to be ſet down and aſcertained, and no privilege to be allowed but what was ſo defined and determined, it were eaſy for the executive power to deviſe ſome new caſe, not within the line of privilege, and under pretence thereof to haraſs any refractory member and violate the freedom of parliament. The dignity and independence of the two houſes are therefore in great meaſure preſerved by keeping their privileges indefinite. Some however of the more notorious privileges of the members of either houſe are, privilege of ſpeech, of perſon, of their domeſtics, and of their lands and goods. As to the firſt, privilege of ſpeech, it is declared by the ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. as one of the liberties of the people, "that the freedom of ſpeech, and debates, and "proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeach-"ed or queſtioned in any court or place out of par-"liament." And this freedom of ſpeech is particularly demanded of the king in perſon, by the ſpeaker of the houſe of commons, at the opening of every new parliament. So likewiſe are the other privileges, of perſons, ſervants, lands and goods: which are immunities as antient as Edward the confeſſor; in whoſe laws [4] we find this precept, "*ad ſynodus venien-*

[3] Seld. Baronage. part. 1. c. 4. [4] *cap.* 3.

"*tibus, ſive ſummoniti ſint, ſive per ſe quid agendum* "*habuerint, ſit ſumma pax:*" and ſo too, in the old Gothic conſtitutions, "*extenditur hæc pax et ſecuritas* "*ad quatuordecim dies, convocato regni ſenatu*[5]." This included formerly not only privilege from illegal violence, but alſo from legal arreſts, and ſeiſures by proceſs from the courts of law. And ſtill to aſſault by violence a member of either houſe, or his menial ſervants, is a high contempt of parliament, and there puniſhed with the utmoſt ſeverity. It has likewiſe peculiar penalties annexed to it in the courts of law, by the ſtatute 5 Hen. IV. c. 6. and 11 Hen. VI. c. 11. Neither can any member of either houſe be arreſted and taken into cuſtody, unleſs for ſome indictable offence, without a breach of the privilege of parliament.

But all other privileges, which derogate from the common law in matters of civil right, are now at an end, ſave only as to the freedom of the member's perſon: which in a peer (by the privilege of peerage) is for ever ſacred and inviolable; and in a commoner (by the privilege of parliament) for forty days after every prorogation, and forty days before the next appointed meeting[6]: which is now in effect as long as the parliament ſubſiſts, it ſeldom being prorogued for more than fourſcore days at a time. As to all other privileges, which obſtruct the ordinary courſe of juſtice, they were reſtrained by the ſtatutes 12 W. III. c. 3. 2 & 3 Ann. c. 18. and 11 Geo. II. c. 24. and are now totally aboliſhed by ſtatute 10 Geo. III. c. 50. which enacts, that any ſuit may at any time be brought againſt any peer or member of parliament, their ſervants, or any other perſon entitled to privilege of parliament: which ſhall not be impeached or delayed by pretence of any ſuch privilege; except that the perſon of a member of the houſe of commons ſhall not thereby be ſubjected to any arreſt or impriſonment. Likewiſe, for the benefit of commerce, it is provided by ſtatute 4 Geo. III. c. 33. that any trader, having privilege of parliament, may be ſerved with legal proceſs for any juſt debt to the amount of 100 *l.* and unleſs he makes ſatisfaction within two months, it ſhall be deemed an act of bank-

[5] Steiran. *de jure Goth. l.* 3. *c.* 3. [6] 2 Lev. 72.

ruptcy; and that commiſſions of bankrupt may be iſſued againſt ſuch privileged traders, in like manner as againſt any other.

The only way by which courts of juſtice could antiently take cognizance of privilege of parliament was by writ of privilege, in the nature of a *ſuperſedeas*, to deliver the party out of cuſtody when arreſted in a civil ſuit[7]. For when a letter was written by the ſpeaker to the judges, to ſtay proceedings againſt a privileged perſon, they rejected it as contrary to their oath of office[8]. But ſince the ſtatute 12 W. III. c. 3. which enacts that no privileged perſon ſhall be ſubject to arreſt or impriſonment, it hath been held that ſuch arreſt is irregular *ab initio*, and that the party may be diſcharged upon motion[9]. It is to be obſerved, that there is no precedent of any ſuch writ of privilege, but only in civil ſuits; and that the ſtatute of 1 Jac. I. c. 13. and that of king William (which remedy ſome inconveniencies ariſing from privilege of parliament) ſpeak only of civil actions. And therefore the claim of privilege hath been uſually guarded with an exception as to the caſe of indictable crimes[10]; or as it hath been frequently expreſſed, of treaſon, felony, and breach (or ſurety) of the peace[1]. Whereby it ſeems to have been underſtood that no privilege was allowable to the members, their families, or ſervants, in any *crime* whatſoever; for all crimes are treated by the law as being *contra pacem domini regis*. And inſtances have not been wanting, wherein privileged perſons have been convicted of miſdemeſnors, and committed, or proſecuted to outlawry, even in the middle of a ſeſſion[2]; which proceeding has afterwards received the ſanction and approbation of parliament[3]. To which may be added, that, a few years ago, the caſe of writing and publiſhing ſeditious libels was reſolved by both houſes[4] not to be entitled to privilege; and that the reaſons, upon which that caſe proceeded[5], extended equally to every indictable of-

[7] Dyer 59. 4 Pryn. *Brev. Parl.* 757.

[8] Latch. 48. Noy. 83.

[9] Stra. 989.

[10] Com. Journ. 17 Aug. 1641.

[1] 4 Inſt. 25. Com. Journ. 20 May 1675.

[2] *Mich.* 16 *Edw. IV. in Scacch*—Lord Raym. 1461.

[3] Com. Journ. 16 May 1726.

[4] Com. Journ. 24 Nov. Lord's Journ. 29 Nov. 1763.

[5] Lord's Proteſt. *ibid.*

fence. So that the chief, if not the only, privilege of parliament, in ſuch caſes, ſeems to be the right of receiving immediate information of the impriſonment or detention of any member, with the reaſon for which he is detained: a practice that is daily uſed upon the ſlighteſt military accuſations, preparatory to a trial by a court martial[6]; and which is recognized by the ſeveral temporary ſtatutes for ſuſpending the *habeas corpus* act[7]: whereby it is provided, that no member of either houſe ſhall be detained, till the matter of which he ſtands ſuſpected, be firſt communicated to the houſe of which he is a member, and the conſent of the ſaid houſe obtained for his commitment or detaining. But yet the uſage has uniformly been, ever ſince the revolution, that the communication has been ſubſequent to the arreſt.

Theſe are the general heads of the laws and cuſtoms relating to parliament, conſidered as one aggregate body. We will next proceed to

IV. The laws and cuſtoms relating to the houſe of lords in particular. Theſe, if we exclude their judicial capacity, which will be more properly treated of in the third and fourth book of theſe commentaries, will take up but little of our time.

One very antient privilege is that declared by the charter of the foreſt[8], confirmed in parliament 9 Hen. III; *viz.* that every lord ſpiritual or temporal ſummoned to parliament, and paſſing through the king's foreſts, may, both in going and returning, kill one or two of the king's deer without warrant; in view of the foreſter if he be preſent, or on blowing a horn if he be abſent: that he may not ſeem to take the king's veniſon by ſtealth.

In the next place they have a right to be attended, and conſtantly are, by the judges of the court of king's bench, and common pleas, and ſuch of the barons of the exchequer as are of the degree of the coif, or have been made ſerjeants at law; as likewiſe by the king's learned counſel, being ſerjeants, and by the maſters of the court of chancery; for their advice in point of law, and for the greater dignity of their

[6] Com. Journ. 20 Apr. 1762.
[7] particularly 17 Geo. II. c. 6.
[8] c. 11.

proceedings. The ſecretaries of ſtate, with the attorney and ſolicitor general, were alſo uſed to attend the houſe of peers, and have to this day, (together with the judges, &c.) their regular writs of ſummons iſſued out at the beginning of every parliament [9], *ad tractandum et conſilium impendendum*, though not *ad conſentiendum*; but, whenever of late years they have been members of the houſe of commons, [10] their attendance here hath fallen into diſuſe.

Another privilege is, that every peer, by licenſe obtained from the king, may make another lord of parliament his proxy, to vote for him in his abſence [1], A privilege, which a member of the other houſe can by no means have, as he is himſelf but a proxy for a multitude of other people [2].

Each peer has alſo a right, by leave of the houſe, when a vote paſſes contrary to his ſentiments, to enter his diſſent on the journals of the houſe, with the reaſons for ſuch diſſent; which is uſually ſtiled his proteſt.

All bills likewiſe, that may in their conſequences any way affect the rights of the peerage, are by the cuſtom of parliament to have their firſt riſe and beginning in the houſe of peers, and to ſuffer no changes or amendments in the houſe of commons.

There is alſo one ſtatute peculiarly relative to the houſe of lords; 6 Ann. c. 23. which regulates the election of the ſixteen repreſentative peers of North Britain, in conſequence of the twenty-ſecond and twenty-third articles of the union: and for that purpoſe preſcribes the oaths, &c. to be taken by the electors; directs the mode of balloting; prohibits the peers electing from being attended in an unuſual manner; and expreſsly provides, that no other matter ſhall be treated of in that aſſembly, ſave only the election, on pain of incurring a *præmunire*.

V. The peculiar laws and cuſtoms of the houſe of commons relate principally to the raiſing of taxes, and the elections of members to ſerve in parliament.

Firſt, with regard to taxes: it is the antient indiſputable privilege and right of the houſe of commons,

9 Stat. 31 Hen. VIII. c. 10. Smith's commonw. b. 2. c. 3. Moor. 551. 4 Inſt. 4. Hale of Parl. 140.

10 See Com. Journ. 11 Apr. 1614. 8 Feb. 1620. 10 Feb. 1625. 4 Inſt. 48.

1 Seld. baronage. p. 1. c. 1.

2 4 Inſt. 12.

that all grants of ſubſidies or parliamentary aids do begin in their houſe, and are firſt beſtowed by them [1]; although their grants are not effectual to all intents and purpoſes, until they have the aſſent of the other two branches of the legiſlature. The general reaſon, given for this excluſive privilege of the houſe of commons, is, that the ſupplies are raiſed upon the body of the people, and therefore it is proper that they alone ſhould have the right of taxing themſelves. This reaſon would be unanſwerable, if the commons taxed none but themſelves: but it is notorious, that a very large ſhare of property is in the poſſeſſion of the houſe of lords: that this property is equally taxable, and taxed, as the property of the commons; and therefore the commons not being the *ſole* perſons taxed, this cannot be the reaſon of their having the *ſole* right of raiſing and modelling the ſupply. The true reaſon, ariſing from the ſpirit of our conſtitution, ſeems to be this. The lords being a permanent hereditary body, created at pleaſure by the king, are ſuppoſed more liable to be influenced by the crown, and when once influenced to continue ſo, than the commons, who are a temporary elective body, freely nominated by the people. It would therefore be extremely dangerous, to give the lords any power of framing new taxes for the ſubject; it is ſufficient that they have a power of rejecting, if they think the commons too laviſh or improvident in their grants. But ſo reaſonably jealous are the commons of this valuable privilege, that herein they will not ſuffer the other houſe to exert any power but that of rejecting; they will not permit the leaſt alteration or amendment to be made by the lords to the mode of taxing the people by a money bill; under which appellation are included all bills, by which money is directed to be raiſed upon the ſubject, for any purpoſe or in any ſhape whatſoever: either for the exigencies of government, and collected from the kingdom in general, as the land tax; or for private benefit, and collected in any particular diſtrict, as by turnpikes, pariſh rates, and the like. Yet ſir Matthew Hale [2] mentions one caſe found-

[1] 4 Inſt. 29. [2] on parliaments 65, 66.

ed on the practice of parliament in the reign of Henry VI[3], wherein he thinks the lords may alter a money bill: and that is, if the commons grant a tax, as that of tonnage and poundage for *four years*: and the lords alter it to a leſs time, as for *two* years; here, he ſays, the bill need not be ſent back to the commons for their concurrence, but may receive the royal aſſent without farther ceremony; for the alteration of the lords is conſiſtent with the grant of the commons. But ſuch an experiment will hardly be repeated by the lords, under the preſent improved idea of the privilege of the houſe of commons, and, in any caſe where a money bill is remanded to the commons, all amendments in the mode of taxation are ſure to be rejected.

Next, with regard to the elections of knights, citizens, and burgeſſes; we may obſerve, that herein conſiſts the exerciſe of the democratical part of our conſtitution: for in a democracy there can be no exerciſe of ſovereignty, but by ſuffrage, which is the declaration of the people's will. In all democracies therefore, it is of the utmoſt importance to regulate by whom, and in what manner, the ſuffrages are to be given. And the Athenians were ſo juſtly jealous of this prerogative, that a ſtranger, who interfered in the aſſemblies of the people, was puniſhed by their laws with death: becauſe ſuch a man was eſteemed guilty of high treaſon, by uſurping thoſe rights of ſovereignty, to which he had no title. In England, where the people do not debate in a collective body but by repreſentation, the exerciſe of this ſovereignty conſiſts in the choice of repreſentatives. The laws have therefore very ſtrictly guarded againſt uſurpation or abuſe of this power by many ſalutary proviſions; which may be reduced to theſe three points, 1. The qualifications of the electors. 2. The qualifications of the elected. 3. The proceedings at elections.

1. As to the qualifications of the electors. The true reaſon of acquiring any qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude ſuch perſons as are in ſo mean a ſituation that they are eſteemed to have no will of their own. If theſe perſons had votes,

[3] Yearbook, 33 Hen. VI. 17. But ſee the anſwer to this caſe by ſir Heneage Finch. Com. Journ. 22 Apr. 1671.

they would be tempted to diſpoſe of them under ſome undue influence or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy man, a larger ſhare in elections than is conſiſtent with general liberty. If it were probable that every man would give his vote freely and without influence of any kind, then, upon the true theory and genuine principles of liberty, every member of the community, however poor, ſhould have a vote in electing thoſe delegates, to whoſe charge is committed the diſpoſal of his property, his liberty, and his life. But ſince that can hardly be expected in perſons of indigent fortunes, or ſuch as are under the immediate dominion of others, all popular ſtates have been obliged to eſtabliſh certain qualifications; whereby ſome, who are ſuſpected to have no will of their own, are excluded from voting in order to ſet other individuals, whoſe wills may be ſuppoſed independent, more thoroughly upon a level with each other.

And this conſtitution of ſuffrages is framed upon a wiſer principle, with us, than either of the methods of voting, by centuries or by tribes, among the Romans. In the method by centuries, inſtituted by Servius Tullius, it was principally property, and not numbers, that turned the ſcale: in the method by tribes, gradually introduced by the tribunes of the people, numbers only were regarded, and property entirely overlooked. Hence the laws paſſed by the former method had uſually too great a tendency to aggrandize the patricians or rich nobles; and thoſe by the latter had too much of a levelling principle. Our conſtitution ſteers between the two extremes. Only ſuch are entirely excluded, as can have no will of their own; there is hardly a free agent to be found, who is not entitled to a vote in ſome place or other in the kingdom. Nor is comparative wealth, or property, entirely diſregarded in elections; for though the richeſt man has only one vote at one place, yet, if his property be at all diffuſed, he has probably a right to vote at more places than one, and therefore has many repreſentatives. This is the ſpirit of our conſtitution; not that I aſſert it is in fact quite ſo perfect[4] as I have here

[4] The candid and intelligent reader will apply this obſervation to many other parts of the work before him, wherein the conſti-

endeavoured to deſcribe it; for, if any alteration might be wiſhed or ſuggeſted in the preſent frame of parliaments, it ſhould be in favour of a more complete repreſentation of the people.

But to return to our qualifications; and firſt thoſe of electors for knights of the ſhire. 1. By ſtatute 8 Hen. VI. c. 7. and 10 Hen. VI. c. 2. (amended by 14 Geo. III. c. 58.) the knights of the ſhire ſhall be choſen of people, whereof every man ſhall have freehold to the value of forty ſhillings by the year within the county; which (by ſubſequent ſtatutes) is to be clear of all charges and deductions, except parliamentary and parochial taxes. The knights of ſhires are the repreſentatives of the landholders, or landed intereſt of the kingdom: their electors muſt therefore have eſtates in lands or tenements, within the county repreſented: theſe eſtates muſt be freehold, that is, for term of life at leaſt; becauſe beneficial leaſes for long terms of years were not in uſe at the making of theſe ſtatutes, and copyholders were then little better than villeins, abſolutely dependent upon their lords: this freehold muſt be of forty ſhillings annual value; becauſe that ſum would then, with proper induſtry furniſh all the neceſſaries of life, and render the freeholder, if he pleaſed, an independent man. For biſhop Fleetwood, in his *chronicon preciosum*, written at the beginning of the preſent century, has fully proved forty ſhillings in the reign of Henry VI to have been equal to twelve pounds *per annum* in the reign of queen Anne; and, as the value of money is very conſiderably lowered ſince the biſhop wrote, I think we may fairly conclude, from this and other circumſtances, that what was equivalent to twelve pounds in his days is equivalent to twenty at preſent. The other leſs important qualifications of the electors for counties in England and Wales may be collected from the ſtatutes cited in the margin[5]; which direct, 2. That

tution of our laws and government are repreſented as nearly approaching to perfection; without deſcending to the invidious taſk of pointing out ſuch deviations and corruptions, as length of time and a looſe ſtate of national morals have too great a tendency to produce. The incurvations of practice are then the moſt notorious when compared with the rectitude of the rule; and to elucidate the clearneſs of the ſpring, conveys the ſtrongeſt ſatire on thoſe who have polluted or diſturbed it.

[5] 7 & 8 W. III. c. 25. 10 Ann. c. 23. 2 Geo. II. c. 21. 18 Geo. 2. c. 18. 31 Geo. II. c. 14. 3 Geo. III. c. 24.

no perſon under twenty-one years of age ſhall be capable of voting for any member. This extends to all ſorts of members, as well for boroughs as counties; as does alſo the next, *viz.* 3, That no perſon convicted of perjury, or ſubornation of perjury, ſhall be capable of voting in any election. 4. That no perſon ſhall vote in right of any freehold, granted to him fraudulently to qualify him to vote. Fraudulent grants are ſuch as contain an agreement to reconvey, or to defeat the eſtate granted; which agreements are made void, and the eſtate is abſolutely veſted in the perſon to whom it is ſo granted. And, to guard the better againſt ſuch frauds, it is farther provided, 5. That every voter ſhall have been in the actual poſſeſſion, or receipt of the profits, of his freehold to his own uſe for twelve calendar months before; except it came to him, by deſcent, marriage, marriage-ſettlement, will, or promotion to a benefice or office. 6. That no perſon ſhall vote in reſpect of an annuity or rentcharge, unleſs regiſtered with the clerk of the peace twelve calendar months before. 7. That in mortgaged or truſt eſtates, the perſon in poſſeſſion, under the above-mentioned reſtrictions, ſhall have the vote. 8. That only one perſon ſhall be admitted to vote for any one houſe or tenement, to prevent the ſplitting of freeholds. 9. That no eſtate ſhall qualify a voter, unleſs the eſtate has been aſſeſſed to ſome land tax aid, at leaſt twelve months before the election *(a)*. 10. That no tenant by copy of

(a) By ſtatute 20 G. III. c. 17. explained and amended by 30 Geo. III. c. 35. no perſon ſhall be allowed to vote in reſpect of any meſſuages, lands or tenements, which have not been aſſeſſed to the land tax for ſix calendar months next before ſuch election, either in the name of the perſon claiming to vote, or of the tenant actually occupying the ſame at the time of ſuch aſſeſſment made; and that no perſon ſhall be allowed to vote in reſpect of any meſſuages, &c. to which the perſon ſo claiming to vote ſhall have become intitled by deſcent, marriage, marriage-ſettlement, deviſe, promotion to any benefice or office, within twelve calendar months next before ſuch election, which meſſuages, &c. have not been aſſeſſed to the land-tax within two years next before ſuch election in the name of the perſon through whom the perſon claiming to vote ſhall derive his title.

court roll ſhall be permitted to vote as a freeholder [B]. Thus much for the electors in counties.

As for the electors of citizens and burgeſſes, theſe are ſuppoſed to be the mercantile part or trading intereſt of this kingdom. But as trade is of a fluctuating nature, and ſeldom long fixed in a place, it was formerly left to the crown to ſummon, *pro re nata*, the moſt flouriſhing towns to ſend repreſentatives to parliament. So that as towns increaſed in trade, and grew populous, they were admitted to a ſhare in the legiſlature. But the misfortune is, that the deſerted boroughs continued to be ſummoned, as well as thoſe to whom their trade and inhabitants were transferred; except a few which petitioned to be eaſed of the expence, then uſual, of maintaining their members: four ſhillings a day being allowed for a knight of the ſhire, and two ſhillings for a citizen or burgeſs: which was the rate of wages eſtabliſhed in the reign of Edward III[6]. Hence the members for boroughs now bear above a quadruple proportion to thoſe for counties, and the number of parliament men is increaſed ſince Forteſcue's time, in the reign of Henry the ſixth, from 300 to upwards of 500, excluſive of thoſe for Scotland. The univerſities were in general not empowered to ſend burgeſſes to parliament; though once, in 28 Edw. I, when a parliament was ſummoned to conſider of the king's right to Scotland, there were iſſued writs, which required the univerſity of Oxford to ſend up four or five, and that of Cambridge two or three, of their moſt diſcreet and learned lawyers for that purpoſe[7]. But it was king James the firſt, who indulged them with the permanent privilege to ſend conſtantly two of their own body; to ſerve for thoſe ſtudents who, though uſeful members of the community, were neither concerned in the landed nor the trading intereſt; and to protect in the legiſla-

[6] 4 Inſt. 16.

[7] Prynne parl. writs. I. 345.

[B] By ſtatute 22 Geo. III. c. 41. no commiſſioner or officer, employed in managing the duties of exciſe, cuſtoms, ſtamps, ſalt, windows or houſes, or revenue of the poſt-office, ſhall be capable of voting in the election of a member of parliament.

ture the rights of the republic of letters. The right of election in boroughs is various, depending entirely on the ſeveral charters, cuſtoms, and conſtitutions of the reſpective places, which has occaſioned infinite diſputes; though now by ſtatute 2 Geo. II. c. 24. the right of voting for the future ſhall be allowed according to the laſt determination of the houſe of commons concerning it. And by ſtatute 3 Geo. III. c. 15. no freeman of any city or borough (other than ſuch as claim by birth, marriage, or ſervitude) ſhall be entitled to vote therein, unleſs he hath been admitted to his freedom twelve calendar months before *(d)*.

2. Next, as to the qualifications of perſons to be *elected* members of the houſe of commons. Some of theſe depend upon the law and cuſtom of parliaments, declared by the houſe of commons [8]; others upon certain ſtatutes. And from theſe it appears. 1. That they muſt not be aliens born [9], or minors [o]. 2. That they muſt not be any of the twelve judges [1], becauſe they ſit in the lords' houſe; nor of the clergy [2], for they ſit in the convocation; nor perſons attainted of treaſon or felony [3], for they are unfit to ſit any where. 3. That ſheriffs of counties, and mayors and bailiffs of boroughs, are not eligible in their reſpective juriſ-

8 4 Inſt. 47, 48.
9 See pag. 164.
o *Ibid.*
1 Com. Journ. 9 Nov. 1605.
2 Com. Journ. 13 Oct. 1553.
8 Feb. 1620. 17 Jan. 1661.
3 Com. Journ. 21 Jan. 1580.
4 Inſt. 47.

(d) And by ſtatute 26 Geo. III. c. 100. no perſon ſhall be admitted to vote at any election of members for any city or borough within England and Wales as an inhabitant paying ſcot and lot, or as an inhabitant-houſeholder, houſekeeper, and pot-waller, legally ſettled, or as an inhabitant-houſeholder, houſekeeper, and pot-waller, or as an inhabitant-houſeholder reſiant, or as an inhabitant of ſuch city or borough (other than ſuch as claim by deſcent, deviſe, marriage, or marriage-ſettlement, or promotion to any office or benefice, or under any other deſcription than inhabitants paying ſcot and lot, or inhabitants in the manner above deſcribed) unleſs he ſhall have been actually and *bona fide* an inhabitant as above, ſix calendar months previous to the day of the election at which he ſhall tender his vote: and if any perſon ſhall vote at any ſuch election contrary to the ſaid act, his vote ſhall be null and void, and he ſhall forfeit 20l. to any perſon who ſhall ſue for the ſame, to be recovered by action of debt in any of the courts at Weſtminſter; in which action the proof of inhabitancy ſhall lie upon the perſon ſued.]

court roll ſhall be permitted to vote as a freeholder [B]. Thus much for the electors in counties.

As for the electors of citizens and burgeſſes, theſe are ſuppoſed to be the mercantile part or trading intereſt of this kingdom. But as trade is of a fluctuating nature, and ſeldom long fixed in a place, it was formerly left to the crown to ſummon, *pro re nata*, the moſt flouriſhing towns to ſend repreſentatives to parliament. So that as towns increaſed in trade, and grew populous, they were admitted to a ſhare in the legiſlature. But the misfortune is, that the deſerted boroughs continued to be ſummoned, as well as thoſe to whom their trade and inhabitants were transferred; except a few which petitioned to be eaſed of the expence, then uſual, of maintaining their members: four ſhillings a day being allowed for a knight of the ſhire, and two ſhillings for a citizen or burgeſs: which was the rate of wages eſtabliſhed in the reign of Edward III[6]. Hence the members for boroughs now bear above a quadruple proportion to thoſe for counties, and the number of parliament men is increaſed ſince Forteſcue's time, in the reign of Henry the ſixth, from 300 to upwards of 500, excluſive of thoſe for Scotland. The univerſities were in general not empowered to ſend burgeſſes to parliament; though once, in 28 Edw. I, when a parliament was ſummoned to conſider of the king's right to Scotland, there were iſſued writs, which required the univerſity of Oxford to ſend up four or five, and that of Cambridge two or three, of their moſt diſcreet and learned lawyers for that purpoſe[7]. But it was king James the firſt, who indulged them with the permanent privilege to ſend conſtantly two of their own body; to ſerve for thoſe ſtudents who, though uſeful members of the community, were neither concerned in the landed nor the trading intereſt; and to protect in the legiſla-

[6] 4 Inſt. 16.

[7] Prynne parl. writs. I. 345.

[B] By ſtatute 22 Geo. III. c. 41. no commiſſioner or officer, employed in managing the duties of exciſe, cuſtoms, ſtamps, ſalt, windows or houſes, or revenue of the poſt-office, ſhall be capable of voting in the election of a member of parliament.

ture the rights of the republic of letters. The right of election in boroughs is various, depending entirely on the ſeveral charters, cuſtoms, and conſtitutions of the reſpective places, which has occaſioned infinite diſputes; though now by ſtatute 2 Geo. II. c. 24. the right of voting for the future ſhall be allowed according to the laſt determination of the houſe of commons concerning it. And by ſtatute 3 Geo. III. c. 15. no freeman of any city or borough (other than ſuch as claim by birth, marriage, or ſervitude) ſhall be entitled to vote therein, unleſs he hath been admitted to his freedom twelve calendar months before *(d)*.

2. Next, as to the qualifications of perſons to be *elected* members of the houſe of commons. Some of theſe depend upon the law and cuſtom of parliaments, declared by the houſe of commons [8]; others upon certain ſtatutes. And from theſe it appears. 1. That they muſt not be aliens born [9], or minors [o]. 2. That they muſt not be any of the twelve judges [1], becauſe they ſit in the lords' houſe; nor of the clergy [2], for they ſit in the convocation; nor perſons attainted of treaſon or felony [3], for they are unfit to ſit any where. 3. That ſheriffs of counties, and mayors and bailiffs of boroughs, are not eligible in their reſpective juriſ-

[8] 4 Inſt. 47, 48.
[9] See pag. 164.
[o] *Ibid.*
[1] Com. Journ. 9 Nov. 1605.
[2] Com. Journ. 13 Oct. 1553.
[8] Feb. 1620. 17 Jan. 1661.
[3] Com. Journ. 21 Jan. 1580. 4 Inſt. 47.

(d) And by ſtatute 26 Geo. III. c. 100. no perſon ſhall be admitted to vote at any election of members for any city or borough within England and Wales as an inhabitant paying ſcot and lot, or as an inhabitant-houſeholder, houſekeeper, and pot-waller, legally ſettled, or as an inhabitant-houſeholder, houſekeeper, and pot-waller, or as an inhabitant-houſeholder reſiant, or as an inhabitant of ſuch city or borough (other than ſuch as claim by deſcent, deviſe, marriage, or marriage-ſettlement, or promotion to any office or benefice, or under any other deſcription than inhabitants paying ſcot and lot, or inhabitants in the manner above deſcribed) unleſs he ſhall have been actually and *bona fide* an inhabitant as above, ſix calendar months previous to the day of the election at which he ſhall tender his vote: and if any perſon ſhall vote at any ſuch election contrary to the ſaid act, his vote ſhall be null and void, and he ſhall forfeit 20l. to any perſon who ſhall ſue for the ſame, to be recovered by action of debt in any of the courts at Weſtminſter; in which action the proof of inhabitancy ſhall lie upon the perſon ſued.]

dictions, as being returning officers[4]; but that ſheriffs of one county are eligible to be knights of another[5]. 4. That, in ſtrictneſs, all members ought to have been inhabitants of the places for which they are choſen[6]: but this, having been long diſregarded, was at length entirely repealed by ſtatute 14 Geo. III. c. 58. 5. That no perſons concerned in the management of any duties or taxes created ſince 1692, except the commiſſioners of the treaſury[7], nor any of the officers following[8], (*viz.* commiſſioners of prizes, tranſports, ſick and wounded, wine licences, navy and victualling; ſecretaries or receivers of prizes: comptrollers of the army accounts; agents for regiments; governors of plantations and their deputies; officers of Minorca or Gibraltar; officers of the exciſe and cuſtoms; clerks or deputies in the ſeveral offices of the treaſury, exchequer, navy, victualling, admiralty, pay of the army or navy, ſecretaries of ſtate, ſalt, ſtamps, appeals, wine licences, hackney coaches, hawkers and pedlars) nor any perſons that hold any new office under the crown created ſince 1705[9], are capable of being elected or ſitting as members. 6. That no perſon having a penſion under the crown during pleaſure, or for any term of years, is capable of being elected or ſitting[10]. 7. That if any member accepts an office under the crown, except an officer in the army or navy accepting a new commiſſion, his ſeat is void; but ſuch member is capable of being re-elected[11]. 8. That all knights of the ſhire ſhall be actual knights, or ſuch notable eſquires and gentlemen as have eſtates ſufficient to be knights, and by no means of the degree of yeomen[12]. This is reduced to a ſtill greater certainty, by ordaining, 9. That every knight of a ſhire ſhall have a clear eſtate of freehold or copyhold to the value of ſix hundred pounds *per*

4 Bro. *Abr. t. Parliament.* 7. Com. Journ. 25 June, 1604. 14 Apr. 1614. 22 Mar. 1620. 2. 4. 15 Jun. 17 Nov. 1685. Hal. of parl. 114.

5 4 Inſt. 48. Whitelocke of parl. ch. 99, 100, 101.

6 Stat. 1 Hen. v. c. 1. 23 Hen. VI. c. 15.

7 Stat. 5 & 6 W. & M. c. 7.

8 Stat. 11 & 12 W. III. c. 2. 12 & 13 W. III. c. 10, 6 Ann. c. 7. 15 Geo. II. c. 22.

9 Stat. 6 Ann. c. 7.

10 Stat. 6 Ann. c. 7. 1 Geo. c. 56.

11 Stat. 6 Ann c. 7.

12 Stat. 23 Hen. VI. c. 15.

annum, and every citizen and burgeſs to the value of three hundred pounds; except the eldeſt ſons of peers, and of perſons qualified to be knights of ſhires, and except the members for the two univerſities [3]: which ſomewhat ballances the aſcendant which the boroughs have gained over the counties, by obliging the trading intereſt to make choice of landed men, and of this qualification the member muſt make oath, and give in the particulars in writing, at the time of his taking his ſeat [4] [c]. But, ſubject to theſe ſtanding reſtrictions and diſqualifications, every ſubject of the realm is eligible of common right: though there are inſtances wherein perſons in particular circumſtances have forfeited that common right, and have been declared ineligible *for that parliament* by a vote of the houſe of commons [5], or *for ever* by an act of the legiſlature [6]. But it was an unconſtitutional prohibition, which was grounded on an ordinance of the houſe of *lords* [7], and inſerted in the *king's* writs, for the parliament holden at Coventry, 6 Hen. IV, that no apprentice or other man of the law ſhould be elected a knight of the ſhire therein [8]: in return for which, our law books and hiſtorians [9] have branded this parliament with the name of *parliamentum indoctum*, or the lack-learning parliament; and ſir Edward Coke obſerves with ſome ſpleen [10], that there was never a good law made thereat.

3. The third point, regarding elections, is the method of proceeding therein. This is alſo regulated by the law of parliament, and the ſeveral ſtatutes referred to in the margin [11]; all which I ſhall blend toge-

[3] Stat. 9 Ann. c. 5.
[4] Stat. 33 Geo. II. c. 20.
[5] See pag. 165.
[6] Stat. 7 Geo. I. c. 28.
[7] 4 Inſt. 10. 48. Pryn. Plea for lords. 379. 2 Whitelocke 359. 368.
[8] Pryn. on 4 Inſt. 13.
[9] Walſingh. *A. D.* 1405.
[10] 4 Inſt. 48.
[11] 7 Hen. IV. c. 15. 8 Hen. VI. c. 7. 23 Hen. VI. c. 14. 1 W. & M. ſt. 1 c. 2. 2 W. & M. ſt. 1. c. 7. 5 & 6 W. & M. c. 20. 7 W. III. c. 4. 7 & 8 W. III. c. 7. and c. 25. 10 & 11 W. III. c. 7. 12 & 13 W. III. c. 10. 6 Ann. c. 23. 9 Ann. c. 5. 10 Ann. c. 19. and c. 33. 2 Geo. II. c. 24. 8 Geo. II. c. 30. 18 Geo. II. c. 18. 19 Geo. II. c. 28. 10 Geo. III. c. 16. 11 Geo. III. c. 42. 14 Geo. III. c. 15. 15 Geo. III. c. 36. 28 Geo. III. c. 52.

[c] By ſtatute 22 Geo. III. c. 45. every perſon who ſhall directly or indirectly, by himſelf or by any other to his uſe, hold any con-

ther, and extract out of them a ſummary account of the method of proceeding to elections.

As ſoon as the parliament is ſummoned, the lord chancellor (or if a vacancy happens during the ſitting of parliament, the ſpeaker *(e)* by order of the houſe; and without ſuch order, if a vacancy happens by death, or the member's becoming a peer, in the time of a receſs for upwards of twenty days) ſends his warrant to the clerk of the crown in chancery; who thereupon iſſues out writs to the ſheriff of every county, for the election of all the members to ſerve for that county, and every city and borough therein. Within three days after the receipt of this writ, the ſheriff is to ſend his precept, under his ſeal, to the proper returning officers of the cities and boroughs, commanding them to elect their members: and the ſaid returning officers are to proceed to election within eight days from the receipt of the precept, giving four days notice of the ſame [2]; and

[2] In the borough of New-Shoreham in Suſſex, wherein certain freeholders of the county are entitled to vote by ſtatute 11 Geo. III. c. 55. the election muſt be within *twelve* days, with *eight* days notice of the ſame *(f)*.

---

tract made with the commiſſioners of the treaſury, navy, or victualling-office, or the maſter-general or board of ordnance, or any other perſon, for, or on account of the public ſervice; or ſhall, in purſuance of any ſuch contract, furniſh any money to be remitted abroad, or any wares or merchandize to be uſed in the ſervice of the public, ſhall be incapable of being elected or ſitting or voting in the houſe of commons, during the time that he ſhall hold ſuch contract.

(e) [The ſtatute 24 Geo. III. c. 26. repeals ſo much of 10 Geo. III. c. 41. and 15 Geo. III. c. 36. as authoriſes the ſpeaker of the houſe of commons to iſſue his warrant to the clerk of the crown for making out writs for the election of members; and, inſtead thereof, ſubſtitutes (among others) the following proviſions: that the ſpeaker, during any receſs, whether by prorogation or adjournment, ſhall iſſue his warrant for making out writs for electing members in the room of thoſe who ſhall die or become peers of Great Britain: and that, to prevent the inconveniences that may ariſe from the death of the ſpeaker, or by his ſeat becoming vacant, or by his abſence out of the realm, the ſpeaker is to nominate a certain number of members to execute the powers given to him by that act.]

(f) [So in the borough of Cricklade, Wiltſhire, where certain freeholders are intitled to vote by ſtatute 22 Geo. III. c. 31. the

to return the perſons choſen, together with the precept, to the ſheriff.

But elections of knights of the ſhire muſt be proceeded to by the ſheriffs themſelves in perſon, at the next county court that ſhall happen after the delivery of the writ *(a)*. The county court is a court held every month or oftener by the ſheriff intended to try little cauſes not exceeding the value of forty ſhillings, in what part of the county he pleaſes to appoint for that purpoſe: but for the election of knights of the ſhire it muſt be held at the moſt uſual place. If the county court falls upon the day of delivering the writ, or within ſix days after, the ſheriff may adjourn the court or election to ſome other convenient time, not longer than ſixteen days, nor ſhorter than ten; but he cannot alter the place, without the conſent of all the candidates: and in all ſuch caſes, ten days public notice muſt be given of the time and place of the election.

And, as it is eſſential to the very being of parliament that elections ſhould be abſolutely free, therefore all undue influences upon the electors are illegal, and

---

election muſt be within *twelve* days; and not leſs than *eight* days; and notice of the ſame muſt be given therewith.]

(a) By 25 Geo. III. c. 84. ſ. 4. the ſheriff is, within two days after the receipt of the writ, to cauſe proclamation to be made at the place where the election ought to be holden of a ſpecial county-court to be there holden for the purpoſe of ſuch election only, on any day (Sunday excepted) not later from the day of making ſuch proclamation than the ſixteenth, nor ſooner than the tenth day, and that he ſhall proceed in ſuch election at ſuch ſpecial county-court in the ſame manner as if the election was to be held at a county-court, or at an adjourned county-court according to the laws now in being. And by the firſt ſection of the ſame act, every poll ſhall commence on the day upon which the ſame ſhall be demanded, or upon the next day at fartheſt, (unleſs Sunday, and then the day after) and ſhall be duly and regularly proceeded in from day to day (Sundays excepted) until the ſame be finiſhed, but ſo as that no poll ſhall continue for more than fifteen days at moſt; (Sundays excepted) and if ſuch poll ſhall continue until the fifteenth day, then the ſame ſhall be finally cloſed at or before the hour of three in the afternoon of the ſame day.

ſtrongly prohibited. For Mr. Locke [3] ranks it among thoſe breaches of truſt in the executive magiſtrate, which according to his notions amount to a diſſolution of the government, "if he employs the force, trea- "ſure, and offices of the ſociety to corrupt the repre- "ſentatives, or openly to preingage the electors, and "preſcribe what manner of perſons ſhall be choſen. "For thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new "model the ways of election, what is it, ſays he, but "to cut up the government by the roots, and poiſon "the very fountain of public ſecurity?" As ſoon therefore as the time and place of election, either in counties or boroughs, are fixed, all ſoldiers quartered in the place are to remove, at leaſt one day before the election, to the diſtance of two miles or more; and not to return till one day after the poll is ended. Riots likewiſe have been frequently determined to make an election void. By vote alſo of the houſe of commons, to whom alone belongs the power of determining conteſted elections, no lord of parliament, or lord lieutenant of a county, hath any right to interfere in the election of commoners; and, by ſtatute, the lord warden of the cinque ports ſhall not recommend any members there. If any officer of the exciſe, cuſtoms, ſtamps, or certain other branches of the revenue, preſume to intermeddle in elections, by perſuading any voter or diſſuading him, he forfeits 100*l*, and is diſabled to hold any office.

Thus are the electors of one branch of the legiſlature ſecured from any undue influence from either of the other two, and from all external violence and compulſion. But the greateſt danger is that in which themſelves co-operate, by the infamous practice of bribery and corruption. To prevent which it is enacted that no candidate ſhall, after the date (uſually called the *teſte*) of the writs, or after the vacancy, give any money or entertainment to his electors, or promiſe to give any, either to particular perſons, or to the place in general, in order to his being elected: on pain of being incapable to ſerve for that place in

[3] on Gov. p. 2. §. 222.

parliament. And if any money, gift, office, employment, or reward be given or promised to be given to any voter, at any time, in order to influence him to give or withhold his vote, as well he that takes as he that offers such bribe forfeits 500*l*, and is for ever disabled from voting and holding any office in any corporation; unless, before conviction, he will discover some other offender of the same kind, and then he is indemnified for his own offence[3]. The first instance that occurs, of election bribery, was so early as 13 Eliz. when one Thomas Longe (being a simple man and of small capacity to serve in parliament) acknowledged that he had given the returning officer and others of the borough for which he was chosen four pounds to be returned member, and was for that premium elected. But for this offence the borough was amerced, the member was removed, and the officer fined and imprisoned[4]. But, as this practice hath since taken much deeper and more universal root, it hath occasioned the making of these wholesome statutes; to complete the efficacy of which, there is nothing wanting but resolution and integrity to put them in strict execution.

Undue influence being thus (I wish the depravity of mankind would permit me to say, effectually guarded against, the election is to be proceeded to on the day appointed; the sheriff or other returning officer first taking an oath against bribery, and for the due execution of his office. The candidates likewise, if required, must swear to their qualification; and the electors in counties to theirs; and the electors both in counties and boroughs are also compellable to take the oath of abjuration and that against bribery and corruption. And it might not be amiss, if the members elected were bound to take the latter oath, as well as the former; which in all probability would be much more effectual, than administering it only to the electors.

[3] In like manner the Julian law *de ambitu* inflicted fines and infamy upon all who were guilty of corruption at elections; but, if the person guilty convicted another offender, he was restored to his credit again. *Ff.* 48. 14. 1.

[4] 4 Inst. 23. Hale of Parl. 112. Com. journ. 10 & 11 May 1571.

The election being cloſed, the returning officer in boroughs returns his precept to the ſheriff, with the perſons elected by the majority: and the ſheriff returns the whole, together with the writ for the county and the knights elected thereupon, to the clerk of the crown in chancery; before the day of meeting, if it be a new parliament, or within fourteen days after the election, if it be an occaſional vacancy; and this under penalty of 500*l.* If the ſheriff does not return ſuch knights only as are duly elected, he forfeits, by the old ſtatutes of Henry VI. 100*l.*; and the returning officer in boroughs for a like falſe return 40*l.*; and they are beſides liable to an action, in which double damages ſhall be recovered, by the later ſtatutes of king William: and any perſon bribing the returning officer ſhall alſo forfeit 300*l.* But the members returned by him are the ſitting members, until the houſe of commons, upon petition, ſhall adjudge the return to be falſe and illegal. The form and manner of proceeding upon ſuch petition are now regulated by ſtatute 10 Geo. III. c. 16. (amended by 11 Geo. III. c. 42. and made perpetual by 14 Geo. III. c. 15.) *(a)* which directs the method of chuſing by lot a ſelect committee of fifteen members, who are ſworn well and truly to try the ſame, and a true judgment to give according to the evidence. And this abſtract of the proceedings at elections of knights, citizens, and burgeſſes, concludes our inquiries into the laws and cuſtoms more particularly relative to the houſe of commons.

VI. I proceed now, ſixthly, to the method of making laws; which is much the ſame in both houſes: and I ſhall touch it very briefly, beginning in the houſe of commons. But firſt I muſt premiſe, that for diſpatch of buſineſs each houſe of parliament has its ſpeaker. The ſpeaker of the houſe of lords, whoſe office it is to preſide there, and manage the formality of buſineſs, is the lord chancellor, or keeper of the king's great ſeal, or any other appointed by the king's commiſſion: and, if none be ſo appointed,

(a) and further regulated by 28 Geo. III. c. 52.

the houſe of lords (it is ſaid) may elect. The ſpeaker of the houſe of commons is choſen by the houſe; but muſt be approved by the king. And herein the uſage of the two houſes differs, that the ſpeaker of the houſe of commons cannot give his opinion or argue any queſtion in the houſe; but the ſpeaker of the houſe of lords, if a lord of parliament, may. In each houſe the act of the majority binds the whole; and this majority is declared by votes openly and publicly given: not as at Venice, and many other ſenatorial aſſemblies, privately or by ballot. This latter method may be ſerviceable, to prevent intrigues and unconſtitutional combinations: but is impoſſible to be practiſed with us; at leaſt in the houſe of commons, where every member's conduct is ſubject to the future cenſure of his conſtituents, and therefore ſhould be openly ſubmitted to their inſpection.

To bring a bill into the houſe, if the relief ſought by it is of a private nature, it is firſt neceſſary to prefer a petition; which muſt be preſented by a member, and uſually ſets forth the grievance deſired to be remedied. This petition (when founded on facts that may be in their nature diſputed) is referred to a committee of members, who examine the matter alleged, and accordingly report it to the houſe; and then (or, otherwiſe, upon the mere petition) leave is given to bring in the bill. In public matters the bill is brought in upon motion made to the houſe, without any petition at all. Formerly, all bills were drawn in the form of petitions, which were entered upon the *parliament rolls*, with the king's anſwer thereunto ſubjoined; not in any ſettled form of words, but as the circumſtances of the caſe required[5]: and at the end of each parliament the judges drew them into the form of a ſtatute, which was entered on the *ſtatute rolls*. In the reign of Henry V, to prevent miſtakes and abuſes, the ſtatutes were drawn up by the judges before the end of the parliament; and, in the reign of Henry VI, bills in the form of acts, according to the modern cuſtom, were firſt introduced.

[5] See, among numberleſs other inſtances, the *articuli cleri*, 9 Edw. II.

The perſons directed to bring in the bill, preſent it in a competent time to the houſe, drawn out on paper, with a multitude of blanks or void ſpaces, where any thing occurs that is dubious, or neceſſary to be ſettled by the parliament itſelf; (ſuch, eſpecially, as the preciſe date of times, the nature and quantity of penalties, or of any ſums of money to be raiſed) being indeed only the ſceleton of the bill. In the houſe of lords, if the bill begins there, it is (when of a private nature) referred to two of the judges, to examine and report the ſtate of the facts alleged, to ſee that all neceſſary parties conſent, and to ſettle all points of technical propriety. This is read a firſt time, and at a convenient diſtance a ſecond time; and after each reading the ſpeaker opens to the houſe the ſubſtance of the bill, and puts the queſtion, whether it ſhall proceed any farther. The introduction of the bill may be originally oppoſed, as the bill itſelf may at either of the readings; and, if the oppoſition ſucceeds, the bill muſt be dropped for that ſeſſion: as it muſt alſo, if oppoſed with ſucceſs in any of the ſubſequent ſtages.

After the ſecond reading it is committed, that is, referred to a committee; which is either ſelected by the houſe in matters of ſmall importance, or elſe, upon a bill of conſequence, the houſe reſolves itſelf into a committee of the whole houſe. A committee of the whole houſe is compoſed of every member; and, to form it, the ſpeaker quits the chair, (another member being appointed chairman) and may ſit and debate as a private member. In theſe committees the bill is debated clauſe by clauſe, amendments made, the blanks filled up, and ſometimes the bill entirely new modelled. After it has gone through the committee, the chairman reports it to the houſe with ſuch amendments as the committee have made; and then the houſe reconſiders the whole bill again, and the queſtion is repeatedly put upon every clauſe and amendment. When the houſe hath agreed or diſagreed to the amendments of the committee, and ſometimes added new amendments of it's own, the bill is then ordered to be engroſſed, or written in a ſtrong groſs hand, on one or more long rolls (or preſſes) of parch-

ment ſewed together. When this is finiſhed, it is read a third time, and amendments are ſometimes then made to it; and if a new clauſe be added, it is done by tacking a ſeparate piece of parchment on the bill, which is called a ryder[6]. The ſpeaker then again opens the contents; and, holding it up in his hands, puts the queſtion, whether the bill ſhall paſs. If this is agreed to, the title to it is then ſettled; which uſed to be a general one for all the acts paſſed in the ſeſſion, till in the firſt year of Henry VIII diſtinct titles were introduced for each chapter. After this, one of the members is directed to carry it to the lords, and deſire their concurrence; who, attended by ſeveral more, carries it to the bar of the houſe of peers, and there delivers it to their ſpeaker, who comes down from his woolſack to receive it.

It there paſſes through the ſame forms as in the other houſe, (except engroſſing, which is already done) and, if rejected, no more notice is taken, but it paſſes *ſub ſilentio*, to prevent unbecoming altercations. But if it is agreed to, the lords ſend a meſſage by two maſters in chancery (or upon matters of high dignity or importance, by two of the judges) that they have agreed to the ſame: and the bill remains with the lords, if they have made no amendment to it. But if any amendments are made, ſuch amendments are ſent down with the bill to receive the concurrence of the commons. If the commons diſagree to the amendments, a conference uſually follows between members deputed from each houſe; who for the moſt part ſettle and adjuſt the difference: but if both houſes remain inflexible, the bill is dropped. If the commons agree to the amendments, the bill is ſent back to the lords by one of the members, with a meſſage to acquaint them therewith. The ſame forms are obſerved, *mutatis mutandis*, when the bill begins in the houſe of lords. But, when an act of grace or pardon is paſſed, it is firſt ſigned by his majeſty, and then read once only in each of the houſes, without any new engroſſing or amendment[7]. And when both houſes have done with

[6] Noy. 84. journ. 17 June 1747.
[7] D'ewes journ. 20. 73 Com.

any bill, it always is depoſited in the houſe of peers, to wait the royal aſſent; except in the caſe of a bill of ſupply, which after receiving the concurrence of the lords is ſent back to the houſe of commons [8].

The royal aſſent may be given two ways: 1. In perſon; when the king comes to the houſe of peers, in his crown and royal robes, and ſending for the commons to the bar, the titles of all the bills that have paſſed both houſes are read; and the king's anſwer is declared by the clerk of the parliament in Norman-French; a badge, it muſt be owned, (now the only one remaining) of conqueſt; and which one could wiſh to ſee fall into total oblivion, unleſs it be reſerved as a ſolemn memento to remind us that our liberties are mortal, having once been deſtroyed by a foreign force. If the king conſents to a public bill, the clerk uſually declares, "*le roy le veut*, the king wills "it ſo to be;" if to a private bill, "*ſoit fait comme* "*il eſt deſirè*, be it as it is deſired." If the king refuſes his aſſent, it is in the gentle language of "*le roy ſ'aviſera*, the king will adviſe upon it." When a bill of ſupply is paſſed, it is carried up and preſented to the king by the ſpeaker of the houſe of commons [9]; and the royal aſſent is thus expreſſed, "*le roy remer-*"*cie ſes loyal ſubjects, accepte lour benevolence, et auſſi le* "*veut*, the king thanks his loyal ſubjects, accepts "their benevolence, and wills it ſo to be." In caſe of an act of grace, which originally proceeds from the crown, and has the royal aſſent in the firſt ſtage of it, the clerk of the parliament thus pronounces the gratitude of the ſubject; "*les prelats, ſeigneurs, et* "*commons, en ce preſent parliament aſſemblees, au nom de* "*touts vous autres ſubjects, remercient tres humblement* "*votre majeſte, et prient a Dieu vous donner en ſante bone* "*vie et longue:* the prelates, lords, and commons, in "this preſent parliament aſſembled, in the name of all "your other ſubjects, moſt humbly thank your ma-"jeſty, and pray to God to grant you in health and "wealth long to live [o]." By the ſtatute 33 Hen. VIII. c. 21. the king may give his aſſent by letters

[8] Com. journ. 24 Jul. 1660. Pryn. 4 Inſt. 30, 31.
[9] *Rot. Parl.* 9 *Hen. IV.* in
[o] D'ewes journ. 35.

patent under his great ſeal, ſigned with his hand, and notified in his abſence to both houſes aſſembled together in the high houſe. And, when the bill has received the royal aſſent in either of theſe ways, it is then, and not before, a ſtatute or act of parliament.

This ſtatute or act is placed among the records of the kingdom: there needing no formal promulgation to give it the force of a law, as was neceſſary by the civil law with regard to the emperor's edicts: becauſe every man in England is, in judgment of law, party to the making of an act of parliament, being preſent thereat by his repreſentatives. However, a copy thereof is uſually printed at the king's preſs for the information of the whole land. And formerly, before the invention of printing, it was uſed to be publiſhed by the ſheriff of every county; the king's writ being ſent to him at the end of every ſeſſion, together with a tranſcript of all the acts made at that ſeſſion, commanding him, "*ut ſtatuta illa, et omnes articulos in eiſ-*"*dem contentos, in ſingulis locis ubi expedire viderit, pub-*"*lice, proclamari, et firmiter teneri et obſervari faciat.*" And the uſage was to proclaim them at his county court, and there to keep them, that whoever would might read or take copies thereof; which cuſtom continued till the reign of Henry the ſeventh [1].

An act of parliament, thus made, is the exerciſe of the higheſt authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. It hath power to bind every ſubject in the land, and the dominions thereunto belonging; nay, even the king himſelf, if particularly named therein. And it cannot be altered, amended, diſpenſed with, ſuſpended, or repealed, but in the ſame forms and by the ſame authority of parliament: for it is a maxim in law, that it requires the ſame ſtrength to diſſolve, as to create an obligation. It is true it was formerly held, that the king might in many caſes diſpenſe with penal ſtatutes [2], but now by ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. it is declared, that the ſuſpending or diſpenſing with laws by regal authority, without conſent of parliament, is illegal.

[1] 3 Inſt. 41. 4 Inſt. 26. Ekm. c. 19.
[2] Finch. L. 81. 234. Bacon.

VII. There remains only, in the ſeventh and laſt place, to add a word or two concerning the manner in which parliaments may be adjourned, prorogued, or diſſolved.

An adjournment is no more than a continuance of the ſeſſion from one day to another, as the word itſelf ſignifies: and this is done by the authority of each houſe ſeparately every day; and ſometimes for a fortnight or a month together, as at Chriſtmas or Eaſter, or upon other particular occaſions. But the adjournment of one houſe is no adjournment of the other[3]. It hath alſo been uſual, when his majeſty hath ſignified his pleaſure that both or either of the houſes ſhould adjourn themſelves to a certain day, to obey the king's pleaſure ſo ſignified, and to adjourn accordingly[4]. Otherwiſe, beſides the indecorum of a refuſal, a prorogation would aſſuredly follow; which would often be very inconvenient to both public and private buſineſs. For prorogation puts an end to the ſeſſion; and then ſuch bills as are only begun and not perfected, muſt be reſumed *de novo* (if at all) in a ſubſequent ſeſſion: whereas, after an adjournment, all things continue in the ſame ſtate as at the time of the adjournment made, and may be proceeded on without any freſh commencement.

A prorogation is the continuance of the parliament from one ſeſſion to another, as an adjournment is a continuation of the ſeſſion from day to day. This is done by the royal authority, expreſſed either by the lord chancellor in his majeſty's preſence, or by commiſſion from the crown, or frequently by proclamation. Both houſes are neceſſarily prorogued at the ſame time; it not being a prorogation of the houſe of lords, or commons, but of the parliament. The ſeſſion is never underſtood to be at an end until a prorogation; though, unleſs ſome act be paſſed or

[3] 4 Inſt. 28.

[4] Com. journ. *paſſim*: *e. g.* 11 Jun. 1572. 5 Apr. 1604. 4 Jun. 14 Nov. 18 Dec. 1621. 11 Jul. 1625. 13 Sept. 1660. 25 Jul. 1667. 4 Aug. 1685. 24 Feb. 1691. 21 Jun. 1712. 16 Apr. 1717. 3 Feb. 1741. 10 Dec. 1745. 21 May 1768.

some judgment given in parliament, it is in truth no session at all[5]. And formerly the usage was, for the king to give the royal assent to all such bills as he approved, at the end of every session, and then to prorogue the parliament; though sometimes only for a day or two[6]: after which all business then depending in the houses was to be begun again. Which custom obtained so strongly, that it once became a question[7], whether giving the royal assent to a single bill did not of course put an end to the session. And, though it was then resolved in the negative, yet the notion was so deeply rooted, that the statute 1 Car. I. c. 7. was passed to declare, that the king's assent to that and some other acts should not put an end to the session; and, even so late as the reign of Charles II, we find a proviso frequently tacked to a bill[8], that his majesty's assent thereto should not determine the session of parliament. But it now seems to be allowed, that a prorogation must be expressly made, in order to determine the session. And, if at the time of an actual rebellion, or imminent danger of invasion, the parliament shall be separated by adjournment or prorogation, the king is empowered[9] to call them together by proclamation, with fourteen days notice of the time appointed for their reassembling.

A dissolution is the civil death of the parliament; and this may be effected three ways: 1. By the king's will, expressed either in person or by representation. For, as the king has the sole right of convening the parliament, so also it is a branch of the royal prerogative, that he may (whenever he pleases) prorogue the parliament for a time, or put a final period to its existence. If nothing had a right to prorogue or dissolve a parliament but itself, it might happen to become perpetual. And this would be extremely dangerous, if at any time it should attempt to encroach upon the executive power: as was fatally experienc-

[5] 4 Inst. 28. Hale of parl. 38. Hut. 61.
[6] Com. journ. 21 Oct. 1553.
[7] *Ibid.* 21 Nov. 1554.
[8] Stat. 12 Car. II. c. 1. 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 1.
[9] Stat. 30 Geo. II. c. 25.

ed by the unfortunate king Charles the firſt; who, having unadviſedly paſſed an act to continue the parliament then in being till ſuch time as it ſhould pleaſe to diſſolve itſelf, at laſt fell a ſacrifice to that inordinate power, which he himſelf had conſented to give them. It is therefore extremely neceſſary that the crown ſhould be empowered to regulate the duration of theſe aſſemblies, under the limitations which the Engliſh conſtitution has preſcribed: ſo that, on the one hand, they may frequently and regularly come together, for the diſpatch of buſineſs, and redreſs of grievances; and may not, on the other, even with the conſent of the crown, be continued to an inconvenient or unconſtitutional length.

2. A parliament may be diſſolved by the demiſe of the crown. This diſſolution formerly happened immediately upon the death of the reigning ſovereign: for he being conſidered in law as the head of the parliament, (*caput, principium et finis*) that failing, the whole body was held to be extinct. But, the calling a new parliament immediately on the inauguration of the ſucceſſor being found inconvenient, and dangers being apprehended from having no parliament in being in caſe of a diſputed ſucceſſion, it was enacted by the ſtatute 7 & 8 W. III. c. 15. and 6 Ann. c. 7. that the parliament in being ſhall continue for ſix months after the death of any king or queen, unleſs ſooner prorogued or diſſolved by the ſucceſſor: that, if the parliament be, at the time of the king's death, ſeparated by adjournment or prorogation, it ſhall notwithſtanding aſſemble immediately: and that, if no parliament is then in being, the members of the laſt parliament ſhall aſſemble, and be again a parliament.

3. Laſtly, a parliament may be diſſolved or expire by length of time. For if either the legiſlative body were perpetual; or might laſt for the life of the prince who convened them, as formerly; and were ſo to be ſupplied, by occaſionally filling the vacancies with new repreſentatives; in theſe caſes, if it were once corrupted, the evil would be paſt all remedy: but when different bodies ſucceed each

other, if the people ſee cauſe to diſapprove of the preſent, they may rectify it's faults in the next. A legiſlative aſſembly alſo, which is ſure to be ſeparated again, (whereby its members will themſelves become private men, and ſubject to the full exent of the laws which they have enacted for others) will think themſelves bound, in intereſt as well as duty, to make only ſuch laws as are good. The utmoſt extent of time that the ſame parliament was allowed to ſit, by the ſtatute 6 W. & M. c. 2. was *three* years; after the expiration of which, reckoning from the return of the firſt ſummons, the parliament was to have no longer continuance. But by the ſtatute 1 Geo. I. ſt. 2. c. 38. (in order, profeſſedly, to prevent the great and continued expences of frequent elections, and the violent heats and animoſities conſequent thereupon, and for the peace and ſecurity of the government then juſt recovering from the late rebellion) this term was prolonged to *ſeven* years: and, what alone is an inſtance of the vaſt authority of parliament, the very ſame houſe, that was choſen for three years, enacted it's own continuance for ſeven. So that, as our conſtitution now ſtands, the parliament muſt expire, or die a natural death, at the end of every ſeventh year; if not ſooner diſſolved by the royal prerogative.

CHAPTER THE THIRD.

OF THE KING, AND HIS TITLE.

THE ſupreme executive power of theſe kingdoms is veſted by our laws in a ſingle perſon, the king or queen: for it matters not to which ſex the crown deſcends; but the perſon intitled to it, whether male or female, is immediately inveſted with all the enſigns, rights, and prerogatives of ſovereign power; as is declared by ſtatute 1 Mar. ſt. 3. c. 1.

In diſcourſing of the royal rights and authority, I ſhall conſider the king under ſix diſtinct views: 1. With regard to his title. 2. His royal family. 3. His councils. 4. His duties. 5. His prerogative. 6. His revenue. And firſt, with regard to his title.

The executive power of the Engliſh nation being veſted in a ſingle perſon, by the general conſent of the people, the evidence of which general conſent is long and immemorial uſage, it became neceſſary to the freedom and peace of the ſtate, that a rule ſhould be laid down, uniform, univerſal, and permanent; in order to mark out with preciſion, *who* is that ſingle perſon, to whom are committed (in ſubſervience to the law of the land) the care and protection of the community; and to whom, in return, the duty and allegiance of every individual are due. It is of the higheſt importance to the public tranquillity,

and to the conſciences of private men, that this rule ſhould be clear and indiſputable: and our conſtitution has not left us in the dark upon this material occaſion. It will therefore be the endeavour of this chapter to trace out the conſtitutional doctrine of the royal ſucceſſion, with that freedom and regard to truth, yet mixed with that reverence and reſpect, which the principles of liberty and the dignity of the ſubject require.

The grand fundamental maxim upon which the *jus coronæ*, or right of ſucceſſion to the throne of theſe kingdoms, depends, I take to be this; "that the "crown is, by common law and conſtitutional cuſ-"tom hereditary; and this, in a manner peculiar to "itſelf: but that the right of inheritance may from "time to time be changed or limited by act of parli-"ament; under which limitations the crown ſtill "continues hereditary." And this propoſition it will be the buſineſs of this chapter to prove, in all it's branches; firſt, that the crown is hereditary; ſecondly, that it is hereditary in a manner peculiar to itſelf; thirdly, that this inheritance is ſubject to limitation by parliament; laſtly, that when it is ſo limited, it is hereditary in the new proprietor.

I. Firſt, it is in general *hereditary*, or deſcendible to the next heir, on the death or demiſe of the laſt proprietor. All regal governments muſt be either hereditary or elective: and, as I believe there is no inſtance wherein the crown of England has ever been aſſerted to be elective, except by the regicides at the infamous and unparalleled trial of king Charles I, it muſt of conſequence be hereditary. Yet while I aſſert an hereditary, I by no means intend a *jure divino*, title to the throne. Such a title may be allowed to have ſubſiſted under the theocratic eſtabliſhments of the children of Iſrael in Paleſtine: but it never yet ſubſiſted in any other country; ſave only ſo far as kingdoms, like other human fabrics, are ſubject to the general and ordinary diſpenſations of providence. Nor indeed have a *jure divino* and an *hereditary* right any neceſſary connexion with each other; as ſome have very weakly imagined. The titles of David and Jehu were equally *jure divino*, as thoſe of either So-

lomon or Ahab; and yet David ſlew the ſons of his predeceſſor, and Jehu his predeceſſor himſelf. And when our kings have the ſame warrant as they had, whether it be to ſit upon the throne of their fathers, or to deſtroy the houſe of the preceding ſovereign, they will then, and not before, poſſeſs the crown of England by a right like theirs, *immediately* derived from heaven. The hereditary right which the laws of England acknowledge, owes it's origin to the founders of our conſtitution, and to them only. It has no relation to, nor depends upon, the civil laws of the Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, or any other nation upon earth: the municipal laws of one ſociety having no connexion with, or influence upon, the fundamental polity of another. The founders of our Engliſh monarchy might perhaps, if they had thought proper, have made it an elective monarchy: but they rather choſe, and upon good reaſon, to eſtabliſh originally a ſucceſſion by inheritance. This has been acquieſced in by general conſent; and ripened by degrees into common law: the very ſame title that every private man has to his own eſtate. Lands are not naturally deſcendible any more than thrones; but the law has thought proper, for the benefit and peace of the public, to eſtabliſh hereditary ſucceſſion in the one as well as the other.

It muſt be owned, an elective monarchy ſeems to be the moſt obvious, and beſt ſuited of any to the rational principles of government, and the freedom of human nature: and accordingly we find from hiſtory that, in the infancy and firſt rudiments of almoſt every ſtate, the leader, chief magiſtrate, or prince, hath uſually been elective. And, if the individuals who compoſe that ſtate could always continue true to firſt principles, uninfluenced by paſſion or prejudice, unaſſailed by corruption, and unawed by violence, elective ſucceſſion were as much to be deſired in a kingdom, as in other inferior communities. The beſt, the wiſeſt, and the braveſt man would then be ſure of receiving that crown, which his endowments have merited; and the ſenſe of an unbiaſſed majority would be dutifully acquieſced in by

the few who were of different opinions. But hiſtory and obſervation will inform us, that elections of every kind (in the preſent ſtate of human nature) are too frequently brought about by influence, partiality, and artifice: and, even where the caſe is otherwiſe, theſe practices will be often ſuſpected, and as conſtantly charged upon the ſucceſsful, by a ſplenetic diſappointed minority. This is an evil to which all ſocieties are liable; as well thoſe of a private and domeſtic kind, as the great community of the public, which regulates and includes the reſt. But in the former there is this advantage; that ſuch ſuſpicions, if falſe, proceed no farther than jealouſies and murmurs, which time will effectually ſuppreſs; and, if true, the injuſtice may be remedied by legal means, by an appeal to thoſe tribunals to which every member of ſociety has (by becoming ſuch) virtually engaged to ſubmit. Whereas, in the great and independent ſociety, which every nation compoſes, there is no ſuperior to reſort to but the law of nature; no method to redreſs the infringements of that law, but the actual exertion of private force. As therefore between two nations, complaining of mutual injuries, the quarrel can only be decided by the law of arms; ſo in one and the ſame nation, when the fundamental principles of their common union are ſuppoſed to be invaded, and more eſpecially when the appointment of their chief magiſtrate is alleged to be unduly made, the only tribunal to which the complainants can appeal is that of the God of battles, the only proceſs by which the appeal can be carried on is that of a civil and inteſtine war. An hereditary ſucceſſion to the crown is therefore now eſtabliſhed, in this and moſt other countries, in order to prevent that periodical bloodſhed and miſery, which the hiſtory of antient imperial Rome, and the more modern experience of Poland and Germany, may ſhew us are the conſequences of elective kingdoms.

2. But, ſecondly, as to the particular mode of inheritance, it in general correſponds with the feodal path of deſcents, chalked out by the common law in

the ſucceſſion to landed eſtates; yet with one or two material exceptions. Like eſtates, the crown will deſcend lineally to the iſſue of the reigning monarch; as it did from king John to Richard II, through a regular pedigree of ſix lineal generations. As in common deſcents, the preference of males to females, and the right of primogeniture among the males, are ſtrictly adhered to. Thus Edward V ſucceeded to the crown, in preference to Richard his younger brother and Elizabeth his elder ſiſter. Like lands or tenements, the crown, on failure of the male line, deſcends to the iſſue female; according to the antient Britiſh cuſtom remarked by Tacitus[1]; "*ſolent fæminarum ductu bellare, et ſexum in imperiis non diſcernere.*" Thus Mary I. ſucceeded to Edward VI; and the line of Margaret queen of Scots, the daughter of Henry VII, ſucceeded on failure of Henry VIII, his ſon. But, among the females, the crown deſcends by right of primogeniture to the eldeſt daughter only and her iſſue; and not, as in common inheritances, to all the daughters at once; the evident neceſſity of a ſole ſucceſſion to the throne having occaſioned the royal law of deſcents to depart from the common law in this reſpect: and therefore queen Mary on the death of her brother ſucceeded to the crown alone, and not in partnerſhip with her ſiſter Elizabeth. Again: the doctrine of repreſentation prevails in the deſcent of the crown, as it does in other inheritances; whereby the lineal deſcendants of any perſon deceaſed ſtand in the ſame place as their anceſtor, if living, would have done. Thus Richard II ſucceeded his grandfather Edward III, in right of his father the black prince; to the excluſion of all his uncles, his grandfather's younger children. Laſtly, on failure of lineal deſcendants, the crown goes to the next collateral relations of the late king; provided they are lineally deſcended from the blood royal, that is, from that royal ſtock which originally acquired the crown. Thus Henry I ſucceeded to William II, John to Richard I, and James I to Elizabeth; being

[1] *In vit. Agricolæ.*

all derived from the conqueror, who was then the only regal ſtock. But herein there is no objection (as in the caſe of common deſcent) to the ſucceſſion of a brother, an uncle, or other collateral relation, of the *half* blood; that is, where the relationſhip proceeds not from the ſame *couple* of anceſtors (which conſtitutes a kinſman of the *whole* blood) but from a *ſingle* anceſtor only; as when two perſons are derived from the ſame father, and not from the ſame mother, or *vice verſa:* provided only, that the one anceſtor, from whom both are deſcended, be that from whoſe veins the blood royal is communicated to each. Thus Mary I inherited to Edward VI, and Elizabeth inherited to Mary; all children of the ſame father, king Henry VIII, but all by different mothers. The reaſon of which diverſity, between royal and common deſcents, will be better underſtood hereafter, when we examine the nature of inheritances in general.

3. The doctrine of *hereditary* right does by no means imply an *indefeaſible* right to the throne. No man will, I think, aſſert this, that has conſidered our laws, conſtitution, and hiſtory, without prejudice, and with any degree of attention. It is unqueſtionable, in the breaſt of the ſupreme legiſlative authority of this kingdom, the king and both houſes of parliament, to defeat this hereditary right; and, by particular entails, limitations, and proviſions, to exclude the immediate heir, and veſt the inheritance in any one elſe. This is ſtrictly conſonant to our laws and conſtitution; as may be gathered from the expreſſion ſo frequently uſed in our ſtatute book, of "the king's majeſty, his heirs, and ſucceſſors." In which we may obſerve, that as the word, "heirs," neceſſarily implies an inheritance or hereditary right, generally ſubſiſting in the royal perſon; ſo the word, "ſucceſſors," diſtinctly taken, muſt imply that this inheritance may ſometimes be broken through; or, that there may be a ſucceſſor, without being the heir, of the king. And this is ſo extremely reaſonable, that without ſuch a power, lodged ſomewhere, our polity would be very defective. For, let us barely ſuppoſe ſo melancholy a caſe, as

that the heir apparent ſhould be a lunatic, an idiot, or otherwiſe incapable of reigning: how miſerable would the condition of the nation be, if he were alſo incapable of being ſet aſide!—It is therefore neceſſary that this power ſhould be lodged ſomewhere: and yet the inheritance, and regal dignity, would be very precarious indeed, if this power were *expreſsly* and *avowedly* lodged in the hands of the ſubject only, to be exerted whenever prejudice, caprice, or diſcontent ſhould happen to take the lead. Conſequently it can no where be ſo properly lodged as in the two houſes of parliament, by and with the conſent of the reigning king; who, it is not to be ſuppoſed, will agree to any thing improperly prejudicial to the rights of his own deſcendants. And thereupon in the king, lords, and commons, in parliament aſſembled, our laws have expreſsly lodged it.

4. But, fourthly; however the crown may be limited or transferred, it ſtill retains it's deſcendible quality, and becomes hereditary in the wearer of it. And hence in our law the king is ſaid never to die, in his political capacity; though, in common with other men, he is ſubject to mortality in his natural: becauſe immediately upon the natural death of Henry, William, or Edward, the king ſurvives in his ſucceſſor. For the right of the crown veſts, *eo inſtanti*, upon his heir; either the *hæres natus*, if the courſe of deſcent remains unimpeached, or the *hæres factus*, if the inheritance be under any particular ſettlement. So that there can be no *interregnum*; but, as ſir Matthew Hale[a] obſerves, the right of ſovereignty is fully inveſted in the ſucceſſor by the very deſcent of the crown. And therefore, however acquired, it becomes in him abſolutely hereditary, unleſs by the rules of the limitation it is otherwiſe ordered and determined. In the ſame manner as landed eſtates, to continue our former compariſon, are by the law hereditary, or deſcendible to the heirs of the owner; but ſtill there exiſts a power, by which the property of thoſe lands may be transferred to another perſon.

[a] 1 Hiſt. P. C. 61.

If this transfer be made ſimply and abſolutely, the lands will be hereditary in the new owner, and deſcend to his heir at law: but if the transfer be clogged with any limitations, conditions, or entails, the lands muſt deſcend in that channel, ſo limited and preſcribed, and no other.

In theſe four points conſiſts, as I take it, the conſtitutional notion of hereditary right to the throne: which will be ſtill farther elucidated, and made clear beyond all diſpute, from a ſhort hiſtorical view of the ſucceſſions to the crown of England, the doctrines of our antient lawyers, and the ſeveral acts of parliament that have from time to time been made, to create, to declare, to confirm, to limit, or to bar, the hereditary title to the throne. And in the purſuit of this inquiry we ſhall find, that, from the days of Egbert, the firſt ſole monarch of this kingdom, even to the preſent, the four cardinal maxims above-mentioned have ever been held the conſtitutional canons of ſucceſſion. It is true, this ſucceſſion, through fraud, or force, or ſometimes through neceſſity, when in hoſtile times the crown deſcended on a minor or the like, has been very frequently ſuſpended; but has generally at laſt returned back into the old hereditary channel, though ſometimes a very conſiderable period has intervened. And, even in thoſe inſtances where the ſucceſſion has been violated, the crown has ever been looked upon as hereditary in the wearer of it. Of which the uſurpers themſelves were ſo ſenſible, that they for the moſt part endeavoured to vamp up ſome feeble ſhew of a title by deſcent, in order to amuſe the people, while they gained the poſſeſſion of the kingdom. And, when poſſeſſion was once gained, they conſidered it as the purchaſe or acquiſition of a new eſtate of inheritance, and tranſmitted or endeavoured to tranſmit it to their own poſterity, by a kind of hereditary right of uſurpation.

King Egbert about the year 800, found himſelf in poſſeſſion of the throne of the weſt Saxons, by a long and undiſturbed deſcent from his anceſtors of above three hundred years. How his anceſtors as-

quired their title, whether by force, by fraud, by contract, or by election, it matters not much to inquire; and is indeed a point of ſuch high antiquity, as muſt render all inquiries at beſt but plauſible gueſſes. His right muſt be ſuppoſed indiſputably good, becauſe we know no better. The other kingdoms of the heptarchy he acquired, ſome by conſent, but moſt by a voluntary ſubmiſſion. And it is an eſtabliſhed maxim in civil polity, and the law of nations, that when one country is united to another in ſuch a manner, as that one keeps it's government and ſtates, and the other loſes them; the latter entirely aſſimilates with or is melted down in the former, and muſt adopt it's laws and cuſtoms [3]. And in purſuance of this maxim there hath ever been, ſince the union of the heptarchy in king Egbert, a general acquieſcence under the hereditary monarchy of the weſt Saxons, through all the united kingdoms.

From Egbert to the death of Edmund Ironſide, a period of above two hundred years, the crown deſcended regularly, through a ſucceſſion of fifteen princes, without any deviation or interruption: ſave only that the ſons of king Ethelwolf ſucceeded to each other in the kingdom, without regard to the children of the elder branches, according to the rule of ſucceſſion preſcribed by their father, and confirmed by the wittena-gemote, in the heat of the Daniſh invaſions; and alſo that king Edred, the uncle of Edwy, mounted the throne for about nine years, in the right of his nephew a minor, the times being very troubleſome and dangerous. But this was with a view to preſerve, and not to deſtroy, the ſucceſſion; and accordingly Edwy ſucceeded him.

King Edmund Ironſide was obliged, by the hoſtile irruption of the Danes, at firſt to divide his kingdom with Canute, king of Denmark; and Canute, after his death, ſeized the whole of it, Edmund's ſons being driven into foreign countries. Here the ſucceſſion was ſuſpended by actual force, and a new family introduced upon the throne: in

3 Puff. L. of N. and N. b. 8. c. 12. §. 6.

whom however this new acquired throne continued hereditary for three reigns; when, upon the death of Hardiknute, the antient Saxon line was reſtored in the perſon of Edward the confeſſor.

He was not indeed the true heir to the crown, being the younger brother of king Edmund Ironſide, who had a ſon Edward, ſirnamed (from his exile) the outlaw, ſtill living. But this ſon was then in Hungary; and, the Engliſh having juſt ſhaken off the Daniſh yoke, it was neceſſary that ſomebody on the ſpot ſhould mount the throne; and the confeſſor was the next of the royal line then in England. On his deceaſe without iſſue, Harold II uſurped the throne; and almoſt at the ſame inſtant came on the Norman invaſion: the right to the crown being all the time in Edgar, ſirnamed Atheling, (which ſignifies in the Saxon language *illuſtrious*, or of royal blood) who was the ſon of Edward the outlaw, and grandſon of Edmund Ironſide; or, as Matthew Paris[4] well expreſſes the ſenſe of our old conſtitution, "*Edmundus* "*autem latusferreum, rex naturalis de ſtirpe regum, ge-*"*nuit Edwardum; et Edwardus genuit Edgarum, cui* "*de jure debebatur regnum Anglorum.*"

William the Norman claimed the crown by virtue of a pretended grant from king Edward the confeſſor: a grant which, if real, was in itſelf utterly invalid: becauſe it was made, as Harold well obſerved in his reply to William's demand[5], "*abſque generali ſenatus, et populi* "*conventu et edicto;*" which alſo very plainly implies, that it then was generally underſtood that the king, with conſent of the general council, might diſpoſe of the crown and change the line of ſucceſſion. William's title however was altogether as good as Harold's, he being a mere private ſubject, and an utter ſtranger to the royal blood. Edgar Atheling's undoubted right was overwhelmed by the violence of the times: though frequently aſſerted by the Engliſh nobility after the conqueſt, till ſuch time as he died without iſſue: but all their attempts proved unſucceſsful, and only ſerved the more firmly to eſtabliſh the crown in the family which had newly acquired it.

[4] *A. D.* 1066. [5] William of Malmſb. *l.* 3.

This conqueſt then by William of Normandy was, like that of Canute before, a forcible tranſfer of the crown of England into a new family: but, the crown being ſo tranſferred, all the inherent properties of the crown were with it tranſferred alſo. For, the victory obtained at Haſtings not being [6] a victory over the nation collectively, but only over the perſon of Harold, the only right that the conqueror could pretend to acquire thereby, was the right to poſſeſs the crown of England, not to alter the nature of the government. And therefore, as the Engliſh laws ſtill remained in force, he muſt neceſſarily take the crown ſubject to thoſe laws, and with all it's inherent properties; the firſt and principal of which was its deſcendibility. Here then we muſt drop our race of Saxon kings, at leaſt for a while, and derive our deſcents from William the conqueror as from a new ſtock, who acquired by right of war (ſuch as it is, yet ſtill the *dernier reſort* of kings) a ſtrong and undiſputed title to the inheritable crown of England.

Accordingly it deſcended from him to his ſons William II and Henry I. Robert, it muſt be owned, his eldeſt ſon, was kept out of poſſeſſion by the arts and violence of his brethren; who perhaps might proceed upon a notion, which prevailed for ſome time in the law of deſcents, (though never adopted as the rule of public ſucceſſions [7]) that when the eldeſt ſon was already provided for, (as Robert was conſtituted duke of Normandy by his father's will) in ſuch a caſe the next brother was entitled to enjoy the reſt of their father's inheritance. But, as he died without iſſue, Henry at laſt had a good title to the throne, whatever he might have at firſt.

Stephen of Blois, who ſucceeded him, was indeed the grandſon of the conqueror, by Adelicia his daughter, and claimed the throne by a feeble kind of hereditary right: not as being the neareſt of the male line, but as the neareſt male of the blood royal, excepting his elder brother Theobald; who

[6] Hale, Hiſt. C. L. c. 5. Seld. review of tithes, c. 8.

[7] See lord Lyttleton's Life of Henry II. Vol. I. pag. 467.

was earl of Blois, and therefore ſeems to have waved, as he certainly never inſiſted on, ſo troubleſome and precarious a claim. The real right was in the empreſs Matilda or Maud, the daughter of Henry I; the rule of ſucceſſion being (where women were admitted at all) that the daughter of a ſon ſhall be preferred to the ſon of a daughter. So that Stephen was little better than a mere uſurper: and therefore he rather chuſe to rely on a title by election [8], while the empreſs Maud did not fail to aſſert her hereditary right by the ſword: which diſpute was attended with various ſucceſs, and ended at laſt in the compromiſe made at Wallingford, that Stephen ſhould keep the crown, but that Henry the ſon of Maud ſhould ſucceed him; as he afterwards accordingly did.

Henry, the ſecond of that name, was (next after his mother Matilda) the undoubted heir of William the conqueror; but he had alſo another connexion in blood, which endeared him ſtill farther to the Engliſh. He was lineally deſcended from Edmund Ironſide, the laſt of the Saxon race of hereditary kings. For Edward the outlaw, the ſon of Edmund Ironſide, had, (beſides Edgar Atheling, who died without iſſue) a daughter Margaret, who was married to Malcolm king of Scotland; and in her the Saxon hereditary right reſided. By Malcolm ſhe had ſeveral children, and among the reſt Matilda the wife of Henry I, who by him had the empreſs Maud, the mother of Henry II. Upon which account the Saxon line is in our hiſtories frequently ſaid to have been reſtored in his perſon: though in reality that right ſubſiſted in the *ſons* of Malcolm by queen Margaret; king Henry's beſt title being as heir to the conqueror.

From Henry II the crown deſcended to his eldeſt ſon Richard I, who dying childleſs, the right veſted in his nephew Arthur, the ſon of Geoffrey his next

[8] "*Ego Stephanus Dei gratia aſſenſu cleri et populi in regem Anglorum electus &c.*" (*Cart. A. D.* 1136. Ric. de Hagustald. 314. Hearne *ad Guil. Neubr.* 723.)

brother: but John, the youngeſt ſon of king Henry, ſeiſed the throne; claiming, as appears from his charters, the crown by hereditary right [9]: that is to ſay, he was next of kin to the deceaſed king, being his ſurviving brother: whereas Arthur was removed one degree farther, being his brother's ſon, though by right of repreſentation he ſtood in the place of his father Geoffrey. And however flimſy this title, and thoſe of William Rufus and Stephen of Blois, may appear at this diſtance to us, after the law of deſcents hath now been ſettled for ſo many centuries, they were ſufficient to puzzle the underſtandings of our brave, but unlettered, anceſtors. Nor indeed can we wonder at the number of partizans, who eſpouſed the pretenſions of king John in particular; ſince even in the reign of his father king Henry II, it was a point undetermined [o], whether, even in common inheritances, the child of an elder brother ſhould ſucceed to the land in right of repreſentation, or the younger ſurviving brother in right of proximity of blood. Nor is it to this day decided in the collateral ſucceſſion to the fiefs of the empire, whether the order of the ſtocks, or the proximity of degree, ſhall take place [1]. However, on the death of Arthur and his ſiſter Eleanor without iſſue, a clear and indiſputable title veſted in Henry III the ſon of John: and from him to Richard the ſecond, a ſucceſſion of ſix generations, the crown deſcended in the true hereditary line. Under one of which race of princes [2] we find it declared in parliament, "that the law of the "crown of England is, and always hath been, that "the children of the king of England whether born "in England or elſewhere, ought to bear the inheritance after the death of their anceſtors. Which "law our ſovereign lord the king, the prelates, earls, "and barons, and other great men, together with "all the commons in parliament aſſembled, do approve and affirm for ever."

9 "—*Regni Angliæ; quod nobis jure competit hæreditario.*" Spelm. *Hiſt. R. Joh. apud.* Wilkins 354.

o Glan. *l.* 7. *c.* 3.

1 Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxx. 512.

2 Stat. 25 Edw. III. ſt. 2.

Upon Richard the ſecond's reſignation of the crown, he having no children, the right reſulted to the iſſue of his grand-father Edward III. That king had many children, beſides his eldeſt, Edward the black prince of Wales, the father of Richard II: but to avoid confuſion I ſhall only mention three; William his ſecond ſon, who died without iſſue; Lionel Duke of Clarence, his third ſon; and John of Gant Duke of Lancaſter, his fourth. By the rules of ſucceſſion therefore the poſterity of Lionel duke of Clarence were entitled to the throne, upon the reſignation of king Richard; and had accordingly been declared by the king, many years before, the preſumptive heirs of the crown; which declaration was alſo confirmed in parliament [3]. But Henry duke of Lancaſter, the ſon of John of Gant, having then a large army in the kingdom, the pretence of raiſing which was to recover his patrimony from the king, and to redreſs the grievances of the ſubject, it was impoſſible for any other title to be aſſerted with any ſafety; and he became king under the title of Henry IV. But as ſir Matthew Hale remarks [4], though the people unjuſtly aſſiſted Henry IV in his uſurpation of the crown, yet he was not admitted thereto, until he had declared that he claimed, not as a conqueror, (which he very much inclined to do [5]) but as a ſucceſſor, deſcended by right line of the blood royal; as appears from the rolls of parliament in thoſe times. And in order to this he ſet up a ſhew of two titles: the one upon the pretence of being the firſt of the blood royal in the intire male line, whereas the Duke of Clarence left only one daughter Phillippa: from which female branch, by a marriage with Edmond Mortimer earl of March, the houſe of York deſcended: the other, by reviving an exploded rumour, firſt propagated by John of Gant, that Edmond earl of Lancaſter (to whom Henry's mother was heireſs) was in reality the elder brother of king Edward I; though his parents, on account of his perſonal defor-

[3] Standford's geneal. hiſt. 246.
[4] Hiſt. C. L. c. 5.
[5] Seld. tit. hon. 1. 3.

mity, had impoſed him on the world for the younger: and therefore Henry would be entitled to the crown, either as ſucceſſor to Richard II, in caſe the intire male line was allowed a preference to the female; or, even prior to that unfortunate prince, if the crown could deſcend through a female, while an entire male line was exiſting.

However, as in Edward the third's time we find the parliament approving and affirming the law of the crown, as before ſtated, ſo in the reign of Henry IV they actually exerted the right of new-ſettling the ſucceſſion to the crown. And this was done by the ſtatute 7 Hen. IV. c. 2. whereby it is enacted, "that the inheritance of the crown and realms of "England and France, and all other the king's do-"minions, ſhall be *ſet and remain*[6] in the perſon of "our ſovereign lord the king, and in the heirs of his "body iſſuing;" and prince Henry is declared heir apparent to the crown, to hold to him and the heirs of his body iſſuing, with remainder to lord Thomas, lord John, and lord Humphry, the king's ſons, and the heirs of their bodies reſpectively: which is indeed nothing more than the law would have done before, provided Henry the fourth had been a rightful king. It however ſerves to ſhew that it was then generally underſtood, that the king and parliament had a right to new-model and regulate the ſucceſſion to the crown: and we may alſo obſerve, with what caution and delicacy the parliament then avoided declaring any ſentiments of Henry's original title. However ſir Edward Coke more than once expreſsly declares[7], that at the time of paſſing this act the right of the crown was in the deſcent from Philippa, daughter and heir of Lionel duke of Clarence.

Nevertheleſs the crown deſcended regularly from Henry IV to his ſon and grandſon Henry V and VI; in the latter of whoſe reigns the houſe of York aſſerted their dormant title; and, after imbruing the kingdom in blood and confuſion for ſeven years together, at laſt eſtabliſhed it in the perſon of Edward IV

[6] *ſoit mys et demœrge.* [7] 4 Inſt. 37. 205.

At his acceſſion to the throne, after a breach of the ſucceſſion that continued for three deſcents, and above threeſcore years, the diſtinction of a king *de jure* and a king *de facto* began to be firſt taken; in order to indemnify ſuch as had ſubmitted to the late eſtabliſhment, and to provide for the peace of the kingdom by confirming all honours conferred and all acts done by thoſe who were now called the uſurpers, not tending to the diſheriſon of the rightful heir. In ſtatute 1 Edw. IV. c. 1. the three Henrys are ſtiled, "late kings of England ſucceſſively in dede, and not "of ryght." And, in all the charters which I have met with of king Edward, wherever he has occaſion to ſpeak of any of the line of Lancaſter, he calls them "*nuper de facto, et non de jure, reges Angliæ.*"

Edward IV left two ſons and a daughter; the eldeſt of which ſons, king Edward V, enjoyed the regal dignity for a very ſhort time, and was then depoſed by Richard his unnatural uncle, who immediately uſurped the royal dignity; having previouſly inſinuated to the populace a ſuſpicion of baſtardy in the children of Edward IV. to make a ſhew of ſome hereditary title: after which he is generally believed to have murdered his two nephews; upon whoſe death the right of the crown devolved to their ſiſter Elizabeth.

The tyrannical reign of king Richard III gave occaſion to Henry earl of Richmond to aſſert his title to the crown. A title the moſt remote and unaccountable that was ever ſet up, and which nothing could have given ſucceſs to, but the univerſal deteſtation of the then uſurper Richard. For, beſides that he claimed under a deſcent from John of Gant, whoſe title was now exploded, the claim (ſuch as it was) was through John earl of Somerſet, a baſtard ſon, begotten by John of Gant upon Catherine Swinford. It is true, that, by an act of parliament 20 Ric. II, this ſon was, with others legitimated and made inheritable to all lands, offices, and dignities, as if he had been born in wedlock: but ſtill, with an expreſs reſervation of the crown, "*excepta dignitate regali*[8]."

[8] 4 Inſt. 36.

Notwithſtanding all this, immediately after the battle of Boſworth field, he aſſumed the regal dignity; the right of the crown then being, as ſir Edward Coke expreſsly declares[9], in Elizabeth, eldeſt daughter of Edward IV: and his poſſeſſion was eſtabliſhed by parliament, holden the firſt year of his reign. In the act for which purpoſe, the parliament ſeems to have copied the caution of their predeceſſors in the reign of Henry IV: and therefore (as lord Bacon the hiſtorian of this reign obſerves) carefully avoided any recognition of Henry VII's right, which indeed was none at all; and the king would not have it by way of new law or ordinance, whereby a right might ſeem to be created and conferred upon him; and therefore a middle way was rather choſen, by way (as the noble hiſtorian expreſſes it) of *eſtabliſhment*, and that under covert and indifferent words, "that the inheritance of the crown ſhould *reſt*, *remain*, "and *abide* in king Henry VII and the heirs of his "body:" thereby providing for the future, and at the ſame time acknowledging his preſent poſſeſſion; but not determining either way, whether the poſſeſſion was *de jure* or *de facto* merely. However, he ſoon after married Elizabeth of York, the undoubted heireſs of the conqueror, and thereby gained (as ſir Edward Coke[o] declares) by much his beſt title to the crown. Whereupon the act made in his favour was ſo much diſregarded, that it never was printed in our ſtatute books.

Henry the eighth, the iſſue of this marriage, ſucceeded to the crown by clear indiſputable hereditary right, and tranſmitted it to his three children in ſucceſſive order. But in his reign we at ſeveral times find the parliament buſy in regulating the ſucceſſion to the kingdom. And, firſt, by ſtatute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 12. which recites the miſchiefs which have and may enſue by diſputed titles, becauſe no perfect and ſubſtantial proviſion hath been made by law concerning the ſucceſſion; and then enacts, that the crown ſhall be entailed to his majeſty, and the ſons

[9] 4 Inſt. 27. [o] 4 Inſt. 37.

or heirs male of his body; and in default of ſuch ſons to the lady Elizabeth (who is declared to be the king's eldeſt iſſue female, in excluſion of the lady Mary, on account of her ſuppoſed illegitimacy by the divorce of her mother queen Catherine) and to the lady Elizabeth's heirs of her body; and ſo on from iſſue female to iſſue female, and the heirs of their bodies, by courſe of inheritance according to their ages, *as the crown of England hath been accuſtomed and ought to go*, in caſe where there be heirs female of the ſame: and in default of iſſue female, then to the king's right heirs for ever. This ſingle ſtatute is an ample proof of all the four poſitions we at firſt ſet out with.

But, upon the king's divorce from Ann Boleyn, this ſtatute was, with regard to the ſettlement of the crown, repealed by ſtatute 28 Hen. VIII. c. 7. wherein the lady Elizabeth is alſo, as well as the lady Mary, baſtardized, and the crown ſettled on the king's children by queen Jane Seymour, and his future wives; and, in defect of ſuch children, then with this remarkable remainder, to ſuch perſons as the king by letters patent, or laſt will and teſtament, ſhould limit and appoint the ſame. A vaſt power; but, notwithſtanding, as it was regularly veſted in him by the ſupreme legiſlative authority, it was therefore indiſputably valid. But this power was never carried into execution; for by ſtatute 35 Hen. VIII. c. 1. the king's two daughters are legitimated again, and the crown is limited to prince Edward by name, after that to the lady Mary, and then to the Lady Elizabeth, and the heirs of their reſpective bodies; which ſucceſſion took effect accordingly, being indeed no other than the uſual courſe of the law, with regard to the deſcent of the crown.

But leſt there ſhould remain any doubt in the minds of the people, through this jumble of acts for limiting the ſucceſſion, by ſtatute 1 Mar. p. 2. c. 1. queen Mary's hereditary right to the throne is acknowledged and recognized in theſe words: "the "crown of theſe realms is moſt lawfully, juſtly, and "rightly *deſcended* and come to the queen's highneſs

" that now is, being the very, true, and undoubted " heir and inheritrix thereof." And again, upon the queen's marriage with Philip of Spain, in the ſtatute which ſettles the preliminaries of that match [1], the hereditary right to the crown is thus aſſerted and declared: " as touching the right of the queen's " inheritance in the realm and dominions of Eng- " land, the children, whether male or female, ſhall " ſucceed in them, according to the known laws " ſtatutes, and cuſtoms of the ſame." Which determination of the parliament, that the ſucceſſion *ſhall* continue in the uſual courſe, ſeems tacitly to imply a power of new-modelling and altering it, in caſe the legiſlature had thought proper.

On queen Elizabeth's acceſſion, her right is recognized in ſtill ſtronger terms than her ſiſter's; the parliament acknowledging [2], " that the queen's highneſs is, and " in very deed and of moſt mere right ought to be, by " the laws of God, and the laws and ſtatutes of this " realm, our moſt lawful and rightful ſovereign liege " lady and queen; and that her highneſs is rightly, " lineally, and lawfully deſcended and come of the " blood royal of this realm of England; in and to " whoſe princely perſon, and to the heirs of her " body lawfully to be begotten, after her, the im- " perial crown and dignity of this realm doth be- " long." And in the ſame reign, by ſtatute 13 Eliz. c. 1. we find the right of parliament to direct the ſucceſſion of the crown aſſerted in the moſt explicit words. " If any perſon ſhall hold, affirm, or main- " tain that the common laws of this realm, not " altered by parliament, ought not to direct the " right of the crown of England: or that the " queen's majeſty, with and by the authority of " parliament, is not able to make laws and ſta- " tutes of ſufficient force and validity, to limit " and bind the crown of this realm, and the de- " ſcent, limitation, inheritance, and government " thereof;—ſuch perſon, ſo holding, affirming, or " maintaining, ſhall, during the life of the queen,

[1] 1 Mar. p. 2. c. 2. [2] Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 3.

" be guilty of high treaſon; and after her deceaſe " ſhall be guilty of a miſdemeſnor, and forfeit his " goods and chattels."

On the death of queen Elizabeth, without iſſue, the line of Henry VIII became extinct. It therefore became neceſſary to recur to the other iſſue of Henry VII by Elizabeth of York his queen: whoſe eldeſt daughter Margaret having married James IV king of Scotland, king James the ſixth of Scotland, and of England the firſt, was the lineal deſcendant from that alliance. So that in his perſon, as clearly as in Henry VIII, centered all the claims of different competitors, from the conqueſt downwards, he being indiſputably the lineal heir of the conqueror. And, what is ſtill more remarkable, in his perſon alſo centered the right of the Saxon monarchs, which had been ſuſpended from the conqueſt till his acceſſion. For, as was formerly obſerved, Margaret the ſiſter of Edgar Atheling, the daughter of Edward the outlaw, and grand-daughter of king Edmund Ironſide, was the perſon in whom the hereditary right of the Saxon kings, ſuppoſing it not aboliſhed by the conqueſt, reſided. She married Malcolm king of Scotland; and Henry II, by a deſcent from Matilda their daughter, is generally called the reſtorer of the Saxon line. But it muſt be remembered, that Malcolm by his Saxon queen had ſons as well as daughters; and that the royal family of Scotland from that time downwards were the offſpring of Malcolm and Margaret. Of this royal family king James the firſt was the direct lineal heir, and therefore united in his perſon every poſſible claim by hereditary right to the Engliſh as well as Scottiſh throne, being the heir both of Egbert and William the conqueror.

And it is no wonder that a prince of more learning than wiſdom, who could deduce an hereditary title for more than eight hundred years, ſhould eaſily betaught by the flatterers of the times to believe there was ſomething divine in this right, and that the finger of Providence was viſible in its preſer-

vation. Whereas, though a wiſe inſtitution, it was clearly a human inſtitution; and the right inherent in him no natural, but a poſitive, right. And in this and no other light was it taken by the Engliſh parliament; who by ſtatute 1 Jac. I. c. 1. did "recognize and acknowledge, that immediately "upon the diſſolution and deceaſe of Elizabeth late "queen of England, the imperial crown thereof "did by inherent birthright, and lawful and un-"doubted ſucceſſion, deſcend and come to his moſt "excellent majeſty, as being lineally, juſtly, and "lawfully, next and ſole heir of the blood royal "of this realm." Not a word here of any right immediately derived from heaven: which, if it exiſted any where, muſt be ſought for among the *aborigines* of the iſland, the antient Britons; among whoſe princes indeed ſome have gone to ſearch it for him [4].

But, wild and abſurd as the doctrine of divine right moſt undoubtedly is, it is ſtill more aſtoniſhing that when ſo many human hereditary rights had centered in this king, his ſon and heir king Charles the firſt ſhould be told by thoſe infamous judges, who pronounced his unparalleled ſentence, that he was an elective prince; elected by his people, and therefore accountable to them, in his own proper perſon, for his conduct. The confuſion, inſtability, and madneſs, which followed the fatal cataſtrophe of that pious and unfortunate prince, will be a ſtanding argument in favour of hereditary monarchy to all future ages; as they proved at laſt to the then deluded people: who, in order to recover that peace and happineſs which for twenty years together they had loſt, in a ſolemn parliamentary convention of the ſtates reſtored the right heir of the crown. And in the proclamation for that pur-

4 Elizabeth of York, the mother of queen Margaret of Scotland, was heireſs of the houſe of Mortimer. And Mr. Carte obſerves, that the houſe of Mortimer, in virtue of it's deſcent from Gladys only ſiſter to Lewelin ap Jorwerth the great, had the true right to the principality of Wales. Hiſt. Eng. iii. 705.

poſe, which was drawn up and attended by both houſes[5], they declared, "that, according to their "duty and allegiance, they did heartily, joyfully, "and unanimouſly acknowledge and proclaim, "that immediately upon the deceaſe of our late "ſovereign lord king Charles, the imperial crown "of theſe realms did by inherent birthright and "lawful and undoubted ſucceſſion deſcend and come "to his moſt excellent majeſty Charles the ſe-"cond, as being lineally, juſtly, and lawfully, next "heir of the blood royal of this realm: and there-"unto they moſt humbly and faithfully did ſubmit, "and oblige themſelves, their heirs, and poſterity for "ever."

Thus I think it clearly appears, from the higheſt authority this nation is acquainted with, that the crown of England hath been ever an hereditary crown; though ſubject to limitations by parliament. The remainder of this chapter will conſiſt principally of thoſe inſtances, wherein the parliament has aſſerted or exerciſed this right of altering and limiting the ſucceſſion: a right which, we have ſeen, was before exerciſed and aſſerted in the reigns of Henry IV, Henry VII, Henry VIII, queen Mary, and queen Elizabeth.

The firſt inſtance, in point of time, is the famous bill of excluſion, which raiſed ſuch a ferment in the latter end of the reign of king Charles the ſecond. It is well known that the purport of this bill was to have ſet aſide the king's brother and preſumptive heir, the duke of York, from the ſucceſſion, on the ſcore of his being a papiſt; that it paſſed the houſe of commons, but was rejected by the lords; the king alſo having declared beforehand, that he never would be brought to conſent to it. And from this tranſaction we may collect two things: 1. That the crown was univerſally acknowledged to be hereditary; and the inheritance indefeaſible unleſs by parliament: elſe it had been needleſs to prefer ſuch a bill. 2.

[5] Com. Journ. 8 May 1660.

That the parliament had a power to have defeated the inheritance: elſe ſuch a bill had been ineffectual. The commons acknowledged the hereditary right then ſubſiſting; and the lords did not diſpute the power, but merely the propriety, of an excluſion. However, as the bill took no effect, king James the ſecond ſucceeded to the throne of his anceſtors; and might have enjoyed it during the remainder of his life, but for his own infatuated conduct, which (with other concurring circumſtances) brought on the revolution in 1688.

The true ground and principle, upon which that memorable event proceeded, was an entirely new caſe in politics, which had never before happened in our hiſtory; the abdication of the reigning monarch, and the vacancy of the throne thereupon. It was not a defeazance of the right of ſucceſſion, and a new limitation of the crown, by the king and both houſes of parliament: it was the act of the nation alone, upon a conviction that there was no king in being. For in a full aſſembly of the lords and commons, met in a convention upon the ſuppoſition of this vacancy, both houſes[6] came to this reſolution; "that king James the ſecond, having endeavoured "to ſubvert the conſtitution of the kingdom, by "breaking the original contract between king "and people; and, by the advice of jeſuits and "other wicked perſons, having violated the fun-"damental laws; and having withdrawn himſelf "out of this kingdom; has abdicated the govern-"ment, and that the throne is thereby vacant." Thus ended at once, by this ſudden and unexpected vacancy of the throne, the old line of ſucceſſion; which from the conqueſt had laſted above ſix hundred years, and from the union of the heptarchy in king Egbert almoſt nine hundred. The facts themſelves thus appealed to, the king's endeavour to ſubvert the conſtitution by breaking the original contract, his violation of the fundamental laws, and his withdrawing himſelf out of the kingdom, were evident and notorious: and the conſequences drawn from theſe facts (namely, that they amounted

[6] Com. Journ. 7 Feb. 1688.

to an abdication of the government; which abdication did not affect only the perſon of the king himſelf, but alſo all his heirs, and rendered the throne abſolutely and completely vacant) it belonged to our anceſtors to determine. For, whenever a queſtion ariſes between the ſociety at large and any magiſtrate veſted with powers originally delegated by that ſociety, it muſt be decided by the voice of the ſociety itſelf: there is not upon earth any other tribunal to reſort to. And that theſe conſequences were fairly deduced from theſe facts, our anceſtors have ſolemnly determined, in a full parliamentary convention repreſenting the whole ſociety. The reaſons upon which they decided may be found at large in the parliamentary proceedings of the times; and may be matter of inſtructive amuſement for us to contemplate, as a ſpeculative point of hiſtory. But care muſt be taken not to carry this inquiry farther, than merely for inſtruction or amuſement. The idea, that the conſciences of poſterity were concerned in the rectitude of their anceſtors' deciſions, gave birth to thoſe dangerous political hereſies, which ſo long diſtracted the ſtate, but at length are all happily extinguiſhed. I therefore rather chuſe to conſider this great political meaſure upon the ſolid footing of authority, than to reaſon in it's favour from it's juſtice, moderation, and expedience: becauſe that might imply a right of diſſenting or revolting from it, in caſe we ſhould think it to have been unjuſt, oppreſſive, or inexpedient. Whereas, our anceſtors having moſt indiſputably a competent juriſdiction to decide this great and important queſtion, and having in fact decided it, it is now become our duty at this diſtance of time to acquieſce in their determination; being born under that eſtabliſhment which was built upon this foundation, and obliged by every tie religious as well as civil, to maintain it.

But, while we reſt this fundamental tranſaction, in point of authority, upon grounds the leaſt liable to cavil, we are bound both in juſtice and gratitude to add, that it was conducted with a temper and

moderation which naturally aroſe from it's equity; that, however it might in ſome reſpects go beyond the letter of our antient laws, (the reaſon of which will more fully appear hereafter [6]) it was agreeable to the ſpirit of our conſtitution, and the rights of human nature; and that though in other points (owing to the peculiar circumſtances of things and perſons) it was not altogether ſo perfect as might have been wiſhed, yet from thence a new æra commenced, in which the bounds of prerogative and liberty have been better defined, the principles of government more thoroughly examined and underſtood, and the rights of the ſubject more explicitly guarded by legal proviſions, than in any other period of the Engliſh hiſtory. In particular it is worthy obſervation that the convention, in this their judgment, avoided with great wiſdom the wild extremes into which the viſionary theories of ſome zealous republicans would have led them. They held that this miſconduct of king James amounted to an *endeavour* to ſubvert the conſtitution; and not to an actual ſubverſion, or total diſſolution, of the government, according to the principles of Mr. Locke [7]: which would have reduced the ſociety almoſt to a ſtate of nature; would have levelled all diſtinctions of honour, rank, offices, and property; would have annihilated the ſovereign power, and in conſequence have repealed all poſitive laws; and would have left the people at liberty to have erected a new ſyſtem of ſtate upon a new foundation of polity. They therefore very prudently voted it to amount to no more than an abdication of the government, and a conſequent vacancy of the throne; whereby the government was allowed to ſubſiſt, though the executive magiſtrate was gone, and the kingly office to remain, though king James was no longer king [8]. And thus the conſtitution was kept entire; which upon every ſound principle of government muſt otherwiſe have fallen to pieces.

[6] See chap. 7.

[7] on Gov. p. 2. c. 19.

[8] Law of forfeit. 118, 119.

had ſo principal and conſtituent a part as the royal authority been aboliſhed, or even ſuſpended.

This ſingle poſtulatum, the vacancy of the throne, being once eſtabliſhed, the reſt that was then done followed almoſt of courſe. For, if the throne be at any time vacant, (which may happen by other means beſides that of abdication; as if all the blood royal ſhould fail, without any ſucceſſor appointed by parliament;) if, I ſay, a vacancy by any means whatſoever ſhould happen, the right of diſpoſing of this vacancy ſeems naturally to reſult to the lords and commons, the truſtees and repreſentatives of the nation. For there are no other hands in which it can ſo properly be intruſted; and there is a neceſſity of it's being intruſted ſomewhere, elſe the whole frame of government muſt be diſſolved and periſh. The lords and commons having therefore determined this main fundamental article, that there was a vacancy of the throne, they proceeded to fill up that vacancy in ſuch manner as they judged the moſt proper. And this was done by their declaration of 12 February 1688[9], in the following manner: "that William "and Mary, prince and princeſs of Orange, be, "and be declared king and queen, to hold the crown "and royal dignity during their lives, and the life of "the ſurvivor of them; and that the ſole and full "exerciſe of the regal power be only in, and execut-"ed by, the ſaid prince of Orange, in the name of "the ſaid prince and princeſs, during their joint "lives: and after their deceaſes the ſaid crown and "royal dignity to be to the heirs of the body of the "ſaid princeſs; and for default of ſuch iſſue to the "princeſs Anne of Denmark and the heirs of her "body; and for default of ſuch iſſue to the heirs of "the body of the ſaid prince of Orange."

Perhaps, upon the principles before eſtabliſhed, the convention might (if they pleaſed) have veſted the regal dignity in a family entirely new, and ſtrangers to the royal blood: but they were too well acquainted with the benefits of hereditary ſucceſſion, and the

[9] Com. Jour. 12 Feb. 1688.

influence which it has by cuſtom over the minds of the people, to depart any farther from the antient line than temporary neceſſity and ſelf preſervation required. They therefore ſettled the crown, firſt on king William and queen Mary, king James's eldeſt daughter, for their joint lives: then on the ſurvivor of them; and then on the iſſue of queen Mary: upon failure of ſuch iſſue, it was limited to the princeſs Anne, king James's ſecond daughter, and her iſſue; and laſtly, on failure of that to the iſſue of king William, who was the grandſon of Charles the firſt, and nephew as well as ſon-in-law of king James the ſecond, being the ſon of Mary his eldeſt ſiſter. This ſettlement included all the proteſtant poſterity of king Charles I, except ſuch other iſſue as king James might at any time have, which was totally omitted through fear of a popiſh ſucceſſion. And this order of ſucceſſion took effect accordingly.

Theſe three princes therefore, king William, queen Mary, and queen Anne, did not take the crown by hereditary right or *deſcent*, but by way of donation or *purchaſe*, as the lawyers call it; by which they mean any method of acquiring an eſtate otherwiſe than by deſcent. The new ſettlement did not merely conſiſt in excluding king James, and the perſon pretended to be prince of Wales, and then ſuffering the crown to deſcend in the old hereditary channel: for the uſual courſe of deſcent was in ſome inſtances broken through; and yet the convention ſtill kept it in their eye, and paid a great, though not total, regard to it. Let us ſee how the ſucceſſion would have ſtood, if no abdication had happened, and king James had left no other iſſue than his two daughters queen Mary and queen Anne. It would have ſtood thus: queen Mary and her iſſue; queen Anne and her iſſue; king William and his iſſue. But we may remember, that queen Mary was only nominally queen, jointly with her huſband king William, who alone had the regal power; and king William his perſonally preferred to queen Anne, though his iſſue was poſtponed to hers. Clearly therefore theſe princes were ſucceſſively in poſſeſ-

ſion of the crown by a title different from the uſual courſe of deſcent.

It was towards the end of king William's reign, when all hopes of any ſurviving iſſue from any of theſe princes died with the duke of Gloceſter, that the king and parliament thought it neceſſary again to exert their power of limiting and appointing the ſucceſſion, in order to prevent another vacancy of the throne; which muſt have enſued upon their deaths, as no farther proviſions was made at the revolution, than for the iſſue of queen Mary, queen Anne, and king William. The parliament had previouſly by the ſtatute of 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2. enacted, that every perſon who ſhould be reconciled to, or hold communion with, the ſee of Rome, ſhould profeſs the popiſh religion, or ſhould marry a papiſt, ſhould be excluded and for ever incapable to inherit, poſſeſs, or enjoy, the crown; and that in ſuch caſe the people ſhould be abſolved from their allegiance, and the crown ſhould deſcend to ſuch perſons, being proteſtants, as would have inherited the ſame, in caſe the perſon ſo reconciled, holding communion, profeſſing, or marrying, were naturally dead. To act therefore conſiſtently with themſelves, and at the ſame time pay as much regard to the old hereditary line as their former reſolutions would admit, they turned their eyes on the princeſs Sophia, electreſs and dutcheſs dowager of Hanover, the moſt accompliſhed princeſs of her age °. For, upon the impending extinction of the proteſtant poſterity of Charles the firſt, the old law of regal deſcent directed them to recur to the deſcendants of James the firſt; and the princeſs Sophia, being the youngeſt daughter of Elizabeth queen of Bohemia, who was the daughter of James the firſt, was the neareſt of the antient blood royal, who was not incapacitated by profeſſing the popiſh religion. On her therefore, and the heirs

° Standford in his genealogical hiſtory, publiſhed *A. D.* 1677, ſpeaking (page 535) of the princeſſes Elizabeth, Louiſa, and Sophia, daughters of the queen of Bohemia, ſays, the firſt was reputed the moſt learned, the ſecond the greateſt artiſt, and the laſt one of the moſt accompliſhed ladies in Europe.

of her body, being proteſtants, the remainder of the crown, expectant on the death of king William and queen Anne without iſſue, was ſettled by ſtatute 12 and 13 W. III. c. 2. And at the ſame time it was enacted, that whoſoever ſhould hereafter come to the poſſeſſion of the crown ſhould join in the communion of the church of England as by law eſtabliſhed.

This is the laſt limitation of the crown that has been made by parliament: and theſe ſeveral actual limitations, from the time of Henry IV to the preſent, do clearly prove the power of the king and parliament to new-model or alter the ſucceſſion. And indeed it is now again made highly penal to diſpute it: for by the ſtatute 6 Ann. c. 7. it is enacted, that if any perſon maliciouſly, adviſedly, and directly, ſhall maintain by writing or printing, that the kings of this realm with the authority of parliament are not able to make laws to bind the crown and the deſcent thereof, he ſhall be guilty of high treaſon; or if he maintains the ſame by only preaching, teaching, or adviſed ſpeaking, he ſhall incur the penalties of a *præmunire*.

The princeſs Sophia dying before queen Anne, the inheritance thus limited, deſcended on her ſon and heir king George the firſt; and, having on the death of the queen taken effect in his perſon, from him it deſcended to his late majeſty king George the ſecond; and from him to his grandſon and heir, our preſent gracious ſovereign, king George the third.

Hence it is eaſy to collect, that the title to the crown is at preſent hereditary, though not quite ſo abſolutely hereditary as formerly: and the common ſtock or anceſtor, from whom the deſcent muſt be derived, is alſo different. Formerly the common ſtock was king Egbert; then William the conqueror; afterwards in James the firſt's time the two common ſtocks united, and ſo continued till the vacancy of the throne in 1688: now it is the princeſs Sophia, in whom the inheritance was veſted by the new king and parliament. Formerly the deſcent was abſolute, and the crown went to the next heir without any re-

ſtriction: but now upon the new ſettlement, the inheritance is conditional; being limited to ſuch heirs only, of the body of the princeſs Sophia, as are proteſtant members of the church of England, and are married to none but proteſtants.

And in this due medium conſiſts, I apprehend, the true conſtitutional notion of the right of ſucceſſion to the imperial crown of theſe kingdoms. The extremes, between which it ſteers, are each of them equally deſtructive of thoſe ends for which ſocieties were formed and are kept on foot. Where the magiſtrate, upon every ſucceſſion, is elected by the people, and may by the expreſs proviſion of the laws be depoſed (if not puniſhed) by his ſubjects, this may ſound like the perfection of liberty, and look well enough when delineated on paper; but in practice will be ever productive of tumult, contention, and anarchy. And, on the other hand, divine indefeaſible hereditary right, when coupled with the doctrine of unlimited paſſive obedience, is ſurely of all conſtitutions the moſt thoroughly ſlaviſh and dreadful. But when ſuch an hereditary right, as our laws have created and veſted in the royal ſtock, is cloſely interwoven with thoſe liberties, which, we have ſeen in a former chapter, are equally the inheritance of the ſubject; this union will form a conſtitution, in theory the moſt beautiful of any, in practice the moſt approved, and, I truſt, in duration the moſt permanent. It was the duty of an expounder of our laws to lay this conſtitution before the ſtudent in it's true and genuine light: it is the duty of every good Engliſhman to underſtand, to revere, to defend it.

CHAPTER THE FOURTH.

OF THE KING'S ROYAL FAMILY.

THE firſt and moſt conſiderable branch of the king's royal family, regarded by the laws of England, is the queen.

The queen of England is either queen *regent*, queen *conſort*, or queen *dowager*. The queen *regent*, *regnant*, or *ſovereign*, is ſhe who holds the crown in her own right; as the firſt (and perhaps the ſecond) queen Mary, queen Elizabeth, and queen Anne; and ſuch a one has the ſame powers, prerogatives, rights, dignities, and duties, as if ſhe had been a king. This was obſerved in the entrance of the laſt chapter, and is expreſsly declared by ſtatute 1 Mar. I. ſt. 3. c. 1. But the queen *conſort* is the wife of the reigning king; and ſhe by virtue of her marriage, is participant of divers prerogatives above other women [1].

[1] Finch. L. 86.

And, first, she is a public person, exempt and distinct from the king; and not, like other married women, so closely connected as to have lost all legal or separate existence so long as the marriage continues. For the queen is of ability to purchase lands, and to convey them, to make leases, to grant copyholds, and do other acts of ownership, without the concurrence of her lord; which no other married woman can do [2]: a privilege as old as the Saxon æra [3]. She is also capable of taking a grant from the king, which no other wife is from her husband; and in this particular she agrees with the *Augusta*, or *piissima regina conjux divi imperatoris* of the Roman laws; who, according to Justinian [4], was equally capable of making a grant to, and receiving one from, the emperor. The queen of England hath separate courts and officers distinct from the king's, not only in matters of ceremony, but even of law; and her attorney and solicitor general are entitled to a place within the bar of his majesty's courts, together with the king's counsel [5]. She may likewise sue and be sued alone, without joining her husband. She may also have a separate property in goods as well as lands, and has a right to dispose of them by will. In short, she is in all legal proceedings looked upon as a feme sole, and not as a feme covert; as a single, not as a married woman [6]. For which the reason given by sir Edward Coke is this: because the wisdom of the common law would not have the king (whose continual care and study is for the public, and *circa ardua regni*) to be troubled and disquieted on account of his wife's domestic affairs; and therefore it vests in the queen a power of transacting her own concerns, without the intervention of the king, as if she was an unmarried woman.

The queen hath also many exemptions, and minute prerogatives. For instance: she pays no toll [7];

[2] 4 Rep. 23.
[3] Seld. *Jan. Angl.* 1. 42.
[4] *Cod.* 5. 16. 26.
[5] Seld. tit. hon. 1. 6. 7.
[6] Finch. L. 86. Co. Litt. 133.
[7] Co. Lit. 133.

nor is ſhe liable to any amercement in any court[8]. But in general, unleſs where the law has expreſsly declared her exempted, ſhe is upon the ſame footing with other ſubjects; being to all intents and purpoſes the king's ſubject, and not his equal: in like manner as, in the imperial law, "*Auguſta legibus ſoluta* "*non eſt*[9]."

The queen hath alſo ſome pecuniary advantages, which form her a diſtinct revenue: as, in the firſt place, ſhe is entitled to an antient perquiſite called queen-gold, or *aurum reginæ*; which is a royal revenue, belonging to every queen conſort during her marriage with the king, and due from every perſon who hath made a voluntary offering or fine to the king, amounting to ten marks or upwards, for and in conſideration of any privileges, grants, licences, pardons, or other matter of royal favour conferred upon him by the king: and it is due in the proportion of one tenth part more, over and above the entire offering or fine made to the king; and becomes an actual debt of record to the queen's majeſty by the mere recording of the fine[10]. As, if an hundred marks of ſilver be given to the king for liberty to take in mortmain, or to have a fair, market, park, chaſe, or free-warren: there the queen is entitled to ten marks in ſilver, or (what was formerly an equivalent denomination) to one mark in gold, by the name of queen-gold, or *aurum reginæ*[1]. But no ſuch payment is due for any aids or ſubſidies granted to the king in parliament or convocation; nor for fines impoſed by courts on offenders againſt their will; nor for voluntary preſents to the king, without any conſideration moving from him to the ſubject; nor for any ſale or contract whereby the preſent revenues or poſſeſſions of the crown are granted away or diminiſhed[2].

The original revenue of our antient queens, be-

8 Finch. L. 185.
9 *Ff* 1. 3. 31.
10 Pryn. *Aur. Reg.* 2.
1 12 Rep. 21. 4 Inſt. 358.
2 *Ibid.* Pryn. 6. Madox. hiſt. exch. 242.

fore and ſoon after the conqueſt, ſeems to have conſiſted in certain reſervations or rents out of the demeſne lands of the crown, which were expreſsly appropriated to her majeſty, diſtinct from the king. It is frequent in domeſday book, after ſpecifying the rent due to the crown, to add likewiſe the quantity of gold or other renders reſerved to the queen [3]. Theſe were frequently appropriated to particular purpoſes; to buy wool for her majeſty's uſe [4], to purchaſe oil for her lamps [5], or to furniſh her attire from head to foot [6], which was frequently very coſtly, as one ſingle robe in the fifth year of Henry II ſtood the city of London in upwards of fourſcore pounds [7]. A practice ſomewhat ſimilar to that of the eaſtern countries, where whole cities and provinces were ſpecifically aſſigned to purchaſe particular parts of the queen's apparel [8]. And, for a farther addition to her income, this duty of queen-gold is ſuppoſed to have been originally granted; thoſe matters of grace and favour, out of which it aroſe, being frequently obtained from the crown by the powerful interceſſion of the queen. There are traces of it's payment, though obſcure ones, in the book of domeſday and in the great pipe-roll of Henry the firſt [9]. In the reign of Henry the ſecond the manner of collecting it appears to have

[3] *Bedefordſcire Maner. Leſtone redd. per annum xxii lib. &c.: ad opus reginæ ii uncias auri.*—— *Herefordſcire. In Lene, &c. conſuetud. et præpoſitus manerii veniente domina ſua (regina) in manar. præſentaret ei xviii oras denar. ut eſſet ipſa læto animo.* Pryn. Append. to *Aur. Reg.* 2, 3.

[4] *Cauſa coadunandi lanam reginæ.* Domeſd. *ibid.*

[5] *Civitas Lundon. Pro oleo ad lamp. ad reginæ. (Mag. rott. ſiſc. temp. Hen. II. ibid.)*

[6] *Vicecomes Berkeſcire, xvi l. pro cappa reginæ. (Mag. rot. ſiſc.* 19.—22 *Hen. II. ibid.) Civitas Lund. cordubanario reginæ xx s. (Mag. rot.* 2 *Hen. II.* Madox hiſt. exch. 419.)

[7] *Pro roba ad opus reginæ, quater xx l. & vi s. viii d. (Mag. rot.* 5 *Hen. II. ibid.* 250.)

[8] *Solere aiunt barbaros reges Perſarum ac Syrorum—uxoribus civitates attribuere, hoc modo; hæc civitas mulieri redimiculum præbeat, hæc in collum, hæc in crines, &c. (Cic. in Verrem, lib.* 3. *cap.* 33.)

[9] See Madox *Diſceptat. epiſtolar.* 74. Pryn. *Aur. Reg.* Append. 5.

been well underſtood, and it forms a diſtinct head in the antient dialogue of the exchequer [o] written in the time of that prince, and uſually attributed to Gervaſe of Tilbury. From that time downwards it was regularly claimed and enjoyed by all the queen conſorts of England till the death of Henry VIII; though after the acceſſion of the Tudor family the collecting of it ſeems to have been much neglected: and, there being no queen conſort afterwards till the acceſſion of James I, a period of near ſixty years, it's very nature and quantity became then a matter of doubt; and, being referred by the king to the chief juſtices and chief baron, their report of it was ſo very unfavourable [1], that his conſort queen Anne (though ſhe claimed it) yet never thought proper to exact it. In 1635, 11 Car. I, a time fertile of expedients for raiſing money upon dormant precedents in our old records (of which ſhip-money was a fatal inſtance) the king, at the petition of his queen Henrietta Maria, iſſued out his writ [2] for levying it; but afterwards purchaſed it of his conſort at the price of ten thouſand pounds; finding it, perhaps, too trifling and troubleſome to levy. And when afterwards, at the reſtoration, by the abolition of the military tenures, and the fines that were conſequent upon them, the little that legally remained of this revenue was reduced to almoſt nothing at all, in vain did Mr. Prynne, by a treatiſe which does honour to his abilities as a painful and judicious antiquary, endeavour to excite queen Catherine to revive this antiquated claim.

Another antient perquiſite belonging to the queen conſort, mentioned by all our old writers [3], and therefore only, worthy notice, is this; that on the taking of a whale on the coaſts, which is a royal fiſh, it ſhall be divided between the king and queen; the head only being the king's property, and the tail of

[o] *lib.* 2. *c.* 26.

[1] Mr. Prynne, with ſome appearance of reaſon, inſinuates, that their reſearches were very ſuperficial. (*Aur. Reg.* 125.)

[2] 19 Rym. *Fœd.* 721.

[3] Bracton, *l.* 3. *c.* 3. Britton, *c.* 17. Flet. *l.* 1. *c.* 45. & 46.

it the queen's. "*De ſturgione obſervetur, quod rex* "*illum habebit integrum: de balena vero ſufficit, ſi rex* "*habeat caput, et regina caudam.*" The reaſon of this whimſical diviſion, as aſſigned by our antient records[4], was, to furniſh the queen's wardrobe with whalebone.

But farther: though the queen is in all reſpects a ſubject, yet, in point of the ſecurity of her life and perſon, ſhe is put on the ſame footing with the king. It is equally treaſon (by the ſtatute 25 Edw. III.) to compaſs or imagine the death of our lady the king's companion, as of the king himſelf: and to violate, or defile the queen conſort, amounts to the ſame high crime; as well in the perſon committing the fact, as in the queen herſelf, if conſenting. A law of Henry the eighth[5] made it treaſon alſo for any woman, who was not a virgin, to marry the king without informing him thereof: but this law was ſoon after repealed: it treſpaſſing too ſtrongly, as well on natural juſtice, as female modeſty. If however the queen be accuſed of any ſpecies of treaſon, ſhe ſhall (whether conſort or dowager) be tried by the peers of parliament, as queen Ann Boleyn was in 28 Hen. VIII.

The huſband of a queen regnant, as prince George of Denmark was to queen Anne, is her ſubject, and may be guilty of high treaſon againſt her: but in the inſtance of conjugal infidelity, he is not ſubjected to the ſame penal reſtrictions. For which the reaſon ſeems to be, that, if a queen conſort is unfaithful to the royal bed, this may debaſe or baſtardize the heirs to the crown; but no ſuch danger can be conſequent on the infidelity of the huſband to a queen regnant.

A queen *dowager* is the widow of the king, and as ſuch enjoys moſt of the privileges belonging to her as queen conſort. But it is not high treaſon to conſpire her death; or to violate her chaſtity, for the ſame reaſon as was before alleged, becauſe the ſucceſſion to the crown is not thereby endangered. Yet

[4] Pryn. *Aur. Reg.* 327. [5] Stat. 33 Hen. VIII. c. 21.

ſtill, *pro dignitate regali*, no man can marry a queen dowager without ſpecial licence from the king, on pain of forfeiting his lands and goods. This ſir Edward Coke [6] tells us was enacted in parliament in 6 Hen. VI, though the ſtatute be not in print. But ſhe, though an alien born, ſhall ſtill be entitled to dower after the king's demiſe, which no other alien is [7]. A queen dowager, when married again to a ſubject, doth not loſe her regal dignity, as peereſſes dowager do their peerage when they marry commoners. For Catherine, queen dowager of Henry V, though ſhe married a private gentleman, Owen ap Meredith ap Theodore, commonly called Owen Tudor; yet, by the name of Katherine queen of England, maintained an action againſt the biſhop of Carliſle, and ſo, the queen dowager of Navarre marrying with Edmond earl of Lancaſter, brother to king Edward the firſt, maintained an action of dower (after the death of her ſecond huſband) by the name of queen of Navarre [8].

The prince of Wales, or heir apparent to the crown, and alſo his royal conſort, and the princeſs royal, or eldeſt daughter of the king, are likewiſe peculiarly regarded by the laws. For, by ſtatute 25 Edw. III, to compaſs or conſpire the death of the former, or to violate the chaſtity of either of the latter, are as much high treaſon as to conſpire the death of the king, or violate the chaſtity of the queen. And this upon the ſame reaſon, as was before given; becauſe the prince of Wales is next in ſucceſſion to the crown, and to violate his wife might taint the blood royal with baſtardy; and the eldeſt daughter of the king is alſo alone inheritable to the crown, on failure of iſſue male, and therefore more reſpected by the laws than any of her younger ſiſters; inſomuch that upon this, united with other (feodal) principles, while our military tenures were in force, the king might levy an aid for marrying his eldeſt daughter, and her only. The heir apparent to the crown

[6] 2 Inſt. 18. See Riley's Plac. Parl. 72.

[7] Co. Litt. 31.

[8] 2 Inſt. 50.

is uſually made prince of Wales and earl of Cheſter, by ſpecial creation, and inveſtiture; but, being the king's eldeſt ſon, he is by inheritance duke of Cornwall, without any new creation [9].

The reſt of the royal family may be conſidered in two different lights, according to the different ſenſes in which the term, *royal family*, is uſed. The larger ſenſe includes all thoſe, who are by any poſſibility inheritable to the crown. Such, before the revolution, were all the deſcendants of William the conqueror; who had branched into an amazing extent, by intermarriages with the antient nobility. Since the revolution and act of ſettlement, it means the proteſtant iſſue of the princeſs Sophia; now comparatively few in number, but which in proceſs of time may poſſibly be as largely diffuſed. The more confined ſenſe includes only thoſe, who are within a certain degree of propinquity to the reigning prince, and to whom therefore the law pays an extraordinary regard and reſpect: but, after that degree is paſt, they fall into the rank of ordinary ſubjects, and are ſeldom conſidered any farther, unleſs called to the ſucceſſion upon failure of the nearer lines. For, though collateral conſanguinity is regarded indefinitely, with reſpect to inheritance or ſucceſſion, yet it is and can only be regarded within ſome certain limits in any other reſpect, by the natural conſtitution of things and the dictates of poſitive law [o].

The younger ſons and daughters of the king, and other branches of the royal family, who are not in the immediate line of ſucceſſion, were therefore little farther regarded by the antient law, than to give them to a certain degree precedence before all peers and public officers, as well eccleſiaſtical as temporal. This is done by the ſtatute 31 Hen. VIII. c. 10. which enacts, that no perſon except the king's children, ſhall preſume to ſit or have place at the ſide of the cloth of eſtate in the parliament chamber; and

[9] 8 Rep. 1. Seld. tit. of hon. 2. 5.

[o] See *eſſay on collateral conſanguinity*, in Law-tracts, 4to. *Oxon.* 1771.

that certain great officers therein named ſhall have precedence above all dukes, except only ſuch as ſhall happen to be the king's ſon, brother, uncle, nephew, (which ſir Edward Coke [1] explains to ſignify grandſon or *nepos*) or brother's or ſiſter's ſon. Therefore, after theſe degrees are paſt, peers or others of the *blood royal* are entitled to no place or precedence except what belongs to them by their perſonal rank or dignity, which made ſir Edward Walker complain [2], that by the haſty creation of prince Rupert to be duke of Cumberland, and of the earl of Lenox to be duke of that name, previous to the creation of king Charles's ſecond ſon, James, to be duke of York, it might happen that their grandſons would have precedence of the grandſons of the duke of York.

Indeed, under the deſcription of the king's *children* his *grandſons* are held to be included, without having recourſe to ſir Edward Coke's interpretation of *nephew*: and therefore when his late majeſty king George II created his grandſon Edward, the ſecond ſon of Frederick prince of Wales deceaſed, duke of York, and referred it to the houſe of lords to ſettle his place and precedence, they certified [3] that he ought to have place next to the late duke of Cumberland the then king's youngeſt ſon; and that he might have a ſeat on the left hand of the cloth of eſtate. But when, on the acceſſion of his preſent majeſty, thoſe royal perſonages ceaſed to take place as the *children*, and ranked only as the *brother* and *uncle*, of the king, they alſo left their ſeats on the ſide of the cloth of eſtate: ſo that when the duke of Glouceſter, his majeſty's ſecond brother, took his ſeat in the houſe of peers [4], he was placed on the upper end of the earls' bench (on which the dukes uſually ſit) next to his royal highneſs the duke of York. And in 1718, upon a queſtion referred to all the judges, by king George I, it was reſolved by the opinion of ten againſt the other two, that the education and care of all the king's grandchildren while minors, did belong

[1] 4 Inſt. 362.
[2] Tracts, p. 301.
[3] Lords' Journ. 24 Apr. 1760.
[4] *Ibid.* 10 Jan. 1765.

of right to his majeſty as king of this realm, even during their father's life [5]. But they all agreed, that the care and approbation of their marriages, when grown up, belonged to the king their grandfather. And the judges have more recently concurred in opinion [6], that this care and approbation extend alſo to the preſumptive heir of the crown; though to what other branches of the royal family the ſame did extend they did not find preciſely determined. The moſt frequent inſtances of the crown's interpoſition go no farther than nephews and nieces [7]; but examples are not wanting of it's reaching to more diſtant collaterals [8]. And the ſtatute 6 Henry VI beforementioned, which prohibits the marriage of a queen dowager without the conſent of the king, aſſigns this reaſon for it: "becauſe the diſparagement of the "queen ſhall give greater comfort and example to "other ladies of eſtate, who are of the *blood royal*, "more lightly to diſparage themſelves [9]." Therefore by the ſtatute 28 Hen. VIII. c. 18. (repealed, among other ſtatutes of treaſons, by 1 Edw. VI. c. 12.) it was made high treaſon for any man to contract marriage with the king's children or reputed children, his ſiſters or aunts *ex parte paterna*, or the children of his brethren or ſiſters, being ex-

[5] Forteſc. Al. 401—440.

[6] Lords' Journ. 28 Feb. 1772.

[7] See (beſides the inſtances cited in Forteſcue Aland) for *brothers* and *ſiſters*; under king Edward III, 4 Rym. 392. 403. 411. 501. 508. 512. 549, 683: —under Henry V, 9 Rym. 710, 711, 741:—under Edward IV. 11 Rym. 564, 565. 590, 601. —under Henry VIII, 13 Rym. 249, 423:——under Edw. VI, 7 St. Tr. 3. 8. For *nephews* and *nieces*; under Henry III, 1 Rym. 852:——under Edward I, 2 Rym. 489:——under Edward III, 5 Rym. 561:——under Richard II, 7 Rym. 264: —under Richard III, 12 Rym. 232. 244:—under Henry VIII, 15 Rym. 26. 31.

[8] To *great nieces*; under Edward II. 3 Rym. 575. 644. To *firſt couſins*; under Edward III, 5 Rym. 177. To *ſecond*, and *third couſins*; under Edward III, 5 Rym. 729:——under Richard II, 7 Rym. 225:——under Henry VI, 10 Rym. 322:——under Henry VII, 12 Rym. 529:——under queen Elizabeth, Camd. Ann. A. D. 1562. To *fourth couſins*; under Henry VII, 12 Rym. 329. To the *blood-royal* in general; under Richard II, 7 Rym. 787.

[9] Ril. plac. parl. 672.

actly the ſame degrees, to which precedence is allowed by the ſtatute 31 Hen. VIII. before-mentioned. And now, by ſtatute 12 Geo. III. c. 11. no deſcendant of the body of king George II, (other than the iſſue of princeſſes married into foreign families) is capable of contracting matrimony, without the previous conſent of the king ſignified under the great ſeal; and any marriage contracted without ſuch conſent is void. Provided, that ſuch of the ſaid deſcendants, as are above the age of twenty-five, may after a twelvemonth's notice given to the king's privy council, contract and ſolemnize marriage without the conſent of the crown; unleſs both houſes of parliament ſhall, before the expiration of the ſaid year, expreſsly declare their diſapprobation of ſuch intended marriage. And all perſons ſolemnizing, aſſiſting, or being preſent at, any ſuch prohibited marriage, ſhall incur the penalties of the ſtatute of *præmunire*.

CHAPTER THE FIFTH.

OF THE COUNCILS BELONGING TO THE KING.

THE third point of view, in which we are to consider the king, is with regard to his councils. For, in order to assist him in the discharge of his duties, the maintenance of his dignity, and the exertion of his prerogative, the law hath assigned him a diversity of councils to advise with.

1. The first of these is the high court of parliament, whereof we have already treated at large.

2. Secondly, the peers of the realm are by their birth hereditary counsellors of the crown, and may be called together by the king to impart their advice in all matters of importance to the realm, either in time of parliament, or, which hath been their principal use, when there is no parliament in being[o]. Accordingly Bracton[1], speaking of the nobility of his time, says they might properly be called "*consules*, "*a consulendo: reges enim tales sibi associant ad consu-*"*lendum.*" And in our law books[2] it is laid down, that peers are created for two reasons: 1. *Ad consulendum.* 2. *Ad defendendum, regem:* on which account the law gives them certain great and high pri-

[o] Co. Litt. 110.
[1] *l.* 1. *c.* 8.
[2] 7 Rep. 34. 9 Rep. 49. 12 Rep. 96.

vileges: ſuch as freedom from arreſts, *&c.* even when no parliament is ſitting: becauſe it intends, that they are always aſſiſting the king with their counſels for the commonwealth, or keeping the realm in ſafety by their proweſs and valour.

Inſtances of conventions of the peers, to adviſe the king, have been in former times very frequent; tho' now fallen into diſuſe, by reaſon of the more regular meetings of parliament. Sir Edward Coke[3] gives us an extract of a record, 5 Hen. IV, concerning an exchange of lands between the king and the earl of Northumberland, wherein the value of each was agreed to be ſettled by advice of parliament (if any ſhould be called before the feaſt of ſaint Lucia) or otherwiſe by advice of the grand council of peers which the king promiſes to aſſemble before the ſaid feaſt, in caſe no parliament ſhall be called. Many other inſtances of this kind of meeting are to be found under our antient kings; though the formal method of convoking them had been ſo long left off, that when king Charles I. in 1640 iſſued out writs under the great ſeal to call a great council of all the peers of England to meet and attend his majeſty at York, previous to the meeting of the long parliament, the earl of Clarendon[4] mentions it as a new invention, not before heard of; that is, as he explains himſelf, ſo old, that it had not been practiſed in ſome hundreds of years. But, though there had not ſo long before been an inſtance, nor has there been any ſince, of aſſembling them in ſo ſolemn a manner, yet, in caſes of emergency, our princes have at ſeveral times thought proper to call for and conſult as many of the nobility as could eaſily be got together; as was particularly the caſe with king James the ſecond, after the landing of the prince of Orange; and with the prince of Orange himſelf, before he called that convention parliament, which afterwards called him to the throne.

Beſides this general meeting, it is uſually looked

[3] 1 Inſt. 110. [4] Hiſt. b. 2.

upon to be the right of each particular peer of the realm to demand an audience of the king, and to lay before him, with decency and reſpect, ſuch matters as he ſhall judge of importance to the public weal. And therefore, in the reign of Edward II, it was made an article of impeachment in parliament againſt the two Hugh Spencers, father and ſon, for which they were baniſhed the kingdom, "that they by "their evil covin would not ſuffer the great men of "the realm, the king's good counſellors, to ſpeak "with the king, or to come near him; but only in "the preſence and hearing of the ſaid Hugh the fa-"ther and Hugh the ſon, or one of them, and at "their will, and according to ſuch things as pleaſed "them [5]."

3. A third council belonging to the king, are, according to ſir Edward Coke [6], his judges of the courts of law, for law matters. And this appears frequently in our ſtatutes, particularly 14 Edw. III. c. 5. and in other books of law. So that when the king's council is mentioned generally, it muſt be de-fined, particularized, and underſtood, *ſecundum ſubjec-tam materiam:* and, if the ſubject be of a legal na-ture, then by the king's council is underſtood his council for matters of law; namely, his judges. Therefore when by ſtatute 16 Ric. II. c. 5. it was made a high offence to import into this kingdom any papal bulles, or other proceſſes from Rome; and it was enacted, that the offenders ſhould be attached by their bodies, and brought before the king and his *council* to anſwer for ſuch offence; here, by the ex-preſſion of the king's *council*, were underſtood the king's judges of his courts of juſtice, the ſubject mat-ter being legal: this being the general way of inter-preting the word, *council* [7].

4. But the principal council belonging to the king is his privy council, which is generally called, by way of eminence, *the council*. And this, according to ſir Edward Coke's deſcription of it [8], is a noble,

[5] 4 Inſt. 53.
[6] 1 Inſt. 110.
[7] 3 Inſt. 125.
[8] 4 Inſt. 53.

honourable, and reverend aſſembly, of the king and ſuch as he wills to be of his privy council, in the king's court or palace. The king's will is the ſole conſtituent of a privy counſellor: and this alſo regulates their number, which of antient time was twelve or thereabouts. Afterwards it encreaſed to ſo large a number, that it was found inconvenient for ſecreſy and diſpatch; and therefore king Charles the ſecond in 1679 limited it to thirty: whereof fifteen were to be the principal officers of ſtate, and thoſe to be counſellors, *virtute officii*; and the other fifteen were compoſed of ten lords and five commoners of the king's chooſing [9]. But ſince that time the number has been much augmented, and now continues indefinite. At the ſame time alſo the antient office of lord preſident of the council was revived in the perſon of Anthony earl of Shaftſbury; an officer, that by the ſtatute of 31 Hen. VIII. c. 10. has precedence next after the lord chancellor and lord treaſurer.

Privy counſellors are *made* by the king's nomination, without either patent or grant; and, on taking the neceſſary oaths, they become immediately privy counſellors during the life of the king that chooſes them, but ſubject to removal at his diſcretion.

As to the *qualifications* of members to ſit at this board; any natural born ſubject of England is capable of being a member of the privy council: taking the proper oaths for the ſecurity of the government, and the teſt for ſecurity of the church. But, in order to prevent any perſons under foreign attachments from inſinuating themſelves into this important truſt, as happened in the reign of king William in many inſtances, it is enacted by the act of ſettlement [o], that no perſon born out of the dominions of the crown of England, unleſs born of Engliſh parents, even though naturalized by parliament, ſhall be capable of being of the privy council.

The *duty* of a privy counſellor appears from the oath of office [1], which conſiſts of ſeven articles:

9 Temple's Mem. part 3.
o Stat. 12 & 13 Will. III. c. 2.
1 4 Inſt. 54.

1. To adviſe the king according to the beſt of his cunning and diſcretion. 2. To adviſe for the king's honour and good of the public, without partiality through affection, love, meed, doubt, or dread. 3. To keep the king's counſel ſecret. 4. To avoid corruption. 5. To help and ſtrengthen the execution of what ſhall be there reſolved. 6. To withſtand all perſons who would attempt the contrary. And, laſtly, in general, 7. To obſerve, keep and do all that a good and true counſellor ought to do to his ſovereign lord.

The *power* of the privy council is to inquire into all offences againſt the government, and to commit the offenders to ſafe cuſtody, in order to take their trial in ſome of the courts of law. But their juriſdiction herein is only to inquire, and not to puniſh: and the perſons committed by them are intitled to their *habeas corpus* by ſtatute 16 Car. I, c. 10, as much as if committed by an ordinary juſtice of the peace. And, by the ſame ſtatute, the court of ſtar-chamber, and the court of requeſts, both of which conſiſted of privy counſellors, were diſſolved: and it was declared illegal for them to take cognizance of any matter of property, belonging to the ſubjects of this kingdom. But, in plantation or admiralty cauſes, which ariſe out of the juriſdiction of this kingdom; and in matters of lunacy or idiocy [2], being a ſpecial flower of the prerogative; with regard to theſe, although they may eventually involve queſtions of extenſive property, the privy council continues to have cognizance, being the court of appeal in ſuch caſes; or, rather the appeal lies to the king's majeſty himſelf in council. Whenever alſo a queſtion ariſes between two provinces in America or elſewhere, as concerning the extent of their charters and the like, the king in his council exerciſes *original* juriſdiction therein, upon the principles of feodal ſovereignty. And ſo likewiſe when any perſon claims an iſland or a province, in the nature of a feodal principality, by grant from the king or his anceſtors, the determina-

[2] 3 P. Wms. 108.

tion of that right belongs to his majeſty in council: as was the caſe of the earl of Derby with regard to the iſle of Man in the reign of queen Elizabeth, and the earl of Cardigan and others, as repreſentatives of the duke of Montague, with relation to the iſland of St. Vincent in 1764. But from all the dominions of the crown, excepting Great Britain and Ireland, an *appellate* juriſdiction (in the laſt reſort) is veſted in the ſame tribunal; which uſually exerciſes it's judicial authority in a committee of the whole privy council, who hear the allegations and proofs, and make their report to his majeſty in council, by whom the judgment is finally given.

The *privileges* of privy counſellors, as ſuch, (abſtracted from their honorary precedence [3]) conſiſt principally in the ſecurity which the law has given them againſt attempts and conſpiracies to deſtroy their lives. For, by ſtatute 3 Hen. VII. c. 14. if any of the king's ſervants, of his houſeſhold, conſpire or imagine to take away the life of a privy counſellor, it is felony, though nothing be done upon it. The reaſon of making this ſtatute, ſir Edward Coke [4] tells us, was becauſe ſuch a conſpiracy was, juſt before this parliament, made by ſome of king Henry the ſeventh's houſehold ſervants, and great miſchief was like to have enſued thereupon. This extends only to the king's menial ſervants. But the ſtatute 9 Ann. c. 16. goes farther, and enacts, that *any perſon* that ſhall unlawfully attempt to kill, or ſhall unlawfully aſſault, and ſtrike, or wound, any privy counſellor in the execution of his office, ſhall be a felon without benefit of clergy. This ſtatute was made upon the daring attempt of the ſieur Guiſcard, who ſtabbed Mr. Harley, afterwards earl of Oxford, with a penknife, when under examination for high crimes in a committee of the privy council.

The *diſſolution* of the privy council depends upon the king's pleaſure; and he may, whenever he thinks proper, diſcharge any particular member, or the

[3] See page 413. [4] 3 Inſt. 38.

whole of it, and appoint another. By the common law alſo it was diſſolved *ipſo facto* by the king's demiſe; as deriving all it's authority from him. But now, to prevent the inconveniencies of having no council in being at the acceſſion of a new prince, it is enacted by ſtatute 6 Ann. c. 7. that the privy council ſhall continue for ſix months after the demiſe of the crown, unleſs ſooner determined by the ſucceſſor.

CHAPTER THE SIXTH.

OF THE KING'S DUTIES.

I Proceed next to the duties, incumbent on the king by our conſtitution; in conſideration of which duties his dignity and prerogative are eſtabliſhed by the laws of the land: it being a maxim in the law, that protection and ſubjection are reciprocal[5]. And theſe reciprocal duties are what, I apprehend, were meant by the convention in 1688, when they declared that king James had broken the *original contract* between king and people. But however, as the term of that original contract were in ſome meaſure diſputed, being alledged to exiſt principally in theory, and to be only deducible by reaſon and the rules of natural law; in which deduction different underſtandings might very conſiderably differ; it was, after the revolution, judged proper to declare theſe duties expreſsly, and to reduce that contract to a plain certainty. So that, whatever doubts might be formerly raiſed by weak and ſcrupulous minds about the exiſtence of ſuch an original contract, they muſt now entirely ceaſe; eſpecially with regard to every prince, who hath reigned ſince the year 1688.

The principal duty of the king is, to govern his people according to law. *Nec regibus infinita aut libera poteſtas*, was the conſtitution of our German anceſtors on the continent[6]. And this is not only conſonant to the principles of nature, of liberty, of reaſon, and of ſociety, but has always been eſteemed an expreſs part of the common law of England, even when prerogative was at the higheſt. "The "king," ſaith Bracton[7], who wrote under Henry

[5] 7 Rep. 5. [6] Tac. *de mor. Germ.* c. 7. [7] *l.* 1. c. 8.

III, "ought not to be ſubject to man, but to God, "and to the law; for the law maketh the king. "Let the king therefore render to the law, what "the law has inveſted in him with regard to "others; dominion and power: for he is not "truly king, where will and pleaſure rules, and not "the law." And again [8]; "the king alſo hath a "ſuperior, namely God, and alſo the law, by which "he was made a king." Thus Bracton: and Forteſcue alſo [9], having firſt well diſtinguiſhed between a monarchy abſolutely and deſpotically regal, which is introduced by conqueſt and violence, and a political or civil monarchy, which ariſes from mutual conſent; (of which laſt ſpecies he aſſerts the government of England to be) immediately lays it down as a principle, that "that the king of England muſt "rule his people according to the decrees of the laws "thereof: inſomuch that he is bound by an oath at "his coronation to the obſervance and keeping of his "own laws." But, to obviate all doubts and difficulties concerning this matter, it is expreſsly declared by ſtatute 12 and 13 W. III. c. 2. "that the "laws of England are the birthright of the people "thereof; and all the kings and queens who ſhall "aſcend the throne of this realm ought to adminiſter "the government of the ſame according to the ſaid "laws; and all their officers and miniſters ought to "ſerve them reſpectively according to the ſame: and "therefore all the laws and ſtatutes of this realm, for "ſecuring the eſtabliſhed religion, and the rights and "liberties of the people thereof, and all other laws "and ſtatutes of the ſame now in force, are ratified "and confirmed accordingly."

And, as to the terms of the original contract between king and people, theſe I apprehend to be now couched in the coronation oath, which by the ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 1. c. 6. is to be adminiſtered to every king and queen, who ſhall ſucceed to the imperial crown of theſe realms, by one of the archbiſhops or biſhops of the realm, in the preſence of all the people; who on their parts do reciprocally take

[8] *l.* 2. *c.* 16. §. 3. [9] *c.* 9. & 34.

the oath of allegiance to the crown. This coronation oath is conceived in the following terms:

"*The archbiſhop or biſhop ſhall ſay*, Will you ſolemnly promiſe and ſwear to govern the people of this kingdom of England, and the dominions thereto belonging, according to the ſtatutes in parliament agreed on, and the laws and cuſtoms of the ſame?—*The king or queen ſhall ſay*, I ſolemnly promiſe ſo to do.——*Archbiſhop or biſhop*. Will you to your power cauſe law and juſtice, in mercy, to be executed in all your judgments?—*King or queen*. I will.——*Archbiſhop or biſhop*. Will you to the utmoſt of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profeſſion of the goſpel, and the proteſtant reformed religion eſtabliſhed by the law? And will you preſerve unto the biſhops and clergy of this realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all ſuch rights and privileges as by law do or ſhall appertain unto them, or any of them?—*King or queen*. All this I promiſe to do.——*After this the king or queen, laying his or her hand upon the holy goſpels, ſhall ſay*, The things which I have here before promiſed I will perform and keep: ſo help me God: *and then ſhall kiſs the book*."

This is the form of the coronation oath, as it is now preſcribed by our laws; the principal articles of which appear to be at leaſt as antient as the mirror of juſtice [o], and even as the time of Bracton [1]: but the wording of it was changed at the revolution, becauſe (as the ſtatute alleges) the oath itſelf had been framed in doubtful words and expreſſions, with relation to antient laws and conſtitutions at this time unknown [2]. However, in what form ſoever it be

[o] *cap.* 1. §. 2.

[1] *l.* 3. *tr.* 1. *c.* 9.

[2] In the old folio abridgment of the ſtatutes, printed by Lettou and Machlinia in the reign of Edward IV, *(penes me)* there is preſerved a copy of the old coronation oath; which, as the book is extremely ſcarce, I will here tranſcribe. *Ceo eſt le ſerement que le roy jurre a ſoun coronement: que il gardera et meintenera lex droitex et lex franchiſex de ſeynt eſgliſe grauntex auncienment dex droitex roys chriſtiens dEngletere, et quil gardera toutex ſex terrex honoures et dignites droiturelx et ſranks del coron du*

conceived, this is moſt indiſputably a fundamental and original expreſs contract; though doubtleſs the duty of protection is impliedly as much incumbent on the ſovereign before coronation as after; in the ſame manner as allegiance to the king becomes the duty of the ſubject immediately on the deſcent of the crown, before he has taken the oath of allegiance, or whether he ever takes it at all. This reciprocal duty of the ſubject will be conſidered in its proper place. At preſent we are only to obſerve, that in the king's part of this original contract are expreſſed all the duties that a monarch can owe to his people: *viz.* to govern according to law; to execute judgment in mercy; and to maintain the eſtabliſhed religion. And, with reſpect to the latter of theſe three branches, we may farther remark, that by the act of union, 5 Ann. c. 8. two preceding ſtatutes are recited and confirmed; the one of the parliament of Scotland, the other of the parliament of England: which enact; the former, that every king at his acceſſion ſhall take and ſubſcribe an oath, to preſerve the proteſtant religion and preſbyterian church government in Scotland; the latter, that at his coronation he ſhall take and ſubſcribe a ſimilar oath, to preſerve the ſettlement of the church of England within England, Ireland, Wales, and Berwick, and the territories thereunto belonging.

roialme dEngletere en tout maner dentier te ſanz null maner dameñuſement, et lex droitez diſpergez dilapidez ou perduz de la corone a ſoun poiair reappeller en launcien eſtate, et quil gardera le peas de ſeynt eſgliſe et al clergie et al people de bon accorde, et quil face faire en toutez ſez jugementez owel et droit juſtice oue diſcretion et miſericorde, et quil grauntera a tenure lex leyes et cuſtumez du roialme, et a ſoun poiar lez face garder et affirmer que lex gentez du people avont faitez et eſtitez, et les malveys leyz et cuſtumes de tout ouſtera, et ferme peas et eſtablie al people de ſoun roialme en ceo garde eſgardera a ſoun poiair: come Dieu luy aide. (Tit. ſacramentum regis. fol. m. ij.) Prynne has alſo given us a copy of the coronation oaths of Richard II, (Signal Loyalty. II. 246.) Edward VI, *(ibid. 251.)* James I, and Charles I. *(ibid. 269.)*

CHAPTER THE SEVENTH.

OF THE KING'S PREROGATIVE.

IT was obſerved in a former chapter [3], that one of the principal bulwarks of civil liberty, or (in other words) of the Britiſh conſtitution, was the limitation of the king's prerogative by bounds ſo certain and notorious, that it is impoſſible he ſhould ever exceed them, without the conſent of the people, on the one hand; or without, on the other, a violation of that original contract, which in all ſtates impliedly, and in ours moſt expreſsly, ſubſiſts between the prince and the ſubject. It will now be our buſineſs to conſider this prerogative minutely; to demonſtrate it's neceſſity in general; and to mark out in the moſt important inſtances it's particular extent and reſtrictions: from which conſiderations this concluſion will evidently follow, that the powers, which are veſted in the crown by the laws of England, are neceſſary for the ſupport of ſociety; and do not intrench any farther on our *natural* liberties, than is expedient for the maintenance of our *civil*.

There cannot be a ſtronger proof of that genuine freedom, which is the boaſt of this age and country, than the power of diſcuſſing and examining, with decency and reſpect, the limits of the king's preroga-

[3] chap. 1. page 143.

tive. A topic, that in ome former ages was thought too delicate and ſacred to be profaned by the pen of a ſubject. It was ranked among the *arcana imperii*: and, like the myſteries of the *bona dea*, was not ſuffered to be pried into by any but ſuch as were initiated in its ſervice; becauſe perhaps the exertion of the one, like the ſolemnities of the other, would not bear the inſpection of a rational and ſober inquiry. The glorious queen Elizabeth herſelf made no ſcruple to direct her parliaments to abſtain from diſcourſing of matters of ſtate [4]; and it was the conſtant language of this favourite princeſs and her miniſters, that even that auguſt aſſembly, "ought not to deal, "to judge, or to meddle, with her majeſty's prerogative royal [5]." And her ſucceſſor, king James the firſt, who had imbibed high notions of the divinity of regal ſway, more than once laid it down in his ſpeeches, that, "as it is atheiſm and blaſphemy in a "creature to diſpute what the deity may do, ſo it is "preſumption and ſedition in a ſubject to diſpute "what a king may do in the height of his power; "good chriſtians, he adds, will be content with "God's will, revealed in his word; and good ſub-"jects will reſt in the king's will, revealed in *his* "law."

But, whatever might be the ſentiments of ſome of our princes, this was never the language of our antient conſtitution and laws. The limitation of the regal authority was a firſt and eſſential principle in all the Gothic ſyſtems of government eſtabliſhed in Europe; though gradually driven out and overborne, by violence and chicane, in moſt of the kingdoms on the continent. We have ſeen, in the preceding chapter, the ſentiments of Bracton and Forteſcue, at the diſtance of two centuries from each other. And ſir Henry Finch, under Charles the firſt, after the lapſe of two centuries more, though he lays down the law of prerogative in very ſtrong and emphatical terms, yet qualifies it with a general reſtriction, in regard

[4] Dewes. 479.
[5] *Ibid.* 645.
[6] King James's works. 557. 531.

to the liberties of the people. "The king hath "a prerogative in all things, that are not injurious "to the ſubject; for in them all it muſt be remem- "bered, that the king's prerogative ſtretcheth not to "the doing of any wrong[5]." *Nihil enim aliud poteſt rex, niſi id ſolum quod de jure poteſt.* And here it may be ſome ſatisfaction to remark, how widely the civil law differs from our own, with regard to the authority of the laws over the prince, or (as a civilian would rather have expreſſed it) the authority of the prince over the laws. It is a maxim of the Engliſh law, as we have ſeen from Bracton, that "*rex debet* "*eſſe ſub lege, quia lex facit regem:*" the imperial law "will tell us, that, "*in omnibus, imperatoris excipitur* "*fortuna; cui ipſas leges Deus ſubjecit*[9]." We ſhall not long heſitate to which of them to give the preference, as moſt conducive to thoſe ends for which ſocieties were framed, and are kept together; eſpecially as the Roman lawyers themſelves ſeem to be ſenſible of the unreaſonableneſs of their own conſtitution. "*Decet tamen principem,*" ſays Paulus, "*ſervare le-* "*ges, quibus ipſe ſolutus eſt*[0]." This is at once laying down the principle of deſpotic power, and at the ſame time acknowledging it's abſurdity.

By the word prerogative we uſually underſtand that ſpecial pre-eminence, which the king hath, over and above all other perſons, and out of the ordinary courſe of the common law, in right of his regal dignity. It ſignifies, in it's etymology, from *præ* and *rogo*) ſomething that is required or demanded before, or in preference to, all others. And hence it follows, that it muſt be in it's nature ſingular and eccentrical; that it can only be applied to thoſe rights and capacities which the king enjoys alone, in contradiſtinction to others, and not to thoſe which he enjoys in common with any of his ſubjects; for if once any one prerogative of the crown could be held in common with the ſubject, it would ceaſe to be prerogative any longer. And therefore Finch[1] lays it

7 Finch L. 84, 85.
8 Bracton. *l.* 3. *tr.* 1. *c.* 9.
9 *Nov.* 105. §. 2.
0 *Ff.* 32. 1. 23.
1 Finch. L. 85.

down as a maxim, that the prerogative is that law in caſe of the king, which is law in no caſe of the ſubject.

Prerogatives are either *direct* or *incidental*. The *direct* are ſuch poſitive ſubſtantial parts of the royal character and authority, as are rooted in and ſpring from the king's political perſon, conſidered merely by itſelf, without reference to any other extrinſic circumſtance; as the right of ſending ambaſſadors, of creating peers, and of making war or peace. But ſuch prerogatives as are *incidental* bear always a relation to ſomething elſe, diſtinct from the king's perſon; and are indeed only exceptions, in favour of the crown, to thoſe general rules that are eſtabliſhed for the reſt of the community: ſuch as, that no coſts ſhall be recovered againſt the king; that the king can never be a joint-tenant; and that his debt ſhall be preferred before a debt to any of his ſubjects. Theſe, and an infinite number of other inſtances, will be better underſtood, when we come regularly to conſider the rules themſelves, to which theſe incidental prerogatives are exceptions. And therefore we will at preſent only dwell upon the king's ſubſtantive or direct prerogative.

Theſe ſubſtantive or direct prerogatives may again be divided into three kinds: being ſuch as regard, firſt, the king's royal *character*; ſecondly, his royal *authority*; and, laſtly, his royal *income*. Theſe are neceſſary, to ſecure reverence to his perſon, obedience to his commands, and an affluent ſupply for the ordinary expences of government; without all of which it is impoſſible to maintain the executive power in due independence and vigour. Yet in every branch of this large and extenſive dominion, our free conſtitution has interpoſed ſuch ſeaſonable checks and reſtrictions, as may curb it from trampling on thoſe liberties, which it was meant to ſecure and eſtabliſh. The enormous weight of prerogative, if left to itſelf, (as in arbitrary governments it is) ſpreads havoc and deſtruction among all the inferior movements: but, when balanced and regulated (as with us) by its proper counterpoiſe, timely and judiciouſly applied, it's

operations are then equable and certain, it invigorates the whole machine, and enables every part to anſwer the end of it's conſtruction.

In the preſent chapter we ſhall only conſider the two firſt of theſe diviſions, which relate to the king's political *character* and *authority:* or, in other words, his *dignity* and regal *power;* to which laſt the name of prerogative is frequently narrowed and confined. The other diviſion, which forms the royal *revenue*, will require a diſtinct examination; according to the known diſtribution of the feodal writers, who diſtinguiſh the royal prerogatives into the *majora* and *minora regalia*, in the latter of which claſſes the rights of the revenue are ranked. For, to uſe their own words, "*majora regalia imperii præ-eminentiam ſpectant; mi-*" *nora vero ad commodum pecuniarium immediate atti-*" *nent: et hæc proprie fiſcalia ſunt, et ad jus fiſci perti-*" *nent* [8]."

Firſt, then, of the royal dignity. Under every monarchical eſtabliſhment, it is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh the prince from his ſubjects, not only by the outward pomp and decorations of majeſty, but alſo by aſcribing to him certain qualities, as inherent in his royal capacity, diſtinct from and ſuperior to thoſe of any other individual in the nation. For, though a philoſophical mind will conſider the royal perſon, merely as one man appointed by mutual conſent to preſide over many others, and will pay him that reverence and duty which the principles of ſociety demand, yet the maſs of mankind will be apt to grow inſolent and refractory, if taught to conſider their prince as a man of no greater perfection than themſelves. The law therefore aſcribes to the king, in his high political character, not only large powers and emoluments, which form his prerogative and revenue, but likewiſe certain attributes of a great and tranſcendant nature; by which the people are led to conſider him in the light of a ſuperior being, and to pay him that awful reſpect, which may enable him with greater eaſe to carry on the buſineſs of government. This is what

[8] *Peregrin. de jure fiſc. l.* 1. *c.* 1. *num.* 9.

I underſtand by the royal dignity, the ſeveral branches of which we will now proceed to examine.

I. And, firſt, the law aſcribes to the king the attribute of *ſovereignty*, or pre-eminence. "*Rex eſt* "*vicarius*," ſays Bracton [3], *et miniſter Dei in terra*: "*omnis quidem ſub eo eſt, et ipſe ſub nullo, niſi tantum* "*ſub Deo.*" He is ſaid to have *imperial* dignity; and in charters before the conqueſt is frequently ſtiled *baſileus* and *imperator*, the titles reſpectively aſſumed by the emperors of the eaſt and weſt [4]. His realm is declared to be an *empire*, and his crown *imperial*, by many acts of parliament, particularly the ſtatutes 24 Hen. VIII. c. 12. and 25 Hen. VIII. c. 28 [5]; which at the ſame time declare the king to be the ſupreme head of the realm in matters both civil and eccleſiaſtical, and of conſequence inferior to no man upon earth, dependent on no man, accountable to no man. Formerly there prevailed a ridiculous notion, propagated by the German and Italian civilians, that an emperor could do many things which a king could not, (as the creation of notaries and the like) and that all kings were in ſome degree ſubordinate and ſubject to the emperor of Germany or Rome. The meaning therefore of the legiſlature, when it uſes theſe terms of *empire* and *imperial*, and applies them to the realm and crown of England, is only to aſſert that our king is equally ſovereign and independent within theſe his dominions, as any emperor is in his empire [6]; and owes no kind of ſubjection to any other potentate upon earth. Hence it is, that no ſuit or action can be brought againſt the king, even in civil matters, becauſe no court can have juriſdiction over him. For all juriſdiction implies ſuperiority of power: authority to try would be vain and idle, without an authority to redreſs; and the ſentence of a court would be contemptible, unleſs that court had power to command the execution of it:

3 *l.* 1. *c.* 8.
4 Seld. tit of hon. I. 2.
5 See alſo 24 Geo. II. c. 24. 5 Geo. III. c. 27.
6 *Rex allegaverit, quod ipſo omnes libertates haberet in regno ſuo, quas imperator vendicabat in imperio.* (M. Paris, *A. D.* 1095.)

but who, says Finch [7], shall command the king? Hence it is likewise, that by law the person of the king is sacred, even though the measures pursued in his reign be completely tyrannical and arbitrary: for no jurisdiction upon earth has power to try him in a criminal way; much less to condemn him to punishment. If any foreign jurisdiction had this power, as was formerly claimed by the pope, the independence of the kingdom would be no more: and, if such a power were vested in any domestic tribunal, there would soon be an end of the constitution, by destroying the free agency of one of the constituent parts of the sovereign legislative power.

Are then, it may be asked, the subjects of England totally destitute of remedy, in case the crown should invade their rights, either by private injuries, or public oppressions? To this we may answer, that the law has provided a remedy in both cases.

And, first, as to private injuries: if any person has, in point of property, a just demand upon the king, he must petition him in his court of chancery, where his chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion [8]. And this is entirely consonant to what is laid down by the writers on natural law. "A subject, says Puffendorf [9], so long as he continues a subject, hath no "way to *oblige* his prince to give him his due, when "he refuses it; though no wise prince will ever re"fuse to stand to a lawful contract. And, if the "prince gives the subject leave to enter an action "against him, upon such contract, in his own courts, "the action itself proceeds rather upon natural "equity, than upon the municipal laws." For the end of such action is not to *compel* the prince to observe the contract, but to *persuade* him. And, as to personal wrongs; it is well observed by Mr. Locke [10], "the harm which the sovereign can do in his own "person not being likely to happen often, nor to

[7] Finch. L. 83.
[8] Finch. L. 255. See b. III. c. 17.
[9] Law. of N. and N. b. 8. c. 10.
[10] on Gov. p. 2. §. 205.

" extend itſelf far; not being able by his ſingle " ſtrength to ſubvert the laws, nor oppreſs the body " of the people, (ſhould any prince have ſo much " weakneſs and ill-nature as to endeavour to do it) " —the inconveniency therefore of ſome particular " miſchiefs, that may happen ſometimes, when a " heady prince comes to the throne, are well recom- " penſed by the peace of the public and ſecurity " of the government, in the perſon of the chief " magiſtrate being thus ſet out of the reach of dan- " ger."

Next, as to caſes of ordinary public oppreſſion, where the vitals of the conſtitution are not attacked, the law hath alſo aſſigned a remedy. For as a king cannot miſuſe his power, without the advice of evil counſellors, and the aſſiſtance of wicked miniſters, theſe men may be examined and puniſhed. The conſtitution has therefore provided, by means of indictments, and parliamentary impeachments, that no man ſhall dare to aſſiſt the crown in contradiction to the laws of the land. But it is at the ſame time a maxim in thoſe laws, that the king himſelf can do no wrong, ſince it would be a great weakneſs and abſurdity in any ſyſtem of poſitive law, to define any poſſible wrong, without any poſſible re- dreſs.

For, as to ſuch public oppreſſions as tend to diſ- ſolve the conſtitution, and ſubvert the fundamentals of government, they are caſes, which the law will not, out of decency, ſuppoſe; being capable of diſ- truſting thoſe, whom it has inveſted with any part of the ſupreme power: ſince ſuch diſtruſt would render the exerciſe of that power precarious and impracti- cable[1]. For, wherever the law expreſſes it's diſtruſt of abuſe of power, it always veſts a ſuperior coercive authority in ſome other hand to correct it; the very notion of which deſtroys the idea of ſovereignty. If therefore (for example) the two houſes of parliament,

[1] See theſe points more fully diſcuſſed in the *conſiderations of the law of forfeiture*, 3d edit. pag. 109——126. wherein the very learned author has thrown many new and important lights on the texture of our happy con- ſtitution.

or either of them, had avowedly a right to animadvert on the king, or each other, or if the king had a right to animadvert on either of the houſes, that branch of the legiſlature, ſo ſubject to animadverſion, would inſtantly ceaſe to be part of the ſupreme power; the balance of the conſtitution would be overturned; and that branch or branches, in which this juriſdiction reſided, would be completely ſovereign. The ſuppoſition of *law* therefore is, that neither the king nor either houſe of parliament (collectively taken) is capable of doing any wrong; ſince in ſuch caſes the law feels itſelf incapable of furniſhing any adequate remedy. For which reaſon all oppreſſions, which may happen to ſpring from any branch of the ſovereign power, muſt neceſſarily be out of the reach of any *ſtated rule*, or *expreſs legal* proviſion: but, if ever they unfortunately happen, the prudence of the times muſt provide new remedies upon new emergencies.

Indeed, it is found by experience, that whenever the unconſtitutional oppreſſions, even of the ſovereign power, advance with gigantic ſtrides, and threaten deſolation to a ſtate, mankind will not be reaſoned out of the feelings of humanity; nor will ſacrifice their liberty by a ſcrupulous adherence to thoſe political maxims, which were originally eſtabliſhed to preſerve it. And therefore, though the poſitive laws are ſilent, experience will furniſh us with a very remarkable caſe, wherein nature and reaſon prevailed. When king James the ſecond invaded the fundamental conſtitution of the realm, the convention declared an abdication, whereby the throne was rendered vacant, which induced a new ſettlement of the crown. And ſo far as this precedent leads, and no farther, we may now be allowed to lay down the *law* of redreſs againſt public oppreſſion. If therefore any future prince ſhould endeavour to ſubvert the conſtitution by breaking the original contract between king and people, ſhould violate the fundamental laws, and ſhould withdraw himſelf out of the kingdom; we are now authoriſed to declare that this conjunction of circumſtances would amount to an abdication, and

the throne would be thereby vacant. But it is not for us to ſay, that any one, or two, of theſe ingredients would amount to ſuch a ſituation; for there our precedents would fail us. In theſe therefore, or other circumſtances, which a fertile imagination may furniſh, ſince both law and hiſtory are ſilent, it becomes us to be ſilent too; leaving to future generations, whenever neceſſity and the ſafety of the whole ſhall require it, the exertion of thoſe inherent (though latent) powers of ſociety, which no climate, no time, no conſtitution, no contract, can ever deſtroy, or diminiſh.

II. Beſides the attribute of ſovereignty, the law alſo aſcribes to the king, in his political capacity, abſolute *perfection*. The king can do no wrong. Which antient and fundamental maxim is not to be underſtood, as if every thing tranſacted by the government was of courſe juſt and lawful, but means only two things. Firſt, that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to the king, nor is he anſwerable for it perſonally to his people: for this doctrine would totally deſtroy that conſtitutional independence of the crown, which is neceſſary for the balance of power in our free and active, and therefore compounded, conſtitution. And, ſecondly, it means that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury; it is created for the benefit of the people, and therefore cannot be exerted to their prejudice [2].

The king, moreover, is not only incapable of *doing* wrong, but even of *thinking* wrong; he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or weakneſs. And therefore if the crown ſhould be induced to grant any franchiſe or privilege to a ſubject contrary to reaſon, or in any wiſe prejudicial to the commonwealth, or a private perſon, the law will not ſuppoſe the king to have meant either an unwiſe or an injurious action, but declares that the king was deceived in his grant; and thereupon ſuch grant is rendered void, merely upon the foundation of fraud

[2] Plowd. 487.

and deception, either by or upon thoſe agents, whom the crown has thought proper to employ. For the law will not caſt an imputation on that magiſtrate whom it intruſts with the executive power, as if he was capable of intentionally diſregarding his truſt: but attributes to mere impoſition (to which the moſt perfect of ſublunary beings muſt ſtill continue liable) thoſe little inadvertencies, which, if charged on the will of the prince, might leſſen him in the eyes of his ſubjects.

Yet ſtill, notwithſtanding this perſonal perfection, which the law attributes to the ſovereign, the conſtitution has allowed a latitude of ſuppoſing the contrary, in reſpect to both houſes of parliament; each of which, in it's turn, hath exerted the right of remonſtrating and complaining to the king even of thoſe acts of royalty, which are moſt properly and perſonally his own; ſuch as meſſages ſigned by himſelf, and ſpeeches delivered from the throne. And yet, ſuch is the reverence which is paid to the royal perſon, that though the two houſes have an undoubted right to conſider theſe acts of ſtate in any light whatever, and accordingly treat them in their addreſſes as perſonally proceeding from the prince, yet among themſelves, (to preſerve the more perfect decency, and for the greater freedom of debate) they uſually ſuppoſe them to flow from the advice of adminiſtration. But the privilege of canvaſſing thus freely the perſonal acts of the ſovereign (either directly, or even through the medium of his reputed adviſers) belongs to no individual, but is confined to thoſe auguſt aſſemblies: and there too the objections muſt be propoſed with the utmoſt reſpect and deference. One member was ſent to the tower [3], for ſuggeſting that his majeſty's anſwer to the addreſs of the commons contained "high words to fright the members "out of their duty;" and another [4], for ſaying that a part of the king's ſpeech "ſeemed rather to be "calculated for the meridian of Germany than Great

[3] Com. Journ. 18 Nov. 1685. [4] *Ibid.* 4 Dec. 1717.

"Britain, and that the king was a ſtranger to our "language and conſtitution."

In farther purſuance of this principle, the law alſo determines that in the king can be no negligence, or *laches*, and therefore no delay will bar his right. *Nullum tempus occurrit regi* has been the ſtanding maxim upon all occaſions: for the law intends that the king is always buſied for the public good, and therefore has not leiſure to aſſert his right within the times limited to ſubjects [5]. In the king alſo can be no ſtain or corruption of blood: for if the heir to the crown were attainted of treaſon or felony, and afterwards the crown ſhould deſcend to him, this would purge the attainder *ipſo facto* [6]. And therefore when Henry VII, who as earl of Richmond ſtood attainted, came to the crown, it was not thought neceſſary to paſs an act of parliament to reverſe this attainder; becauſe, as lord Bacon in his hiſtory of that prince informs us, it was agreed that the aſſumption of the crown had at once purged all attainders. Neither can the king in judgment of law, as king, ever be a minor or under age; and therefore his royal grants and aſſents to acts of parliament are good, though he has not in his natural capacity attained the legal age of twenty-one [7]. By a ſtatute indeed, 28 Hen. VIII. c. 17. power was given to future kings to reſcind and revoke all acts of parliament that ſhould be made while they were under the age of twenty-four: but this was repealed by the ſtatute 1 Edw. VI. c. 11. ſo far as related to that prince; and both ſtatutes are declared to be determined by 24 Geo. II. c. 24. It hath alſo been uſually thought prudent, when the heir apparent has been very young, to appoint a protector, guardian, or regent, for a limited time: but the very neceſſity of ſuch extraordinary proviſion is ſufficient to demonſtrate the truth of that maxim of the common law, that in the king is

[5] Finch. L. 82. Co. Litt. 90.
[6] Finch. L. 82.
[7] Co. Litt. 43. 2 Inſt. proem. 3.

no minority; and therefore he hath no legal guardian [s].

III. A third attribute of the king's majeſty is his *perpetuity*. The law aſcribes to him, in his political capacity, an abſolute immortality. The king never dies. Henry, Edward, or George may die; but the

[s] The methods of appointing this guardian or regent have been ſo various, and the duration of his power ſo uncertain, that from hence alone it may be collected that his office is unknown to the common law; and therefore (as ſir Edward Coke ſays, 4 Inſt. 58.) the ſureſt way is to have him made by authority of the great council in parliament. The earl of Pembroke, by his own authority, aſſumed in very troubleſome times the regency of Henry III, who was then only nine years old; but was declared of full age by the pope at ſeventeen, confirmed the great charter at eighteen, and took upon him the adminiſtration of the government at twenty. A guardian and council of regency were named for Edward III, by the parliament, which depoſed his father; the young king being then fifteen, and not aſſuming the government till three years after. When Richard II ſucceeded at the age of eleven, the duke of Lancaſter took upon him the management of the kingdom, till the parliament met, which appointed a nominal council to aſſiſt him. Henry V on his death-bed named a regent and a guardian for his infant ſon Henry VI, then nine months old: but the parliament altered his diſpoſition, and appointed a protector and council, with a ſpecial limited authority. Both theſe princes remained in a ſtate of pupilage till the age of twenty-three. Edward V, at the age of thirteen, was recommended by his father to the care of the duke of Glouceſter; who was declared protector by the privy council. The ſtatutes 25 Hen. VIII. c. 12. and 28 Hen. VIII. c. 7. provided, that the ſucceſſor, if a male, and under eighteen, or if a female, and under ſixteen, ſhould be till ſuch age in the government of his or her natural mother, (if approved by the king) and ſuch other counſellors as his majeſty ſhould by will or otherwiſe appoint: and he accordingly appointed his ſixteen executors to have the government of his ſon Edward VI, and the kingdom, which executors elected the earl of Hertford protector. The ſtatute 24 Geo. II. c. 24. in caſe the crown ſhould deſcend to any of the children of Frederic late prince of Wales under the age of eighteen, appointed the princeſs dowager;—and that of 5 Geo. III. c. 27. in caſe of a like deſcent to any of his preſent majeſty's children, empowers the king to name either the queen, the princeſs dowager, or any deſcendant of king George II reſiding in this kingdom;—to be guardian and regent, till the ſucceſſor attains ſuch age, aſſiſted by a council of regency: the powers of them all being expreſsly defined and ſet down in the ſeveral acts.

king ſurvives them all. For immediately upon the deceaſe of the reigning prince in his natural capacity, his kingſhip or imperial dignity, by act of law, without any *interregnum* or interval, is veſted at once in his heir; who is, *eo inſtanti*, king to all intents and purpoſes. And ſo tender is the law of ſuppoſing even a poſſibility of his death, that his natural diſſolution is generally called his *demiſe; demiſſio regis, vel coronæ:* an expreſſion which ſignifies merely a transfer of property; for, as is obſerved in Plowden [9], when we ſay the demiſe of the crown, we mean only that, in conſequence of the diſunion of the king's natural body from his body politic, the kingdom is transferred or demiſed to his ſucceſſor; and ſo the royal dignity remains perpetual. Thus too, when Edward the fourth, in the tenth year of his reign, was driven from his throne for a few months by the houſe of Lancaſter, this temporary transfer of his dignity was denominated his *demiſe*; and all proceſs was held to be diſcontinued, as upon a natural death of the king [o].

We are next to conſider thoſe branches of the royal prerogative, which inveſt thus our ſovereign lord, thus all-perfect and immortal in his kingly capacity, with a number of authorities and powers; in the exertion whereof conſiſts the executive part of government. This is wiſely placed in a ſingle hand by the Britiſh conſtitution, for the ſake of unanimity, ſtrength, and diſpatch. Were it placed in many hands, it would be ſubject to many wills: many wills, if diſunited and drawing different ways, create weakneſs in a government; and to unite thoſe ſeveral wills, and reduce them to one, is a work of more time and delay than the exigencies of ſtate will afford. The king of England is therefore not only the chief, but properly the ſole, magiſtrate of the nation; all others acting by commiſſion from, and in due ſubordination to him: in like manner as, upon the great revolution in the Roman ſtate, all the powers of the antient magiſtracy of the commonwealth were concentred in

[9] Plowd. 177. 234. [o] M. 49 Hen. VI. pl. 1—3.

the new emperor; ſo that as Gravina [s] expreſſes it, "*in ejus unius perſona veteris reipublicæ vis atque majeſ-*"*tas per cumulatas magiſtratuum poteſtates exprimeba-*"*tur.*"

After what has been premiſed in this chapter, I ſhall not (I truſt) be conſidered as an advocate for arbitrary power, when I lay it down as a principle, that, in the exertion of lawful prerogative, the king is and ought to be abſolute; that is, ſo far abſolute, that there is no legal authority that can either delay or reſiſt him. He may reject what bills, may make what treaties, may coin what money, may create what peers; may pardon what offences he pleaſes: unleſs where the conſtitution hath expreſsly, or by evident conſequence, laid down ſome exception or boundary; declaring, that thus far the prerogative ſhall go and no farther. For otherwiſe the power of the crown would indeed be but a name and a ſhadow, inſufficient for the ends of government, if, where it's juriſdiction is clearly eſtabliſhed and allowed, any man or body of men were permitted to diſobey it, in the ordinary courſe of law: I ſay, in the *ordinary* courſe of law; for I do not now ſpeak of thoſe *extraordinary* reſources to firſt principles, which are neceſſary when the contracts of ſociety are in danger of diſſolution, and the law proves too weak a defence againſt the violence of fraud or oppreſſion. And yet the want of attending to this obvious diſtinction has occaſioned theſe doctrines, of abſolute power in the prince and of national reſiſtance by the people, to be much miſunderſtood and perverted, by the advocates for ſlavery on the one hand, and the demagogues of faction on the other. The former, obſerving the abſolute ſovereignty and tranſcendant dominion of the crown laid down (as it certainly is) moſt ſtrongly and emphatically in our law-books, as well as our homilies, have denied that any caſe can be excepted from ſo general and poſitive a rule; forgetting how impoſſible it is, in any practical ſyſtem of laws, to point out beforehand thoſe eccentrical remedies, which the ſudden emergence of national diſtreſs may dictate, and which that alone can juſtify. On

[s] Orig. 1. §. 103

the other hand, over-zealous republicans, feeling the abſurdity of unlimited paſſive obedience, have fancifully (or ſometimes factiouſly) gone over to the other extreme: and, becauſe reſiſtance is juſtifiable to the perſon of the prince when the being of the ſtate is endangered, and the public voice proclaims ſuch reſiſtance neceſſary, they have therefore allowed to every individual the right of determining this expedience, and of employing private force to reſiſt even private oppreſſion. A doctrine productive of anarchy, and (in conſequence) equally fatal to civil liberty as tyranny itſelf. For civil liberty, rightly underſtood, conſiſts in protecting the rights of individuals by the united force of ſociety: ſociety cannot be maintained, and of courſe can exert no protection, without obedience to ſome ſovereign power: and obedience is an empty name, if every individual has a right to decide how far he himſelf ſhall obey.

In the exertion therefore of thoſe prerogatives, which the law has given him, the king is irreſiſtable and abſolute, according to the forms of the conſtitution. And yet, if the conſequence of that exertion be manifeſtly to the grievance or diſhonour of the kingdom, the parliament will call his adviſers to a juſt and ſevere account. For prerogative conſiſting (as Mr. Locke [1] has well defined it) in the diſcretionary power of acting for the public good, where the poſitive laws are ſilent; if that diſcretionary power be abuſed to the public detriment, ſuch prerogative is exerted in an unconſtitutional manner.—Thus the king may make a treaty with a foreign ſtate, which ſhall irrevocably bind the nation; and yet, when ſuch treaties have been judged pernicious, impeachments have purſued thoſe miniſters, by whoſe agency or advice they were concluded.

The prerogatives of the crown (in the ſenſe under which we are now conſidering them) reſpect either this nation's intercourſe with foreign nations, or it's own domeſtic government and civil polity.

With regard to foreign concerns, the king is the

[1] on Gov. 2. §. 166.

delegate or repreſentative of his people. It is impoſſible that the individuals of a ſtate, in their collective capacity, can tranſact the affairs of that ſtate with another community, equally as numerous as themſelves. Unanimity muſt be wanting to their meaſures, and ſtrength to the execution of their counſels. In the king therefore, as in a center, all the rays of his people are united, and form by that union, a conſiſtency, ſplendor, and power, that make him feared and reſpected by foreign potentates; who would ſcruple to enter into any engagement, that muſt afterwards be reviſed and ratified by a popular aſſembly. What is done by the royal authority, with regard to foreign powers, is the act of the whole nation; what is done without the king's concurrence is the act only of private men. And ſo far is this point carried by our law, that it hath been held[2], that ſhould all the ſubjects of England make war with a king in league with the king of England, without the royal aſſent, ſuch war is no breach of the league. And, by the ſtatute 2 Hen. V. c. 6. any ſubject committing acts of hoſtility upon any nation in league with the king was declared to be guilty of high treaſon; and, though that act was repealed by the ſtatute 20 Hen. VI. c. 11. ſo far as relates to the making this offence high treaſon, yet ſtill it remains a very great offence againſt the law of nations, and puniſhable by our laws, either capitally or otherwiſe, according to the circumſtances of the caſe.

I. The king therefore, conſidered as the repreſentative of his people, has the ſole power of ſending embaſſadors to foreign ſtates, and receiving embaſſadors at home. This may lead us into a ſhort digreſſion, by way of inquiry, how far the municipal laws of England intermeddle with or protect the rights of theſe meſſengers from one potentate to another, whom we call embaſſadors.

The rights, the powers, the duties, and the privileges of embaſſadors are determined by the law of nature and nations, and not by any municipal conſti-

[2] 4 Inſt. 152.

tutions. For, as they repreſent the perſons of their reſpective maſters, who owe no ſubjection to any laws but thoſe of their own country, their actions are not ſubject to the control of the private law of that ſtate, wherein they are appointed to reſide. He that is ſubject to the coercion of laws is neceſſarily dependent on that power by whom thoſe laws were made: but an embaſſador ought to be independent of every power, except that by which he is ſent; and of conſequence ought not to be ſubject to the mere municipal laws of that nation, wherein he is to exerciſe his functions. If he groſsly offends, or makes an ill uſe of his character, he may be ſent home and accuſed before his maſter [3]; who is bound either to do juſtice upon him, or avow himſelf the accomplice of his crimes [4]. But there is great diſpute among the writers on the laws of nations, whether this exemption of embaſſadors extends to all crimes, as well natural as poſitive; or whether it only extends to ſuch as are *mala prohibita*, as coining, and not to thoſe that are *mala in ſe*, as murder [5]. Our law ſeems to have formerly taken in the reſtriction, as well as the general exemption. For it has been held, both by our common lawyers and civilians [6], that an embaſſador is privileged by the law of nature and nations; and yet, if he commits any offence againſt the law of reaſon and nature, he ſhall loſe his privilege [7]: and that, therefore, if an embaſſador conſpires the death of the king in whoſe land he is, he may be condemned and executed for treaſon; but if he commits any other ſpecies of treaſon, it is otherwiſe, and he muſt be ſent to his own kingdom [8]. And theſe poſitions ſeem to be built on good appearance of reaſon. For ſince, as we have formerly ſhewn, all municipal laws act in ſubordination to the primary law of nature, and,

[3] As was done with count Gyllenberg the Swediſh miniſter to Great Britain, *A. D.* 1716.

[4] Sp. L. 26. 21.

[5] Van Leeuwen *in Ff.* 50. 7. 17. Barbeyrac's Puff. *l.* 8. c. 9. §. 9. & 17. Van Bynkerſhoek *de foro legator. c.* 17, 18, 19.

[6] 1 Roll. Rep. 175. 3 Bulſtr. 27.

[7] 4 Inſt. 153.

[8] 1 Roll. Rep. 185.

where they annex a puniſhment to natural crimes, are only declaratory of and auxiliary to that law; therefore to this natural univerſal rule of juſtice embaſſadors, as well as other men, are ſubject in all countries; and of conſequence it is reaſonable that, wherever they tranſgreſs it, there they ſhall be liable to make atonement [9]. But, however theſe principles might formerly obtain, the general practice of this country, as well as of the reſt of Europe, ſeems now to purſue the ſentiments of the learned Grotius, that the ſecurity of embaſſadors is of more importance than the puniſhment of a particular crime [o]. And therefore few, if any, examples have happened within a century paſt, where an embaſſador has been puniſhed for any offence, however atrocious, in it's nature.

In reſpect to civil ſuits, all the foreign juriſts agree, that neither an embaſſador, or any of his train or *comites*, can be proſecuted for any debt or contract in the courts of that kingdom wherein he is ſent to reſide. Yet ſir Edward Coke maintains, that, if an embaſſador make a contract which is *jure gentium*, he ſhall anſwer for it here [1]. But the truth is, ſo few caſes (if any) had ariſen wherein the privilege was either claimed or diſputed, even with regard to civil ſuits, that our law-books are (in general) quite ſilent upon it previous to the reign of queen Anne; when an embaſſador from Peter the Great, czar of Muſcovy, was actually arreſted and taken out of his coach in London [2], for a debt of fifty pounds which he had there contracted. Inſtead of applying to be diſcharged upon his privilege, he gave bail to the action, and the next day complained to the queen. The perſons concerned in the arreſt were examined before the privy council (of which the lord chief juſtice Holt was at the ſame time ſworn a member [3]) and ſeventeen were committed to priſon [4]: moſt of

9 Foſter's Reports. 188.

o *Securitas legatorum utilitati quæ ex pœna eſt præponderat. (de jure b. & p. 18. 4. 4.)*

1 4 Inſt. 153.

2 21 July 1708. Boyer's annals of queen Anne.

3 23 July 1708. *Ibid.*

4 25, 29 July 1708. *Ibid.*

whom were profecuted by information in the court of queen's bench, at the ſuit of the attorney general [5], and at their trial before the lord chief juſtice were convicted of the facts by the jury [6], reſerving the queſtion of law, how far thoſe facts were criminal, to be afterwards argued before the judges, which queſtion was never determined. In the mean time the czar reſented this affront very highly, and demanded that the ſheriff of Middleſex and all others concerned in the arreſt ſhould be puniſhed with inſtant death [7]. But the queen (to the amazement of that deſpotic court) directed her ſecretary to inform him, "that "ſhe could inflict no puniſhment upon any, the "meaneſt, of her ſubjects, unleſs warranted by the "law of the land: and therefore was perſuaded that "he would not inſiſt upon impoſſibilities [8]." To ſatisfy however the clamours of the foreign miniſters (who made it a common cauſe) as well as to appeaſe the wrath of Peter, a bill was brought into parliament [9], and afterwards paſſed into a law [o], to prevent and to puniſh ſuch outrageous inſolence for the future. And with a copy of this act, elegantly engroſſed and illuminated, accompanied by a letter from the queen, an embaſſador extraordinary [1] was commiſſioned to appear at Moſcow [2], who declared "that though her Majeſty could not inflict ſuch a "puniſhment as was required, becauſe of the defect "in that particular of the former eſtabliſhed conſti-"tutions of her kingdom, yet, with the unanimous "conſent of the parliament, ſhe had cauſed a new 'act to be paſſed, to ſerve as a law for the future." This humiliating ſtep was accepted as a full ſatisfaction by the czar; and the offenders, at his requeſt, were diſcharged from all farther proſecution.

[5] 23 Oct. 1708. *Ibid.*
[6] 14 Feb. 1708. *Ibid.*
[7] 17 Sept. 1708. *Ibid.*
[8] 11 Jan. 1708. *Ibid.* Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxxv. 454.
[9] Com. Journ. 23 Dec. 1708.
[o] 21 Apr. 1709. Boyer, *ibid.*
[1] Mr. Whitworth.
[2] 8 Jan. 1709. Boyer, *ibid.*

This ſtatute[3] recites the arreſt which had been made, "in contempt of the protection granted by "her majeſty, contrary to the law of nations, and "in prejudice of the rights and privileges, which "embaſſadors and other public miniſters have at all "times been thereby poſſeſſed of, and ought to be "kept ſacred and inviolable:" wherefore it enacts, that for the future all proceſs whereby the perſon of any embaſſador, or of his domeſtic or domeſtic ſervant may be arreſted, or his goods diſtrained or ſeiſed, ſhall be utterly null and void; and the perſons proſecuting, ſoliciting, or executing ſuch proceſs ſhall be deemed violaters of the law of nations, and diſturbers of the public repoſe; and ſhall ſuffer ſuch penalties and corporal puniſhment as the lord chancellor, and the two chief juſtices, or any two of them, ſhall think fit. But it is expreſsly provided, that no trader, within the deſcription of the bankrupt laws, who ſhall be in the ſervice of any embaſſador, ſhall be privileged or protected by this act; nor ſhall any one be puniſhed for arreſting an embaſſador's ſervant, unleſs his name be regiſtered with the ſecretary of ſtate, and by him tranſmitted to the ſheriffs of London and Middleſex. Exceptions that are ſtrictly conformable to the rights of embaſſadors[4], as obſerved in the moſt civilized countries. And, in conſequence of this ſtatute, thus declaring and enforcing the law of nations, theſe privileges are now held to be part of the law of the land, and are conſtantly allowed in the courts of common law[5].

II. It is alſo the king's prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances with foreign ſtates and princes. For it is by the law of nations eſſential

3 7 Ann. c. 12.

4 *Sæpe quæſitum eſt an comitum numero et jure habendi ſunt, qui legatum comitantur, non ut inſtructior fiat legatio, ſed unice ut ducro ſuo conſulant, inſtitores forte et mercatores. Et, quamvis hos ſæpe defenderint et comitum loco habere voluerint legati, apparet tamen ſatis eo non pertinere, qui in legati legationiſve officio non ſunt. Quum autem ea res nonnunquam turbas dederit, optimo exemplo in quibuſdam aulis eliminceptum fuit, et legatus teneretur exhibere nomenclaturam comitum ſuorum.* Van Bynkerſh. c. 15. *prope finem.*

5 Fit 23.200. Stra. 797.

to the goodneſs of a league, that it be made by the ſovereign power[6]; and then it is binding upon the whole community: and in England the ſovereign power, *quoad hoc*, is veſted in the perſon of the king. Whatever contracts therefore he engages in, no other power in the kingdom can legally delay, reſiſt, or annul. And yet, leſt this plenitude of authority ſhould be abuſed to the detriment of the public, the conſtitution (as was hinted before) hath here interpoſed a check, by the means of parliamentary impeachment, for the puniſhment of ſuch miniſters as from criminal motives adviſe or conclude any treaty, which ſhall afterwards be judged to derogate from the honour and intereſt of the nation.

III. Upon the ſame principle the king has alſo the ſole prerogative of making war and peace. For it is held by all the writers on the law of nature and nations, that the right of making war, which by nature ſubſiſted in every individual, is given up by all private perſons that enter into ſociety, and is veſted in the ſovereign power[7]: and this right is given up, not only by individuals, but even by the entire body of people, that are under the dominion of a ſovereign. It would indeed be extremely improper, that any number of ſubjects ſhould have the power of binding the ſupreme magiſtrate, and putting him againſt his will in a ſtate of war. Whatever hoſtilities therefore may be committed by private citizens, the ſtate ought not to be affected thereby; unleſs that ſhould juſtify their proceedings, and thereby become partners in the guilt. Such unauthoriſed voluntiers in violence are not ranked among open enemies, but are treated like pirates and robbers; according to that rule of the civil law[8]; *hoſtes hi ſunt qui nobis, aut quibus nos, publice bellum decrevimus; cæteri latrones aut prædones ſunt.* And the reaſon which is given by

[6] Puff. L. of N. b. 8. c. 9. §. 6. Barbeyr. *in loc.*

[7] Puff. b. 8. c. 6. §. 8. and

[8] *Ff.* 50. 16, 118.

Grotius [9], why according to the law of nations a denunciation of war ought always to precede the actual commencement of hoſtilities, is not ſo much that the enemy may be put upon his guard, (which is matter rather of magnanimity than right) but that it may be certainly clear that the war is not undertaken by private perſons, but by the will of the whole community; whoſe right of willing is in this caſe transferred to the ſupreme magiſtrate by the fundamental laws of ſociety. So that, in order to make a war completely effectual, it is neceſſary with us in England that it be publicly declared and duly proclaimed by the king's authority; and, then, all parts of both the contending nations, from the higheſt to the loweſt, are bound by it. And wherever the right reſides of beginning a national war, there alſo muſt reſide the right of ending it, or the power of making peace. And the ſame check of parliamentary impeachment, for improper or inglorious conduct, in beginning, conducting, or concluding a national war, is in general ſufficient to reſtrain the miniſters of the crown from a wanton or injurious exertion of this great prerogative.

IV. But, as the delay of making war may ſometimes be detrimental to individuals who have ſuffered by depredations from foreign potentates, our laws have in ſome reſpects armed the ſubject with powers to impel the prerogative, by directing the miniſters of the crown to iſſue letters of marque and repriſal upon due demand: the prerogative of granting which is nearly related to, and plainly derived from, that other of making war: this being indeed only an incomplete ſtate of hoſtilities, and generally ending in a formal denunciation of war. Theſe letters are grantable by the law of nations [o], whenever the ſubjects of one ſtate are oppreſſed and injured by thoſe of another; and juſtice is denied by that ſtate to which the oppreſſor belongs. In this caſe letters of marque and repriſals (words uſed as ſynonimous;

[9] *de jure b. & p. l.* 3. *c.* 3. §. 11.

[o] *Ibid. l.* 3. *c.* 2. §. 4 & 5.

and signifying, the latter a taking in return, the former the passing the frontiers, in order to such taking [1]) may be obtained in order to seise the bodies or goods of the subjects of the offending state, until satisfaction be made, wherever they happen to be found. And indeed this custom of reprisals seems dictated by nature herself; for which reason we find in the most antient times very notable instances of it [2]. But here the necessity is obvious of calling in the sovereign power, to determine when reprisals may be made; else every private sufferer would be a judge in his own cause. In pursuance of which principle, it is with us declared by the statute 4 Hen. V. c. 7. that if any subjects of the realm are oppressed in time of truce by any foreigners, the king will grant marque in due form to all that feel themselves grieved. Which form is thus directed to be observed: the sufferer must first apply to the lord privy-seal, and he shall make out letters of request under the privy-seal; and, if after such request of satisfaction made, the party required do not within convenient time make due satisfaction or restitution to the party grieved, the lord chancellor shall make him out letters of marque under the great seal; and by virtue of these he may attack and seise the property of the aggressor nation, without hazard of being condemned as a robber or pirate.

V. Upon exactly the same reason stands the prerogative of granting safe-conducts, without which by the law of nations no member of one society has a right to intrude into another. And therefore Puffendorf very justly resolves [3], that it is left in the power of all states, to take such measures about the

[1] Dufresne. tit. *Marca.*

[2] See the account given by Nestor, in the eleventh book of the Iliad, of the reprisals made by himself on the Epeian nation; from whom he took a multitude of cattle, as a satisfaction for a prize won at the Elian games by his father Neleus, and for debts due to many private subjects of the Pylian kingdom; out of which booty the king took three hundred head of cattle for his own demand, and the rest were equitably divided among the other creditors.

[3] Law of N. and N. b. 3. c. 3. §. 9.

admiſſion of ſtrangers, as they think convenient; thoſe being ever excepted who are driven on the coaſts by neceſſity, or by any cauſe that deſerves pity or compaſſion. Great tenderneſs is ſhewn by our laws, not only to foreigners in diſtreſs (as will appear when we come to ſpeak of ſhipwrecks) but with regard alſo to the admiſſion of ſtrangers who come ſpontaneouſly. For ſo long as their nation continues at peace with ours, and they themſelves behave peaceably, they are under the king's protection; though liable to be ſent home whenever the king ſees occaſion. But no ſubject of a nation at war with us can, by the law of nations, come into the realm, nor can travel himſelf upon the high ſeas, or ſend his goods and merchandize from one place to another, without danger of being ſeiſed by our ſubjects, unleſs he has letters of ſafe-conduct; which by divers antient ſtatutes[4] muſt be granted under the king's great ſeal and inrolled in chancery; or elſe are of no effect: the king being ſuppoſed the beſt judge of ſuch emergencies, as may deſerve exception from the general law of arms. But paſſports under the king's ſign-manual, or licences from his embaſſadors abroad, are now more uſually obtained, and are allowed to be of equal validity.

Indeed the law of England, as a commercial country, pays a very particular regard to foreign merchants in innumerable inſtances. One I cannot omit to mention: that by *magna carta*[5] it is provided, that all merchants (unleſs publicly prohibited beforehand) ſhall have ſafe-conduct to depart from, to come into, to tarry in, and to go through England, for the exerciſe of merchandize, without any unreaſonable impoſts except in time of war: and, if a war breaks out between us and their country, they ſhall be attached (if in England) without harm of body or goods, till the king or his chief juſticiary be informed how our merchants are treated in the land with which we are at war; and, if

[4] 15 Hen. VI. c. 3. 18 Hen. VI. c. 8. 20 Hen. VI. c. 10.

[5] c. 30.

ours be ſecure in that land, they ſhall be ſecure in ours. This ſeems to have been a common rule of equity among all the northern nations; for we learn from Stiernhook [6], that it was a maxim among the Goths and Swedes, "*quam legem exteri nobis poſuere, eandem illis ponemus.*" But it is ſomewhat extraordinary, that it ſhould have found a place in *magna carta*, a mere interior treaty between the king and his natural-born ſubjects: which occaſions the learned Monteſquieu to remark with a degree of admiration, "that the Engliſh have made the protection "of *foreign* merchants one of the articles of their "*national* liberty [7]." But indeed it well juſtifies another obſervation which he has made [8], "that "the Engliſh know better than any other people "upon earth, how to value at the ſame time, theſe "three great advantages, religion, liberty, and "commerce." Very different from the genius of the Roman people; who, in their manners, their conſtitutions, and even in their laws, treated commerce as a diſhonourable employment, and prohibited the exerciſe thereof to perſons of birth, or rank, or fortune [9]: and equally different from the bigotry of the canoniſts, who looked on trade as inconſiſtent with chriſtianity [10], and determined at the council of Melfi, under pope Urban II, *A. D.* 1090, that, it was impoſſible with a ſafe conſcience to exerciſe any traffic, or follow the profeſſion of the law [11].

Theſe are the principal prerogatives of the king reſpecting this nation's intercourſe with foreign nations; in all of which he is conſidered as the delegate or repreſentative of his people. But in domeſ-

[6] *de jure Sueor. l.* 3. *c.* 4.

[7] Sp. L. 20. 13.

[8] *Ibid.* 20. 6.

[9] *Nobiliores natalibus, et honorem luce conſpicuos, et patrimonio ditiores, perniciosum urbibus mercimonium exercere prohibemus.* C. 4. 63. 3.

[10] *Homo mercator vix aut nunquam poteſt Deo placere; et ideo nullus chriſtianus debet eſſe mercator; aut ſi voluerit eſſe, projiciatur de eccleſia Dei. Decret.* 1. 88. 11.

[11] *Falſa ſit pœnitentia* [laici] *cum penitus ab officio curiali vel negotiali non recedit, quæ ſine peccatis agi ulla ratione non prævalet. Act. Concil. apud Baron. c.* 16.

tic affairs he is conſidered in a great variety of characters, and from thence there ariſes an abundant number of other prerogatives.

I. Firſt, he is a conſtituent part of the ſupreme legiſlative power; and, as ſuch, has the prerogative of rejecting ſuch proviſions in parliament, as he judges improper to be paſſed. The expediency of which conſtitution has before been evinced at large [2]. I ſhall only farther remark, that the king is not bound by any act of parliament, unleſs he be named therein by ſpecial and particular words. The moſt general words that can be deviſed ("any perſon or "perſons, bodies politic or corporate, *&c.*") affect not him in the leaſt, if they may tend to reſtrain or diminiſh any of his rights or intereſts [3]. For it would be of moſt miſchievous conſequence to the public, if the ſtrength of the executive power were liable to be curtailed without it's own expreſs conſent, by conſtructions and implications of the ſubject. Yet, where an act of parliament is expreſsly made for the preſervation of public rights, and the ſuppreſſion of public wrongs, and does not interfere with the eſtabliſhed rights of the crown, it is ſaid to be binding as well upon the king as upon the ſubject [4]: and, likewiſe, the king may take the benefit of any particular act, though he be not eſpecially named [5].

II. The king is conſidered, in the next place, as the generaliſſimo, or the firſt in military command, within the kingdom. The great end of ſociety is to protect the weakneſs of individuals by the united ſtrength of the community: and the principal uſe of government is to direct that united ſtrength in the beſt and moſt effectual manner, to anſwer the end propoſed. Monarchical government is allowed to be the fitteſt of any for this purpoſe: it follows therefore, from the very end of its inſtitution, that in a monarchy the military power muſt be truſted in the hands of the prince.

[2] ch. 2. pag. 156.
[3] 11 Rep. 74.
[4] *Ibid.* 71.
[5] 7 Rep. 32.

In this capacity therefore, of general of the kingdom, the king has the ſole power of raiſing and regulating fleets and armies. Of the manner in which they are raiſed and regulated I ſhall ſpeak more, when I come to conſider the military ſtate. We are now only to conſider the prerogative of enliſting and of governing them: which indeed was diſputed and claimed, contrary to all reaſon and precedent, by the long parliament of king Charles I; but, upon the reſtoration of his ſon, was ſolemnly declared by the ſtatute 13 Car. II. c. 6, to be in the king alone: for that the ſole ſupreme government and command of the militia within all his majeſty's realms and dominions, and of all forces by ſea and land, and of all forts and places of ſtrength, ever was and is the undoubted right of his majeſty, and his royal predeceſſors, kings and queens of England; and that both or either houſe of parliament cannot, nor ought to, pretend to the ſame.

This ſtatute, it is obvious to obſerve, extends not only to fleets and armies, but alſo to forts, and other places of ſtrength, within the realm; the ſole prerogative as well of erecting, as manning and governing of which, belongs to the king in his capacity of general of the kingdom[6]: and all lands were formerly ſubject to a tax, for building of caſtles wherever the king thought proper. This was one of the three things, from contributing to the performance of which no lands were exempted; and therefore called by our Saxon anceſtors the *trinoda neceſſitas*: *ſc. pontis reparatio, arcis conſtructio, et expeditio contra hoſtem*[7]. And this they were called upon to do ſo often, that, as ſir Edward Coke from M. Paris aſſures us[8], there were in the time of Henry II. 1115 caſtles ſubſiſting in England. The inconveniencies of which, when granted out to private ſubjects, the lordly barons of thoſe times, were ſeverely felt by the whole kingdom; for, as William of Newburgh remarks in the reign of king Stephen, "*erant in Anglia quodammodo*

[6] 2 Inſt. 30.

[7] Cowel's interpr. *tit. caſtellorum operatio.* Seld. *Jan. Angl.* 1. 42.

[8] 2 Inſt. 31.

"*tot reges vel potius tyranni, quot domini caſtellorum*;" but it was felt by none more ſenſibly than by two ſucceeding princes, king John and king Henry III. And therefore, the greateſt part of them being demoliſhed in the barons' wars, the kings of after-times have been very cautious of ſuffering them to be rebuilt in a fortified manner: and ſir Edward Coke lays it down [9], that no ſubject can build a caſtle, or houſe of ſtrength imbattled, or other fortreſs defenſible, without the licence of the king; for the danger which might enſue, if every man at his pleaſure might do it.

It is partly upon the ſame, and partly upon a fiſcal foundation, to ſecure his marine revenue, that the king has the prerogative of appointing *ports* and *havens*, or ſuch places only, for perſons and merchandize to paſs into and out of the realm, as he in his wiſdom ſees proper. By the feodal law all navigable rivers and havens were computed among the regalia,[o] and were ſubject to the ſovereign of the ſtate. And in England it hath always been holden, that the king is lord of the whole ſhore[1], and particularly is the guardian of the ports and havens, which are the inlets and gates of the realm [2]; and therefore, ſo early as the reign of king John, we find ſhips ſeiſed by the king's officers for putting in at a place that was not a legal port[3]. Theſe legal ports were undoubtedly at firſt aſſigned by the crown; ſince to each of them a court of portmote is incident[4], the juriſdiction of which muſt flow from the royal authority: the *great ports* of the ſea are alſo referred to, as well known and eſtabliſhed, by ſtatute 4 Hen. IV. c. 20. which prohibits the landing elſewhere under pain of confiſcation: and the ſtatute 1 Eliz. c. 11. recites, that the franchiſe of lading and diſcharging had been frequently granted by the crown.

But though the king had a power of granting the franchiſe of havens and ports, yet he had not the power of reſumption, or of narrowing and confining

9 1 Inſt. 5.
o 2 *Feud. t.* 56. Crag. 1. 15. 15.
1 F. N. B 113.
2 Dav. 9. 56.
3 Madox. hiſt. exch. 530.
4 4 Inſt. 148.

their limits when once eſtabliſhed; but any perſon had a right to load or diſcharge his merchandize in any part of the haven: whereby the revenue of the cuſtoms was much impaired and diminiſhed, by fraudulent landings in obſcure and private corners. This occaſioned the ſtatutes of 1 Eliz. c. 11. and 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 11. §. 14. which enable the crown by commiſſion to aſcertain the limits of all ports, and to aſſign proper wharfs and quays in each port, for the excluſive landing and loading of merchandize.

The erection of beacons, light-houſes, and ſea-marks, is alſo a branch of the royal prerogative: whereof the firſt was antiently uſed in order to alarm the country, in caſe of the approach of an enemy; and all of them are ſignally uſeful in guiding and preſerving veſſels at ſea by night as well as by day. For this purpoſe the king hath the excluſive power, by commiſſion under his great ſeal [5], to cauſe them to be erected in fit and convenient places [6], as well upon the lands of the ſubjects as upon the demeſnes of the crown: which power is uſually veſted by letters patent in the office of lord high admiral [7]. And by ſtatute 8 Eliz. c. 13. the corporation of the trinity houſe are impowered to ſet up any beacons or ſea-marks wherever they ſhall think them neceſſary; and if the owner of the land or any other perſon ſhall deſtroy them, or ſhall take down any ſteeple, tree, or other known ſea-mark, he ſhall forfeit 100*l*, or in caſe of inability to pay it, ſhall be *ipſo facto* outlawed.

To this branch of the prerogative may alſo be referred the power veſted in his majeſty, by ſtatutes 12 Car. II. c. 4. and 29 Geo. II. c. 16. of prohibiting the exportation of arms or ammunition out of this kingdom, under ſevere penalties: and likewiſe the right which the king has, whenever he ſees proper, of confining his ſubjects to ſtay within the realm, or of recalling them when beyond the ſeas. By the

[5] 3 Inſt. 204. 4 Inſt. 148. 42. Pryn. on 4 Inſt. 136.
[6] *Rot. Clauſ.* 1 *Ric. II. m.* [7] Sid. 158, 4 Inſt. 149.

common law [8], every man may go out of the realm for whatever cauſe he pleaſeth, without obtaining the king's leave; provided he is under no injunction of ſtaying at home: (which liberty was expreſsly declared in king John's great charter; though left out in that of Henry III) but, becauſe that every man ought of right to defend the king and his realm, therefore the king at his pleaſure may command him by his writ that he go not beyond the ſeas, or out of the realm, without licence; and, if he do the contrary, he ſhall be puniſhed for diſobeying the king's command. Some perſons there antiently were, that, by reaſon of their ſtations, were under a perpetual prohibition of going abroad without licence obtained; among which were reckoned all peers, on account of their being counſellors of the crown; all knights, who were bound to defend the kingdom from invaſions; all eccleſiaſtics, who were expreſsly confined by the fourth chapter of the conſtitutions of Clarendon, on account of their attachment in the times of popery to the ſee of Rome; all archers and other artificers, leſt they ſhould inſtruct foreigners to rival us in their ſeveral trades and manufactures. This was law in the times of Britton [9], who wrote in the reign of Edward I: and ſir Edward Coke [0] gives us many inſtances to this effect in the time of Edward III. In the ſucceeding reign the affair of travelling wore a very different aſpect: an act of parliament being made [1], forbidding all perſons whatever to go abroad without licence; *except* only the lords and other great men of the realm; and true and notable merchants; and the king's ſoldiers. But this act was repealed by the ſtatute 4 Jac. I. c. 1. And at preſent every body has, or at leaſt aſſumes, the liberty of going abroad when he pleaſes. Yet undoubtedly if the king, by writ of *ne exeat regnum*, under his great ſeal or privy ſeal, thinks proper to prohibit him from ſo doing; or if the king ſends a writ to any man, when abroad, commanding his

[8] F. N. B. 85.
[9] c. 123.
[0] 3 Inſt. 175.
[1] 5 Ric. II. c. 2.

return; and in either caſe the ſubject diſobeys; it is a high contempt of the king's prerogative, for which the offender's lands ſhall be ſeiſed till he return; and then he is liable to fine and impriſonment[1].

III. Another capacity, in which the king is conſidered in domeſtic affairs, is as the fountain of juſtice and general conſervator of the peace of the kingdom. By the fountain of juſtice the law does not mean the *author* or *original*, but only the *diſtributor*. Juſtice is not derived from the king, as from his *free giſt*; but he is the ſteward of the public, to diſpenſe it to whom it is *due*[2]. He is not the ſpring, but the reſervoir; from whence right and equity are conducted, by a thouſand channels, to every individual. The original power of judicature, by the fundamental principles of ſociety, is lodged in the ſociety at large: but as it would be impracticable to render complete juſtice to every individual, by the people in their collective capacity, therefore every nation has committed that power to certain ſelect magiſtrates, who with more eaſe and expedition can hear and determine complaints; and in England this authority has immemorially been exerciſed by the king or his ſubſtitutes. He therefore has alone the right of erecting courts of judicature: for, though the conſtitution of the kingdom hath intruſted him with the whole executive power of the laws, it is impoſſible, as well as improper, that he ſhould perſonally carry into execution this great and extenſive truſt: it is conſequently neceſſary, that courts ſhould be erected, to aſſiſt him in executing this power: and equally neceſſary, that, if erected, they ſhould be erected by his authority. And hence it is, that all juriſdictions of courts are either mediately or immediately derived from the crown, their proceedings run generally in the king's name, they paſs under his ſeal, and are executed by his officers.

It is probable, and almoſt certain, that in very

[1] Hawk. P. C. 22.

[2] *Ad hoc autem creatus eſt et electus, ut juſtitiam faciat univerſis.* Bract. *l.* 3. *tr.* 1. *c.* 9.

early times, before our conſtitution arrived at it's full perfection, our kings in perſon often heard and determined cauſes between party and party. But at preſent, by the long and uniform uſage of many ages, our kings have delegated their whole judicial power to the judges of their ſeveral courts; which are the grand depoſitaries of the fundamental laws of the kingdom, and have gained a known and ſtated juriſdiction, regulated by certain and eſtabliſhed rules, which the crown itſelf cannot now alter but by act of parliament [4]. And, in order to maintain both the dignity and independence of the judges in the ſuperior courts, it is enacted by the ſtatute 13 W. III. c. 2. that their commiſſion ſhall be made (not, as formerly, *durante bene placito*, but) *quamdiu bene ſe geſſerint*, and their ſalaries aſcertained and eſtabliſhed; but that it may be lawful to remove them on the addreſs of both houſes of parliament. And now, by the noble improvements of that law in the ſtatute of 1 Geo. III. c. 23. enacted at the earneſt recommendation of the king himſelf from the throne, the judges are continued in their offices during their good behaviour, notwithſtanding any demiſe of the crown, (which was formerly held [5] immediately to vacate their ſeats) and their full ſalaries are abſolutely ſecured to them during the continuance of their commiſſions; his majeſty having been pleaſed to declare, "that he looked upon the independence "and uprightneſs of the judges, as eſſential to the "impartial adminiſtration of juſtice; as one of the "beſt ſecurities of the rights and liberties of his "ſubjects; and as moſt conducive to the honour of "the crown. [6]"

In criminal proceedings, or proſecutions for offences, it would ſtill be a higher abſurdity, if the king perſonally ſate in judgment; becauſe in regard to theſe he appears in another capacity, that of *proſecutor*. All offences are either againſt the king's peace, or his crown and dignity: and are ſo laid in

4 2 Hawk. P. C. 2.
5 Lord Raym. 747.
6 Com. Journ. 3 Mar. 1761.

every indictment. For though in their conſequences they generally ſeem (except in the caſe of treaſon and a very few others) to be rather offences againſt the kingdom than the king; yet, as the public, which is an inviſible body, has delegated all it's power and rights, with regard to the execution of the laws, to one viſible magiſtrate, all affronts to that power, and breaches of thoſe rights, are immediately offences againſt him, to whom they are ſo delegated by the public. He is therefore the proper perſon to proſecute for all public offences and breaches of the peace, being the perſon injured in the eye of the law. And this notion was carried ſo far in the old Gothic conſtitution, (wherein the king was bound by his coronation oath to conſerve the peace) that in caſe of any forcible injury offered to the perſon of a fellow ſubject, the offender was accuſed of a kind of perjury, in having violated the king's coronation oath; *dicebatur fregiſſe juramentum regis juratum* [7]. And hence alſo ariſes another branch of the prerogative, that of *pardoning* offences; for it is reaſonable that he only who is injured ſhould have the power of forgiving. Of proſecutions and pardons I ſhall treat more at large hereafter; and only mention them here, in this curſory manner, to ſhew the conſtitutional grounds of this power of the crown, and how regularly connected all the links are in this vaſt chain of prerogative.

In this diſtinct and ſeparate exiſtence of the judicial power in a peculiar body of men, nominated indeed, but not removeable at pleaſure, by the crown, conſiſts one main preſervative of the public liberty: which cannot ſubſiſt long in any ſtate, unleſs the adminiſtration of common juſtice be in ſome degree ſeparated both from the legiſlative and alſo from the executive power. Were it joined with the legiſlative, the life, liberty, and property, of the ſubject

[7] Stiernh. *de jure Goth. l.* 3. c. 3. A notion ſomewhat ſimilar to this may be found in the mirror. c. 1. §. 5. And ſo alſo, when the chief juſtice Thorpe was condemned to be hanged for bribery, he was ſaid *ſacramentum domini regis fregiſſe. Rot. Parl.* 25 *Edw. III.*

would be in the hands of arbitrary judges, whoſe deciſions would be then regulated only by their own opinions, and not by any fundamental principles of law; which, though legiſlators may depart from, yet judges are bound to obſerve. Were it joined with the executive, this union might ſoon be an overballance for the legiſlative. For which reaſon, by the ſtatute of 10 Car. I. c. 10. which aboliſhed the court of ſtar-chamber, effectual care is taken to remove all judicial power out of the hands of the king's privy council; who, as then was evident from recent inſtances, might ſoon be inclined to pronounce that for law, which was moſt agreeable to the prince or his officers. Nothing therefore is more to be avoided, in a free conſtitution, than uniting the provinces of a judge and a miniſter of ſtate. And indeed, that the abſolute power, claimed and exerciſed in a neighbouring nation, is more tolerable than that of the eaſtern empires, is in great meaſure owing to their having veſted the judicial power in their parliaments, a body ſeparate and diſtinct from both the legiſlative and executive: and, if ever that nation recovers its former liberty, it will owe it to the efforts of thoſe aſſemblies. In Turkey, where every thing is centered in the ſultan or his miniſters, deſpotic power is in it's meridian, and wears a more dreadful aſpect.

A conſequence of this prerogative is the legal *ubiquity* of the king. His majeſty, in the eye of the law, is always preſent in all his courts, though he cannot perſonally diſtribute juſtice[8]. His judges are the mirror by which the king's image is reflected. It is the regal office, and not the royal perſon, that is always preſent in court, always ready to undertake proſecutions, or pronounce judgment, for the benefit and protection of the ſubject. And from this ubiquity it follows, that the king can never be nonſuit[9]; for a nonſuit is the deſertion of the ſuit or action by the non-appearance of the plaintiff in court. For the ſame reaſon alſo, in the

[8] Forteſc. c. 8. 2 Inſt. 186. [9] Co. Litt. 139.

forms of legal proceedings, the king is not ſaid to appear *by his attorney*, as other men do; for in contemplation of law he is always preſent in court [o].

From the ſame original, of the king's being the fountain of juſtice, we may alſo deduce the prerogative of iſſuing proclamations, which is veſted in the king alone. Theſe proclamations have then a binding force, when (as ſir Edward Coke obſerves [1]) they are grounded upon and enforce the laws of the realm. For, though the making of laws is entirely the work of a diſtinct part, the legiſlative branch, of the ſovereign power, yet the manner, time, and circumſtances of putting thoſe laws in execution muſt frequently be left to the diſcretion of the executive magiſtrate. And therefore his conſtitutions or edicts concerning theſe points, which we call proclamations, are binding upon the ſubject, where they do not either contradict the old laws or tend to eſtabliſh new ones; but only enforce the execution of ſuch laws as are already in being, in ſuch manner as the king ſhall judge neceſſary. Thus the eſtabliſhed law is, that the king may prohibit any of his ſubjects from leaving the realm: a proclamation therefore forbidding this in general for three weeks, by laying an embargo upon all ſhipping in time of war [2], will be equally binding as an act of parliament, becauſe founded upon a prior law. But a proclamation to lay an embargo in time of peace upon all veſſels laden with wheat (though in the time of a public ſcarcity) being contrary to law, and particularly to ſtatute 22 Car. II. c. 13. the adviſers of ſuch a proclamation and all perſons acting under it, found it neceſſary to be indemnified by a ſpecial act of parliament, 7 Geo. III. c. 7. A proclamation for diſarming papiſts is alſo binding, being only in execution of what the legiſlature has firſt ordained: but a proclamation for allowing arms to papiſts, or for diſarming any proteſtant ſubjects, will not bind; becauſe the firſt would be

[o] Finch. L. 81.
[1] 3 Inſt. 162.
[2] 4 Mod. 177. 179.

to aſſume a diſpenſing power, the latter a legiſlative one; to the veſting of either of which in any ſingle perſon the laws of England are abſolutely ſtrangers. Indeed by the ſtatute 31 Hen. VIII. c. 8. it was enacted, that the king's proclamation ſhould have the force of acts of parliament: a ſtatute, which was calculated to introduce the moſt deſpotic tyranny; and which muſt have proved fatal to the liberties of this kingdom, had it not been luckily repealed in the minority of his ſucceſſor, about five years after[4].

IV. The king is likewiſe the fountain of honour, of office, and of privilege: and this in a different ſenſe from that wherein he is ſtiled the fountain of juſtice; for here he is really the parent of them. It is impoſſible that government can be maintained without a due ſubordination of rank; that the people may know and diſtinguiſh ſuch as are ſet over them, in order to yield them their due reſpect and obedience; and alſo that the officers themſelves, being encouraged by emulation and the hopes of ſuperiority, may the better diſcharge their functions: and the law ſuppoſes, that no one can be ſo good a judge of their ſeveral merits and ſervices, as the king himſelf who employs them. It has therefore intruſted with him the ſole power of conferring dignities and honours, in confidence that he will beſtow them upon none, but ſuch as deſerve them. And therefore all degrees of nobility, of knighthood, and other titles, are received by immediate grant from the crown: either expreſſed in writing, by writs or letters patent, as in the creations of peers and baronets; or by corporeal inveſtiture, as in the creation of a ſimple knight.

From the ſame principle alſo ariſes the prerogative of erecting and diſpoſing of offices: for honours and offices are in their nature convertible and ſynonymous. All offices under the crown carry in the eye of the law an honour along with them; becauſe they imply a ſuperiority of parts and abilities, being ſuppoſed to be always filled with thoſe that are moſt

[4] Stat. 1 Ed. VI. c. 12.

able to execute them. And, on the other hand, all honours in their original had duties or offices annexed to them: an earl, *comes*, was the conſervator or governor of a county; and a knight, *miles*, was bound to attend the king in his wars. For the ſame reaſon therefore that honours are in the diſpoſal of the king, offices ought to be ſo likewiſe; and as the king may create new titles, ſo may he create new offices: but with this reſtriction, that he cannot create new offices with new fees annexed to them, nor annex new fees to old offices; for this would be a tax upon the ſubject, which cannot be impoſed but by act of parliament[5]. Wherefore, in 13 Hen. IV. a new office being created by the king's letters patent for meaſuring cloths, with a new fee for the ſame, the letters patent were, on account of the new fee, revoked and declared void in parliament.

Upon the ſame, or a like reaſon, the king has alſo the prerogative of conferring privileges upon private perſons. Such as granting place or precedence to any of his ſubjects, as ſhall ſeem good to his royal wiſdom[6]: or ſuch as converting aliens, or perſons born out of the king's dominions, into denizens; whereby ſome very conſiderable privileges of natural-born ſubjects are conferred upon them. Such alſo is the prerogative of erecting corporations; whereby a number of private perſons are united and knit together, and enjoy many liberties, powers, and immunities in their politic capacity, which they were utterly incapable of in their natural. Of aliens, denizens, natural-born, and naturalized ſubjects, I ſhall ſpeak more largely in a ſubſequent chapter; as alſo of corporations at the cloſe of this book of our commentaries. I now only mention them incidentally, in order to remark the king's prerogative of making them; which is grounded upon this foundation, that the king, having the ſole adminiſtration of the government in his hands, is the beſt and the only judge, in what capacities, with what privileges, and under what diſtinctions, his people are the beſt qualified

[5] 2 Inſt. 533. [6] 4 Inſt. 361.

to ſerve, and to act under him. A principle, which was carried ſo far by the imperial law, that it was determined to be the crime of ſacrilege, even to doubt whether the prince had appointed proper officers in the ſtate[7].

V. Another light, in which the laws of England conſider the king with regard to domeſtic concerns, is as the arbiter of commerce. By commerce, I at preſent mean domeſtic commerce only. It would lead me into too large a field, if I were to attempt to enter upon the nature of foreign trade, it's privileges, regulations, and reſtrictions; and would be alſo quite beſide the purpoſe of theſe commentaries, which are confined to the laws of England: whereas no municipal laws can be ſufficient to order and determine the very extenſive and complicated affairs of traffic and merchandize; neither can they have a proper authority for this purpoſe. For, as theſe are tranſactions carried on between ſubjects of independent ſtates, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded by the other. For which reaſon the affairs of commerce are regulated by a law of their own, called the law merchant or *lex mercatoria*, which all nations agree in and take notice of. And in particular it is held to be part of the law of England, which decides the cauſes of merchants by the general rules which obtain in all commercial countries; and that often even in matters relating to domeſtic trade, as for inſtance with regard to the drawing, the acceptance, and the transfer, of inland bills of exchange.[8]

With us in England, the king's prerogative, ſo far as it relates to mere domeſtic commerce, will fall principally under the following articles.

Firſt, the eſtabliſhment of public marts, or places of buying and ſelling, ſuch as markets and fairs, with the tolls thereunto belonging. Theſe can only be ſet up by virtue of the king's grant, or by long

[7] *Diſputare de principali judicio non oportet; ſacrilegii enim inſtar eſt, dubitare an is dignus ſit, quem elegerit imperator. C. 9. 29. 3.*

[8] Co. Lit. 172. Ld. Raym. 181. 1542.

and immemorial uſage and preſcription, which preſuppoſes ſuch a grant[9]. The limitation of theſe public reſorts, to ſuch time and ſuch place as may be moſt convenient for the neighbourhood, forms a part of œconomics, or domeſtic polity; which, conſidering the kingdom as a large family, and the king as the maſter of it, he clearly has a right to diſpoſe and order as he pleaſes.

Secondly, the regulation of weights and meaſures. Theſe, for the advantage of the public, ought to be univerſally the ſame throughout the kingdom; being the general criterions which reduce all things to the ſame or an equivalent value. But, as weight and meaſure are things in their nature arbitrary and uncertain, it is therefore expedient that they be reduced to ſome fixed rule or ſtandard: which ſtandard it is impoſſible to fix by any written law or oral proclamation; for no man can, by words only, give an adequate idea of a foot-rule, or a pound-weight. It is therefore neceſſary to have recourſe to ſome viſible, palpable, material ſtandard; by forming a compariſon with which, all weights and meaſures may be reduced to one uniform ſize: and the prerogative of fixing this ſtandard our ancient law veſted in the crown, as in Normandy it belonged to the duke[o]. This ſtandard was originally kept at Wincheſter: and we find in the laws of king Edgar[1], near a century before the conqueſt, an injunction that the one meaſure, which was kept at Wincheſter, ſhould be obſerved throughout the realm. Moſt nations have regulated the ſtandard of meaſures of length by compariſon with the parts of the human body; as the palm, the hand, the ſpan, the foot, the cubit, the ell, (*ulna*, or arm) the pace, and the fathom. But, as theſe are of different dimenſions in men of different proportions, our ancient hiſtorians[2] inform us, that a new ſtandard of longitudinal meaſure was aſcertained by king Henry the firſt;

[9] 2 Inſt. 220.
[o] *Gr. Couſtum. c.* 16.
[1] *cap.* 8.
[2] Will. Malmſb. *in vita Hen.* I. Spelm. *Hen. I. apud* Wilkins. 299.

wi mmanded that the *ulna* or ancient ell, which anſwers to the modern yard, ſhould be made of the exact length of his own arm. And, one ſtandard of meaſures of length being gained, all others are eaſily derived from thence; thoſe of greater length by multiplying, thoſe of leſs by ſubdividing, that original ſtandard. Thus, by the ſtatute called *compoſitio ulnarum et perticarum*, five yards and a half make a perch; and the yard is ſubdivided into three feet, and each foot into twelve inches; which inches will be each of the length of three grains of barley. Superficial meaſures are derived by ſquaring thoſe of length; and meaſures of capacity by cubing them. The ſtandard of weights was originally taken from corns of wheat, whence the loweſt denomination of weights we have is ſtill called a grain; thirty-two of which are directed, by the ſtatute called *compoſitio menſurarum*, to compoſe a penny weight, whereof twenty make an ounce, twelve ounces a pound, and ſo upwards. And upon theſe principles the firſt ſtandards were made; which, being originally ſo fixed by the crown, their ſubſequent regulations have been generally made by the king in parliament. Thus, under king Richard I, in his parliament holden at Weſtminſter, *A. D.* 1197, it was ordained that there ſhould be only one weight and one meaſure throughout the kingdom, and that the cuſtody of the aſſiſe or ſtandard of weights and meaſures ſhould be committed to certain perſons in every city and borough[3]; from whence the ancient office of the king's aulnager ſeems to have been derived, whoſe duty it was, for a certain fee, to meaſure all cloths made for ſale, till the office was aboliſhed by the ſtatute 11 & 12 W. III. c. 20. In king John's time this ordinance of king Richard was frequently diſpenſed with for money[4]; which occaſioned a proviſion to be made for inforcing it, in the great charters of king John and his ſon[5]. Theſe original ſtandards were called *pon-*

[3] Hoved. Matth. Par's.
[4] Hoved. *A. D.* 1201.
[5] 9 Hen. III. c. 25.

dus regis[6], and *menſura domini regis*[7]; and are directed by a variety of ſubſequent ſtatutes to be kept in the exchequer, and all weights and meaſures to be made conformable thereto[8]. But, as ſir Edward Coke obſerves[9], though this hath ſo often by authority of parliament been enacted, yet it could never be effected; ſo forcible is cuſtom with the multitude.

Thirdly, as money is the medium of commerce, it is the king's prerogative, as the arbiter of domeſtic commerce, to give it authority or make it current. Money is an univerſal medium, or common ſtandard, by compariſon with which the value of all merchandize may be aſcertained: or it is a ſign, which repreſents the reſpective values of all commodities. Metals are well calculated for this ſign, becauſe they are durable and are capable of many ſubdiviſions: and a precious metal is ſtill better calculated for this purpoſe, becauſe it is moſt portable. A metal is alſo the moſt proper for a common meaſure, becauſe it can eaſily be reduced to the ſame ſtandard in all nations: and every particular nation fixes on it's own impreſſion, that the weight and ſtandard (wherein conſiſts the intrinſic value) may both be known by inſpection only.

As the quantity of precious metals increaſes, that is, the more of them there is extracted from the mine, this univerſal medium or common ſign will ſink in value, and grow leſs precious. Above a thouſand millions of bullion are calculated to have been imported into Europe from America within leſs than three centuries; and the quantity is daily increaſing. The conſequence is, that more money muſt be given now for the ſame commodity than was given an hundred years ago. And, if any accident were to diminiſh the quantity of gold and ſilver, their value would proportionably riſe. A horſe, that was formerly worth ten pounds, is now perhaps worth twenty; and, by any failure of current ſpecie, the

[6] *Plac.* 35 *Edw. I. apud* Cowel's Interpr. *tit. pondus regis.*

[7] *Flet.* 2. 12.

[8] 14 Edw. III. ſt. 1. c. 12. 25 Edw. III. ſt. 5. c. 10. 16 Ric. II. c. 3. 8 Hen. VI. c. 5. 11 Hen. VI. c. 8. 11 H. VII. c. 4. 22 Car. II. c. 8.

[9] Inſt. 41.

price may be reduced to what it was. Yet is the horſe in reality neither dearer nor cheaper at one time than another: for, if the metal which conſtitutes the coin was formerly twice as ſcarce as at preſent, the commodity was then as dear at half the price, as now it is at the whole.

The coining of money is in all ſtates the act of the ſovereign power; for the reaſon juſt mentioned, that it's value may be known on inſpection. And with reſpect to coinage in general, there are three things to be conſidered therein; the materials, the impreſſion, and the denomination.

With regard to the materials, ſir Edward Coke lays it down [o], that the money of England muſt either be of gold or ſilver: and none other was ever iſſued by the royal authority till 1672, when copper farthings and half-pence were coined by king Charles the ſecond, and ordered by proclamation to be current in all payments, under the value of ſix-pence, and not otherwiſe. But this copper coin is not upon the ſame footing with the other in many reſpects, particularly with regard to the offence of counterfeiting it. And, as to the ſilver coin, it is enacted by ſtatute 14 Geo. III. c. 42. that no tender of payment in ſilver money, exceeding twenty-five pounds at one time, ſhall be a ſufficient tender in law, for more than it's value by weight, at the rate of 5s. 2d. an ounce.

As to the impreſſion, the ſtamping thereof is the unqueſtionable prerogative of the crown: for, though divers biſhops and monaſteries had formerly the privilege of coining money, yet, as ſir Matthew Hale obſerves [r], this was uſually done by ſpecial grant from the king, or by preſcription which ſuppoſes one; and therefore was derived from, and not in derogation of, the royal prerogative. Beſides that they had only the profit of the coinage, and not the power of inſtituting either the impreſſion or denomination; but had uſually the ſtamp ſent them from the exchequer.

[o] 2 Inſt. 577. [r] 1 Hiſt. P. C. 191.

The denomination, or the value for which the coin is to pass current, is likewise in the breast of the king; and, if any unusual pieces are coined, that value must be ascertained by proclamation. In order to fix the value, the weight and the fineness of the metal are to be taken into consideration together. When a given weight of gold or silver is of a given fineness, it is then of the true standard[2], and called esterling or sterling metal; a name for which there are various reasons given[3], but none of them entirely satisfactory. And of this sterling or esterling metal all the coin of the kingdom must be made, by the statute 25 Edw. III. c. 13. So that the king's prerogative seemeth not to extend to the debasing or inhancing the value of the coin, below or above the sterling value[4]: though sir Matthew Hale[5] appears to be of another opinion. The king may also, by his proclamation legitimate foreign coin, and make it current here; declaring at what value it shall be taken in payments[6]. But this, I apprehend, ought to be by comparison with the standard of our own coin; otherwise the consent of parliament will be necessary. There is at present no such legitimated money; Portugal coin being only current by private consent, so that any one who pleases may refuse to take it in payment. The

[2] This standard hath been frequently varied in former times; but hath for many years past been thus invariable settled. The pound troy of gold, consisting of twenty-two carats (or twenty-fourth parts) fine, and two of alloy, is divided into forty-four guineas and an half of the present value of 21s. each. And the pound troy of silver, consisting of eleven ounces and two penny weights pure, and eighteen penny-weights alloy, is divided into sixty-two shillings. (See Folkes on English coins.)

[3] Spelm. Gloss. 203. Du-fresne, III. 165. The most plausible opinion seems to be that adopted by those two etymologists, that the name was derived from the *Esterlingi*, or Easterlings; as those Saxons were anciently called, who inhabited that district of Germany, now occupied by the Hanse towns and their appendages; the earliest traders in modern Europe.

[4] 2 Inst. 577.

[5] 1 Hal. P. C. 194.

[6] *Ibid.* 197.

king may alſo at any time decry, or cry down, any coin of the kingdom, and make it no longer current[7].

V. The king is, laſtly, conſidered by the laws of England as the head and ſupreme governor of the national church.

To enter into the reaſons upon which this prerogative is founded is matter rather of divinity than of law. I ſhall therefore only obſerve that by ſtatute 26 Hen. VIII. c. 1. (reciting that the king's majeſty juſtly and rightfully is and ought to be the ſupreme head of the church of England; and ſo had been recognized by the clergy of this kingdom in their convocation) it is enacted, that the king ſhall be reputed the only ſupreme head in earth of the church of England, and ſhall have, annexed to the imperial crown of this realm, as well the title and ſtile thereof, as all juriſdictions, authorities, and commodities, to the ſaid dignity of ſupreme head of the church appertaining. And another ſtatute to the ſame purport was made, 1 Eliz. c. 1.

In virtue of this authority the king convenes, prorogues, reſtrains, regulates, and diſſolves all eccleſiaſtical ſynods or convocations. This was an inherent prerogative of the crown, long before the time of Henry VIII, as appears by the ſtatute 8 Hen. VI. c. 1. and the many authors, both lawyers and hiſtorians, vouched by ſir Edward Coke[8]. So that the ſtatute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19. which reſtrains the convocation from making or putting in execution any canons repugnant to the king's prerogative, or the laws, cuſtoms, and ſtatutes of the realm, was merely declaratory of the old common law[9]: that part of it only being new, which makes the king's royal aſſent actually neceſſary to the validity of every canon. The convocation or eccleſiaſtical ſynod, in England, differs conſiderably in it's conſtitution from the ſynods of other chriſtian kingdoms: thoſe conſiſting wholly of biſhops; whereas with us the com-

[7] 1 Hal. P. C. 197.
[8] 4 Inſt. 322, 323.
[9] 12 Rep. 72.

vocation is the miniature of a parliament, wherein the archbiſhop preſides with regal ſtate; the upper houſe of biſhops repreſents the houſe of lords; and the lower houſe, compoſed of repreſentatives of the ſeveral dioceſes at large, and of each particular chapter therein, reſembles the houſe of commons with it's knights of the ſhire and burgeſſes[o]. This conſtitution is ſaid to be owing to the policy of Edward I. who thereby at one and the ſame time let in the inferior clergy to the privileges of forming eccleſiaſtical canons, (which before they had not) and alſo introduced a method of taxing eccleſiaſtical benefices, by conſent of convocation [1].

From this prerogative alſo, of being the head of the church, ariſes the king's right of nomination to vacant biſhopricks, and certain other eccleſiaſtical preferments; which will more properly be conſidered when we come to treat of the clergy. I ſhall only here obſerve, that this is now done in conſequence of the ſtatute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 20.

As head of the church, the king is likewiſe the *dernier reſort* in all eccleſiaſtical cauſes; an appeal lying ultimately to him in chancery from the ſentence of every eccleſiaſtical judge: which right was reſtored to the crown by ſtatute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19. as will more fully be ſhewn hereafter.

[o] In the diet of Sweden, where the eccleſiaſtics form one of the branches of the legiſlature, the chamber of the clergy reſembles the convocation of England. It is compoſed of the biſhops and ſuper-intendants; and alſo of deputies, one of which is choſen by every ten pariſhes or rural deanry. Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxxiii. 18.

[1] Gilb. Hiſt. of Exch. c. 4.

CHAPTER THE EIGHTH.

OF THE KING'S REVENUE.

HAVING, in the preceding chapter, conſidered at large thoſe branches of the king's prerogative, which contribute to his royal dignity, and conſtitute the executive power of the government, we proceed now to examine the king's *fiſcal* prerogatives, or ſuch as regard his *revenue*; which the Britiſh conſtitution hath veſted in the royal perſon, in order to ſupport his dignity and maintain his power: being a portion which each ſubject contributes of his property, in order to ſecure the remainder.

This revenue is either ordinary, or extraordinary. The king's ordinary revenue is ſuch, as has either ſubſiſted time out of mind in the crown; or elſe has been granted by parliament, by way of purchaſe or exchange for ſuch of the king's inherent hereditary revenues, as were found inconvenient to the ſubject.

When I ſay that it has ſubſiſted time out of mind in the crown, I do not mean that the king is at preſent in the actual poſſeſſion of the whole of this revenue. Much (nay, the greateſt part) of it is at this day in the hands of ſubjects; to whom it has been granted out from time to time by the kings of England: which has rendered the crown in ſome meaſure dependent on the people for it's ordinary ſupport and ſubſiſtence. So that I muſt be obliged to recount, as part of the royal revenue, what lords of manors and other ſubjects frequently look upon to be their own abſolute inherent rights; becauſe they are and have been veſted in them and their anceſtors for ages, though in reality originally derived from the grants of our antient princes.

I. The firſt of the king's ordinary revenues, which I ſhall take notice of, is of an eccleſiaſtical kind; (as are alſo the three ſucceeding ones) viz. the cuſtody of the temporalties of biſhops: by which are meant all the lay revenues, lands, and tenements, (in which is included his barony) which belong to an archbiſhop's or biſhop's ſee. And theſe upon the vacancy of the biſhoprick are immediately the right of the king, as a conſequence of his prerogative in church matters; whereby he is conſidered as the founder of all archbiſhopricks and biſhopricks, to whom during the vacancy they revert. And for the ſame reaſon, before the diſſolution of abbeys, the king had the cuſtody of the temporalties of all ſuch abbeys and priories as were of royal foundation (but not of thoſe founded by ſubjects) on the death of the abbot or prior[1]. Another reaſon may alſo be given, why the policy of the law hath veſted this cuſtody in the king; becauſe as the ſucceſſor is not known, the lands and poſſeſſions of the ſee would be liable to ſpoil and devaſtation, if no one had a property therein. Therefore the law has given the king, not the temporalties themſelves, but the *cuſtody* of the temporalties, till ſuch time as a ſucceſſor is appointed; with power of taking to himſelf all the intermediate profits, without any account of the ſucceſſor; and with the right of preſenting (which the crown very frequently exerciſes) to ſuch benefices and other preferments as fall within the time of vacation[2]. This revenue is of ſo high a nature, that it could not be granted out to a ſubject, before, or even after, it accrued; but now by the ſtatute 15 Edw. III. ſt. 4. c. 4 & 5. the king may, after the vacancy, leaſe the temporalties to the dean and chapter; ſaving to himſelf all advowſons, eſcheats, and the like. Our antient kings, and particularly William Rufus, were not only remarkable for keeping the biſhopricks a long time vacant, for the ſake of enjoying the temporalties, but alſo committed horrible waſte on the woods and other parts of the

[1] 2 Inſt. 15. [2] Stat. 17 Edw. II. c. 14. F. N. B. 32

eſtate; and to crown all, would never, when the ſee was filled up, reſtore to the biſhop his temporalties again unleſs he purchaſed them at an exorbitant price. To remedy which, king Henry the firſt[3] granted a charter at the beginning of his reign, promiſing neither to ſell, nor let to farm, nor take any thing from, the domains of the church, till the ſucceſſor was inſtalled. And it was made one of the articles of the great charter[4], that no waſte ſhould be committed in the temporalties of biſhopricks, neither ſhould the cuſtody of them be ſold. The ſame is ordained by the ſtatute of Weſtminſter the firſt[5]; and the ſtatute 14 Edw. III. ſt. 4. c. 4. (which permits, as we have ſeen, a leaſe to the dean and chapter) is ſtill more explicit in prohibiting the other exactions. It was alſo a frequent abuſe, that the king would for trifling, or no cauſes, ſeiſe the temporalties of biſhops, even during their lives, into his own hands: but this is guarded againſt by ſtatute 1 Edw. III. ſt. 2. c. 2.

This revenue of the king, which was formerly very conſiderable, is now by a cuſtomary indulgence almoſt reduced to nothing: for, at preſent, as ſoon as the new biſhop is conſecrated and confirmed, he uſually receives the reſtitution of his temporalties quite entire, and untouched, from the king; and at the ſame time does homage to his ſovereign: and then, and not ſooner, he has a fee ſimple in his biſhoprick, and may maintain an action for the profits.[6]

II. The king is entitled to a corody, as the law calls it, out of every biſhoprick, that is, to ſend one of his chaplains to be maintained by the biſhop, or to have a penſion allowed him till the biſhop promotes him to a benefice[7]. This is alſo in the nature of an acknowledgement to the king, as founder of the ſee, ſince he had formerly the ſame corody or penſion from every abbey or priory of royal foundation. It is, I apprehend, now fallen into total diſuſe;

[3] Matt. Paris.
[4] 9 Hen. III. c. 5.
[5] Edw. I. c. 21.
[6] Co. Litt. 67. 341.
[7] F. N. B. 230.

though ſir Matthew Hale ſays[7], that it is due of common right, and that no preſcription will diſcharge it.

III. The king alſo (as was formerly obſerved[9]) is entitled to all the tithes ariſing in extraparochial places[o]: though perhaps it may be doubted how far this article, as well as the laſt, can be properly reckoned a part of the king's own royal revenue; ſince a corody ſupports only his chaplains, and theſe extraparochial tithes are held under an implied truſt, that the king will diſtribute them for the good of the clergy in general.

IV. The next branch conſiſts in the firſt-fruits, and tenths, of all ſpiritual preferments in the kingdom; both of which I ſhall conſider together.

Theſe were originally a part of the papal uſurpations over the clergy of this kingdom; firſt introduced by Pandulph the pope's legate, during the reigns of king John and Henry the third, in the ſee of Norwich; and afterwards attempted to be made univerſal by the popes Clement V and John XXII, about the beginning of the fourteenth century. The firſt-fruits, *primitiæ*, or *annates*, were the firſt year's whole profits of the ſpiritual preferment, according to a rate or *valor* made under the direction of pope Innocent IV by Walter biſhop of Norwich in 38 Hen. III, and afterwards advanced in value by commiſſion from pope Nicholas III. A. D. 1292, 20 Edw. I.[1]; which valuation of pope Nicholas is ſtill preſerved in the exchequer[2]. The tenths, or *decimæ*, were the tenth part of the annual profit of each living by the ſame valuation; which was alſo claimed by the holy ſee, under no better pretence than a ſtrange miſapplication of that precept of the Levitical law, which directs[3], that the Levites "ſhould offer the tenth part of their tithes as a "heave-offering to the Lord, and give it to Aaron

6 Notes on F. N. B. above cited.
9 page 115.
o 2. Inſt. 647.
1 F. N. B. 176.
2 3 Inſt. 154.
3 Numb. xviii. 26.

the *high* prieſt. But this claim of the pope met with a vigorous reſiſtance from the Engliſh parliament; and a variety of acts were paſſed to prevent and reſtrain it, particularly the ſtatute 6 Hen. IV. c. 1. which calls it a horrible miſchief and damnable cuſtom. But the popiſh clergy, blindly devoted to the will of a foreign maſter, ſtill kept it on foot: ſometimes more ſecretly, ſometimes more openly and avowedly; ſo that in the reign of Henry VIII, it was computed, that in the compaſs of fifty years 800,000 ducats had been ſent to Rome for firſt-fruits only. And, as the clergy expreſſed this willingneſs to contribute ſo much of their income to the head of the church, it was thought proper (when in the ſame reign the papal power was aboliſhed, and the king was declared the head of the church of England) to annex this revenue to the crown; which was done by ſtatute 26 Hen. VIII. c. 3. (confirmed by ſtatute 1 Eliz. c. 4.) and a new *valor beneficiorum* was then made, by which the clergy are at preſent rated.

By theſe laſt mentioned ſtatutes all vicarages under ten pounds a year, and all rectories under ten marks, are diſcharged from the payment of firſt-fruits: and if, in ſuch livings as continue chargeable with this payment, the incumbent lives but half a year, he ſhall pay only one quarter of his firſt-fruits; if but one whole year, then half of them; if a year and a half, three quarters; and if two years, then the whole; and not otherwiſe. Likewiſe by the ſtatute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 8. no tenths are to be paid for the firſt year, for then the firſt-fruits are due: and by other ſtatutes of queen Anne, in the fifth and ſixth years of her reign, if a benefice be under fifty pounds *per annum* clear yearly value, it ſhall be diſcharged of the payment of firſt-fruits and tenths.

Thus the richer clergy, being, by the criminal bigotry of their popiſh predeceſſors, ſubjected at firſt to a foreign exaction, were afterwards, when that yoke was ſhaken off, liable to a like miſapplication of their revenues, through the rapacious diſpoſition

of the then reigning monarch: till at length the piety of queen Anne reſtored to the church what had been thus indirectly taken from it. This ſhe did, not by remitting the tenths and firſt-fruits entirely; but, in a ſpirit of the trueſt equity, by applying theſe ſuperfluities of the larger benefices to make up the deficiencies of the ſmaller. And to this end ſhe granted her royal charter, which was confirmed by the ſtatute 2 Ann. c. 11. whereby all the revenue of firſt-fruits and tenths is veſted in truſtees for ever, to form a perpetual fund for the augmentation of poor livings. This is uſually called queen Anne's bounty; which has been ſtill farther regulated by ſubſequent ſtatutes [4].

V. The next branch of the king's ordinary revenue (which, as well as the ſubſequent branches, is of a lay or temporal nature) conſiſts in the rents and profits of the demeſne lands of the crown. Theſe demeſne lands, *terræ dominicales regis*, being either the ſhare reſerved to the crown at the original diſtribution of landed property, or ſuch as came to it afterwards by forfeitures or other means, were anciently very large and extenſive; comprizing divers manors, honors, and lordſhips: the tenants of which had very peculiar privileges, as will be ſhewn in the ſecond book of theſe commentaries, when we ſpeak of the tenure in ancient demeſne. At preſent they are contracted within a very narrow compaſs, having been almoſt entirely granted away to private ſubjects. This has occaſioned the parliament frequently to interpoſe; and, particularly, after king William III had greatly impoveriſhed the crown, an act paſſed [5], whereby all future grants or leaſes from the crown for any longer term than thirty-one years or three lives are declared to be void; except with regard to houſes, which may be granted for fifty years. And no reverſionary leaſe can be made, ſo as to exceed, together with the eſtate in being, the ſame term of three lives or thirty-one years: that is

[4] 5 Ann. c. 24. 6 Ann. c. 27. 1 Geo. I. ſt. 2. c. 12. 3 Geo. I. c. 10.

[5] 1 Ann. ſt. 1. c. 7.

where there is a ſubſiſting leaſe, of which there are twenty years ſtill to come, the king cannot grant a future intereſt, to commence after the expiration of the former, for any longer term than eleven years. The tenant muſt alſo be made liable to be puniſhed for committing waſte; and the uſual rent muſt be reſerved, or where there has uſually been no rent, one third of the clear yearly value [6]. The misfortune is, that this act was made too late, after almoſt every valuable poſſeſſion of the crown had been granted away for ever, or elſe upon very long leaſes; but may be of ſome benefit to poſterity, when thoſe leaſes come to expire (*g*).

[6] In like manner by the civil law, the inheritances or *fundi patrimoniales* of the imperial crown could not be alienated, but only let to farm. *Cod. l.* 11. *t.* 61.

(*g*) By the ſtatute 26 Geo. III. c. 87. commiſſioners are appointed for examining and enquiring into the ſtate, produce, and expenditure of the rents of the lands, and fines for leaſes of the ſame, and into the ſtate, produce, management, extent and value of all the honors, caſtles, lordſhips, foreſts, chaſes, demeſne and other lands, derelict and waſte lands within the ſurvey of his majeſty's exchequer, and appertaining to the crown of Great Britain in England and Wales, and into all ſuch ſubſiſting leaſes, patents and other grants of the ſaid honors and premiſes reſpectively, as contain any expreſs ſaving to the crown of any rights or intereſts in poſſeſſion, reverſion, or contingency, and into all and all manner of rights and privileges claimed or exerciſed within, over and upon his majeſty's ſaid foreſts, chaſes, parks, derelict and waſte lands reſpectively; and into all the ſubſiſting offices eſtabliſhed for the management of the ſaid foreſts and other premiſes reſpectively, and the annual expence of the ſame: and the ſaid commiſſioners are, within fourteen days after the commencement of every ſeſſion of parliament, and from time to time, when and ſo often as they conveniently can or may, certify and report in writing, under their hands and ſeals, unto the king and both houſes of parliament, what progreſs they ſhall have made in the execution of the truſts and powers of the ſaid act, together with ſuch obſervations as ſhall occur to them, and ſuggeſt ſuch plans for the diſpoſal and alienation, or for the future management and improvement of the ſaid landed eſtates and poſſeſſions, and for the protection and ſupply of timber for the uſe of the royal navy, or for redreſſing any abuſes in the management of the landed eſtates, and the collection of the revenues of the ſame, as the ſaid commiſſioners ſhall think beſt calculated for ren-

VI. Hither might have been referred the advantages which uſed to ariſe to the king from the profits of his military tenures, to which moſt lands in the kingdom were ſubject, till the ſtatute 12 Car. II. c. 24. which in great meaſure aboliſhed them all: the explication of the nature of which tenures muſt be poſtponed to the ſecond book of theſe commentaries. Hither alſo might have been referred the profitable prerogative of purveyance and pre-emption: which was a right enjoyed by the crown of buying up proviſions and other neceſſaries, by the intervention of the king's purveyors, for the uſe of his royal houſhold, at an appraiſed valuation, in preference to all others, and even without conſent of the owner: and alſo of forcibly impreſſing the carriages and horſes of the ſubject, to do the king's buſineſs on the public roads, in the conveyance of timber, baggage, and the like, however inconvenient to the proprietor, upon paying him a ſettled price. A prerogative, which prevailed pretty generally throughout Europe, during the ſcarcity of gold and ſilver, and the high valuation of money conſequential thereupon. In thoſe early times the king's houſhold, as well as thoſe of inferior lords, were ſupported by ſpecific renders of corn, and other victuals, from the tenants of the reſpective demeſnes; and there was alſo a continual market kept at the palace gate to furniſh viands for the royal uſe[7]. And this anſwered all purpoſes, in thoſe ages of ſimplicity, ſo long as the king's court continued in any certain place. But when it removed from one part of the kingdom to another (as was formerly very frequently done) it was found neceſſary to ſend purveyors beforehand to get together a ſufficient quantity of proviſions and other neceſſaries for the houſhold: and, leſt the unuſual demand ſhould raiſe them to an exorbitant price,

[7] 4 Inſt. 273.

---

dering the ſaid eſtates and poſſeſſions of the crown, and the revenues ariſing therefrom, moſt productive and advantageous to his majeſty and the public.]

the powers before mentioned were veſted in theſe purveyors: who in proceſs of time very greatly abuſed their authority, and became a great oppreſſion to the ſubject, though of little advantage to the crown; ready money in open market (when the royal reſidence was more permanent, and ſpecie began to be plenty) being found upon experience to be the beſt proveditor of any. Wherefore by degrees the powers of purveyance have declined, in foreign countries as well as our own: and particularly were aboliſhed in Sweden by Guſtavus Adolphus, towards the beginning of the laſt century [8]. And, with us in England, having fallen into diſuſe during the ſuſpenſion of monarchy, king Charles at his reſtoration conſented, by the ſame ſtatute, to reſign entirely theſe branches of his revenue and power: and the parliament, in part of recompence, ſettled on him, his heirs, and ſucceſſors, for ever, the hereditary exciſe of fifteen pence *per* barrel on all beer and ale ſold in the kingdom, and a proportionable ſum for certain other liquors. So that this hereditary exciſe, the nature of which ſhall be farther explained in the ſubſequent part of this chapter, now forms the ſixth branch of his majeſty's ordinary revenue.

VII. A ſeventh branch might alſo be computed to have ariſen from wine licenſes; or the rents payable to the crown by ſuch perſons as are licenſed to ſell wine by retail throughout England, except in a few privileged places. Theſe were firſt ſettled on the crown by the ſtatute 12 Car. II. c. 25. and, together with the hereditary exciſe, made up the equivalent in value for the loſs ſuſtained by the prerogative in the abolition of the military tenures, and the right of pre-emption and purveyance: but this revenue was aboliſhed by the ſtatute 30 Geo. II. c. 19. and an annual ſum of upwards of 7000l. *per annum*, iſſuing out of the new ſtamp duties impoſed on wine licenſes, was ſettled on the crown in it's ſtead.

VIII. An eighth branch of the king's ordinary

[8] Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxxiii. 220.

revenue is usually reckoned to consist in the profits arising from his forests. Forests are waste grounds belonging to the king, replenished with all manner of beasts of chase or venary; which are under the king's protection, for the sake of his royal recreation and delight: and to that end, and for preservation of the king's game, there are particular laws, privileges, courts and officers belonging to the king's forests; all which will be, in their turns, explained in the subsequent books of these commentaries. What we are now to consider are only the profits arising to the king from hence, which consist principally in amercements or fines levied for offences against the forest-laws. But, as few, if any courts of this kind for levying amercements [9] have been held since 1632, 8 Car. I. and as from the accounts given of the proceedings in that court by our histories and law books [o], no body would now wish to see them again revived, it is needless (at least in this place) to pursue this inquiry any farther.

IX. The profits arising from the king's ordinary courts of justice make a ninth branch of his revenue. And these consist not only in fines imposed upon offenders, forfeitures of recognizances, and amercements levied upon defaulters; but also in certain fees due to the crown in a variety of legal matters, as, for setting the great seal to charters, original writs, and other forensic proceedings, and for permitting fines to be levied of lands in order to bar entails, or otherwise to insure their title. As none of these can be done without the immediate intervention of the king, by himself or his officers, the law allows him certain perquisites and profits, as a recompense for the trouble he undertakes for the public. These, in process of time, have been almost all granted out to private persons, or else appropriated to certain

[9] Roger North, in his life of lord keeper North, (43, 44.) mentions an eyre, or *iter*, to have been held south of Trent soon after the restoration; but I have met with no report of it's proceedings.

[o] 1 Jones. 267—298.

particular uſes: ſo that, though our law-proceedings are ſtill loaded with their payment, very little of them is now returned into the king's exchequer; for a part of whoſe royal maintenance they were originally intended. All future grants of them however, by the ſtatute 1 Ann. ſt. 2. c. 7. are to endure for no longer time than the prince's life who grants them.

X. A tenth branch of the king's ordinary revenue, ſaid to be grounded on the conſideration of his guarding and protecting the ſeas from pirates and robbers, is the right to *royal fiſh*, which are whale and ſturgeon: and theſe when either thrown aſhore, or caught near the coaſts, are the property of the king, on account [1] of their ſuperior excellence. Indeed our anceſtors ſeem to have entertained a very high notion of the importance of this right; it being the prerogative of the kings of Denmark and the dukes of Normandy [2]; and from one of theſe it was probably derived to our princes. It is expreſsly claimed and allowed in the ſtatute *de prærogativa regis* [3]: and the moſt antient treatiſes of law now extant make mention of it [4]; though they ſeem to have made a diſtinction between whale and ſturgeon, as was incidentally obſerved in a former chapter [5].

XI. Another maritime revenue, and founded partly upon the ſame reaſon, is that of ſhipwrecks: which are alſo declared to be the king's property by the ſame prerogative ſtatute 17 Edw. II. c. 11. and were ſo, long before, at the common law. It is worthy obſervation, how greatly the law of wrecks has been altered, and the rigour of it gradually ſoftened in favour of the diſtreſſed proprietors. Wreck, by the antient common law, was where any ſhip was loſt at ſea, and the goods or cargo were thrown

[1] Plowd. 315.

[2] Stiernh. *de jure Sueonum. l.* 2. *c.* 8. *Gr. Couſtum. cap.* 17.

[3] 17 Edw. II. *c.* 11.

[4] Bracton. *l.* 3. *c.* 3. Britton. *c.* 17. Fleta. *l.* 1. *c.* 45 & 46. *Memorand. Scacch'. H.* 24 *Edw.* I. 37. prefixed to Maynard's year book of Edward II.

[5] Ch. 4. pag. 223.

upon the land; in which caſe theſe goods, ſo wrecked, were adjudged to belong to the king: for it was held, that by the loſs of the ſhip, all property was gone out of the original owner [6]. But this was undoubtedly adding ſorrow to ſorrow, and was conſonant neither to reaſon nor humanity. Wherefore it was firſt ordained by king Henry I, that if any perſon eſcaped alive out of the ſhip it would be no wreck [7]; and afterwards king Henry II, by his charter [8], declared, that if on the coaſts of either England, Poictou, Oleron, or Gaſcony, any ſhip ſhould be diſtreſſed, and either man or beaſt ſhould eſcape or be found therein alive, the goods ſhould remain to the owners, if they claimed them within three months; but otherwiſe ſhould be eſteemed a wreck, and ſhould belong to the king, or other lord of the franchiſe. This was again confirmed with improvements by king Richard the firſt; who, in the ſecond year of his reign [9], not only eſtabliſhed theſe conceſſions, by ordaining that the owner, if he was ſhipwrecked and eſcaped, "*omnes res ſuas liberas et quietas haberet*," but alſo, that if he periſhed, his children, or in default of them, his brethren and ſiſters, ſhould retain the property; and in default of brother or ſiſter, then the goods ſhould remain to the king [o]. And the law, as laid down by Bracton in the reign of Henry III, ſeems ſtill to have improved in it's equity. For then, if not only a dog (for inſtance) eſcaped, by which the owner might be diſcovered, but if any certain mark were ſet on the goods, by which they might be known again, it was held to be no wreck [1]. And this is certainly moſt agreeable to reaſon; the rational claim of the

[6] Dr. & St. d. 2. c. 51.

[7] Spelm. *Cod. apud* Wilkins. 305.

[8] 26 May, *A. D.* 1174. 1 Rym. *Fœd.* 36.

[9] Rog. Hoved. *in Ric.* I.

[o] In like manner Conſtantine the great, finding that by the imperial law the revenue of wrecks was given to the prince's treaſury or *fiſcus*, reſtrained it by an edict (*Cod.* 11. 5. 1.) and ordered them to remain to the owners; adding this humane expoſtulation,—"*Quod enim jus habet fiſcus in* "*aliena calamitate, ut de re tam* "*luctuoſa compendium ſectetur?*

[1] Bract. *l.* 3. *c.* 3.

king being only founded upon this, that the true owner cannot be aſcertained. Afterwards, in the ſtatute of Weſtminſter the firſt [2], the time of limitation of claims, given by the charter of Henry II, is extended to a year and a day, according to the uſage of Normandy [3]: and it enacts, that if a man, a dog, or a cat, eſcape alive, the veſſel ſhall not be adjudged a wreck. Theſe animals, as in Bracton, are only put for examples [4]; for it is now held [5], that not only if any live thing eſcape, but if proof can be made of the property of any of the goods or lading which came to ſhore, they ſhall not be forfeited as wreck. The ſtatute further ordains, that the ſheriff of the county ſhall be bound to keep the goods a year and a day, (as in France for one year, agreeable to the maritime laws of Oleron [6], and in Holland for a year and half) that if any man can prove a property in them, either in his own right or by right of repreſentation [7], they ſhall be reſtored to him without delay; but, if no ſuch property be proved within that time, they then ſhall be the king's. If the goods are of a periſhable nature, the ſheriff may ſell them, and the money ſhall be liable in their ſtead [8]. This revenue of wrecks is frequently granted out to lords of manors, as a royal franchiſe; and if any one be thus entitled to wrecks in his own land, and the king's goods are wrecked thereon, the king may claim them at any time, even after the year and day [9].

It is to be obſerved, that, in order to conſtitute a legal *wreck*, the goods muſt come to land. If they continue at ſea, the law diſtinguiſhes them by the barbarous and uncouth appellations of *jetſam*, *flotſam*, and *ligan*. Jetſam is where goods are caſt into the ſea, and there ſink and remain under water: flotſam is where they continue ſwimming on the

[2] 3 Edw. I. c. 4.
[3] *Gr. Couſtum.* c. 17.
[4] Flet. *l.* 1. *c.* 44. 2 Inſt. 167. 5 Rep. 1 7.
[5] Hamilton v. Davies. *Trin.* 11 *Geo. III. B. R.*
[6] §. 28.
[7] 2 Inſt. 168.
[8] Plowd. 166.
[9] 2 Inſt. 168. Bro. *Abr. tit. Wreck.*

ſurface of the waves: ligan is where they are ſunk in the ſea, but tied to a cork or buoy, in order to be found [o]. Theſe are alſo the king's if no owner appears to claim them; but, if any owner appears, he is entitled to recover the poſſeſſion. For even if they be caſt overboard, without any mark or buoy, in order to lighten the ſhip, the owner is not by this act of neceſſity conſtrued to have renounced his property [1]: much leſs can things ligan be ſuppoſed to be abandoned, ſince the owner has done all in his power to aſſert and retain his property. Theſe three are therefore accounted ſo far a diſtinct thing from the former, that by the king's grant to a man of wrecks, things jetſam, flotſam, and ligan will not paſs [2].

Wrecks, in their legal acceptation, are at preſent not very frequent: for, if any goods come to land, it rarely happens, ſince the improvement of commerce, navigation, and correſpondence, that the owner is not able to aſſert his property within the year and day limited by law. And in order to preſerve this property entire for him, and if poſſible to prevent wrecks at all, our laws have made many very humane regulations; in a ſpirit quite oppoſite to thoſe ſavage laws, which formerly prevailed in all the northern regions of Europe, and a few years ago were ſtill ſaid to ſubſiſt on the coaſts of the Baltic ſea, permitting the inhabitants to ſeize on whatever they could get as lawful prize: or, as an author of their own expreſſes it, "*in naufragorum miſeria et calamitate tanquam vultures ad prædam currere*[3]." For by the ſtatute 27 Edw. III. c. 13. if any ſhip be loſt on the ſhore, and the goods come to land (which cannot, ſays the ſtatute, be called wreck) they ſhall be preſently delivered to the merchants, paying only a reaſonable reward to thoſe that ſaved and preſerved them, which is entitled *ſalvage*. Alſo by the

[o] 5 Rep. 106.

[1] *Quæ enim res in tempeſtate, levandæ navis cauſa, ejiciuntur, hæ dominorum permanent. Quia falam eſt, eas non eo animo ejici, quod quis habere nolit.* Inſt. 2. 1. §. 48.

[2] 5 Rep. 108.

[3] Stiernh. *de jure Sueon. l.* 3. *c.* 5.

common law, if any perſons (other than the ſheriff) take any goods ſo caſt on ſhore, which are not legal wreck, the owners might have a commiſſion to inquire and find them out, and compel them to make reſtitution[4]. And by ſtatute 12 Ann. ſt. 2. c. 18. confirmed by 4 Geo. I. c. 12. in order to aſſiſt the diſtreſſed, and prevent the ſcandalous illegal practices on ſome of our ſea coaſts, (too ſimilar to thoſe on the Baltic) it is enacted, that all head-officers and others of towns near the ſea ſhall, upon application made to them, ſummon as many hands as are neceſſary, and ſend them to the relief of any ſhip in diſtreſs, on forfeiture of 100l. and, in caſe of aſſiſtance given, ſalvage ſhall be paid by the owners, to be aſſeſſed by three neighbouring juſtices. All perſons that ſecrete any goods ſhall forfeit their treble value: and if they wilfully do any act whereby the ſhip is loſt or deſtroyed, by making holes in her, ſtealing her pumps, or otherwiſe, they are guilty of felony, without benefit of clergy. Laſtly, by the ſtatute 26 Geo. II. c. 19. plundering any veſſel either in diſtreſs, or wrecked, and whether any living creature be on board, or not, (for, whether wreck or otherwiſe, it is clearly not the property of the populace) ſuch plundering, I ſay, or preventing the eſcape of any perſon that endeavours to ſave his life, or wounding him with intent to deſtroy him, or putting out falſe lights in order to bring any veſſel into danger, are all declared to be capital felonies; in like manner as the deſtroying of trees, ſteeples, or other ſtated ſeamarks, is puniſhed by the ſtatute 8 Eliz. c. 13. with a forfeiture of 100l. or outlawry. Moreover, by the ſtatute of George II, pilfering any goods caſt aſhore is declared to be petty larceny; and many other ſalutary regulations are made, for the more effectually preſerving ſhips of any nation in diſtreſs[5].

4 F. N. B. 112.

5 By the civil law, to deſtroy perſons ſhipwrecked, or prevent their ſaving the ſhip, is capital. And to ſteal even a plank from a veſſel in diſtreſs, or wrecked, makes the party liable to anſwer for the whole ſhip and cargo. (*Ff.* 47. 9. 3. The laws alſo of the Wiſigoths, and the moſt early Neapolitan conſtitutions, puniſhed with the utmoſt ſeverity all thoſe who neglected to aſſiſt any ſhip in diſtreſs, or plundered any goods caſt on ſhore. (Lindenbrog. *Cod. LL. antiqu.* 146. 715.

XII. A twelfth branch of the royal revenue, the right to mines, has its original from the king's prerogative of coinage, in order to ſupply him with materials: and therefore thoſe mines, which are properly royal, and to which the king is entitled when found, are only thoſe of ſilver and gold[6]. By the old common law, if gold or ſilver be found in mines of baſe metal, according to the opinion of ſome the whole was a royal mine, and belonged to the king; though others held that it only did ſo, if the quantity of gold or ſilver was of greater value than the quantity of baſe metal[7]. But now by the ſtatutes 1 W. & M. ſt. 1. c. 30. and 5 W. & M. c. 6. this difference is made immaterial; it being enacted, that no mines of copper, tin, iron, or lead, ſhall be looked upon as royal mines, notwithſtanding gold or ſilver may be extracted from them in any quantities: but that the king, or perſons claiming royal mines under his authority, may have the ore, (other than tin-ore in the counties of Devon and Cornwall) paying for the ſame a price ſtated in the act. This was an extremely reaſonable law: for now private owners are not diſcouraged from working mines, through a fear that they may be claimed as royal ones; neither does the king depart from the juſt rights of his revenue, ſince he may have all the precious metal contained in the ore, paying no more for it than the value of the baſe metal which it is ſuppoſed to be; to which baſe metal the land owner is by reaſon and law entitled.

XIII. To the ſame original may in part be referred the revenue of treaſure-trove (derived from the French word, *trover*, to find) called in Latin *theſaurus inventus*, which is where any money or coin, gold, ſilver, plate, or bullion, is found hidden *in* the earth, or other private place, the owner thereof being unknown: in which caſe the treaſure belongs to the king: but if he that hid it be known, or afterwards found out, the owner and not the king is entitled to it[8]. Alſo if it be found in the ſea, or

[6] 2 Inſt. 577.
[7] Plowd. 336.
[8] 3 Inſt. 132. Dalt. of Sheriffs. c. 16.

upon the earth, it does not belong to the king, but the finder, if no owner appears[9]. So that it ſeems it is the *hiding*, and not the *abandoning* of it, that gives the king a property: Bracton[o] defining it, in the words of the civilians, to be "*vetus depoſitio pecuniæ.*" This difference clearly ariſes from the different intentions, which the law implies in the owner. A man, that hides his treaſure in a ſecret place, evidently does not mean to relinquiſh his property; but reſerves a right of claiming it again, when he ſees occaſion: and, if he dies and the ſecret alſo dies with him, the law gives it the king, in part of his royal revenue. But a man that ſcatters his treaſure into the ſea, or upon the public ſurface of the earth, is conſtrued to have abſolutely abandoned his property, and returned it into the common ſtock, without any intention of reclaiming it: and therefore it belongs, as in a ſtate of nature, to the firſt occupant, or finder; unleſs the owner appear and aſſert his right, which then proves that the loſs was by accident, and not with an intent to renounce his property.

Formerly all treaſure-trove belonged to the finder[1]; as was alſo the rule of the civil law.[2] Afterwards it was judged expedient for the purpoſes of the ſtate, and particularly for the coinage, to allow part of what was ſo found to the king; which part was aſſigned to be all *hidden* treaſure; ſuch as is *caſually loſt* and unclaimed, and alſo ſuch as is *deſignedly abandoned*, ſtill remaining the right of the fortunate finder. And that the prince ſhall be entitled to this hidden treaſure is now grown to be, according to Grotius,[3] "*jus commune, et quaſi gentium:*" for it is not only obſerved, he adds, in England, but in Germany, France, Spain, and Denmark. The finding of depoſited treaſure was much more frequent, and the treaſures themſelves more conſiderable, in the infancy of our conſtitution than at preſent. When the Romans, and other inhabitants of the reſpective countries which compoſed their empire,

9 Britt. c. 17. Finch. L. 177.
o *l.* 3. *c.* 3. §. 4.
1 Bracton. *l.* 3. *c.* 3. 3. Inſt. 133.
2 *Ff.* 41. 1 31.
3 *de jur. b. & p. l.* 2. *c.* 8. §. 7.

were driven out by the northern nations, they concealed their money under-ground: with a view of reſorting to it again when the heat of the irruption ſhould be over, and the invaders driven back to their deſarts. But, as this never happened, the treaſures were never claimed; and on the death of the owners the ſecret alſo died along with them. The conquering generals, being aware of the value of theſe hidden mines, made it highly penal to ſecrete them from the public ſervice. In England therefore, as among the feudiſts [4], the puniſhment of ſuch as concealed from the king the finding of hidden treaſure was formerly no leſs than death; but now it is only fine and impriſonment [5].

XIV. Waifs, *bona waviata*, are goods ſtolen, and waived or thrown away by the thief in his flight, for fear of being apprehended. Theſe are given to the king by the law, as a puniſhment upon the owner, for not himſelf purſuing the felon, and taking away his goods from him [6]. And therefore if the party robbed do his diligence immediately to follow and apprehend the thief, (which is called making freſh *ſuit*) or do convict him afterwards, or procure evidence to convict him, he ſhall have his goods again [7]. Waived goods do alſo not belong to the king, till ſeiſed by ſomebody for his uſe; for if the party robbed can ſeiſe them firſt, though at the diſtance of twenty years, the king ſhall never have them [8]. If the goods are hid by the thief, or left any where by him, ſo that he had them not about him, when he fled, and therefore did not throw them away in his flight; theſe alſo are not *bona waviata*, but the owner may have them again when he pleaſes [9]. The goods of a foreign merchant, though ſtolen and thrown away in flight, ſhall never be waifs [10]: the reaſon whereof may be, not only for the encourage-

[4] Glanv. *l.* 1. *c.* 2. Crag. 1. 16. 40.
[5] 3 Inſt. 133.
[6] Cro. Eliz. 694.
[7] Finch. L. 212.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] 5 Rep. 109.
[10] Fitz. *Abr. tit. Eſtray.* 1. 3 Bulſtr. 19.

ment of trade, but alſo becauſe there is no wilful default in the foreign merchant's not purſuing the thief; he being generally a ſtranger to our laws, our uſages, and our language.

XV. Eſtrays are ſuch valuable animals as are found wandering in any manor or lordſhip, and no man knoweth the owner of them; in which caſe the law gives them to the king as the general owner and lord paramount of the ſoil, in recompenſe for the damage which they may have done therein: and they now moſt commonly belong to the lord of the manor, by ſpecial grant from the crown. But, in order to veſt an abſolute property in the king, or his grantees, they muſt be proclaimed in the church and two market towns next adjoining to the place where they are found: and then, if no man claims them, after proclamation and a year and a day paſſed, they belong to the king or his ſubſtitute without redemption [1]; even though the owner were a minor, or under any other legal incapacity [2]. A proviſion ſimilar to which obtained in the old Gothic conſtitution, with regard to all things that were found, which were to be thrice proclaimed; *primum coram comitibus et viatoribus obviis, deinde in proxima villa vel pago, poſtremo coram eccleſia vel judicio:* and the ſpace of a year was allowed for the owner to reclaim his property [3]. If the owner claims them within the year and day, he muſt pay the charges of finding, keeping, and proclaiming them [4]. The king or lord has no property till the year and day paſſed: for if a lord keepeth an eſtray three quarters of a year, and within the year it ſtrayeth again, and another lord getteth it, the firſt lord cannot take it again [5]. Any beaſts may be eſtrays, that are by nature tame or reclaimable, and in which there is a valuable property, as ſheep, oxen, ſwine, and horſes, which we in general call cattle; and ſo Fleta [6] defines them, *pecus vagens, quod nullus petit, ſequitur vel advocat.*

1 Mirr. c. 3. §. 19.
2 5 Rep. 108. Bro. *Abr. tit. Eſtray.* Cro. Eliz. 716.
3 Stiernh. *de jure Gothor. l.* 3. *c.* 5.
4 Dalt. Sh. 79.
5 Finch. L. 177.
6 *l.* 1. *c.* 43.

For animals upon which the law ſets no value, as a dog or cat, and animals *feræ naturæ*, as a bear or wolf, cannot be conſidered as eſtrays. So ſwans may be eſtrays, but not any other fowl[7]; whence they are ſaid to be royal fowl. The reaſon of which diſtinction ſeems to be, that, cattle and ſwans being of a reclaimed nature, the owner's property in them is not loſt merely by their temporary eſcape; and they alſo, from their intrinſic value, are a ſufficient pledge for the expence of the lord of the franchiſe in keeping them the year and day. For he that takes an eſtray is bound, ſo long as he keeps it, to find it in proviſions and preſerve it from damage[8]; and may not uſe it by way of labour, but is liable to an action for ſo doing[9]. Yet he may milk a cow, or the like; for that tends to the preſervation, and is for the benefit, of the animal[10].

Beſides the particular reaſons before given why the king ſhould have the ſeveral revenues of royal fiſh, ſhipwrecks, treaſure-trove, waifs, and eſtrays, there is alſo one general reaſon which holds for them all; and that is, becauſe they are *bona vacantia*, or goods in which no one elſe can claim a property. And therefore by the law of nature they belonged to the firſt occupant or finder; and ſo continued under the imperial law. But, in ſettling the modern conſtitutions of moſt of the governments in Europe, it was thought proper (to prevent that ſtrife and contention, which the mere title of occupancy is apt to create and continue, and to provide for the ſupport of public authority in a manner the leaſt burthenſome to individuals) that theſe rights ſhould be annexed to the ſupreme power by the poſitive laws of the ſtate. And ſo it came to paſs that, as Bracton expreſſes it[11], *hæc quæ nullius in bonis ſunt, et olim fuerunt inventoris de jure naturali, jam efficiuntur principis de jure gentium.*

[7] 7 Rep. 17.
[8] 1 Roll. Abr. 889.
[9] Cro. Jac. 147.
[10] Cro. Jac. 148. Noy. 119.
[11] *l.* 1, *c.* 12.

XVI. The next branch of the king's ordinary revenue conſiſts in forfeitures of lands and goods for offences; *bona confiſcata*, as they are called by the civilians, becauſe they belonged to the *fiſcus* or imperial treaſury; or, as our lawyers term them, *forisfacta:* that is, ſuch whereof the property is gone away or departed from the owner. The true reaſon and only ſubſtantial ground of any forfeiture for crimes conſiſt in this; that all property is derived from ſociety, being one of thoſe civil rights which are conferred upon individuals, in exchange for that degree of natural freedom, which every man muſt ſacrifice when he enters into ſocial communities. If therefore a member of any national community violates the fundamental contract of his aſſociation, by tranſgreſſing the municipal law, he forfeits his right to ſuch privileges as he claims by that contract; and the ſtate may very juſtly reſume that portion of property, or any part of it, which the laws have before aſſigned him. Hence, in every offence of an atrocious kind, the laws of England have exacted a total confiſcation of the moveables or perſonal eſtate; and in many caſes a perpetual, in others only a temporary, loſs of the offender's immoveables or landed property; and have veſted them both in the king, who is the perſon ſuppoſed to be offended, being the one viſible magiſtrate in whom the majeſty of the public reſides. The particulars of theſe forfeitures will be more properly recited when we treat of crimes and miſdemeanors. I therefore only mention them here, for the ſake of regularity, as a part of the *cenſus regalis;* and ſhall poſtpone for the preſent the farther conſideration of all forfeitures, excepting one ſpecies only, which ariſes from the misfortune rather than the crime of the owner, and is called a *deodand.*

By this is meant whatever perſonal chattel is the immediate occaſion of the death of any reaſonable creature: which is forfeited to the king, to be applied to pious uſes, and diſtributed in alms by his

high almoner[2]; though formerly deſtined to a more ſuperſtitious purpoſe. It ſeems to have been originally deſigned, in the blind days of popery, as an expiation for the ſouls of ſuch as were ſnatched away by ſudden death; and for that purpoſe ought properly to have been given to holy church[3]: in the ſame manner as the apparel of a ſtranger, who was found dead, was applied to purchaſe maſſes for the good of his ſoul. And this may account for that rule of law, that no deodand is due where an infant under the age of diſcretion is killed by a fall *from* a cart, or horſe, or the like, not being in motion[4]; whereas, if an adult perſon falls from thence and is killed, the thing is certainly forfeited. For the reaſon given by ſir Matthew Hale ſeems to be very inadequate, *viz.* becauſe an infant is not able to take care of himſelf; for why ſhould the owner ſave his forfeiture, on account of the imbecility of the child, which ought rather to have made him more cautious to prevent any accident of miſchief? The true ground of this rule ſeems rather to have been, that the child, by reaſon of its want of diſcretion, was preſumed incapable of actual ſin, and therefore needed no deodand to purchaſe propitiatory maſſes: but every adult, who died in actual ſin, ſtood in need of ſuch atonement, according to the humane ſuperſtition of the founders of the Engliſh law.

Thus ſtands the law if a perſon be killed by a fall from a thing ſtanding ſtill. But if a horſe, or ox, or other animal, of his own motion, kill as well an infant as an adult, or if a cart run over him, they ſhall in either caſe be forfeited as deodands[5]; which is grounded upon this additional reaſon, that ſuch misfortunes are in part owing to the negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly puniſhed by ſuch forfeiture. A like puniſhment is in like caſes

[2] 1 Hal. P. C. 419. Fleta. l. 1. c. 25.

[3] Fitzh. *Abr. tit. Endtiement.* pl. 27. Staundf. P. C. 20, 21.

[4] 3 Inſt. 57. 1 Hal. P. C. 422.

[5] *Omnia, quæ movent ad mortem, ſunt Deodanda.* Bracton. l. 3. c. 5.

inflicted by the Moſaical law[6]: "if an ox gore a "man that he die, the ox ſhall be ſtoned, and his "fleſh ſhall not be eaten." And, among the Athenians[7], whatever was the cauſe of a man's death, by falling upon him, was exterminated or caſt out of the dominions of the republic. Where a thing, not in motion, is the occaſion of a man's death, that part only which is the immediate cauſe is forfeited; as if a man be climbing up the wheel of a cart, and is killed by falling from it, the wheel alone is a deodand[8]: but, wherever the thing is in motion, not only that part which immediately gives the wound, (as the wheel, which runs over his body) but all things which move with it and help to make the wound more dangerous (as the cart and loading, which increaſe the preſſure of the wheel) are forfeited[9]. It matters not whether the owner were concerned in the killing or not; for, if a man kills another with my ſword, the ſword is forfeited[o] as an accurſed thing[1]. And therefore, in all indictments for homicide, the inſtrument of death and the value are preſented and found by the grand jury (as, that the ſtroke was given by a certain penknife, value ſixpence) that the king or his grantee may claim the deodand: for it is no deodand, unleſs it be preſented as ſuch by a jury of twelve men[2]. No deodands are due for accidents happening upon the high ſea, that being out of the juriſdiction of the common law: but if a man falls from a boat or ſhip in freſh

6 Exod. xxi. 28.

7 Aeſchin. *cont. Cteſiph.* Thus too by our antient law, a well in which a perſon was drowned, was ordered to be filled up, under the inſpection of the coroner. Flet. *l.* 1. *c.* 25. §. 10. Fitzh. Abr. *t. corone.* 416.

8 1 Hal. P. C. 422.

9 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 26.

o A ſimilar rule obtained among the antient Goths. *Si quis, me neſciente, quocunque meo telo vel inſtrumento in pernicium ſuam abutatur; vel ex aedibus meis cadat, vel incidat in puteum meum, quantumvis tectum et munitum, vel in cataractam, et ſub molendino meo confringatur, ipſe aliqua mulcta plectar; at in parte infelicitatis meae numeretur, habuiſſe vel aedificaſſe aliquod quo homo periret.* Stiernhook *de jure Goth.* l. 3. *c.* 4.

1 Dr. & St. d. 2. c. 51.

2 3 Inſt. 57.

water, and is drowned, it hath been ſaid, that the veſſel and cargo are in ſtrictneſs of law a deodand [3]. But juries have of late very frequently taken upon themſelves to mitigate theſe forfeitures, by finding only ſome trifling thing, or part of an entire thing, to have been the occaſion of the death. And in ſuch caſes, although the finding by the jury be hardly warrantable by law, the court of king's bench hath generally refuſed to interfere on behalf of the lord of the franchiſe, to aſſiſt ſo unequitable a claim [4].

Deodands, and forfeitures in general, as well as wrecks, treaſure-trove, royal fiſh, mines, waifs, and eſtrays, may be granted by the king to particular ſubjects, as a royal franchiſe: and indeed they are for the moſt part granted out to the lords of manors, or other liberties: to the perverſion of their original deſign.

XVII. Another branch of the king's ordinary revenue ariſes from eſcheats of lands, which happen upon the defect of heirs to ſucceed to the inheritance; whereupon they in general revert to and veſt in the king, who is eſteemed, in the eye of the law, the original proprietor of all the lands in the kingdom. But the diſcuſſion of this topic more properly belongs to the ſecond book of theſe commentaries, wherein we ſhall particularly conſider the manner in which lands may be acquired or loſt by eſcheat.

XVIII. I proceed therefore to the eighteenth and laſt branch of the king's ordinary revenue; which conſiſts in the cuſtody of idiots, from whence we ſhall be naturally led to conſider alſo the cuſtody of lunatics.

An idiot, or natural fool, is one that hath had no underſtanding from his nativity; and therefore is by law preſumed never likely to attain any. For which reaſon the cuſtody of him and of his lands was for-

[3] 3 Inſt. 58. 1 Hal. P. C. 2. 225. 2 Molloy *de jur. maritim.*

[4] Foſter of homicide. 266.

merly veſted in the lord of the fee [5]; (and therefore ſtill, by ſpecial cuſtom, in ſome manors the lord ſhall have the ordering of idiot and lunatic copyholders [6]) but, by reaſon of the manifold abuſes of this power by ſubjects, it was at laſt provided by common conſent, that it ſhould be given to the king, as the general conſervator of his people; in order to prevent the idiot from waſting his eſtate, and reducing himſelf and his heirs to poverty and diſtreſs [7]. This fiſcal prerogative of the king is declared in parliament by ſtatute 17 Edw. II. c. 9. which directs (in affirmance of the common law [8]) that the king ſhall have ward of the lands of natural fools, taking the profits without waſte or deſtruction, and ſhall find them neceſſaries; and after the death of ſuch idiots he ſhall render the eſtate to the heirs: in order to prevent ſuch idiots from aliening their lands, and their heirs from being diſinherited.

By the old common law there is a writ *de idiota inquirendo*, to inquire whether a man be an idiot or not [9]: which muſt be tried by a jury of twelve men: and, if they find him *purus idiota*, the profits of his lands, and the cuſtody of his perſon may be granted by the king to ſome ſubject, who has intereſt enough to obtain them [o]. This branch of the revenue hath been long conſidered as a hardſhip upon private families: and ſo long ago as in the 8 Jac. I. it was under the conſideration of parliament, to veſt this cuſtody in the relations of the party, and to ſettle an equivalent on the crown in lieu of it; it being then propoſed to ſhare the ſame fate with the ſlavery of the feodal tenures, which has been ſince aboliſhed [1]. Yet few inſtances can be given of the oppreſſive exertion of it, ſince it

[5] Flet. *l.* 1. *c.* 11. §. 10.

[6] Dyer. 302. Hutt. 17. Noy. 27.

[7] F. N. B. 232.

[8] 4 Rep. 126. *Memorand' Scacc' 20 Edw. I.* (prefixed to Maynard's year book of Edw. II.) fol. 20. 24.

[9] F. N. B. 232.

[o] This power, though of late very rarely exerted, is ſtill alluded to in common ſpeech, by that uſual expreſſion of *begging* a man for a fool.

[1] 4 Inſt. 203. Com. journ. 1610.

ſeldom happens that a jury finds a man an idiot *a nativitate*, but only *non compos mentis* from ſome particular time; which has an operation very different in point of law.

A man is not an idiot [2], if he hath any glimmering of reaſon, ſo that he can tell his parents, his age, or the like common matters. But a man who is born deaf, dumb, and blind, is looked upon by the law as in the ſame ſtate with an idiot [3]; he being ſuppoſed incapable of any underſtanding, as wanting all thoſe ſenſes which furniſh the human mind with ideas.

A lunatic, or *non compos mentis*, is one who hath had underſtanding, but by diſeaſe, grief, or other accident hath loſt the uſe of his reaſon [4]. A lunatic is indeed properly one that hath lucid intervals; ſometimes enjoying his ſenſes, and ſometimes not, and that frequently depending upon the change of the moon. But under the general name of *non compos mentis*, (which ſir Edward Coke ſays is the moſt legal name [5]) are comprized not only lunatics, but perſons under frenzies; or who loſe their intellects by diſeaſe; thoſe that *grow* deaf, dumb, and blind, not being *born* ſo; or ſuch, in ſhort, as are judged by the court of chancery incapable of conducting their own affairs. To theſe alſo, as well as idiots, the king is guardian, but to a very different purpoſe. For the law always imagines, that theſe accidental misfortunes may be removed; and therefore only conſtitutes the crown a truſtee for the unfortunate perſons, to protect their property, and to account to them for all profits received, if they recover, or after their deceaſe to their repreſentatives. And therefore it is declared by the ſtatute 17 Edw. II. c. 10. that the king ſhall provide for the cuſtody and ſuſtentation of lunatics, and preſerve their lands and the profits of them for their uſe, when they come to

[2] F. N. B. 233.

[3] Co. Lit. 42. Fleta. *l.* 6. c. 40.

[4] *Idiota a caſu et infirmitate.* (*Mem. Scacch.* 20 *Edw. I.* in Maynard's year-book of Edw. II. 20.)

[5] 3 Inſt. 246.

their right mind; and the king ſhall take nothing to his own uſe: and if the parties die in ſuch eſtate, the reſidue ſhall be diſtributed for their ſouls by the advice of the ordinary, and of courſe (by the ſubſequent amendments of the law of adminiſtration) ſhall now go to their executors or adminiſtrators.

On the firſt attack of lunacy, or other occaſional inſanity, while there may be hopes of a ſpeedy reſtitution of reaſon, it is uſual to confine the unhappy objects in private cuſtody under the direction of their neareſt friends and relations: and the legiſlature, to prevent all abuſes incident to ſuch private cuſtody, hath thought proper to interpoſe it's authority, by ſtatute 14 Geo. III. c. 49. (continued by 19 Geo. III. c. 15.) *(g)* for regulating private madhouſes. But, when the diſorder is grown permanent, and the circumſtances of the party will bear ſuch additional expence, it is proper to apply to the royal authority to warrant a laſting confinement.

The method of proving a perſon *non compos* is very ſimilar to that of proving him an idiot. The lord chancellor, to whom, by ſpecial authority from the king, the cuſtody of idiots and lunatics is entruſted [6], upon petition or information, grants a commiſſion in nature of the writ *de idiota inquirendo*, to inquire into the party's ſtate of mind; and if he be found *non compos*, he uſually commits the care of his perſon, with a ſuitable allowance for his maintenance, to ſome friend, who is then called his committee. However, to prevent ſiniſter practices, the next heir is ſeldom permitted to be this committee of the perſon; becauſe it is his intereſt that the party ſhould die. But it hath been ſaid, there lies not the ſame objection againſt his next of kin, provided he be not his heir; for it is his intereſt to preſerve the lunatic's life, in order to increaſe the perſonal eſtate by ſavings, which he or his family may hereafter be entitled to enjoy [7]. The heir is generally made the manager or committee of the eſtate,

[6] 3 P. Wms. 108. [7] 2 P. Wms. 638.

(g) [And made perpetual by 26 Geo. III. c. 91.]

it being clearly his intereſt by good management to keep it in condition: accountable however to the court of chancery, and to the *non compos* himſelf, if he recovers; or otherwiſe, to his adminiſtrators.

In this caſe of idiots and lunatics the civil law agrees with ours; by aſſigning them tutors to protect their perſons, and curators to manage their eſtates. But in another inſtance the Roman law goes much beyond the Engliſh. For, if a man by notorious prodigality was in danger of waſting his eſtate, he was looked upon as *non compos*, and committed to the care of curators or tutors by the praetor[8]. And by the laws of Solon ſuch prodigals were branded with perpetual infamy[9]. But with us, when a man on an inqueſt of idiocy hath been returned an *unthrift* and not an *idiot*[o], no farther proceedings have been had. And the propriety of the practice itſelf ſeems to be very queſtionable. It was doubtleſs an excellent method of beneſiting the individual, and of preſerving eſtates in families; but it hardly ſeems calculated for the genius of a free nation, who claim and exerciſe the liberty of uſing their own property as they pleaſe. "*Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas,*" is the only reſtriction our laws have given with regard to oeconomical prudence. And the frequent circulation and transfer of lands and other property, which cannot be effected without extravagance ſomewhere, are perhaps not a little conducive towards keeping our mixed conſtitution in it's due health and vigour.

This may ſuffice for a ſhort view of the king's *ordinary* revenue, or the proper patrimony of the crown; which was very large formerly, and capable of being increaſed to a magnitude truly formidable: for there are very few eſtates in the kingdom,

[8] *Solent praetores, ſi talem hominem invenerint, qui neque tempus neque finem expenſarum habet, ſed bona ſua dilacerando et diſſipando profundit, curatorem ei dare, exemplo furioſi: et tamdiu erunt ambo in curatione, quamdiu vel furioſus ſanitatem, vel ille bonos mores, receperit. Ff.* 27. 10. 1.

[9] Potter Antiqu. b. 1. c. 26.

[o] Bro. *Abr. tit. Idiot.* 4.

that have not, at ſome period or other ſince the Norman conqueſt, been veſted in the hands of the king by forfeiture, eſcheat, or otherwiſe. But, fortunately for the liberty of the ſubject, this hereditary landed revenue, by a ſeries of improvident management, is ſunk almoſt to nothing; and the caſual profits, ariſing from the other branches of the *cenſus regalis*, are likewiſe almoſt all of them alienated from the crown. In order to ſupply the deficiencies of which, we are now obliged to have recourſe to new methods of raiſing money, unknown to our early anceſtors; which methods conſtitute the king's *extraordinary* revenue. For, the public patrimony being got into the hands of private ſubjects, it is but reaſonable that private contributions ſhould ſupply the public ſervice. Which, though it may perhaps fall harder upon ſome individuals, whoſe anceſtors have had no ſhare in the general plunder, than upon others, yet, taking the nation throughout, it amounts to nearly the ſame; provided the gain by the extraordinary, ſhould appear to be no greater than the loſs by the ordinary, revenue. And perhaps, if every gentleman in the kingdom was to be ſtripped of ſuch of his lands as were formerly the property of the crown; was to be again ſubject to the inconveniencies of purveyance and pre-emption, the oppreſſion of foreſt laws, and the ſlavery of feodal tenures; and was to reſign into the king's hands all his royal franchiſes of waifs, wrecks, eſtrays, treaſure-trove, mines, deodands, forfeitures, and the like; he would find himſelf a greater loſer, than by paying his *quota* to ſuch taxes, as are neceſſary to the ſupport of government. The thing therefore to be wiſhed and aimed at in a land of liberty is by no means the total abolition of taxes, which would draw after it very pernicious conſequences, and the very ſuppoſition of which is the height of political abſurdity. For as the true idea of government and magiſtracy will be found to conſiſt in this, that ſome few men are deputed by many others to preſide over public affairs, ſo that

individuals may the better be enabled to attend their private concerns; it is neceſſary that thoſe individuals ſhould be bound to contribute a portion of their private gains, in order to ſupport that government, and reward that magiſtracy, which protects them in the enjoyment of their reſpective properties. But the things to be aimed at are wiſdom and moderation, not only in granting, but alſo in the method of raiſing, the neceſſary ſupplies; by contriving to do both in ſuch a manner as may be moſt conducive to the national welfare, and at the ſame time moſt conſiſtent with the oeconomy and the liberty of the ſubject; who, when properly taxed, contributes only, as was before obſerved [1], ſome part of his property, in order to enjoy the reſt.

Theſe extraordinary grants are uſually called by the ſynonymous names of aids, ſubſidies, and ſupplies; and are granted, we have formerly ſeen [2], by the commons of Great Britain in parliament aſſembled: who, when they have voted a ſupply to his majeſty, and ſettle the *quantum* of that ſupply, uſually reſolve themſelves into what is called a committee of way and means, to conſider the ways and means of raiſing the ſupply ſo voted. And in this committee every member (though it is looked upon as the peculiar province of the chancellor of the exchequer) may propoſe ſuch ſcheme of taxation as he thinks will be leaſt detrimental to the public. The reſolutions of this committee, when approved by a vote of the houſe, are in general eſteemed to be (as it were) final and concluſive. For, though the ſupply cannot be actually raiſed upon the ſubject till directed by an act of the whole parliament, yet no monied man will ſcruple to advance to the government any quantity of ready caſh, on the credit of a bare vote of the houſe of commons, though no law be yet paſſed to eſtabliſh it.

The taxes, which are raiſed upon the ſubject, are either annual or perpetual. The uſual annual taxes are thoſe upon land and malt.

[1] page 284. [2] page 171.

I. The land tax, in it's modern ſhape, has ſuperſeded all the former methods of rating either property, or perſons in reſpect of their property, whether by tenths or fifteenths, ſubſidies on land, hydages, ſcutages, or talliages; a ſhort explication of which will however greatly aſſiſt us in underſtanding our ancient laws and hiſtory.

Tenths, and fifteenths [3], were temporary aids iſſuing out of perſonal property, and granted to the king by parliament. They were formerly the real tenth or fifteenth part of all the moveables belonging to the ſubject; when ſuch moveables, or perſonal eſtates, were a very different and a much leſs conſiderable thing than what they uſually are at this day. Tenths are ſaid to have been firſt granted under Henry the ſecond, who took advantage of the faſhionable zeal for croiſades to introduce this new taxation, in order to defray the expence of a pious expedition to Paleſtine, which he really or ſeemingly had projected againſt Saladine emperor of the Saracens; whence it was originally denominated the Saladine tenth [4]. But afterwards fifteenths were more uſually granted than tenths. Originally the amount of theſe taxes was uncertain, being levied by aſſeſſments new made at every freſh grant of the commons, a commiſſion for which is preſerved by Matthew Paris [5]: but it was at length reduced to a certainty in the eighth year of Edward III, when, by virtue of the king's commiſſion new taxations were made of every townſhip, borough, and city in the kingdom, and recorded in the exchequer; which rate was, at the time, the fifteenth part of the value of every townſhip, the whole amounting to about 29000 *l.* and therefore it ſtill kept up the name of a fifteenth, when, by the alteration of the value of money and the increaſe of perſonal property, things came to be in a very different ſituation. So that when, of later years, the commons granted the king a fifteenth, every pariſh in England immediately

[3] 2 Inſt. 77. 4 Inſt. 34. Carte. 1. 719. Hume. i. 329.
[4] Hoved. *A. D.* 1188. [5] *A. D.* 1232.

knew their proportion of it; that is, the ſame identical ſum that was aſſeſſed by the ſame aid in the eighth of Edward III; and then raiſed it by a rate among themſelves, and returned it into the royal exchequer.

The other antient levies were in the nature of a modern land tax: for we may trace up the original of that charge as high as to the introduction of our military tenures [6]; when every tenant of a knight's fee was bound, if called upon, to attend the king in his army for forty days in every year. But this perſonal attendance growing troubleſome in many reſpects, the tenants found means of compounding for it, by firſt ſending others in their ſtead, and in proceſs of time by making a pecuniary ſatisfaction to the crown in lieu of it. This pecuniary ſatisfaction at laſt came to be levied by aſſeſſments, at ſo much for every knight's fee, under the name of ſcutages; which appear to have been levied for the firſt time in the fifth year of Henry the ſecond, on account of his expedition to Toulouſe, and were then (I apprehend) mere arbitrary compoſitions, as the king and the ſubject could agree. But this precedent being afterwards abuſed into a means of oppreſſion, (in levying ſcutages on the landholders by the royal authority only, whenever our kings went to war, in order to hire mercenary troops and pay their contingent expences) it became thereupon a matter of national complaint; and king John was obliged to promiſe in his *magna carta* [7], that no ſcutage ſhould be impoſed without the conſent of the common council of the realm. This clauſe was indeed omitted in the charters of Henry III, where [8] we only find it ſtipulated, that ſcutages ſhould be taken as they were uſed to be in the time of king Henry the ſecond. Yet afterwards, by a variety of ſtatutes under Edward I. and his grandſon [9], it was

[6] See the ſecond book of theſe commentaries.

[7] *cap.* 14.

[8] 9 Hen. III. c. 37.

[9] 25 Edw. I. c. 5 & 6. 34 Edw. I. ſt. 4. c. 1. 14 Ed. III. ſt. 2. c. 1.

provided, that the king ſhould not take any aids or taſks, any talliage or tax, but by the common aſſent of the great men and commons in parliament.

Of the ſame nature with ſcutages upon knight's-fees were the aſſeſſments of hydage upon all other lands, and of talliage upon cities and burghs [o]. But they all gradually fell into diſuſe upon the introduction of ſubſidies, about the time of king Richard II. and king Henry IV. Theſe were a tax, not immediately impoſed upon property, but upon perſons in reſpect of their reputed eſtates, after the nominal rate of 4*s.* in the pound for lands, and 2*s.* 8*d.* for goods; and for thoſe of aliens in a double proportion. But this aſſeſſment was alſo made according to an antient valuation; wherein the computation was ſo very moderate, and the rental of the kingdom was ſuppoſed to be ſo exceeding low, that one ſubſidy of this ſort did not, according to ſir Edward Coke [z], amount to more than 70000*l.* whereas a modern land-tax at the ſame rate produces two millions. It was antiently the rule never to grant more than one ſubſidy, and two fifteenths at a time: but this rule was broken through for the firſt time on a very preſſing occaſion, the Spaniſh invaſion in 1588; when the parliament gave queen Elizabeth two ſubſidies and four-fifteenths. Afterwards, as money ſunk in value, more ſubſidies were given; and we have an inſtance in the firſt parliament of 1640, of the king's deſiring twelve ſubſidies of the commons, to be levied in three years; which was looked upon as a ſtartling propoſal: though lord Clarendon ſays [a], that the ſpeaker, ſerjeant Glanville, made it manifeſt to the houſe, how very inconſiderable a ſum twelve ſubſidies amounted to, by telling them he had computed what he was to pay for them himſelf; and when he named the ſum, he being known to be poſſeſſed of a great eſtate, it ſeemed not worth any farther deliberation. And indeed upon calculation, we ſhall find, that the total

[o] Madox. hiſt. exch. 480.
[z] 4 Inſt. 33.
[a] Hiſt. b. 2.

amount of theſe twelve ſubſidies, to be raiſed in three years, is leſs than what is now raiſed in one year, by a land tax of two ſhillings in the pound.

The grant of ſcutages, talliages, or ſubſidies by the commons did not extend to ſpiritual preferments; thoſe being uſually taxed at the ſame time by the clergy themſelves in convocation: which grants of the clergy were confirmed in parliament, otherwiſe they were illegal, and not binding; as the ſame noble writer obſerves of the ſubſidies granted by the convocation, which continued ſitting after the diſſolution of the firſt parliament in 1640. A ſubſidy granted by the clergy was after the rate of 4*s.* in the pound according to the valuation of their livings in the king's books; and amounted, as ſir Edward Coke tells us [2], to about 20000*l.* While this cuſtom continued, convocations were wont to ſit as frequently as parliaments: but the laſt ſubſidies, thus given by the clergy, were thoſe confirmed by ſtatute 15 Car. II. cap. 10. ſince which another method of taxation has generally prevailed, which takes in the clergy as well as the laity: in recompence for which the beneficed clergy have from that period been allowed to vote at the election of knights of the ſhire [3]; and thenceforward alſo the practice of giving eccleſiaſtical ſubſidies hath fallen into total diſuſe.

The lay ſubſidy was uſually raiſed by commiſſioners appointed by the crown, or the great officers of ſtate; and therefore in the beginning of the civil wars between Charles I. and his parliament, the latter having no other ſufficient revenue to ſupport themſelves and their meaſures, introduced the practice of laying weekly and monthly aſſeſſments [4] of a ſpecific ſum upon the ſeveral counties of the kingdom; to be levied by a pound rate on lands and perſonal eſtates: which were occaſionally continued during the whole uſurpation, ſometimes at the rate of 120000*l.* a month, ſometimes at inferior rates [5].

[2] 4 Inſt. 33.
[3] Dalt. of ſheriffs, 418. Gilb. hiſt. of exch. c. 4.
[4] 29 Nov. 4 Mar. 1642.
[5] One of theſe bills of aſſeſſment, in 1656, is preſerved in Scobell's collection, 400.

After the reſtoration the ancient method of granting ſubſidies, inſtead of ſuch monthly aſſeſſments, was twice, and twice only, renewed; *viz.* in 1663, when four ſubſidies were granted by the temporalty, and four by the clergy; and in 1670, when 800000*l.* was raiſed by way of ſubſidy, which was the laſt time of raiſing ſupplies in that manner. For, the monthly aſſeſſments being now eſtabliſhed by cuſtom, being raiſed by commiſſioners named by parliament, and producing a more certain revenue; from that time forwards we hear no more of ſubſidies, but occaſional aſſeſſments were granted, as the national emergencies required. Theſe periodical aſſeſſments, the ſubſidies which preceded them, and the more antient ſcutage, hydage, and talliage, were to all intents and purpoſes a land tax; and the aſſeſſments were ſometimes expreſsly called ſo [6]. Yet a popular opinion has prevailed, that the land tax was firſt introduced in the reign of king William III; becauſe in the year 1692 a new aſſeſſment or valuation of eſtates was made throughout the kingdom: which, though by no means a perfect one, had this effect, that a ſupply of 500000*l.* was equal to 1*s.* in the pound of the value of the eſtates given in. And, according to this enhanced valuation, from the year 1693 to the preſent, a period of above fourſcore years, the land tax has continued an annual charge upon the ſubject; above half the time at 4*s.* in the pound, ſometimes at 3*s*, ſometimes at 2*s*, twice [7] at 1*s*, but without any total intermiſſion. The medium has been 3*s.* 3*d.* in the pound; being equivalent with twenty-three antient ſubſidies, and amounting annually to more than a million and a half of money. The method of raiſing it is by charging a particular ſum upon each county, according to the valuation given in, *A. D.* 1692: and this ſum is aſſeſſed and raiſed upon individuals (their perſonal eſtates, as well as real, being liable thereto) by commiſſioners appointed in the act, being the principal landholders of the county, and their officers.

[6] Com. journ. 26 Jun. 9 Dec. 1678. [7] In the years 1732 and 1733.

II. The other annual tax is the malt tax; which is a ſum of 750000l. raiſed every year by parliament, ever ſince 1697, by a duty of 6*d.* in the buſhel on malt, and a proportionable ſum on certain liquors, ſuch as cyder and perry, which might otherwiſe prevent the conſumption of malt. This is under the management of the commiſſioners of the exciſe; and is indeed itſelf no other than an annual exciſe, the nature of which ſpecies of taxation I ſhall preſently explain: only premiſing at preſent, that in the year 1760 an additional perpetual exciſe of 3*d. per* buſhel was laid upon malt; to the produce of which a duty of 15 *per cent*, or nearly an additional halfpenny per buſhel, was added in 1779: and that in 1763 a proportionable exciſe was laid upon cyder and perry, but ſo new-modelled in 1766, as ſcarce to be worth collecting.

The perpetual taxes are,

I. The cuſtoms; or the duties, toll, tribute, or tariff, payable upon merchandize exported and imported. The conſiderations upon which this revenue (or the more antient part of it, which aroſe only from exports) was inveſted in the king, were ſaid to be two [7]; 1. Becauſe he gave the ſubject leave to depart the kingdom, and to carry his goods along with him. 2. Becauſe the king was bound of common right to maintain and keep up the ports and havens, and to protect the merchant from pirates. Some have imagined they are called with us cuſtoms, becauſe they were the inheritance of the king by immemorial uſage and the common law, and not granted him by any ſtatute [8]: but ſir Edward Coke hath clearly ſhewn [9], that the king's firſt claim to them was by grant of parliament 3 Edw. I. though the record thereof is not now extant. And indeed this is in expreſs words confeſſed by ſtatute 25 Edw. I. c. 7. wherein the king promiſes to take no cuſtoms from merchants, without the common aſſent of the

[7] Dyer. 165.
[8] Dyer. 43. *pl.* 24.
[9] 2 Inſt. 58, 59.

realm, "ſaving to us and our heirs, the cuſtoms on "wool, ſkins, and leather, formerly granted to us "by the commonalty aforeſaid." Theſe were formerly called the hereditary cuſtoms of the crown; and were due on the exportation only of the ſaid three commodities, and of none other: which were ſtyled the *ſtaple* commodities of the kingdom, becauſe they were obliged to be brought to thoſe ports where the king's ſtaple was eſtabliſhed, in order to be there firſt rated, and then exported [c]. They were denominated in the barbarous Latin of our antient records, *cuſtuma* [1]; not *conſuetudines*, which is the language of our law whenever it means merely uſages. The duties on wool, ſheep-ſkins, or woolfells, and leather, exported, were called *cuſtuma antiqua ſive magna*: and were payable by every merchant, as well native as ſtranger; with this difference, that merchant ſtrangers paid an additional toll, viz. half as much again as was paid by natives. The *cuſtuma parva et nova* were an impoſt of 3*d*. in the pound, due from merchant ſtrangers only, for all commodities, as well imported as exported; which was uſually called the alien's duty, and was firſt granted in 31 Edw. I [2]. But theſe antient hereditary cuſtoms, eſpecially thoſe on wool and woolfells, came to be of little account, when the nation became ſenſible of the advantages of a home manufacture, and prohibited the exportation of wool by ſtatute 11 Edw. III. c. 1.

There is alſo another very ancient hereditary duty belonging to the crown, called the *priſage* or *butlerage* of wines; which is conſiderably older than the cuſtoms, being taken notice of in the great roll of the exchequer, 8 Ric. I. ſtill extant [3]. Priſage was a right of *taking* two tons of wine from every ſhip (Engliſh or foreign) importing into England twenty

[c] Dav. 9.

[1] This appellation ſeems to be derived from the French word *couſtum*, or *coûtum*, which ſignifies toll or tribute, and owes it's etymology to the word *couſt*, which ſignifies price, charge, or as we have adopted it in Engliſh, *coſt*.

[2] 4 Inſt. 29.

[3] Madox. hiſt. exch. 526. 532.

tons or more; one before and one behind the maſt: which by charter of Edward I was exchanged into a duty of 2*s*. for every ton imported by merchant-ſtrangers, and called butlerage, becauſe paid to the king's butler [4].

Other cuſtoms payable upon exports and imports were diſtinguiſhed into ſubſidies, tonnage, poundage, and other impoſts. Subſidies were ſuch as were impoſed by parliament upon any of the ſtaple commodities before mentioned, over and above the *cuſtuma antiqua et magna*: tonnage was a duty upon all wines imported, over and above the priſage and butlerage aforeſaid: poundage was a duty impoſed *ad valorem*, at the rate of 12*d*. in the pound, on all other merchandize whatſoever; and the other impoſts were ſuch as were occaſionally laid on by parliament, as circumſtances and times required [5]. Theſe diſtinctions are now in a manner forgotten, except by the officers immediately concerned in this department; their produce being in effect all blended together, under the one denomination of the cuſtoms.

By theſe we underſtand at preſent, a duty or ſubſidy paid by the merchant, at the quay, upon all imported as well as exported commodities, by authority of parliament; unleſs where, for particular national reaſons, certain rewards, bounties, or drawbacks, are allowed for particular exports or imports. Thoſe of tonnage and poundage, in particular, were at firſt granted, as the old ſtatutes (and particularly 1 Eliz. c. 19.) expreſs it, for the defence of the realm, and the keeping and ſafeguard of the ſeas, and for the intercourſe of merchandize ſafely to come into and paſs out of the ſame. They were at firſt uſually granted only for a ſtated term of years, as, for two years in 5 Ric. II [6]; but in Henry the ſixth's time, they were granted him for life by a ſtatute in the thirty-firſt year of his reign; and again to

[4] Dav. 8. 2 Bulſtr. 254. Stat. Eſtr. 16 Edw. II. Com. journ. 27 Apr. 1689.

[5] Dav. 11, 12.

[6] Dav. 12.

Edward IV. for the term of his life alſo: ſince which time they were regularly granted to all his ſucceſſors, for life, ſometimes at the firſt, ſometimes at other ſubſequent parliaments, till the reign of Charles the firſt; when, as the noble hiſtorian expreſſes it [7], his miniſters were not ſufficiently ſolicitous for a renewal of this legal grant. And yet theſe impoſts were imprudently and unconſtitutionally levied and taken, without conſent of parliament, for fifteen years together; which was one of the cauſes of thoſe unhappy diſcontents, juſtifiable at firſt in too many inſtances, but which degenerated at laſt into cauſeleſs rebellion and murder. For, as in every other, ſo in this particular caſe, the king (previous to the commencement of hoſtilities) gave the nation ample ſatisfaction for the errors of his former conduct, by paſſing an act [8], whereby he renounced all power in the crown of levying the duty of tonnage and poundage, without the expreſs conſent of parliament; and alſo all power of impoſition upon any merchandizes whatever. Upon the reſtoration this duty was granted to king Charles the ſecond for life, and ſo it was to his two immediate ſucceſſors; but now by three ſeveral ſtatutes, 9 Ann. c. 6, 1 Geo. I. c. 12. and 3 Geo. I. c. 7. it is made perpetual and mortgaged for the debt of the public. The cuſtoms thus impoſed by parliament, are chiefly contained in two books of rates, ſet forth by parliamentary authority [9]; one ſigned by ſir Harbottle Grimſton, ſpeaker of the houſe of commons in Charles the ſecond's time; and the other an additional one ſigned by ſir Spenſer Compton, ſpeaker in the reign of George the firſt; to which alſo ſubſequent additions have been made. Aliens pay a larger proportion than natural ſubjects, which is what is now generally underſtood by the alien's duty; to be exempted from which is one principal cauſe of the frequent applications to parliaments for acts of naturalization.

[7] Hiſt. Rebell. b. 3.
[8] 16 Car. I. c. 8.
[9] Stat. 12 Car. II. c. 4 11 Geo. I. c. 7.

These customs are then, we see, a tax immediately paid by the merchant, although ultimately by the consumer. And yet these are the duties felt least by the people; and, if prudently managed, the people hardly consider that they pay them at all. For the merchant is easy, being sensible he does not pay them for himself; and the consumer, who really pays them, confounds them with the price of the commodity: in the same manner as Tacitus observes, that the emperor Nero gained the reputation of abolishing the tax of the sale of slaves, though he only transferred it from the buyer to the seller; so that it was, as he expresses it, "*remissum magis specie, quam* "*vi: quia, cum venditor pendere juberetur, in partem* "*pretii emptoribus accrescebat*[o]." But this inconvenience attends it on the other hand, that these imposts, if too heavy, are a check and cramp upon trade; and especially when the value of the commodity bears little or no proportion to the quantity of the duty imposed. This in consequence gives rise also to smuggling, which then becomes a very lucrative employment: and it's natural and most reasonable punishment, *viz.* confiscation of the commodity, is in such cases quite ineffectual; the intrinsic value of the goods, which is all that the smuggler has paid, and therefore all that he can lose, being very inconsiderable when compared with his prospect of advantage in evading the duty. Recourse must therefore be had to extraordinary punishments to prevent it; perhaps even to capital ones: which destroys all proportion of punishment[1], and puts murderers upon an equal footing with such as are really guilty of no natural, but merely a positive, offence.

There is also another ill consequence attending high imposts on merchandize, not frequently considered, but indisputably certain; that the earlier any tax is laid on a commodity, the heavier it falls upon the consumer in the end: for every trader, through whose hands it passes, must have a profit, not only upon the raw material and his own labour and time

[o] *Hist. l.* 13.

[1] Montesq. Sq. L. b. 13. c. 8.

in preparing, but alſo upon the very tax itſelf, which he advances to the government; otherwiſe he loſes the uſe and intereſt of the money which he ſo advances. To inſtance in the article of foreign paper. The merchant pays a duty upon importation, which he does not receive again till he ſells the commodity, perhaps at the end of three months. He is therefore equally entitled to a profit upon that duty which he pays at the cuſtom-houſe, as to a profit upon the original price which he pays to the manufacturer abroad; and conſiders it accordingly in the price he demands of the ſtationer. When the ſtationer ſells it again, he requires a profit of the printer or bookſeller upon the whole ſum advanced by him to the merchant: and the bookſeller does not forget to charge the full proportion to the ſtudent or ultimate conſumer; who therefore does not only pay the original duty, but the profits of theſe three intermediate traders, who have ſucceſſively advanced it for him. This might be carried much farther in any mechanical, or more complicated, branch of trade.

II. Directly oppoſite in it's nature to this is the exciſe duty; which is an inland impoſition, paid ſometimes upon the conſumption of the commodity, or frequently upon the retail ſale, which is the laſt ſtage before the conſumption. This is doubtleſs, impartially ſpeaking, the moſt oeconomical way of taxing the ſubject: the charges of levying, collecting and managing the exciſe duties being conſiderably leſs in proportion, than in other branches of the revenue. It alſo renders the commodity cheaper to the conſumer, than charging it with cuſtoms to the ſame amount would do; for the reaſon juſt now given, becauſe generally paid in a much later ſtage of it. But, at the ſame time, the rigour and arbitrary proceedings of exciſe-laws ſeem hardly compatible with the temper of a free nation. For the frauds that might be committed in this branch of the revenue, unleſs a ſtrict watch is kept, make it

neceſſary, wherever it is eſtabliſhed, to give the officers a power of entering and ſearching the houſes of ſuch as deal in exciſeable commodities, at any hour of the day, and, in many caſes, of the night likewiſe. And the proceedings in caſe of tranſgreſſions are ſo ſummary and ſudden, that a man may be convicted in two days time in the penalty of many thouſand pounds by two commiſſioners or juſtices of the peace: to the total excluſion of the trial by jury, and diſregard of the common law. For which reaſon, though lord Clarendon tells us [2], that to his knowledge the Earl of Bedford (who was made lord treaſurer by king Charles the firſt, to oblige his parliament) intended to have ſet up the exciſe in England, yet it never made a part of that unfortunate prince's revenue; being firſt introduced, on the model of the Dutch prototype, by the parliament itſelf after it's rupture with the crown. Yet ſuch was the opinion of it's general unpopularity, that when in 1642 "aſperſions were caſt by malig-"nant perſons upon the houſe of commons, that "they intended to introduce exciſes, the houſe for "it's vindication therein did declare, that theſe ru-"mours were falſe and ſcandalous; and that their au-"thors ſhould be apprehended and brought to condign "puniſhment [3]." However, it's original [4] eſtabliſhment was in 1643, and it's progreſs was gradual; being at firſt laid upon thoſe perſons and commodities, where it was ſuppoſed the hardſhip would be

[2] Hiſt. b. 3.

[3] Com. Journ. 8 Oct. 1642.

[4] The tranſlator and continuator of Petavius's chronological hiſtory (Lond. 1659. fol.) informs us, that it was firſt moved for, 28 Mar. 1643, by Mr. Prynne. And it appears from the journals of the commons, that on that day the houſe reſolved itſelf into a committee to conſider of raiſing money, in conſequence of which the exciſe was afterwards voted. But Mr. Prynne was not a member parliament till 7 Nov. 1648; and publiſhed in 1654, A proteſtation "againſt the illegal, deteſta-"ble, and oft-condemned tax "and extortion of exciſe in "general." It is probably therefore a miſtake of the printer for Mr. Pymme, who was intended for chancellor of the exchequer under the earl of Bedford. Lord Clar. b. 7.

leaſt perceivable, *viz.* the makers and venders of beer, ale, cyder, and perry[5], and the royaliſts at Oxford ſoon followed the example of their brethren at Weſtminſter by impoſing a ſimilar duty; both ſides proteſting that it ſhould be continued no longer than to the end of the war, and then be utterly aboliſhed[6]. But the parliament at Weſtminſter ſoon after impoſed it on fleſh, wine, tobacco, ſugar, and ſuch a multitude of other commodities, that it might fairly be denominated general: in purſuance of the plan laid down by Mr. Pymme (who ſeems to have been the father of the exciſe) in his letter to ſir John Hotham[7], ſignifying, "that they had proceeded in "the exciſe to many particulars, and intended to go "on farther; but that it would be neceſſary to uſe "the people to it by little and little." And afterwards, when the nation had been accuſtomed to it for a ſeries of years, the ſucceeding champions of liberty boldly and openly declared, "the impoſt of "exciſe to be the moſt eaſy and indifferent levy that "could be laid upon the people[8]:" and accordingly continued it during the whole uſurpation. Upon king Charles's return, it having then been long eſtabliſhed and it's produce well known, ſome part of it was given to the crown, in 12 Car. II. by way of purchaſe (as was before obſerved) for the feodal tenures and other oppreſſive parts of the hereditary revenue. But, from it's firſt original to the preſent time, it's very name has been odious to the people of England. It has nevertheleſs been impoſed on abundance of other commodities in the reigns of king William III. and every ſucceeding prince, to ſupport the enormous expenſes occaſioned by our wars on the continent. Thus brandies and other ſpirits are now exciſed at the diſtillery; printed ſilks and linens, at the printer's; ſtarch and hair powder, at the maker's: gold and ſilver wire, at the wire-

[5] Com. Journ. 17 May 1643.

[6] Lord Clar. b. 7.

[7] 30 May 1643. Dugdale of the troubles, 120.

[8] Ord. 14 Aug. 1649. c. 50. Scobell. 72. Stat. 1656. c. 19. Scobell. 453.

drawer's; plate in the hands of the vendor, who pays yearly for a licenſe to ſell it: lands and goods ſold by auction, for which a pound-rate is payable by the auctioneer, who alſo is charged with an annual duty for his licenſe; and coaches and other wheel carriages, for which the occupier is exciſed, though not with the ſame circumſtances of arbitrary ſtrictneſs, as in moſt of the other inſtances. To theſe we may add coffee and tea, chocolate and cocoa paſte, for which the duty is paid by the retailer; all artificial wines, commonly called ſweets; paper and paſteboard, firſt when made, and again if ſtained or printed; malt as before mentioned; vinegars; and the manufacture of glaſs; for all which the duty is paid by the manufacturer; hops, for which the perſon that gathers them is anſwerable; candles and ſoap, which are paid for at the maker's; malt liquors brewed for ſale, which are exciſed at the brewery; cyder and perry, at the vendor's; and leather and ſkins, at the tanner's. A liſt, which no friend to his country would wiſh to ſee farther increaſed.

III. I proceed therefore to a third duty, namely that upon ſalt; which is another diſtinct branch of his majeſty's extraordinary revenue, and conſiſts in an exciſe of 3*s*. 4*d*. *per* buſhel impoſed upon all ſalt; by ſeveral ſtatutes of king William and other ſubſequent reigns. This is not generally called an exciſe, becauſe under the management of different commiſſioners: but the commiſſioners of the ſalt duties have by ſtatute 1 Ann. c. 21. the ſame powers, and muſt obſerve the ſame regulations, as thoſe of other exciſes. This tax had uſually been only temporary; but by ſtatute 26 Geo. II. c. 3. was made perpetual [D].

[D] By ſtatute 22 Geo III. c. 39. a further duty is laid; particularly, on Glauber and Epſom ſalts, and mineral alkali or flux for glaſs, made of rock ſalt, brine or ſea water, and an annual duty of 5*l*. for a licenſe is charged on the maker thereof (*h*).

(*h*) [The ſtatute 26 Geo. III. c. 90. repeals ſuch part of the ſtatute 22 Geo. 3. c. 39. as relates to the obtaining of rock ſalt, or ſalt rock, or brine, or ſea water, for the purpoſe of

IV. Another very conſiderable branch of the revenue is levied with greater chearfulneſs, as, inſtead of being a burden, it is a manifeſt advantage to the public. I mean the poſt-office, or duty for the carriage of letters. As we have traced the original of the exciſe to the parliament of 1643, ſo it is but juſtice to obſerve that this uſeful invention owes it's firſt legiſlative eſtabliſhment to the ſame aſſembly. It is true, there exiſted poſt-maſters in much earlier times: but I apprehend their buſineſs was confined to the furniſhing of poſt-horſes to perſons who were deſirous to travel expeditiouſly, and to the diſpatching of extraordinary packets upon ſpecial occaſions. King James I originally erected a poſt-office under the controll of one Matthew de Queſter or de l'Equeſter for the conveyance of letters to and from foreign parts; which office was afterwards claimed by lord Stanhope [9], but was confirmed and continued to William Frizell and Thomas Witherings by king Charles I, *A. D.* 1632, for the better accommodation of the Engliſh merchants [10]. In 1635, the ſame prince erected a letter-office for England and Scotland, under the direction of the ſame Thomas Witherings, and ſettled certain rates of poſtage [11]: but this extended only to a few of the principal roads, the times of carriage were uncertain, and the poſt-maſters on each road were required to furniſh the mail with horſes at the rate of 2½*d.* a mile. Witherings was ſuperſeded, for abuſes in the execution of both his offices, in 1640; and they were ſequeſtered into the hands of Philip Burlamachy, to be exerciſed under the care and overſight of the king's principal ſecretary of ſtate [12]. On the breaking out of

9 Latch. Rep. 87. 192.
10 19 Raym. *Fred.* 385. 12 20 Rym. 429.
11 *Ibid.* 650. 20 Rym.

making a mineral alkali, or flux, for glaſs, duty free; with a proviſo, that glaſs-makers may take rock ſalt, or ſalt rock, or brine, or ſea water, for making a flux for glaſs only, at their own glaſs works, upon the terms of the ſaid act of 22 Geo. III.]

the civil war, great confuſions and interruptions were neceſſarily occaſioned in the conduct of the letter-office. And, about that time, the outline of the preſent more extended and regular plan ſeems to have been conceived by Mr. Edmond Prideaux, who was appointed attorney general to the commonwealth after the murder of king Charles. He was chairman of a committee in 1642 for conſidering what rates ſhould be ſet upon inland letters[3]; and afterwards appointed poſt-maſter by an ordinance of both the houſes[4], in the execution of which office he firſt eſtabliſhed a *weekly* conveyance of letters into *all* parts of the nation[5]; thereby ſaving to the public the charge of maintaining poſt-maſters, to the amount of 7000*l. per annum*. And, his own emoluments being probably very conſiderable, the common council of London endeavoured to erect another poſt-office in oppoſition to his; till checked by a reſolution of the houſe of commons[6], declaring, that the office of poſt-maſter is and ought to be in the ſole power and diſpoſal of the parliament. This office was afterwards farmed by one Manley in 1654[7]. But, in 1657, a regular poſt-office was erected by the authority of the protector and his parliament, upon nearly the ſame model as has been ever ſince adopted, and with the ſame rates of poſtage as continued till the reign of queen Anne[8]. After the reſtoration a ſimilar office, with ſome improvements, was eſtabliſhed by ſtatute 12 Car. II. c. 35. but the rates of letters were altered, and ſome farther regulations added, by the ſtatutes 9 Ann. c. 10. 6 Geo. I. c. 21. 26 Geo. II. c. 12. 5 Geo. III. c. 25. & 7 Geo. III. c. 50. and penalties were enacted, in order to confine the carriage of letters to the public office only, except in ſome few caſes: a proviſion, which is abſolutely neceſſary; for nothing but an excluſive right can ſupport an office of this

[3] Com. Journ. 28 Mar. 1642.
[4] *Ibid.* 7 Sept. 1644.
[5] *Ibid.* 21 Mar. 1649.
[6] *Ibid.* 21 Mar. 1649.
[7] Scobell. 358.
[8] Com. Journ. 9 June 1657. Scobell. 511.

ſort: many rival independent offices would only ſerve to ruin one another. The privilege of letters coming free of poſtage, to and from members of parliament, was claimed by the houſe of commons in 1660, when the firſt legal ſettlement of the preſent poſt-office was made [8]; but afterwards dropped [9] upon a private aſſurance from the crown, that this privilege ſhould be allowed the members [o]. And accordingly a warrant was conſtantly iſſued to the poſt-maſter-general [1], directing the allowance thereof, to the extent of two ounces in weight: till at length it was expreſsly confirmed by ſtatute 4 Geo. III. c. 24; which adds many new regulations, rendered neceſſary by the great abuſes crept into the practice of franking; whereby the annual amount of franked letters had gradually increaſed, from 23600*l.* in the year 1715, to 170700*l.* in the year 1763 [2] (*i*). There cannot be deviſed a more eligible method, than this, of raiſing money upon the ſubject: for therein both the government and the people find a mutual benefit. The government acquires a large revenue; and the people do their buſineſs with greater eaſe, expedition, and cheapneſs, than they would be able to do if no ſuch tax (and of courſe no ſuch office) exiſted.

V. A fifth branch of the perpetual revenue conſiſts in the ſtamp duties, which are a tax impoſed upon all parchment and paper whereon any legal proceedings, or private inſtruments of almoſt any nature whatſoever, are written; and, alſo upon licenſes for retailing wines, letting horſes to hire,

[8] Com. Journ. 17 Dec. 1660.
[9] *Ibid.* 22 Dec. 1660.
[o] *Ibid.* 16 Apr. 1735.
[1] *Ibid.* 26 Feb. 1734.
[2] *Ibid.* 28 Mar. 1764.

(*i*) [By ſtatute 24 Geo. III. ſeſſ. 2. c. 37. additional rates are impoſed upon all inland letters and packets, and the privilege of franking is put under ſtill farther reſtrictions; and it is made a tranſportable felony to counterfeit the hand-writing of any perſon in the ſuperſcription of any letter to be ſent by the poſt, or to counterfeit or alter the date upon the ſuperſcription of any letter, in order to evade the duty of poſtage.]

and for certain other purpoſes (*k*); and upon all almanacks, news-papers, advertiſements, cards, dice, and pamphlets, containing leſs than ſix ſheets of paper. Theſe impoſts are very various, according to the nature of the thing ſtamped, riſing gradually from a penny to ten pounds. This is alſo a tax, which though in ſome inſtances it may be heavily felt, by greatly increaſing the expenſe of all mercantile as well as legal proceedings, yet (if moderately impoſed) is of ſervice to the public in general, by authenticating inſtruments, and rendering it much more difficult than formerly to forge deeds of any ſtanding; ſince, as the officers of this branch of the revenue vary their ſtamps frequently, by marks perceptible to none but themſelves, a man that would forge a deed of king William's time, muſt know and be able to counterfeit the ſtamp of that date alſo. In France and ſome other countries the duty is laid on the contract itſelf, not on the inſtrument in which it is contained; (as, with us too, beſides the ſtamps on the indentures, a tax is laid by ſtatute 8 Ann. c. 9. of 6d. in the pound, upon every apprentice-fee, if it be 50l. or under; and 1s. in the pound, if it be a greater ſum) but this tends to draw the ſubject into a thouſand nice diſquiſitions and diſputes concerning the nature of his contract, and whether taxable or not; in which the farmers of the revenue are ſure to have the advantage[3]. Our general method anſwers the purpoſes of the ſtate as well, and conſults the eaſe of the ſubject much better. The firſt inſtitution of the ſtamp duties was by ſtatute 5 & 6 W. & M. c. 21. and they have ſince in many inſtances been increaſed to ten times their original amount.

VI. A ſixth branch is the duty upon houſes and windows. As early as the conqueſt mention is made in domeſday book of fumage, or fuage, vulgarly called ſmoke farthings; which were paid by cuſtom to the king for every chimney in the houſe. And we read that

[3] Sp. of L. b. xiii. c. 9.

(*k*) [Selling of hats by 24 Geo. III. ſeſſ. 2. c. 51.]

Edward the black prince (ſoon after his ſucceſſes in France) in imitation of the Engliſh cuſtom, impoſed a tax of a florin upon every hearth in his French dominions[4]. But the firſt parliamentary eſtabliſhment of it in England was by ſtatute 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 10. whereby an hereditary revenue of 2s. for every hearth, in all houſes paying to church and poor, was granted to the king for ever. And, by ſubſequent ſtatutes for the more regular aſſeſſment of this tax, the conſtable and two other ſubſtantial inhabitants of the pariſh, to be appointed yearly, (or the ſurveyor, appointed by the crown, together with ſuch conſtable or other public officer) were, once in every year, empowered to view the inſide of every houſe in the pariſh. But, upon the revolution, by ſtatute 1 W. & M. ſt. 1. c. 10. hearth-money was declared to be "not only a great oppreſſion to the poorer ſort, but a badge of ſlavery upon the whole people, expoſing every man's houſe to be entered into, and ſearched at pleaſure, by perſons unknown to him; and therefore, to erect a laſting monument of their majeſties goodneſs in every houſe in the kingdom, the duty of hearth-money was taken away and aboliſhed." This monument of goodneſs remains among us to this day: but the proſpect of it was ſomewhat darkened, when in ſix years afterwards by ſtatute 7 W. III. c. 18. a tax was laid upon all houſes (except cottages) of 2s. now advanced to 3s. *per annum*, and a tax alſo upon all windows, if they exceeded nine, in ſuch a houſe. Which rates have been from time to time[5] varied, being now extended to all windows exceeding ſix; and power is given to ſurveyors, appointed by the crown, to inſpect the outſide of houſes, and alſo to paſs through any houſe two days in the year, into any court or yard, to inſpect the windows there. A new duty from 6d. to 1s. in the

[4] Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxiii. 463. Spelm. Gloſſ. *tit. Fuage.*

[5] Stat. 20 Geo. II. c. 3. 31 Geo. II. c. 22. 2 Geo. III. c. 8. 6. Geo. III. c. 38. [and 24 *Geo. III. ſeſſ.* 2. c. 38.]

pound, was alſo impoſed by ſtatutes 18 Geo. III. c. 26. and 19 Geo. III. c. 59. on every dwelling-houſe inhabited, together with the offices and gardens therewith occupied; which duty, as well as the former, is under the direction of the commiſſioners of the land tax.

VII. The ſeventh branch of the extraordinary perpetual revenue is a duty of 21s. *per annum* for every male ſervant retained or employed in the ſeveral capacities ſpecifically mentioned in the act of parliament, and which almoſt amount to an univerſality, except ſuch as are employed in huſbandry, trade, or manufactures. This was impoſed by ſtatute 17 Geo. III. c. 39. amended by 19 Geo. III. c. 59. and is under the management of the commiſſioners of the land and window tax [z].

VIII. An eighth branch is the duty ariſing from licences to hackney coaches and chairs in London, and the parts adjacent. In 1654 two hundred hackney coaches were allowed within London, Weſtminſter, and ſix miles round, under the direction of the court of aldermen [6]. By ſtatute 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 2. four hundred were licenſed; and the money ariſing thereby was applied to repairing the ſtreets [7]. This number was increaſed to ſeven hundred by ſtatute 5 W. & M. c. 22. and the duties veſted in the crown: and by the ſtatute 9 Ann. c. 23. and other ſubſequent ſtatutes for their government [8], there are now a thouſand licenſed coaches and four hundred chairs. This revenue is governed by commiſſioners of it's own, and is, in truth, a benefit to the ſubject; as the expenſe of it is felt by no individual, and it's neceſſary regulations have

[6] Scobell. 313.
[7] Com. Journ. 14 Feb. 1661.
[8] 19 Ann. c. 19. §. 158. 12 Geo. I. c. 15. 7 Geo. III. c. 44. 10 Geo. III. c. 44. 11 Geo. III. c. 24. 28. 12 Geo. III. c. 49.

[z] By ſtatute 21 Geo. III. c. 31. the ſame is again much altered, and brought under the management of the commiſſioners of exciſe; [and now by 25 Geo. III. c. 43. under the management of the commiſſioners for the affairs of taxes.]

eſtabliſhed a competent juriſdiction, whereby a very refractory race of men may be kept in ſome tolerable order (*l*).

IX. The ninth and laſt branch of the king's extraordinary perpetual revenue is the duty upon offices and penſions; conſiſting in an annual payment of 1s. in the pound (over and above all other duties[9]) out of all ſalaries, fees, and perquiſites, of offices and penſions payable by the crown, exceeding the value of 100*l. per annum*. This highly popular taxation was impoſed by ſtatute 31 Geo. II. c. 22. and is under the direction of the commiſſioners of the land tax.

The clear neat produce of theſe ſeveral branches of the revenue, after all charges of collecting and management paid, amounts at preſent annually to about ſeven millions and three quarters ſterling; beſides more than two millions and a quarter raiſed by the land and malt tax. How theſe immenſe ſums are appropriated, is next to be conſidered. And this is, firſt and principally, to the payment of the intereſt of the national debt.

[9] Previous to this, a deduction of 6*d.* in the pound was charged on all penſions and annuities, and all ſalaries, fees, and wages of all offices of profit granted by or derived from the crown; in order to pay the intereſt at the rate of three *per cent.* on one million, which was raiſed for diſcharging the debts on the civil liſt, by ſtatutes 7 Geo. I. ſt. 1. c. 27. 11 Geo. I. c. 17. and 12 Geo. I. c. 2. This million, being charged on this particular fund, is not conſidered as any part of the national debt.

(*l*) [By ſtatute 26 Geo. III. c. 72. it is enacted, that from and after the 1ſt Auguſt 1786, the proprietors of hackney-coaches ſhall be entitled to, and may demand and take, for the hire of any hackney-coach, the following rates and fares; that is to ſay, for one mile and one-fourth, 1*s.*; for three-fourths of a mile further, 6*d.*; for half a mile beyond the former three-fourths, 6*d.*; and for every half mile further, 6*d.*; for three-fourths of an hour, 1*s.*; between three-fourths and an hour, 1*s.* 6*d.*; between an hour and an hour and twenty minutes, 2*s.*; and for every twenty minutes afterwards, 6*d.*; for a day of twelve hours, 14*s.* 6*d.* By §. 2. the penalties for exacting more than the above mentioned fares, are to be recovered as heretofore.]

In order to take a clear and comprehenſive view of the nature of this national debt, it muſt firſt be premiſed, that after the revolution, when our new connections with Europe introduced a new ſyſtem of foreign politics, the expenſes of the nation, not only in ſettling the new eſtabliſhment, but in maintaining long wars, as principals, on the continent, for the ſecurity of the Dutch barrier, reducing the French monarchy, ſettling the Spaniſh ſucceſſion, ſupporting the houſe of Auſtria, maintaining the liberties of the Germanic body, and other purpoſes, increaſed to an unuſual degree: inſomuch that it was not thought adviſable to raiſe all the expenſes of any one year by taxes to be levied within that year, leſt the unaccuſtomed weight of them ſhould create murmurs among the people. It was therefore the policy of the times to anticipate the revenues of their poſterity, by borrowing immenſe ſums for the current ſervice of the ſtate, and to lay no more taxes upon the ſubject than would ſuffice to pay the annual intereſt of the ſums ſo borrowed: by this means converting the principal debt into a new ſpecies of property transferable from one man to another at any time and in any quantity. A ſyſtem which ſeems to have had it's original in the ſtate of Florence, *A. D.* 1344: which government then owed about 60000*l.* ſterling: and, being unable to pay it, formed the principal into an aggregate ſum, called metaphorically a *mount* or *bank*, the ſhares whereof were transferable like our ſtocks, with intereſt at 5 *per cent.* the prices varying according to the exigencies of the ſtate (*m*). This policy of the Engliſh parliament laid the foundation of what is called the national debt: for a few long annuities created in the reign of Charles II will hardly deſerve that name. And the example then ſet has been ſo cloſely followed during the long wars in the reign of queen Anne, and ſince, that the capital of the national debt (funded and unfunded) amounted at the cloſe of the

(*m*) *Pro tempore, pro ſpe, pro commodo, minuitur eorum pretium atque augeſcit.* Aretin. See Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxxvi. 116.

ſeſſion in June 1777, to about an hundred and thirty-ſix millions (*n*): to pay the intereſt of which, together with certain annuities for lives and years, and the charges of management, amounting annually to upwards of four millions and three quarters, the extraordinary revenues juſt now enumerated (excepting only the land-tax and annual malt-tax) are in the firſt place mortgaged, and made perpetual by parliament. Perpetual I ſay; but ſtill redeemable by the ſame authority that impoſed them: which, if it at any time can pay off the capital will aboliſh thoſe taxes which are raiſed to diſcharge the intereſt.

By this means the quantity of property in the kingdom is greatly increaſed in idea, compared with former times: yet, if we coolly conſider it, not a all increaſed in reality. We may boaſt of large fortunes, and quantities of money in the funds. But where does this money exiſt? It exiſts only in name, in paper, in public faith, in parliamentary ſecurity: and that is undoubtedly ſufficient for the creditors of the public to rely on. But then what is the pledge, which the public faith has pawned for the ſecurity of theſe debts? The land, the trade, and the perſonal induſtry of the ſubject; from which the money muſt ariſe that ſupplies the ſeveral taxes. In theſe therefore, and theſe only, the property of the public creditors does really and intrinſically exiſt; and of courſe the land, the trade, and the perſonal induſtry of individuals, are diminiſhed in their true value juſt ſo much as they are pledged to anſwer. If A's income amounts to 100*l.* *per annum*; and he is ſo far indebted to B, that he pays him 50*l.* *per annum* for his intereſt; one half of the value of A's property is transferred to B the creditor. The creditor's property exiſts in the demand which he has upon the debtor, and no where elſe; and the debtor is only a truſtee to his creditor for one half of the value of his income. In ſhort, the property of a creditor of

(*n*) [And at the cloſe of the ſeſſion in July 1786, to about two hundred and thirty-nine millions.]

the public conſiſts in a certain portion of the national taxes: by how much therefore he is the richer, by ſo much the nation, which pays theſe taxes, is the poorer.

The only advantage, that can reſult to a nation from public debts, is the increaſe of circulation by multiplying the caſh of the kingdom, and creating a new ſpecies of currency, aſſignable at any time and in any quantity; always therefore ready to be employed in any beneficial undertaking, by means of this it's transferable quality; and yet producing ſome profit even when it lies idle and unemployed. A certain proportion of debt ſeems therefore to be highly uſeful to a trading people; but what that proportion is, it is not for me to determine. Thus much is indiſputably certain, that the preſent magnitude of our national incumbrances very far exceeds all calculations of commercial benefit, and is productive of the greateſt inconveniencies. For, firſt, the enormous taxes, that are raiſed upon the neceſſaries of life for the payment of the intereſt of this debt, are a hurt both to trade and manufactures, by raiſing the price as well of the artificer's ſubſiſtence, as of the raw material, and of courſe, in a much greater proportion, the price of the commodity itſelf. Nay, the very increaſe of paper-circulation itſelf, when extended beyond what is requiſite for commerce or foreign exchange, has a natural tendency to increaſe the price of proviſions as well as of all other merchandize. For, as it's effect is to multiply the caſh of the kingdom, and this to ſuch an extent that much muſt remain unemployed, that caſh (which is the univerſal meaſure of the reſpective values of all other commodities) muſt neceſſarily ſink in it's own value[o], and every thing grow comparatively dearer. Secondly, if part of this debt be owing to foreigners, either they draw out of the kingdom annually a conſiderable quantity of ſpecie for the intereſt; or elſe it is made an argument to grant them unreaſonable privileges,

[o] See page 287.

in order to induce them to reſide here. Thirdly, if the whole be owing to ſubjects only, it is then charging the active and induſtrious ſubject, who pays his ſhare of the taxes, to maintain the indolent and idle creditor who receives them. Laſtly, and principally, it weakens the internal ſtrength of a ſtate, by anticipating thoſe reſources which ſhould be reſerved to defend it in caſe of neceſſity. The intereſt we now pay for our debts would be nearly ſufficient to maintain any war, that any national motives could require. And if our anceſtors in king William's time had annually paid, ſo long as their exigencies laſted, even a leſs ſum than we now annually raiſe upon their accounts, they would in the time of war have borne no greater burdens, than they have bequeathed to and ſettled upon their poſterity in time of peace: and might have been eaſed the inſtant the exigence was over.

The reſpective produces of the ſeveral taxes beforementioned were originally ſeparate and diſtinct funds; being ſecurities for the ſums advanced on each ſeveral tax, and for them only. But at laſt it became neceſſary, in order to avoid confuſion, as they multiplied yearly, to reduce the number of theſe ſeparate funds, by uniting and blending them together; ſuperadding the faith of parliament for the general ſecurity of the whole. So that there are now only three capital funds of any account, the *aggregate* fund, and the *general* fund, ſo called from ſuch union and addition: and the *ſouth ſea* fund, being the produce of the taxes appropriated to pay the intereſt of ſuch part of the national debt as was advanced by that company and it's annuitants. Whereby the ſeparate funds, which were thus united, are become mutual ſecurities for each other; and the whole produce of them, thus aggregated, liable to pay ſuch intereſt or annuities as were formerly charged upon each diſtinct fund; the faith of the legiſlature being moreover engaged to ſupply any caſual deficiencies.

The cuſtoms, exciſes, and other taxes, which are to ſupport theſe funds, depending on contingencies,

upon exports, imports, and conſumptions, muſt neceſſarily be of a very uncertain amount; but though ſome of them have proved unproductive, and others deficient, the ſum total hath always been conſiderably more than was ſufficient to anſwer the charge upon them. The ſurpluſſes therefore of the three great national funds, the aggregate, general, and ſouth ſea funds, over and above the intereſt and annuities charged upon them, are directed by ſtatute 3 Geo. I. c. 7. to be carried together, and to attend the diſpoſition of parliament; and are uſually denominated the *ſinking* fund, becauſe originally deſtined to ſink and lower the national debt. To this have been ſince added many other entire duties, granted in ſubſequent years; and the annual intereſt of the ſums borrowed on their reſpective credits is charged on and payable out of the produce of the ſinking fund. However the neat ſurpluſſes and ſavings, after all deductions paid, amount annually to a very conſiderable ſum. For as the intereſt on the national debt has been at ſeveral times reduced, (by the conſent of the proprietors, who had their option either to lower their intereſt or be paid their principal) the ſavings from the appropriated revenues came at length to be extremely large. This ſinking fund is the laſt reſort of the nation; it's only domeſtic reſource on which muſt chiefly depend all the hopes we can entertain of ever diſcharging or moderating our incumbrances. And therefore the prudent and ſteady application of the large ſums now ariſing from this fund, is a point of the utmoſt importance, and well worthy the ſerious attention of parliament; which was thereby enabled, in the year 1765, to reduce above two millions ſterling of the public debt; and ſeveral additional millions in ſeveral ſucceeding years (*o*).

(*o*) [By ſtatute 26 Geo. III. c. 31. it is enacted, that at the end of every quarter of a year, ending the fifth day of January, the fifth day of April, the fifth day of July, and the tenth day of October, reſpectively, in every year, there ſhall be iſſued and ſet apart at his majeſty's receipt of exchequer, purſuant to the ſeveral acts in that behalf made, out of the ſurpluſſes,

But, before any part of the aggregate fund (the ſurpluſſes whereof are one of the chief ingredients that form the ſinking fund) can be applied to diminiſh the principal of the public debt, it ſtands mortgaged by parliament to raiſe an annual ſum for the maintenance of the king's houſhold and the civil liſt. For this purpoſe, in the late reigns, the produce of certain branches of the exciſe and cuſtoms, the poſt-office, the duty on wine licenſes, the revenues of the remaining crown lands, the profits ariſing from courts of juſtice, (which articles include all the hereditary revenues of the crown) and alſo a clear annuity of 120,000*l.* in money, were ſettled on the king for life, for the ſupport of his majeſty's houſhold, and the honour and dignity of the crown. And, as the amount of theſe ſeveral branches was uncertain, (though in the laſt reign they were computed to have ſometimes raiſed almoſt a million) if they did not ariſe annually to 800,000*l.* the parliament engaged to make up the deficiency. But his preſent majeſty having, ſoon after his acceſſion, ſpontaneouſly ſignified his conſent, that his own hereditary revenues might be ſo diſpoſed of as might beſt conduce to the utility and ſatisfaction of the public;

---

exceſſes, and overplus monies compoſing the ſinking fund, a ſufficient ſum to make good, to the day on which ſuch quarter ſhall end, all ſuch intereſts or annuities, or parts of intereſt or annuities, or deficiencies of funds provided for the payment of intereſts or annuities, as ſhall be ſpecially charged on the ſaid ſinking fund; and that, after ſuch ſum ſhall have been ſo iſſued, there ſhall then be farther ſet apart, in the ſaid receipt of exchequer, out of the ſurpluſſes, exceſſes, and overplus monies compoſing the ſaid ſinking fund, a ſum of 250,000*l.* or ſuch part thereof as the ſaid ſurpluſſes, exceſſes, and overplus monies, then remaining in the ſaid receipt of exchequer, ſhall be ſufficient to ſatisfy: and that, if, after iſſuing or ſetting apart the ſums directed to be previouſly iſſued or ſet apart, there ſhall not remain monies ſufficient to provide for the payment of the ſaid 250,000*l.* the amount of the deficiency ſhall be carried forward as a charge on the monies in the receipt of the exchequer, out of the ſaid overplus monies, until ſuch deficiency ſhall have been made good; and that the monies ſet apart quarterly ſhall be paid to the bank, and to be applied in reducing the national debt, by certain commiſſioners named in the act.]

and having graciously accepted the limited sum of 800,000*l.* *per annum* for the support of his civil list; the said hereditary and other revenues were carried into and made a part of the aggregate fund, and the aggregate fund was charged [1] with the payment of the whole annuity to the crown of 800,000*l.* which, being found insufficient, was increased in 1777 to 900,000*l.* *per annum*. Hereby the revenues themselves, being put under the same care and management as the other branches of the public patrimony, produce more and are better collected than heretofore; and the public is still a gainer of near 100,000*l.* *per annum* by this disinterested conduct of his majesty. The civil list, thus liquidated, together with the four millions and three quarters, interest of the national debt, and more than two millions produced from the sinking fund, make up the seven millions and three quarters *per annum*, neat money, which were before stated to be the annual produce of our *perpetual* taxes; besides the immense, though uncertain, sums arising from the *annual* taxes on land and malt, but which, at an average, may be calculated at more than two millions and a quarter; and, added to the preceding sum, make the clear produce of the taxes (exclusive of the charge of collecting) which are raised yearly on the people of this country, amount to about ten millions sterling.

The expenses defrayed by the civil list are those that in any shape relate to civil government; as, the expenses of the royal household; the revenues allotted to the judges, previous to the year 1758; all salaries to officers of state, and every of the king's servants; the appointments to foreign embassadors; the maintenance of the queen and royal family; the king's private expenses, or privy purse; and other very numerous outgoings, as secret service money, pensions, and other bounties: which sometimes have so far exceeded the revenues appointed for that pur-

[1] Stat. 1 Geo. III. c. 1.

poſe, that application has been made to parliament to diſcharge the debts contracted on the civil liſt; as particularly in 1724, when one million [2] was granted for that purpoſe by the ſtatute 11 Geo. I. c. 17. and in 1769 and 1777, when half a million and 600,000*l.* were appropriated to the like uſes, by the ſtatutes 9 Geo. III. c. 34. and 17 Geo. III. c. 47.

The civil liſt is indeed properly the whole of the king's revenue in his own diſtinct capacity; the reſt being rather the revenue of the public, or it's creditors, though collected and diſtributed again, in the name and by the officers of the crown: it now ſtanding in the ſame place, as the hereditary income did formerly; and, as that has gradually diminiſhed, the parliamentary appointments have increaſed. The whole revenue of queen Elizabeth did not amount to more than 600,000*l.* a year [3]; that of king Charles I was [4] 800,000*l.* and the revenue voted for king Charles II was [5] 1,200,000*l.* though complaints were made (in the firſt years at leaſt) that it did not amount to ſo much [6]. But it muſt be obſerved, that under theſe ſums were included all manner of public expenſes; among which lord Clarendon in his ſpeech to the parliament computed, that the charge of the navy and land forces amounted annually to 800,000*l.* which was ten times more than before the former troubles [7]. The ſame revenue, ſubject to the ſame charges, was ſettled on king James II [8]: but by the increaſe of trade, and more frugal management, it amounted on an average to a million and a half *per annum*, (beſides other additional cuſtoms, granted by parliament [9], which produced an annual revenue of 400,000*l.*) out of which his fleet and army were maintained at the yearly expence of [10] 1,100,000*l.*

2 See page 342.

3 Lord Clar. continuation. 163.

4 Com. Journ. 4 Sept. 1660.

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.* 4 Jun. 1663. Lord Clar. *ibid.*

7 Lord Clar. 165.

8 Stat. 1 Jac. II. c. 1.

9 *Ibid.* c. 3. & 4.

10 Com. journ. 1 Mar. 20 Mar. 1668.

After the revolution, when the parliament took into it's own hands the annual ſupport of the forces both maritime and military, a civil liſt revenue was ſettled on the new king and queen, amounting, with the hereditary duties, to 700,000*l. per annum* [1]; and the ſame was continued to queen Anne and king George I [2]. That of king George II, we have ſeen, was nominally augmented to [3] 800,000*l.* and in fact was conſiderably more: and that of his preſent majeſty is avowedly increaſed to the limited ſum of 900,000*l.* And upon the whole it is doubtleſs much better for the crown, and alſo for the people, to have the revenue ſettled upon the modern footing rather than the antient. For the crown; becauſe it is more certain, and collected with greater eaſe: for the people; becauſe they are now delivered from the feodal hardſhips, and other odious branches of the prerogative. And though complaints have ſometimes been made of the increaſe of the civil liſt, yet if we conſider the ſums that have been formerly granted, the limited extent under which it is now eſtabliſhed, the revenues and prerogatives given up in lieu of it by the crown, the numerous branches of the preſent royal family, and (above all) the diminution of the value of money compared with what it was worth in the laſt century, we muſt acknowledge theſe complaints to be void of any rational foundation; and that it is impoſſible to ſupport that dignity, which a king of Great Britain ſhould maintain, with an income in any degree leſs than what is now eſtabliſhed by parliament.

This finiſhes our inquiries into the fiſcal prerogatives of the king; or his revenue, both ordinary and extraordinary. We have therefore now chalked out all the principal outlines of this vaſt title of the law, the ſupreme executive magiſtrate, or the king's majeſty, conſidered in his ſeveral capacities and points of view. But, before we entirely diſmiſs this ſubject, it may not be improper to take a ſhort com-

[1] Com. journ. 14 Mar. 1701. Aug. 1714.
[2] *Ibid.* 17 Mar. 1701. 11 [3] Stat. 1 Geo. II. c. 1.

parative review of the power of the executive magiſtrate, or prerogative of the crown, as it ſtood in former days, and as it ſtands at preſent. And we cannot but obſerve, that moſt of the laws for aſcertaining, limiting and reſtraining this prerogative have been made within the compaſs of little more than a century paſt; from the petition of right in 3 Car. I. to the preſent time. So that the powers of the crown are now to all appearance greatly curtailed and diminiſhed ſince the reign of king James the firſt: particularly by the abolition of the ſtar chamber and high commiſſion courts in the reign of Charles the firſt, and by the diſclaiming of martial law, and the power of levying taxes on the ſubject, by the ſame prince: by the diſuſe of foreſt laws for a century paſt: and by the many excellent proviſions enacted under Charles the ſecond; eſpecially the abolition of military tenures, purveyance, and preemption; the *habeas corpus* act; and the act to prevent the diſcontinuance of parliaments for above three years: and, ſince the revolution, by the ſtrong and emphatical words in which our liberties are aſſerted in the bill of rights, and act of ſettlement; by the act for triennial, ſince turned into ſeptennial, elections; by the excluſion of certain officers from the houſe of commons by rendering the ſeats of the judges permanent, and their ſalaries liberal and independent; and by reſtraining the king's pardon from obſtructing parliamentary impeachments. Beſides all this, if we conſider how the crown is impoveriſhed and ſtripped of all it's ancient revenues, ſo that it muſt greatly rely on the liberality of parliament for it's neceſſary ſupport and maintenance, we may perhaps be led to think, that the ballance is inclined pretty ſtrongly to the popular ſcale, and that the executive magiſtrate has neither independence nor power enough left to form that check upon the lords and commons, which the founders of our conſtitution intended.

But, on the other hand, it is to be conſidered, that every prince, in the firſt parliament after his acceſſion, has by long uſage a truly royal addition to his

hereditary revenue ſettled upon him for his life; and has never any occaſion to apply to parliament for ſupplies, but upon ſome public neceſſity of the whole realm. This reſtores to him that conſtitutional independence, which at his firſt acceſſion ſeems, it muſt be owned, to be wanting. And then with regard to power, we may find perhaps that the hands of government are at leaſt ſufficiently ſtrengthened; and that an Engliſh monarch is now in no danger of being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The inſtruments of power are not perhaps ſo open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the leſs liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account. In ſhort, our national debt and taxes (beſides the inconveniencies before mentioned) have alſo in their natural conſequences thrown ſuch a weight of power into the executive ſcale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot anceſtors; who gloriouſly ſtruggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative, and by an unaccountable want of foreſight eſtabliſhed this ſyſtem in their ſtead. The entire collection and management of ſo vaſt a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given riſe to ſuch a multitude of new officers created by and removeable at the royal pleaſure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witneſs the commiſſioners and the multitude of dependents on the cuſtoms, in every port of the kingdom; the commiſſioners of exciſe, and their numerous ſubalterns, in every inland diſtrict; the poſt-maſters, and their ſervants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commiſſioners of the ſtamps, and their diſtributors, which are full as ſcattered and full as numerous; the officers of the ſalt duty, which though a ſpecies of exciſe and conducted in the ſame manner, are yet made a diſtinct corps from the ordinary managers of that revenue; the ſurveyors of houſes and windows; the receivers of the land tax; the managers of lotteries; and the commiſſioners of hackney coaches; all which are either mediately or

immediately appointed by the crown, and removeable at pleaſure without any reaſon aſſigned: theſe, it requires but little penetration to ſee, muſt give that power, on which they depend for ſubſiſtence, an influence moſt amazingly extenſive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in loans, ſubſcriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money-tranſactions, which will greatly increaſe this influence; and that over thoſe perſons whoſe attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the moſt deſirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeſeen conſequence of erecting our funds of credit, and to ſupport them eſtabliſhing our preſent perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new ſince the reſtoration in 1660; and by far the greateſt part ſince the revolution in 1688. And the ſame may be ſaid with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has created. All which put together give the executive power ſo perſuaſive an energy with reſpect to the perſons themſelves, and ſo prevailing an intereſt with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the loſs of external prerogative.

But, though this profuſion of offices ſhould have no effect on individuals, there is ſtill another newly acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a diſciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the crown: raiſed by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot it is true only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament: but during that year they muſt by the nature of our conſtitution, if raiſed at all, be at the abſolute diſpoſal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonſtrate how great a truſt is thereby repoſed in the prince by his people. A truſt that is more than equivalent to a thouſand little troubleſome prerogatives.

Add to all this, that beſides the civil liſt, the immenſe revenue of almoſt ſeven millions ſterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the public, or carried to the ſinking fund, is firſt depoſited in

the royal exchequer, and thence iſſued out to the reſpective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuſe to raiſe, becauſe it is made perpetual by act of parliament: which alſo, when well conſidered, will appear to be a truſt of great delicacy and high importance.

Upon the whole therefore I think it is clear, that, whatever may have become of the *nominal*, the *real* power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any tranſactions in the laſt century. Much is indeed given up; but much is alſo acquired. The ſtern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence: the ſlaviſh and exploded doctrine of non-reſiſtance has given way to a military eſtabliſhment by law; and to the diſuſe of parliaments has ſucceeded a parliamentary truſt of an immenſe perpetual revenue. When, indeed, by the free operation of the ſinking fund, our national debts ſhall be leſſened; when the poſture of foreign affairs, and the univerſal introduction of a well planned and national militia, will ſuffer our formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when (in conſequence of all) our taxes ſhall be gradually reduced; this adventitious power of the crown will ſlowly and imperceptibly diminiſh, as it ſlowly and imperceptibly roſe. But, till that ſhall happen, it will be our ſpecial duty, as good ſubjects and good Engliſhmen, to reverence the crown, and yet guard againſt corrupt and ſervile influence from thoſe who are intruſted with it's authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by a ſovereign, who, in all thoſe public acts that have perſonally proceeded from himſelf, hath manifeſted the higheſt veneration for the free conſtitution of Britain: hath already in more than one inſtance remarkably ſtrengthened its outworks: and will therefore never harbour a thought, or adopt a perſuaſion, in any the remoteſt degree detrimental to public liberty.

CHAPTER THE NINTH.

OF SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES.

IN a former chapter of these commentaries[1] we distinguished magistrates into two kinds; supreme, or those in whom the sovereign power of the state resides; and subordinate, or those who act in an inferior secondary sphere. We have hitherto considered the former kind only; namely, the supreme legislative power or parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king; and are now to proceed to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal subordinate magistrates.

And herein we are not to investigate the powers and duties of his majesty's great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the principal secretaries, or the like; because I do not know that they are in that capacity in any considerable degree the objects of our laws, or have any very important share of magistracy conferred upon them: except that the secretaries of state are allowed the power of commitment, in order to bring offenders to trial[2]. Neither shall I here treat of the office and authority of the lord chancellor, or the other judges of the superior courts of justice; because they will find a more proper place in the third part of these commentaries. Nor shall I enter into any minute dis-

[1] ch. 2. page 157.

[2] 1 Leon. 70. 2 Leon. 175. Comb. 143. 5 Mod. 84. Salk. 347. Carth. 291.

quiſitions, with regard to the rights and dignities of mayors and aldermen, or other magiſtrates of particular corporations; becauſe theſe are mere private and ſtrictly municipal rights, depending entirely upon the domeſtic conſtitution of their reſpective franchiſes. But the magiſtrates and officers, whoſe rights and duties it will be proper in this chapter to conſider, are ſuch as are generally in uſe, and have a juriſdiction and authority diſperſedly throughout the kingdom: which are, principally, ſheriffs; coroners; juſtices of the peace; conſtables; ſurveyors of highways; and overſeers of the poor. In treating of all which I ſhall inquire into, firſt, their antiquity and original; next, the manner in which they are appointed and may be removed; and laſtly, their rights and duties. And firſt of ſheriffs,

I. The ſheriff is an officer of very great antiquity in this kingdom, his name being derived from two Saxon words, ꝛcipe ȝenera, the reeve, bailiff, or officer of the ſhire. He is called in Latin *vice-comes*, as being the deputy of the earl or *comes*; to whom the cuſtody of the ſhire is ſaid to have been committed at the firſt diviſion of this kingdom into counties. But the earls in proceſs of time, by reaſon of their high employments and attendance on the king's perſon, not being able to tranſact the buſineſs of the county, were delivered of that burden [3]; reſerving to themſelves the honour, but the labour was laid on the ſheriff. So that now the ſheriff does all the king's buſineſs in the county; and though he be ſtill called *vice-comes*, yet he is entirely independent of, and not ſubject to the earl; the king by his letters patent committing *cuſtodiam comitatus* to the ſheriff, and him alone.

Sheriffs were formerly choſen by the inhabitants of the ſeveral counties. In confirmation of which it was ordained by ſtat. 28 Edw. I. c. 8. that the people ſhould have election of ſheriffs in every ſhire, where the ſhrievalty is not of inheritance. For anciently in ſome counties the ſheriffs were hereditary;

[3] Dalton of ſheriffs, c. 1.

as I apprehend they were in Scotland till the ſtatute 20 Geo. II. c. 43; and ſtill continue in the county of Weſtmorland to this day: the city of London having alſo the inheritance of the ſhrievalty in Middleſex veſted in their body by charter[4]. The reaſon of theſe popular elections is aſſigned in the ſame ſtatute, c. 13. "that the commons might chuſe ſuch as would not be a burthen to them." And herein appears plainly a ſtrong trace of the democratical part of our conſtitution; in which form of government it is an indiſpenſible requiſite, that the people ſhould chuſe their own magiſtrate[5]. This election was in all probability not abſolutely veſted in the commons, but required the royal approbation. For, in the Gothic conſtitution, the judges of the county courts (which office is executed by our ſheriff) were elected by the people, but confirmed by the king: and the form of their election was thus managed: the people, or *incolæ territorii*, choſe *twelve* electors, and they nominated *three* perſons, *ex quibus rex unum confirmabat*[6]. But with us in England theſe popular elections, growing tumultuous, were put an end to by the ſtatute 9 Edw. II. ſt. 2. which enacted, that the ſheriffs ſhould from thenceforth be aſſigned by the chancellor, treaſurer, and the judges; as being perſons in whom the ſame truſt might with confidence be repoſed. By ſtatute 14 Edw. III. c. 7. 23 Hen. VI. c. 8. and 21 Hen. VIII. c. 20. the chancellor, treaſurer, preſident of the king's council, *chief* juſtices, and *chief* baron, are to make this election; and that on the morrow of All Souls in the exchequer. And the king's letters patent, appointing the new ſheriffs, uſed commonly to bear date the ſixth day of November[7]. The ſtatute of Cambridge, 12 Ric. II. c. 2. ordains, that the chancellor, treaſurer, keeper of the privy ſeal, ſteward of the king's houſe, the king's chamberlain, clerk of the rolls, the juſtices of the one bench and the other, barons

4 3 Rep. 72.
5 Monteſq. Sp. L. b. 2. c. 2.
6 Stiernh. *de jure Goth. l.* 1. *c.* 3.
7 Stat. 12 Edw. IV. c. 1.

of the exchequer, and all other that ſhall be called to ordain, name, or make juſtices of the peace, *ſheriffs*, and other officers of the king, ſhall be ſworn to act indifferently, and to appoint no man that ſueth either privily or openly to be put in office, but ſuch only as they ſhall judge to be the beſt and moſt ſufficient. And the cuſtom now is (and has been at leaſt ever ſince the time of Forteſcue [8], who was chief juſtice and chancellor to Henry the ſixth) that all the judges, together with the other great officers and privy counſellors, meet in the exchequer on the morrow of All Souls yearly, (which day is now altered to the morrow of St. Martin by the laſt act for abbreviating Michaelmas term) and then and there the judges propoſe three perſons, to be reported (if approved of) to the king, who afterwards appoints one of them to be ſheriff.

This cuſtom, of the *twelve* judges propoſing *three* perſons, ſeems borrowed from the Gothic conſtitution before-mentioned; with this difference, that among the Goths the twelve nominors were firſt elected by the people themſelves. And this uſage of ours at it's firſt introduction, I am apt to believe, was founded upon ſome ſtatute, though not now to be found among our printed laws: firſt, becauſe it is materially different from the direction of all the ſtatutes before-mentioned: which it is hard to conceive that the judges would have countenanced by their concurrence, or that Forteſcue would have inſerted in his book, unleſs by the authority of ſome ſtatute: and alſo, becauſe a ſtatute is expreſsly referred to in the record, which ſir Edward Coke tells us [9] he tranſcribed from the council book of 3 March, 34 Hen. VI. and which is in ſubſtance as follows. The king had of his own authority appointed a man ſheriff of Lincolnſhire, which office he refuſed to take upon him: whereupon the opinions of the judges were taken, what ſhould be done in this behalf. And the two chief juſtices, ſir John Forteſcue and ſir John Priſot, delivered the unanimous opinion of them all,

[8] *de L. L. c.* 24. [9] 2 Inſt. 559.

" that the king did an error when he made a perſon " ſheriff, that was not choſen and preſented to him " according to the *ſtatute*; that the perſon refuſing " was liable to no fine for diſobedience, as if he had " been one of the *three* perſons choſen according to " the tenor of the *ſtatute*; that they would adviſe " the king to have recourſe to the *three* perſons that " were choſen according to the *ſtatute*, or that ſome " other thrifty man be intreated to occupy the office " for this year; and that, the next year, to eſchew " ſuch inconveniencies, the order of the *ſtatute* in this " behalf made be obſerved." But notwithſtanding this unanimous reſolution of all the judges of England, thus entered in the council book, and the ſtatute 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 26. §. 61. which expreſsly recognizes this to be the law of the land, ſome of our writers [o] have affirmed, that the king, by his prerogative, may name whom he pleaſes to be ſheriff, whether choſen by the judges or no. This is grounded on a very particular caſe in the fifth year of queen Elizabeth, when, by reaſon of the plague, there was no Michaelmas term kept at Weſtminſter; ſo that the judges could not meet there *in craſtino animarum* to nominate the ſheriffs: whereupon the queen named them herſelf, without ſuch previous aſſembly, appointing for the moſt part one of the two remaining in the laſt year's liſt [1]. And this caſe, thus circumſtanced, is the only authority in our books for the making theſe extraordinary ſheriffs. It is true, the reporter adds, that it was held that the queen by her prerogative might make a ſheriff without the election of the judges, *non obſtante aliquo ſtatuto in contrarium*: but the doctrine of *non obſtante's*, which ſets the prerogative above the laws, was effectually demoliſhed by the bill of rights at the revolution, and abdicated Weſtminſter-hall when king James abdicated the kingdom. However, it muſt be acknowledged, that the practice of occaſionally naming what are called pocket-ſheriffs, by the ſole authority of the crown, hath uniformly continued to

[o] Jenkins. 229. [1] Dyer. 225.

the reign of his preſent majeſty; in which, I believe, few (if any) compulſory inſtances have occurred.

Sheriffs, by virtue of ſeveral old ſtatutes, are to continue in their office no longer than one year: and yet it hath been ſaid [2] that a ſheriff may be appointed *durante bene placito*, or during the king's pleaſure; and ſo is the form of the royal writ [3]. Therefore, till a new ſheriff be named, his office cannot be determined, unleſs by his own death, or the demiſe of the king; in which laſt caſe it was uſual for the ſucceſſor to ſend a new writ to the old ſheriff [4]: but now by ſtatute 1 Ann. ſt. 1. c. 8. all officers appointed by the preceding king may hold their offices, for ſix months after the king's demiſe, unleſs ſooner diſplaced by the ſucceſſor. We may farther obſerve, that by ſtatute 1 Ric. II. c. 11. no man that has ſerved the office of ſheriff for one year, can be compelled to ſerve the ſame again within three years after.

We ſhall find it is of the utmoſt importance to have the ſheriff appointed according to law, when we conſider his power and duty. Theſe are either as a judge, as the keeper of the king's peace, as a miniſterial officer of the ſuperior courts of juſtice, or as the king's bailiff.

In his judicial capacity he is to hear and determine all cauſes of forty ſhillings value and under, in his county court, of which more in it's proper place; and he has alſo a judicial power in divers other civil caſes [5]. He is likewiſe to decide the elections of knights of the ſhire, (ſubject to the control of the houſe of commons) of coroners, and of verderors; to judge of the qualification of voters, and to return ſuch as he ſhall determine to be duly elected.

As the keeper of the king's peace, both by common law and ſpecial commiſſion, he is the firſt man in the county, and ſuperior in rank to any nobleman therein, during his office [6]. He may apprehend,

[2] 4 Rep. 32.
[3] Dalt. of ſheriffs. 8.
[4] *Ibid.* 7.
[5] Dalt. c. 4.
[6] 1 Roll. Rep. 237.

and commit to priſon, all perſons who break the peace, or attempt to break it; and may bind any one in a recognizance to keep the king's peace. He may, and is bound *ex officio* to purſue, and take all traitors, murderers, felons, and other miſdoers, and commit them to gaol for ſafe cuſtody. He is alſo to defend his county againſt any of the king's enemies when they come into the land: and for this purpoſe, as well as for keeping the peace and purſuing felons, he may command all the people of his county to attend him; which is called the *poſſe comitatus*, or power of the county [7]: and this ſummons every perſon above fifteen years old, and under the degree of a peer, is bound to attend upon warning [8], under pain of fine and impriſonment [9]. But though the ſheriff is thus the principal conſervator of the peace in his county, yet by the expreſs directions of the great charter [0], he, together with the conſtable, coroner, and certain other officers of the king, are forbidden to hold any pleas of the crown, or, in other words, to try any criminal offence. For it would be highly unbecoming, that the executioners of juſtice ſhould be alſo the judges; ſhould impoſe, as well as levy, fines and amercements; ſhould one day condemn a man to death, and perſonally execute him the next. Neither may he act as an ordinary juſtice of the peace during the time of his office [1]: for this would be equally inconſiſtent; he being in many reſpects the ſervant of the juſtices.

In his miniſterial capacity the ſheriff is bound to execute all proceſs iſſuing from the king's courts of juſtice. In the commencement of civil cauſes, he is to ſerve the writ, to arreſt, and to take bail: when the cauſe comes to trial, he muſt ſummon and return the jury; when it is determined, he muſt ſee the judgment of the court carried into execution. In criminal matters, he alſo arreſts and impriſons, he returns the jury, he has the cuſtody of the delinquent,

[7] Dalt. c. 95.
[8] Lamb. Eiren. 315.
[9] Stat. 2 Hen. V. c. 8.
[0] *cap.* 17.
[1] Stat. 1 Mar. ſt. 2. c. 8.

and he executes the ſentence of the court, though it extend to death itſelf.

As the king's bailiff, it is his buſineſs to preſerve the rights of the king within his bailiwick; for ſo his county is frequently called in the writs: a word introduced by the princes of the Norman line; in imitation of the French, whoſe territory is divided into bailiwicks, as that of England into counties [2]. He muſt ſeiſe to the king's uſe all lands devolved to the crown by attainder or eſcheat; muſt levy all fines and forfeitures; muſt ſeiſe and keep all waifs, wrecks, eſtrays, and the like, unleſs they be granted to ſome ſubject; and muſt alſo collect the king's rents within the bailiwick, if commanded by proceſs from the exchequer [3].

To execute theſe various offices, the ſheriff has under him many inferior officers: an under-ſheriff, bailiffs, and gaolers; who muſt neither buy, ſell, nor farm their offices, on forfeiture of 500*l.* [4].

The under-ſheriff uſually performs all the duties of the office; a very few only excepted, where the perſonal preſence of the high-ſheriff is neceſſary. But no under-ſheriff ſhall abide in his office above one year [5]; and if he does, by ſtatute 23 Hen. VI. c. 8. he forfeits 200*l.* a very large penalty in thoſe early days. And no under-ſheriff or ſheriff's officer ſhall practiſe as an attorney, during the time he continues in ſuch office [6]: for this would be a great inlet to partiality and oppreſſion. But theſe ſalutary regulations are ſhamefully evaded, by practiſing in the names of other attorneys, and putting in ſham deputies by way of nominal under-ſheriffs: by reaſon of which, ſays Dalton [7], the under-ſheriffs and bailiffs do grow ſo cunning in their ſeveral places, that they are able to deceive, and it may well be feared that many of them do deceive, both the king, the high-ſheriff, and the county.

[2] Forteſc. *de L. L.* c. 24.
[3] Dalt. c. 9.
[4] Stat. 3 Geo. I. c. 15.
[5] Stat. 42 Edw. III. c. 9.
[6] Stat. 1 Hen. V. c. 4.
[7] of ſheriffs, c. 115.

Bailiffs, or ſheriff's officers, are either bailiffs of hundreds, or ſpecial bailiffs. Bailiffs of hundreds are officers appointed over thoſe reſpective diſtricts by the ſheriffs, to collect fines therein, to ſummon juries; to attend the judges and juſtices at the aſſiſes, and quarter ſeſſions: and alſo to execute writs and proceſs in the ſeveral hundreds. But, as theſe are generally plain men, and not thoroughly ſkilful in this latter part of their office, that of ſerving writs, and making arreſts and executions, it is now uſual to join ſpecial bailiffs with them: who are generally mean perſons, employed by the ſheriffs on account only of their adroitneſs and dexterity in hunting and ſeiſing their prey. The ſheriff being anſwerable for the miſdemeſnors of theſe bailiffs, they are therefore uſually bound in an obligation with ſureties for the due execution of their office, and thence are called bound-bailiffs; which the common people have corrupted into a much more homely appellation.

Gaolers are alſo the ſervants of the ſheriff, and he muſt be reſponſible for their conduct. Their buſineſs is to keep ſafely all ſuch perſons as are committed to them by lawful warrant: and, if they ſuffer any ſuch to eſcape, the ſheriff ſhall anſwer it to the king, if it be a criminal matter; or, in a civil caſe, to the party injured [8]. And to this end the ſheriff muſt [9] have lands ſufficient within the county to anſwer the king and his people. The abuſes of gaolers and ſheriff's officers, toward the unfortunate perſons in their cuſtody, are well reſtrained and guarded againſt by ſtatute 32 Geo. II. c. 28. and by ſtatute 14 Geo. III. c. 59. proviſions are made for better preſerving the health of priſoners, and preventing the gaol diſtemper (*o*).

[8] Dalt. c. 118. 4 Rep. 34. III. c. 9. 5 Edw. III. c. 4.
[9] Stat. 9 Edw. II. ſt. 2. 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 21. § 7. 2 Edw. III. c. 4. 4 Edw.

(*o*) By ſtatute 24 Geo. III. ſeſſ. 2. c. 54. ſect. 22. no gaoler is to ſuffer tippling or gaming in the priſon, or to ſell any liquors therein under the penalty of 10*l.* to be recovered by diſtreſs upon conviction.]

The vaſt expenſe, which cuſtom had introduced in ſerving the office of high-ſheriff, was grown ſuch a burthen to the ſubject, that it was enacted, by ſtatute 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 21. that no ſheriff (except of London, Weſtmorland, and towns which are counties of themſelves) ſhould keep any table at the aſſiſes, except for his own family, or give any preſents to the judges or their ſervants, or have more than forty men in livery: yet for the ſake of ſafety and decency, he may not have leſs than twenty men in England and twelve in Wales; upon forfeiture, in any of theſe caſes, of 200*l.*

II. The coroner's is alſo a very antient office at the common law. He is called coroner, *coronator*, becauſe he hath principally to do with pleas of the crown, or ſuch wherein the king is more immediately concerned [o]. And in this light the lord chief juſtice of the king's bench is the principal coroner in the kingdom, and may (if he pleaſes) exerciſe the juriſdiction of a coroner in any part of the realm [1]. But there are alſo particular coroners for every county of England; uſually four, but ſometimes ſix, and ſometimes fewer [2]. This office [3] is of equal antiquity with the ſheriff; and was ordained together with him to keep the peace, when the earls gave up the wardſhip of the county.

He is ſtill choſen by all the freeholders in the county court; as by the policy of our antient laws the ſheriffs, and conſervators of the peace, and all other officers were, who were concerned in matters that affected the liberty of the people [4]; and as verderors of the foreſt ſtill are, whoſe buſineſs it is to ſtand between the prerogative and the ſubject in the execution of the foreſt laws. For this purpoſe there is a writ at common law *de coronatore eligendo* [5]: in which it is expreſsly commanded the ſheriff, *quod* "*talem eligi faciat, qui melius et ſciat, et velit, et poſſit,* "*officio illi intendere.*" And, in order to effect this

[o] 2 Inſt. 31. 4 Inſt. 271.
[1] 4 Rep. 57.
[2] F. N. B. 163.
[3] Mirror. c. 1. §. 3.
[4] 2 Inſt. 558.
[5] F. N. B. 163.

the more ſurely, it was enacted by the ſtatute [6] of Weſtm. 1. that none but lawful and diſcreet knights ſhould be choſen; and there was an inſtance in the 5 Edw. III. of a man being removed from this office, becauſe he was only a merchant [7]. But it ſeems it is now ſufficient if a man hath lands enough to be made a knight, whether he be really knighted or not [8]: for the coroner ought to have an eſtate ſufficient to maintain the dignity of his office, and anſwer any fines that may be ſet upon him for his miſbehaviour [9]; and if he hath not enough to anſwer, his fine ſhall be levied on the county, as the puniſhment for electing an inſufficient officer [0]. Now indeed, through the culpable neglect of gentlemen of property, this office has been ſuffered to fall into diſrepute, and get into low and indigent hands; ſo that, although formerly no coroners would condeſcend to be paid for ſerving their country, and they were by the aforeſaid ſtatute of Weſtm. 1. expreſsly forbidden to take a reward, under pain of a great forfeiture to the king: yet for many years paſt they have only deſired to be choſen for the ſake of their perquiſites: being allowed fees for their attendance by the ſtatute 3 Hen. VII. c. 1. which ſir Edward Coke complains of heavily [1]; though ſince his time thoſe fees have been much enlarged [2].

The coroner is choſen for life: but may be removed, either by being made ſheriff, or choſen verderor, which are offices incompatible with the other; or by the king's writ *de coronatore exonerando*, for a cauſe to be therein aſſigned, as that he is engaged in other buſineſs, is incapacitated by years or ſickneſs, hath not a ſufficient eſtate in the county, or lives in an inconvenient part of it [3]. And by the ſtatute 25 Geo. II. c. 29. extortion, neglect, or miſbehaviour, are alſo made cauſes of removal.

[6] 3 Edw. I. c. 10.
[7] 2 Inſt. 32.
[8] F. N. B. 163, 164.
[9] *Ibid.*
[0] Mirr. c. 1. §. 3. 2 Inſt. 175.
[1] 2 Inſt. 210.
[2] Stat. 25 Geo. II. c. 29.
[3] F. N. B. 163, 164.

The office and power of a coroner are alſo, like thoſe of the ſheriff, either judicial or miniſterial; but principally judicial. This is in great meaſure aſcertained by ſtatute 4 Edw. I. *de officio coronatoris*; and conſiſts, firſt, in inquiring, when any perſon is ſlain, or dies ſuddenly, or in priſon, concerning the manner of his death. And this muſt be "*ſuper* "*viſum corporis*[4];" for, if the body be not found, the coroner cannot ſit[5]. He muſt alſo ſit at the very place where the death happened; and his inquiry is made by a jury from four, five, or ſix of the neighbouring towns, over whom he is to preſide. If any be found guilty by this inqueſt of murder or other homicide, he is to commit them to priſon for farther trial, and is alſo to inquire concerning their lands, goods and chattels, which are forfeited thereby: but, whether it be homicide or not, he muſt inquire whether any deodand has accrued to the king, or the lord of the franchiſe, by this death: and muſt certify the whole of this inquiſition (under his own ſeal and the ſeals of the jurors[6]) together with the evidence thereon, to the court of king's bench, or the next aſſiſes. Another branch of his office is to inquire concerning ſhipwrecks; and certify whether wreck or not, and who is in poſſeſſion of the goods. Concerning treaſure-trove, he is alſo to inquire who were the finders, and where it is, and whether any one be ſuſpected of having found and concealed a treaſure; "and that may be well "perceived (ſaith the old ſtatute of Edw. I.) where "one liveth riotouſly, haunting taverns, and hath "done ſo of long time:" whereupon he might be

[4] [5] 4 Inſt. 271.

Thus, in the Gothic conſtitution, before any fine was payable by the neighbourhood, for the ſlaughter of a man therein, "*de corpore delicti* "*conſtare oportebat*; *i. e. non* "*tam fuiſſe aliquem in territorio* "*iſto mortuum inventum, quam* "*vulneratum et cæſum. Poteſt* "*enim homo etiam ex alia cauſa* "*ſubito mori.*" Stiernhook de *jure Gothor. l.* 3. *c.* 4.

[6] Stat. 33 Hen. VIII. c. 12. 1 & 2 P. & M. c. 13. 2 Weſt. Symbol. §. 310. Crompt. 264. Tremain. P. C. 621.

attached, and held to bail, upon this ſuſpicion only.

The miniſterial office of the coroner is only as the ſheriff's ſubſtitute. For when juſt exception can be taken to the ſheriff, for ſuſpicion of partiality, (as that he is intereſted in the ſuit, or of kindred to either plaintiff or defendant) the proceſs muſt then be awarded to the coroner, inſtead of the ſheriff, for execution of the king's writs [7];

III. The next ſpecies of ſubordinate magiſtrates, whom I am to conſider, are juſtices of the peace; the principal of whom is the *cuſtos rotulorum*, or keeper of the records of the county. The common law hath ever had a ſpecial care and regard for the conſervation of the peace; for peace is the very end and foundation of civil ſociety. And therefore, before the preſent conſtitution of juſtices was invented, there were peculiar officers appointed by the common law for the maintenance of the public peace. Of theſe ſome had, and ſtill have, this power annexed to other offices which they hold; others had it merely by itſelf, and were thence named *cuſtodes* or *conſervatores pacis*. Thoſe that were ſo *virtute officii* ſtill continue: but the latter ſort are ſuperſeded by the modern juſtices.

The king's majeſty [8] is, by his office and dignity royal, the principal conſervator of the peace within all his dominions; and may give authority to any other to ſee the peace kept, and to puniſh ſuch as break it: hence it is uſually called the king's peace. The lord chancellor or keeper, the lord treaſurer, the lord high ſteward of England, the lord mareſchal, the lord high conſtable of England, (when any ſuch officers are in being) and all the juſtices of the court of king's bench (by virtue of their offices) and the maſter of the rolls (by preſcription) are general conſervators of the peace throughout the whole kingdom, and may commit all breakers of it, or bind them in recognizances to keep it [9]: the other judges

[7] 4 Inſt. 271.
[8] Lambard. Eirenarch. 12.
[9] Lamb. 12.

are only ſo in their own courts. The coroner is alſo a conſervator of the peace within his own county [o]; as is alſo the ſheriff [1]; and both of them may take a recognizance or ſecurity for the peace. Conſtables, tything-men, and the like, are alſo conſervators of the peace within their own juriſdictions; and may apprehend all breakers of the peace and commit them, till they find ſureties for their keeping it [2].

Thoſe that were, without any office, ſimply and merely conſervators of the peace, either claimed that power by preſcription [3]; or were bound to exerciſe it by the tenure of their lands [4]; or, laſtly, were choſen by the freeholders in full county court before the ſheriff; the writ for their election directing them to be choſen "*de probioribus et potentioribus comitatus "ſui in cuſtodes pacis* [5]." But when queen Iſabel, the wife of Edward II, had contrived to depoſe her huſband by a forced reſignation of the crown, and had ſet up his ſon Edward III in his place; this, being a thing then without example in England, it was feared would much alarm the people: eſpecially as the old king was living, though hurried about from caſtle to caſtle; till at laſt he met with an untimely death. To prevent therefore any riſings, or other diſturbance of the peace, the new king ſent writs to all the ſheriffs in England, the form of which is preſerved by Thomas Walſingham [6], giving a plauſible account of the manner of his obtaining the crown; to wit, that it was done *ipſius patris beneplacito*: and withal commanding each ſheriff that the peace be kept throughout his bailiwick, on pain and peril of diſinheritance and loſs of life and limb. And in a few weeks after the date of theſe writs, it was ordained in parliament [7], that for the better maintaining and keeping of the peace in every county, good men and lawful, which were no maintainers of evil, or

[o] Britton. 3.
[1] F. N. B. 81.
[2] Lamb. 14. *Ibid.* 15.
[3] *Ibid.* 17.
[4] *Ibid.* 16.
[5] Hiſt.. *A. D.* 1327.
[6] Stat. 1 Edw. III. c. 16.

barretors in the country, ſhould be *aſſigned* to keep the peace. And in this manner, and upon this occaſion, was the election of the conſervators of the peace taken from the people, and given to the king[8]; this aſſignment being conſtrued to be by the king's commiſſion[9]. But ſtill they were only called conſervators, wardens, or keepers of the peace, till the ſtatute 34 Edw. III. c. 1. gave them the power of trying felonies; and then they acquired the more honourable appellation of juſtices[10].

Theſe juſtices are appointed by the king's ſpecial commiſſion under the great ſeal, the form of which was ſettled by all the judges, *A. D.* 1590[11]. This appoints them all[12], jointly and ſeverally, to keep the peace, and any two or more of them to inquire of and determine felonies and other miſdemeanors: in which number ſome particular juſtices, or one of them, are directed to be always included, and no buſineſs to be done without their preſence; the words of the commiſſion running thus, "*quorum aliquem* "*veſtrum, A. B. C. D. &c. unum eſſe volumus;*" whence the perſons ſo named are uſually called juſtices of the *quorum*. And formerly it was cuſtomary to appoint only a ſelect number of juſtices, eminent for their ſkill and diſcretion, to be of the *quorum*; but now the practice is to advance almoſt all of them to that dignity, naming them all over again in the *quorum* clauſe, except perhaps only ſome one inconſiderable perſon for the ſake of propriety: and no exception is now allowable, for not expreſſing in the form of warrants, *&c.* that the juſtice who iſſued them is of the *quorum*[13]. When any juſtice intends to act under this commiſſion, he ſues out a writ of *dedimus poteſtatem*, from the clerk of the crown in chancery, empowering certain perſons therein named to adminiſter the uſual oaths to him; which done, he is at liberty to act.

[8] Lamb. 20.

[9] Stat. 4 Edw. III. c. 2. 18 Edw. III. ſt. 2. c. 2.

[10] Lamb. 23.

[11] *Ibid.* 43.

[12] See the form itſelf, Lamb. 35. Burn. tit. Juſtices, §. 1.

[13] Stat. 26 Geo. II. c. 27. See alſo ſtat. 7 Geo. III. c. 21.

Touching the number and qualifications of theſe juſtices; it was ordained by ſtatute 18 Edw. III. c. 2. that *two* or *three*, of the beſt reputation in each county, ſhall be aſſigned to be keepers of the peace. But theſe being found rather too few for that purpoſe, it was provided by ſtatute 34 Edw. III. c. 1. that one lord, and three, or four, of the moſt worthy men in the county, with ſome learned in the law, ſhall be made juſtices in every county. But afterwards the number of juſtices, through the ambition of private perſons, became ſo large, that it was thought neceſſary by ſtatute 12 Ric. II. c. 10. and 14 Ric. II. c. 11. to reſtrain them at firſt to ſix, and afterwards to eight only. But this rule is now diſregarded, and the cauſe ſeems to be (as Lambard obſerved long ago [4]) that the growing number of ſtatute laws, committed from time to time to the charge of juſtices of the peace, have occaſioned alſo (and very reaſonably) their encreaſe to a larger number. And, as to their qualifications, the ſtatutes juſt cited direct them to be of the beſt reputation, and moſt worthy men in the county: and the ſtatute 13 Ric. II. c. 7. orders them to be of the moſt ſufficient knights, eſquires, and gentlemen of the law. Alſo by ſtatute 2 Hen. V. ſt. 1. c. 4. and ſt. 2. c. 1. they muſt be reſident in their ſeveral counties. And becauſe, contrary to theſe ſtatutes, men of ſmall ſubſtance had crept into the commiſſion, whoſe poverty made them both covetous and contemptible, it was enacted by ſtatute 18 Hen. VI. c. 11. that no juſtice ſhould be put in commiſſion, if he had not lands to the value of 20*l.* *per annum*. And, the rate of money being greatly altered ſince that time, it is now enacted by ſtatute 5 Geo. II. c. 11. that every juſtice, except as is therein excepted, ſhall have 100*l.* *per annum* clear of all deductions; and, if he acts without ſuch qualification, he ſhall forfeit 100*l.* This qualification [5] is almoſt an equivalent to the 20*l.* *per annum* required in Henry the

[4] Lamb. 34.

[5] See biſhop Fletwood's calculations in his *chronicon preciosum*.

ſixth's time: and of this [7] the juſtice muſt now make oath. Alſo it is provided by the act 5 Geo. II. that no practiſing attorney, ſolicitor, or proctor, ſhall be capable of acting as a juſtice of the peace.

As the office of theſe juſtices is conferred by the king, ſo it ſubſiſts only during his pleaſure; and is determinable, 1. By the demiſe of the crown; that is, in ſix months after [8]. But if the ſame juſtice is put in commiſſion by the ſucceſſor, he ſhall not be obliged to ſue out a new *dedimus*, or to ſwear to his qualification afreſh [9]: nor, by reaſon of any new commiſſion, to take the oaths more than once in the ſame reign [o]. 2. By expreſs writ under the great ſeal [1], diſcharging any particular perſon from being any longer juſtice. 3. By ſuperſeding the commiſſion by writ of *ſuperſedeas*, which ſuſpends the power of all the juſtices, but does not totally deſtroy it; ſeeing it may be revived again by another writ, called a *procedendo*. 4. By a new commiſſion, which virtually, though ſilently, diſcharges all the former juſtices that are not included therein; for two commiſſions cannot ſubſiſt at once. 5. By acceſſion of the office of ſheriff or coroner [2]. Formerly it was thought, that if a man was named in any commiſſion of the peace, and had afterwards a new dignity conferred upon him, that this determined his office; he no longer anſwering the deſcription of the commiſſion: but now [3] it is provided, that, notwithſtanding a new title of dignity, the juſtice on whom it is conferred ſhall ſtill continue a juſtice.

The power, office, and duty of a juſtice of the peace depend on his commiſſion, and on the ſeveral ſtatutes which have created objects of his juriſdiction. His commiſſion, firſt, empowers him ſingly to conſerve the peace: and thereby gives him all the power of the antient conſervators at the common

[7] Stat. 18 Geo. II. c. 20.
[8] Stat. 1 Ann. c. 8.
[9] Stat. 1 Geo. III. c. 13.
[o] Stat 7 Geo. III. c. 9.
[1] Lamb. 67.
[2] Stat. 1 Mar. ſt. 1. c. 8.
[3] Stat. 1 Edw. VI. c. 7.

law, in suppressing riots and affrays, in taking securities for the peace, and in apprehending and committing felons and other inferior criminals. It also empowers any two or more to hear and determine all felonies and other offences; which is the ground of their jurisdiction at sessions, of which more will be said in it's proper place. And as to the powers given to one, two, or more justices by the several statutes, which from to time have heaped upon them such an infinite variety of business, that few care to undertake, and fewer understand, the office; they are such and of so great importance to the public, that the country is greatly obliged to any worthy magistrate, that without sinister views of his own will engage in this troublesome service. And therefore, if a well-meaning justice makes any undesigned slip in his practice, great lenity and indulgence are shewn to him in the courts of law; and there are many statutes made to protect him in the upright discharge of his office [4]; which, among other privileges, prohibit such justices from being sued for any oversights without notice beforehand; and stop all suits begun, on tender made of sufficient amends. But, on the other hand, any malicious or tyrannical abuse of their office is usually severely punished; and all persons who recover a verdict against a justice, for any wilful or malicious injury, are entitled to double costs.

It is impossible upon our present plan to enter minutely into the particulars of the accumulated authority, thus committed to the charge of these magistrates. I must therefore refer myself at present to such subsequent part of these commentaries, as will in their turns comprize almost every object of the justices' jurisdiction: and in the mean time recommend to the student the perusal of Mr. Lambard's *eirenarcha*, and Dr. Burn's *justice of the peace*; wherein he will find every thing relative to this subject, both in antient and modern practice, collected with

[4] Stat. 7 Jac. I. c. 5. 21 Jac. I. c. 12. 24 Geo. II. c. 44.

great care and accuracy, and diſpoſed in a moſt clear and judicious method.

I ſhall next conſider ſome officers of lower rank than thoſe which have gone before, and of more confined juriſdiction; but ſtill ſuch as are univerſally in uſe through every part of the kingdom.

IV. Fourthly, then, of the conſtable. The word *conſtable* is frequently ſaid to be derived from the Saxon, koning-ꝛtapel, and to ſignify the ſupport of the king. But, as we borrowed the name as well as the office of conſtable from the French, I am rather inclined to deduce it, with ſir Henry Spelman and Dr. Cowel, from that language: wherein it is plainly derived from the Latin *comes ſtabuli*, an officer well known in the empire; ſo called becauſe, like the great conſtable of France, as well as the lord high conſtable of England, he was to regulate all matters of chivalry, tilts, tournaments, and feats of arms, which were performed on horſeback. This great office of lord high conſtable hath been diſuſed in England, except only upon great and ſolemn occaſions, as the king's coronation and the like, ever ſince the attainder of Stafford duke of Buckingham under king Henry VIII; as in France it was ſuppreſſed about a century after by an edict of Louis XIII[5]: but from his office, ſays Lambard[6], this lower conſtableſhip was at firſt drawn and fetched, and is as it were a very finger of that hand. For the ſtatute of Wincheſter[7], which firſt appoints them, directs that, for the better keeping of the peace, two conſtables in every hundred and franchiſe ſhall inſpect all matters relating to *arms* and *armour*.

Conſtables are of two ſorts, high conſtables, and petty conſtables. The former were firſt ordained by the ſtatute of Wincheſter, as before-mentioned; are appointed at the court leets of the franchiſe or hundred over which they preſide, or, in default of that,

[5] Philip's Life of Pole. ii. iii.

[6] of conſtables, 5.

[7] 13 Edw. I. c. 6.

by the juſtices at their quarter ſeſſions; and are removeable by the ſame authority that appoints them [8]. The petty conſtables are inferior officers in every town and pariſh, ſubordinate to the high conſtable of the hundred, firſt inſtituted about the reign of Edw. III [9]. Theſe petty conſtables have two offices united in them; the one anciont, the other modern. Their antient office is that of headborough, tithing-man, or borſholder; of whom we formerly ſpoke [o], and who are as antient as the time of king Alfred: their more modern office is that of conſtable merely; which was appointed (as was obſerved) ſo lately as the reign of Edward III, in order to aſſiſt the high conſtable [1]. And in general the antient headboroughs, tithing-men, and borſholders, were made uſe of to ſerve as petty conſtables; though not ſo generally, but that in many places they ſtill continue diſtinct officers from the conſtable. They are all choſen by the jury at the court leet; or if no court leet be held, are appointed by two juſtices of the peace [2].

The general duty of all conſtables, both high and petty, as well as of the other officers, is to keep the king's peace in their ſeveral diſtricts; and to that purpoſe they are armed with very large powers, of arreſting, and impriſoning, of breaking open houſes, and the like: of the extent of which powers, conſidering what manner of men are for the moſt part put into theſe offices, it is perhaps very well that they are generally kept in ignorance. One of their principal duties, ariſing from the ſtatute of Winchester, which appoints them, is to keep watch and ward in their reſpective juriſdictions. Ward, guard, or *cuſtodia*, is chiefly applied to the day time, in order to apprehend rioters, and robbers on the highways; the manner of doing which is left to the diſcretion of the juſtices of the peace and the conſta-

[8] Salk. 150.
[9] Spelm. Gloſſ. 148.
[o] page 117.
[1] Lamb. 9.
[2] Stat. 14 & 15 Car. II. c. 12.

Ile[3]: the hundred being however anſwerable for all robberies committed therein, by day light, for having kept negligent guard. Watch is properly applicable to the night only, (being called among our Teutonic anceſtors *wacht* or *watta*[4]) and it begins at the time when ward ends, and ends when that begins: for, by the ſtatute of Wincheſter, in walled towns the gates ſhall be cloſed from ſunſetting to ſunriſing, and watch ſhall be kept in every borough and town, eſpecially in the ſummer ſeaſon, to apprehend all rogues, vagabonds, and night-walkers, and make them give an account of themſelves. The conſtable may appoint watchmen, at his diſcretion, regulated by the cuſtom of the place; and theſe, being his deputies, have for the time being the authority of their principal. But, with regard to the infinite number of other minute duties, that are laid upon conſtables by a diverſity of ſtatutes, I muſt again refer to Mr. Lambard and Dr. Burn; in whoſe compilations may be alſo ſeen, what powers and duties belong to the conſtable or tithing-man indifferently, and what to the conſtable only: for the conſtable may do whatever the tithing-man may; but it does not hold *e converſo*, the tithing-man not having an equal power with the conſtable.

V. We are next to conſider the ſurveyors of the high-ways. Every pariſh is bound of common right to keep the high roads, that go through it, in good and ſufficient repair; unleſs by reaſon of the tenure of lands, or otherwiſe, this care is conſigned to ſome particular private perſon. From this burthen no man was exempt by our antient laws, whatever other immunities he might enjoy: this being part of the *trinoda neceſſitas*, to which every man's eſtate was ſubject; viz. *expeditio contra hoſtem, arcium conſtructio, et pontium reparatio.* For, though the reparation of bridges only is expreſſed, yet that of roads alſo muſt be underſtood: as in the Roman law, *ad inſtructiones reparationeſque itinerum et pontium, nullum genus homi-*

[3] Dalt. juſt. c. 104. *Excubias et explorationes quas wactas vocant.* Capitular. Hludov. Pii. cap. 1. A. D. 815.

num, nulliuſque dignitatis ac venerationis meritis, ceſſare oportet [5]. And indeed now, for the moſt part, the care of the roads only ſeems to be left to pariſhes; that of bridges being in great meaſure devolved upon the county at large, by ſtatute 22 Hen. VIII. c. 5. If the pariſh neglected theſe repairs, they might formerly, as they may ſtill, be indicted for ſuch their neglect: but it was not then incumbent on any particular officer to call the pariſh together, and ſet them upon this work; for which reaſon by the ſtatute 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 8. ſurveyors of the highways were ordered to be choſen in every pariſh [6].

Theſe ſurveyors were originally, according to the ſtatute of Philip and Mary, to be appointed by the conſtable and church-wardens of the pariſh; but now they are conſtituted by two neighbouring juſtices, out of ſuch inhabitants or others, as are deſcribed in ſtatute 13 Geo. III. c. 78. and may have ſalaries allotted them for their trouble.

Their office and duty conſiſts in putting in execution a variety of laws for the repairs of the public highways; that is, of ways leading from one town to another; all which are now reduced into one act by ſtatute 13 Geo. III. c. 78. which enacts, 1. That they may remove all annoyances in the highways, or give notice to the owner to remove them; who is liable to penalties on non-compliance. 2. They are to call together all the inhabitants and occupiers of lands, tenements, and hereditaments within the pariſh, ſix days in every year, to labour in fetching materials or repairing the highways; all

[5] *C.* 11. 74. 4.

[6] This office, Mr. Dalton (juſt. cap. 50.) ſays, exactly anſwers that of the *curatores viarum* of the Romans; but it ſhould ſeem that theirs was an office of rather more dignity and authority than ours; not only from comparing the method of making and mending the Roman ways with thoſe of our country pariſhes; but alſo becauſe one Thermus, who was the curator of the Flaminian way, was candidate for the conſulſhip with Julius Cæſar. (*Cic. ad Attic. l.* 1. *ep.* 1.)

perſons keeping draughts (of three horſes, &c.) or occupying lands, being obliged to ſend a team for every draught, and for every 50*l.* a year, which they keep or occupy; perſons keeping leſs than a draught, or occupying leſs than 50*l.* a year, to contribute in a leſs proportion; and all other perſons chargeable, between the ages of eighteen and ſixty-five, to work or find a labourer. But they may compound with the ſurveyors, at certain eaſy rates eſtabliſhed by the act. And every cartway leading to any market-town muſt be made twenty feet wide at the leaſt, if the fences will permit; and may be increaſed by two juſtices, at the expenſe of the pariſh, to the breadth of thirty feet. 3. The ſurveyors may lay out their own money in purchaſing materials for repairs, in erecting guide-poſts, and making drains, and ſhall be reimburſed by a rate, to be allowed at a ſpecial ſeſſions. 4. In caſe the perſonal labour of the pariſh be not ſufficient, the ſurveyors, with the conſent of the quarter ſeſſions, may levy a rate on the pariſh, in aid of the perſonal duty, not exceeding, in any one year, together with the other highway rates, the ſum of 9*d.* in the pound; for the due application of which they are to account upon oath. As for turnpikes, which are now pretty generally introduced in aid of ſuch rates, and the law relating to them, theſe depend principally on the particular powers granted in the ſeveral road acts, and upon ſome general proviſions which are extended to all turnpike roads in the kingdom, by ſtatute 13 Geo. III. c. 84. amended by many ſubſequent acts [7].

VI. I proceed therefore, laſtly, to conſider the overſeers of the poor; their original, appointment, and duty.

The poor of England, till the time of Henry VIII, ſubſiſted entirely upon private benevolence, and the charity of well-diſpoſed chriſtians. For, though it appears by the mirrour [8], that by the common law, the poor were to be "ſuſtained by par-

[7] Stat. 14 Geo. III. c. 14. 39 18 Geo. III. c. 28. 36. 57. 82. 16 Geo. III. c. [illegible] [8] c. 1. §. 3.

"ſons, rectors of the church, and the pariſhioners; "ſo that none of them die for default of ſuſtenance;" and though by the ſtatutes 12 Ric. II. c. 7. and 19 Hen. VII. c. 12. the poor are directed to abide in the cities or towns wherein they were born, or ſuch wherein they had dwelt for three years, (which ſeem to be the firſt rudiments of pariſh ſettlements) yet till the ſtatute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 25, I find no compulſory method chalked out for this purpoſe: but the poor ſeem to have been left to ſuch relief as the humanity of their neighbours would afford them. The monaſteries were, in particular, their principal reſource; and, among other bad effects which attended the monaſtic inſtitutions, it was not perhaps one of the leaſt (though frequently eſteemed quite otherwiſe) that they ſupported and fed a very numerous and very idle poor, whoſe ſuſtenance depended upon what was daily diſtributed in alms at the gates of the religious houſes. But, upon the total diſſolution of theſe, the inconvenience of thus encouraging the poor in habits of indolence and beggary was quickly felt throughout the kingdom: and abundance of ſtatutes were made in the reign of king Henry the eighth and his children, for providing for the poor and impotent; which, the preambles to ſome of them recite, had of late years greatly increaſed. Theſe poor were principally of two ſorts: ſick and impotent, and therefore unable to work: idle and ſturdy, and therefore able, but not willing, to exerciſe any honeſt employment. To provide in ſome meaſure for both of theſe, in and about the metropolis, Edward the ſixth founded three royal hoſpitals; Chriſt's and St. Thomas's, for the relief of the impotent through infancy or ſickneſs; and Bridewell for the puniſhment and employment of the vigorous and idle. But theſe were far from being ſufficient for the care of the poor throughout the kingdom at large: and therefore, after many other fruitleſs experiments, by ſtatute 43 Eliz. c. 2. overſeers of the poor were appointed in every pariſh.

By virtue of the ſtatute laſt mentioned, theſe overſeers are to be nominated yearly in Eaſter-week, or

within one month after, (though a ſubſequent nomination will be valid [9]) by two juſtices dwelling near the pariſh. They muſt be ſubſtantial houſeholders, and ſo expreſſed to be in the appointment of the juſtices [o].

Their office and duty, according to the ſame ſtatute, are principally theſe; firſt, to raiſe competent ſums for the neceſſary relief of the poor, impotent, old, blind, and ſuch other, being poor and not able to work; and ſecondly, to provide work for ſuch as are able, and cannot otherwiſe get employment: but this latter part of their duty, which, according to the wiſe regulations of that ſalutary ſtatute, ſhould go hand in hand with the other, is now moſt ſhamefully neglected. However, for theſe joint purpoſes, they are impowered to make and levy rates upon the ſeveral inhabitants of the pariſh, by the ſame act of parliament; which has been farther explained and enforced by ſeveral ſubſequent ſtatutes.

The two great objects of this ſtatute ſeem to have been, 1. To relieve the impotent poor and them only. To find employment for ſuch as are able to work: and this principally by providing ſtocks of raw materials to be worked up at their ſeparate homes, inſtead of accumulating all the poor in one common work-houſe: a practice which puts the ſober and diligent upon a level (in point of their earnings) with thoſe who are diſſolute and idle, depreſſes the laudable emulation of domeſtic induſtry and neatneſs, and deſtroys all endearing family connexions, the only felicity of the indigent. Whereas, if none were relieved but thoſe who are incapable to get their livings, and that in proportion to their incapacity; if no children were removed from their parents, but ſuch as are brought up in rags and idleneſs; and if every poor man and his family were regularly furniſhed with employment, and allowed the whole profits of their labour;—a ſpirit of buſy cheerfulneſs would ſoon diffuſe itſelf through every cottage; work would become eaſy and habitual, when abſolutely

[9] Str. 1133. [o] 2 Lord Raym. 1394.

neceſſary for daily ſubſiſtence; and the peaſant would go through his taſk without a murmur, if aſſured that he and his children (when incapable of work through infancy, age, or infirmity) would then, and then only, be entitled to ſupport from his opulent neighbours.

This appears to have been the plan of the ſtatute of queen Elizabeth; in which the only defect was confining the management of the poor to ſmall, parochial, diſtricts; which are frequently incapable of furniſhing proper work, or providing an able director. However, the laborious poor were then at liberty to ſeek employment wherever it was to be had; none being obliged to reſide in the places of their ſettlement, but ſuch as were unable or unwilling to work; and thoſe places of ſettlement being only ſuch where they were *born*, or had made their *abode*, originally for three years [1], and afterwards (in the caſe of vagabonds) for one year only [2].

After the reſtoration a very different plan was adopted, which has rendered the employment of the poor more difficult, by authorizing the ſubdiviſion of pariſhes; has greatly increaſed their number, by confining them all to their reſpective diſtricts; has given birth to the intricacy of our poor laws, by multiplying and rendering more eaſy the methods of gaining ſettlements; and, in conſequence, has created an infinity of expenſive law-ſuits, between contending neighbourhoods, concerning thoſe ſettlements and removals. By the ſtatute 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. a legal ſettlement was declared to be gained by *birth*; or by *inhabitancy*, *apprenticeſhip*, or *ſervice*, for forty days: within which period all intruders were made removeable from any pariſh by two juſtices of the peace, unleſs they ſettled in a tenement of the annual value of 10*l*. The frauds, naturally conſequent upon this proviſion, which gave a ſettlement by ſo ſhort a reſidence, produced the ſtatute 1 Jac. II. c. 17. which directed *notice* in writing to be delivered to the pariſh officers, before a ſettlement could be gained by ſuch

[1] Stat. 19 Hen. VII. c. 12. VI. c. 16. 14 Eliz. c. 5. 1 Edw. VI. c. 3. 3 Edw.

[2] Stat. 39 Eliz. c. 4.

reſidence. Subſequent proviſions allowed other circumſtances of notoriety to be equivalent to ſuch notice given; and thoſe circumſtances have from time to time been altered, enlarged, or reſtrained, whenever the experience of new inconveniencies, ariſing daily from new regulations, ſuggeſted the neceſſity of a remedy. And the doctrine of *certificates* was invented, by way of counterpoiſe, to reſtrain a man and his family from acquiring a new ſettlement by any length of reſidence whatever, unleſs in two particular excepted caſes; which makes pariſhes very cautious of giving ſuch certificates, and of courſe confines the poor at home, where frequently no adequate employment can be had.

The law of ſettlements may be therefore now reduced to the following general heads; or, a ſettlement in a pariſh may be acquired, 1. By *birth*; for, wherever a child is firſt known to be, that is always *prima facie* the place of ſettlement, until ſome other can be ſhewn [3]. This is alſo generally the place of ſettlement of a baſtard child [4]; for a baſtard having in the eye of the law no father, cannot be referred to *his* ſettlement, as other children may [5]. But, in legitimate children, though the place of birth be *prima facie* the ſettlement, yet it is not concluſively ſo; for there are, 2. Settlements by *parentage*, being the ſettlement of one's father or mother: all legitimate children being really ſettled in the pariſh where their parents are ſettled, until they get a new ſettlement for themſelves [6]. A new ſettlement may be acquired ſeveral ways; as, 3. By marriage. For a woman, marrying a man that is ſettled in another pariſh, changes her own ſettlement: the law not permitting the ſeparation of huſband and wife [7]. But if the man has no ſettlement, her's is ſuſpended during his life, if he remains in England and is able to maintain her; but in his abſence, or after his death,

3 Carth. 433. Comb. 364. Salk. 485. 1 Lord Raym. 567.

4 See p. 459.

5 Salk. 427.

6 Salk. 528. 2 Lord Raym. 1473.

7 Stra. 544.

or during (perhaps) his inability, ſhe may be removed to her old ſettlement [8]. The other methods of acquiring ſettlements in any pariſh are all reducible to this one, of *forty days reſidence* therein: but this forty days reſidence (which is conſtrued to be lodging or lying there) muſt not be by fraud, or ſtealth, or in any clandeſtine manner; but made notorious, by one or other of the following concomitant circumſtances. The next method therefore of gaining a ſettlement, is, 4. By forty days reſidence, and *notice*. For if a ſtranger comes into a pariſh, and delivers notice in writing of his place of abode, and number of his family, to one of the overſeers (which muſt be read in the church and regiſtered) and reſides there unmoleſted for forty days after ſuch notice, he is legally ſettled thereby [9]. For the law preſumes that ſuch a one at the time of notice is not likely to become chargeable, elſe he would not venture to give it: or that in ſuch caſe, the pariſh would take care to remove him. But there are alſo other circumſtances equivalent to ſuch notice: therefore, 5. *Renting* for a year a tenement of the yearly value of ten pounds, and reſiding forty days in the pariſh, gains a ſettlement without notice [10]: upon the principle of having ſubſtance enough to gain credit for ſuch a houſe. 6. Being charged to and paying the public *taxes* and levies of the pariſh; (excepting thoſe for ſcavengers, highways [1], and the duties on houſes and windows [2]) and, 7. Executing, when legally appointed, any public parochial *office* for a whole year in the pariſh, as church-warden, *&c.* are both of them equivalent to notice, and gain a ſettlement [3], if coupled with a reſidence of forty days. 8. Being *hired* for a year, when unmarried and childleſs, and *ſerving* a year in the ſame ſervice; and, 9. Being bound an *apprentice*,

[8] Foley. 249. 251, 252. Bur. Sett. C. 370.

[9] Stat. 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. 1 Jac. II. c. 17. 3 & 4 W. and Mar. c. 11.

[10] Stat. 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12.

[1] Stat. 9 Geo. I. c. 7. §. 6.

[2] Stat. 21 Geo. II. c. 10. 18 Geo. III. c. 26.

[3] Stat. 3 & 4 W. and M. c. 11.

give the ſervant, and apprentice a ſettlement without notice [4], in that place wherein they ſerve the laſt forty days. This is meant to encourage application to trades, and going out to reputable ſervices. 10. Laſtly, the having an *eſtate* of one's own, and reſiding thereon forty days, however ſmall the value may be, in caſe it be acquired by act of law or of a third perſon, as by deſcent, gift, deviſe, *&c.* is a ſufficient ſettlement [5]: but if a man acquire it by his own act, as by purchaſe, (in it's popular ſenſe, in conſideration of money paid) then unleſs the conſideration advanced, *bona fide*, be 30*l.* it is no ſettlement for any longer time, than the perſon ſhall inhabit thereon [6]. He is in no caſe removeable from his own property; but he ſhall not, by any trifling or fraudulent purchaſe of his own, acquire a permanent and laſting ſettlement.

All perſons, not ſo ſettled, may be removed to their own pariſhes, on complaint of the overſeers, by two juſtices of the peace, if they ſhall adjudge them likely to become chargeable to the pariſh, into which they have intruded: unleſs they are in a way of getting a legal ſettlement, as by having hired a houſe of 10*l.* *per annum*, or living in an annual ſervice; for then they are not removeable [7]. And in all other caſes, if the pariſh to which they belong will grant them a certificate, acknowledging them to be *their* pariſhioners, they cannot be removed merely becauſe *likely* to become chargeable, but only when they become *actually* chargeable [8]. But ſuch certificated perſon can gain no ſettlement by any of the means above-mentioned; unleſs by renting a tenement of 10*l.* *per annum*, or by ſerving an annual office in the pariſh, being legally placed therein: neither can an apprentice or ſervant to ſuch certificated perſon gain a ſettlement by ſuch their ſervice [9].

Theſe are the general heads of the laws relating to the poor, which, by the reſolutions of the courts

[4] Stat. 3 & 4 W. and M. c. 11. 8 & 9 W. III. c. 1e. 31 Geo. II. c. 11.

[5] Salk. 524.

[6] Stat. 9 Geo. I. c. 7.

[7] Salk. 472.

[8] Stat. 8 & 9 W. III. c. 30.

[9] Stat. 12 Ann. c. 18.

of juſtice thereon within a century paſt, are branched into a great variety. And yet, notwithſtanding the pains that have been taken about them, they ſtill remain very imperfect, and inadequate to the purpoſes they are deſigned for: a fate, that has generally attended moſt of our ſtatute laws, where they have not the foundation of the common law to build on. When the ſhires, the hundreds, and the tithings, were kept in the ſame admirable order in which they were diſpoſed by the great Alfred, there were no perſons idle, conſequently none but the impotent that needed relief: and the ſtatute of 43 Eliz. ſeems entirely founded on the ſame principle. But when this excellent ſcheme was neglected and departed from, we cannot but obſerve with concern, what miſerable ſhifts and lame expedients have from time to time been adopted, in order to patch up the flaws occaſioned by this neglect. There is not a more neceſſary or more certain maxim in the frame and conſtitution of ſociety, than that every individual muſt contribute his ſhare, in order to the well-being of the community: and ſurely they muſt be very deficient in ſound policy, who ſuffer one half of a pariſh to continue idle, diſſolute, and unemployed; and at length are amazed to find, that the induſtry of the other half is not able to maintain the whole.

CHAPTER THE TENTH.

OF THE PEOPLE, WHETHER ALIENS, DENIZENS, OR NATIVES.

HAVING, in the eight preceding chapters, treated of perſons as they ſtand in the public relations of *magiſtrates*, I now proceed to conſider ſuch perſons as fall under the denomination of the *people*. And herein all the inferior and ſubordinate magiſtrates, treated of in the laſt chapter, are included.

The firſt and moſt obvious diviſion of the people is into aliens and natural-born ſubjects. Natural-born ſubjects are ſuch as are born within the dominions of the crown of England; that is, within the ligeance, or as it is generally called, the allegiance of the king: and aliens, ſuch as are born out of it. Allegiance is the tie, or *ligamen*, which binds the ſubject to the king, in return for that protection which the king affords the ſubject. The thing itſelf, or ſubſtantial part of it, is founded in reaſon and the nature of government; the name and the form are derived to us from our Gothic anceſtors. Under the feodal ſyſtem, every owner of lands held them in ſubjection to ſome ſuperior or lord, from whom or whoſe anceſtors the tenant or vaſal had received them: and there was a mutual truſt or confidence ſubſiſting between the lord and vaſal, that the lord ſhould protect the vaſal in the enjoyment of the territory he had granted him, and, on the other hand, that the vaſal ſhould be faithful to the lord and defend him againſt all his enemies. This obligation

on the part of the vaſal was called his *fidelitas* or fealty; and an oath of fealty was required, by the feodal law, to be taken by all tenants to their landlord, which is couched in almoſt the ſame terms as our ancient oath of allegiance[1]: except that in the uſual oath of fealty there was frequently a ſaving or exception of the faith due to a ſuperior lord by name, under whom the landlord himſelf was perhaps only a tenant or vaſal. But when the acknowledgment was made to the abſolute ſuperior himſelf, who was vaſal to no man, it was no longer called the oath of fealty, but the oath of allegiance; and therein the tenant ſwore to bear faith to his ſovereign lord, in oppoſition to all men, without any ſaving or exception: "*contra omnes homines fidelitatem fecit*[2]." Land held by this exalted ſpecies of fealty was called *feudum ligium*, a liege fee; the vaſals *homines ligii*, or liege men; and the ſovereign their *dominus ligius*, or liege lord. And when ſovereign princes did homage to each other, for lands held under their reſpective ſovereignties, a diſtinction was always made between *ſimple* homage, which was only an acknowledgement of tenure[3]; and *liege* homage, which included the fealty before-mentioned, and the ſervices conſequent upon it. Thus when our Edward III, in 1329, did homage to Philip VI. of France, for his ducal dominions on that continent, it was warmly diſputed of what ſpecies the homage was to be, whether *liege* or *ſimple* homage[4]. But with us in England, it becoming a ſettled principle of tenure, that *all* lands in the kingdom are holden of the king as their ſovereign and lord paramount, no oath but that of fealty could ever be taken to inferior lords, and the oath of allegiance was neceſſarily confined to the perſon of the king alone. By an eaſy analogy the term of allegiance was ſoon brought to ſignify all other engagements, which are due from ſubjects to their prince, as well as thoſe

[1] 2 *Feud.* 5, 6, 7.
[2] 2 *Feud.* 99.
[3] Rep. Calvin's caſe. 7.
[4] 2 Carte. 401. Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxiii. 420.

duties which were ſimply and merely territorial. And the oath of allegiance, as adminiſtered for upwards of ſix hundred years[5], contained a promiſe "to be true and faithful to the king and his heirs, "and truth and faith to bear of life and limb and "terrene honour, and not to know or hear of any "ill or damage intended him, without defending "him therefrom." Upon which ſir Matthew Hale[6] makes this remark; that it was ſhort and plain, not entangled with long or intricate clauſes or declarations, and yet is comprehenſive of the whole duty from the ſubject to his ſovereign. But at the revolution, the terms of this oath being thought perhaps to favour too much the notion of non-reſiſtance, the preſent form was introduced by the convention parliament, which is more general and indeterminate than the former; the ſubject only promiſing "that "he will be faithful and bear *true* allegiance to the "king," without mentioning "his heirs," or ſpecifying in the leaſt wherein that allegiance conſiſts. The oath of ſupremacy is principally calculated as a renunciation of the pope's pretended authority: and the oath of abjuration, introduced in the reign of king William[7], very amply ſupplies the looſe and general texture of the oath of allegiance; it recognizing the right of his majeſty, derived under the act of ſettlement; engaging to ſupport him to the utmoſt of the juror's power; promiſing to diſcloſe all traiterous conſpiracies againſt him; and expreſsly renouncing any claim of the deſcendants of the late pretender, in as clear and explicit terms as the Engliſh language can furniſh. This oath muſt be taken by all perſons in any office, truſt, or employment; and may be tendered by two juſtices of the peace to any perſon, whom they ſhall ſuſpect of diſaffection[8]. And the oath of allegiance may be tendered[9] to all perſons above the age of twelve years,

[5] Mirror. c. 3. §. 35. Fleta. 3. 16. Britton. c. 29. 7 Rep. Calvin's caſe. 6.

[6] 1 Hal. P. C. 63.

[7] Stat. 13 W. III. c. 6.

[8] Stat. 1 Geo. I. c. 13. 6 Geo. III. c. 53.

[9] 2 Inſt. 121. 1 Hale P. C. 64.

whether natives, denizens, or aliens, either in the court-leet of the manor, or in the ſheriff's tourn, which is the court-leet of the county.

But, beſides theſe expreſs engagements, the law alſo holds that there is an implied, original, and virtual allegiance, owing from every ſubject to his ſovereign, antecedently to any expreſs promiſe; and although the ſubject never ſwore any faith or allegiance in form. For as the king, by the very deſcent of the crown, is fully inveſted with all the rights and bound to all the duties of ſovereignty, before his coronation; ſo the ſubject is bound to his prince by an intrinſic allegiance, before the ſuper-induction of thoſe outward bonds of oath, homage, and fealty; which were only inſtituted to remind the ſubject of this his previous duty, and for the better ſecuring it's performance[o]. The formal profeſſion therefore, or oath of ſubjection, is nothing more than a declaration in words of what was before implied in law. Which occaſions ſir Edward Coke very juſtly to obſerve [1], that "all ſubjects are equally bounden to their allegiance, as if they had taken "the oath; becauſe it is written by the finger of "the law in their hearts, and the taking of the corporal oath is but an outward declaration of the "ſame." The ſanction of an oath, it is true, in caſe of violation of duty, makes the guilt ſtill more accumulated, by ſuperadding perjury to treaſon: but it does not increaſe the civil obligation to loyalty; it only ſtrengthens the *ſocial* tie by uniting it with that of *religion*.

Allegiance, both expreſs and implied, is however diſtinguiſhed by the law into two ſorts or ſpecies, the one natural, the other local; the former being alſo perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance is ſuch as is due from all men born within the king's dominions immediately upon their birth [2]. For, immediately upon their birth, they are under the king's protection; at a time too, when (during

1 Hal. P. C. 61.
2 Inſt. 121.
2 7 Rep. 7.

their infancy) they are incapable of protecting themſelves. Natural allegiance is therefore a debt of gratitude; which cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered, by any change of time, place, or circumſtance, nor by any thing but the united concurrence of the legiſlature [3]. An Engliſhman who removes to France, or to China, owes the ſame allegiance to the king of England there as at home, and twenty years hence as well as now. For it is a principle of univerſal law [4], that the natural born ſubject of one prince cannot by any act of his own, no, not by ſwearing allegiance to another, put off or diſcharge his natural allegiance to the former: for this natural allegiance was intrinſic, and primitive, and antecedent to the other; and cannot be deveſted without the concurrent act of that prince to whom it was firſt due. Indeed the natural-born ſubject of one prince, to whom he owes allegiance, may be entangled by ſubjecting himſelf abſolutely to another: but it is his own act that brings him into theſe ſtraits and difficulties, of owing ſervice to two maſters; and it is unreaſonable that, by ſuch voluntary act of his own, he ſhould be able at pleaſure to unlooſe thoſe bands, by which he is connected to his natural prince.

Local allegiance is ſuch as is due from an alien, or ſtranger born, for ſo long time as he continues within the king's dominion and protection [5]: and it ceaſes, the inſtant ſuch ſtranger transfers himſelf from this kingdom to another. Natural allegiance is therefore perpetual, and local temporary only: and that for this reaſon, evidently founded upon the nature of government; that allegiance is a debt due from the ſubject, upon an implied contract with the prince, that ſo long as the one affords protection, ſo long the other will demean himſelf faithfully. As therefore the prince is always under a conſtant tie to protect his natural-born ſubjects, at all times and in all countries, for this reaſon their allegiance due to him is equally univerſal and permanent. But,

[3] 2 P. Wms. 124.
[4] 1 Hal. P. C. 68.
[5] 7 Rep. 6

on the other hand, as the prince affords his protection to an alien, only during his reſidence in this realm, the allegiance of an alien is confined (in point of time) to the duration of ſuch his reſidence, and (in point of locality) to the dominions of the Britiſh empire. From which conſideration ſir Matthew Hale[6] deduces this conſequence, that though there be an uſurper of the crown, yet it is treaſon for any ſubject, while the uſurper is in full poſſeſſion of the ſovereignty, to practice any thing againſt his crown and dignity: wherefore, although the true prince regain the ſovereignty, yet ſuch attempts againſt the uſurper (unleſs in defence or aid of the rightful king) have been afterwards puniſhed with death; becauſe of the breach of that temporary allegiance, which was due to him as king *de facto*. And upon this footing, after Edward IV recovered the crown, which had been long detained from his houſe by the line of Lancaſter, treaſons committed againſt Henry VI, were capitally puniſhed; though Henry had been declared an uſurper by parliament.

This oath of allegiance, or rather the allegiance itſelf, is held to be applicable not only to the political capacity of the king, or regal office, but to his natural perſon, and blood-royal: and for the miſapplication of their allegiance, viz. to the regal capacity or crown, excluſive of the perſon of the king, were the Spenſers baniſhed in the reign of Edward II[7]. And from hence aroſe that principle of perſonal attachment, and affectionate loyalty, which induced our forefathers, (and, if occaſion required, would doubtleſs induce their ſons) to hazard all that was dear to them, life, fortune, and family, in defence and ſupport of their liege lord and ſovereign.

This allegiance then, both expreſs and implied, is the duty of all the king's ſubjects, under the diſtinctions here laid down, of local and temporary, or univerſal and perpetual. Their rights are alſo diſtinguiſhable by the ſame criterions of time and

[6] 1 Hal. P. C. 60. [7] 1 Hal. P. C. 67.

locality; natural-born ſubjects having a great variety of rights, which they acquire by being born within the king's ligeance, and can never forfeit by any diſtance of place or time, but only by their own miſbehaviour: the expianation of which rights is the principal ſubject of the two firſt books of theſe commentaries. The ſame is alſo in ſome degree the caſe of aliens; though their rights are much more circumſcribed, being acquired only by reſidence here, and loſt whenever they remove. I ſhall however here endeavour to chalk out ſome of the principal lines, whereby they are diſtinguiſhed from natives, deſcending to farther particulars when they come in courſe.

An alien born may purchaſe lands, or other eſtates: but not for his own uſe; for the king is thereupon entitled to them [8]. If an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he muſt owe an allegiance, equally permanent with that property, to the king of England; which would probably be inconſiſtent with that, which he owes to his own natural liege lord: beſides that thereby the nation might in time be ſubject to foreign influence, and feel many other inconveniences. Wherefore by the civil law ſuch contracts were alſo made void [9]: but the prince had no ſuch advantage of forfeiture thereby, as with us in England. Among other reaſons, which might be given for our conſtitution, it ſeems to be intended by way of puniſhment for the alien's preſumption, in attempting to acquire any landed property: for the vendor is not affected by it, he having reſigned his right, and received an equivalent in exchange. Yet an alien may acquire a property in goods, money, and other perſonal eſtate, or may hire a houſe for his habitation [o]: for perſonal eſtate is of a tranſitory and moveable nature; and, beſides, this indulgence to ſtrangers is neceſſary for the advancement of trade. Aliens alſo may trade as freely as other people; only they are

[8] Co. Lit. 2.
[9] *Cod. l.* 11 *tit.* 55.
[o] 7 Rep. 17.

ſubject to certain higher duties at the cuſtom-houſe: and there are alſo ſome obſolete ſtatutes of Henry VIII, prohibiting alien artificers to work for themſelves in this kingdom; but it is generally held that they were virtually repealed by ſtatute 5 Eliz. c. 7. Alſo an alien may bring an action concerning perſonal property, and may make a will, and diſpoſe of his perſonal eſtate [1]: not as it is in France, where the king at the death of an alien is entitled to all he is worth, by the *droit d'aubaine* or *jus albinatus* [2], unleſs he has a peculiar exemption. When I mention theſe rights of an alien, I muſt be underſtood of alien friends only, or ſuch whoſe countries are in peace with ours; for alien-enemies have no rights, no privileges, unleſs by the king's ſpecial favour, during the time of war.

When I ſay, that an alien is one who is born out of the king's dominions, or allegiance, this alſo muſt be underſtood with ſome reſtrictions. The common law indeed ſtood abſolutely ſo; with only a very few exceptions: ſo that a particular act of parliament became neceſſary after the reſtoration [3], "for the naturalization of children of his majeſty's "Engliſh ſubjects, born in foreign countries during "the late troubles." And this maxim of the law proceeded upon a general principle, that every man owes natural allegiance where he is born, and cannot owe to ſuch allegiances, or ſerve two maſters, at once. Yet the children of the king's embaſſadors born abroad were always held to be natural ſubjects [4]: for as the father, though in a foreign country, owes not even a local allegiance to the prince to whom he is ſent; ſo, with regard to the ſon alſo, he was held (by a kind of *poſtliminium*) to be born under the king of England's allegiance, repreſented by his father, the ambaſſador. To encourage alſo foreign commerce, it was enacted by ſtatute 25 Edw. III. ſt. 2. that all children born abroad, provided

[1] Lutw. 34.
[2] A word derived from *alibi natus*. Spelm. Gl. 24.
[3] Stat. 29 Car. II. c. 6.
[4] 7 Rep. 18.

both their parents were at the time of his birth in allegiance to the king, and the mother had paſſed the ſeas by her huſband's conſent, might inherit as if born in England: and accordingly it hath been ſo adjudged in behalf of merchants[5]. But by ſeveral more modern ſtatutes[6] theſe reſtrictions are ſtill farther taken off: ſo that all children, born out of the king's ligeance, whoſe *fathers* (or *grandfathers* by the father's ſide) were natural-born ſubjects, are now deemed to be natural-born ſubjects themſelves, to all intents and purpoſes; unleſs their ſaid anceſtors were attainted, or baniſhed beyond ſea, for high treaſon; or were at the birth of ſuch children in the ſervice of a prince at enmity with Great Britain. Yet the grandchildren of ſuch anceſtors ſhall not be privileged in reſpect of the alien's duty, except they be proteſtants, and actually reſide within the realm; nor ſhall be enabled to claim any eſtate or intereſt, unleſs the claim be made within five years after the ſame ſhall accrue.

The children of aliens, born here in England, are, generally ſpeaking, natural-born ſubjects, and entitled to all the privileges of ſuch. In which the conſtitution of France differs from ours; for there, by their *jus albinatus*, if a child be born of foreign parents, it is an alien[7].

A denizen is an alien born, but who has obtained *ex donatione regis* letters patent to make him an Engliſh ſubject: a high and incommunicable branch of the royal prerogative[8]. A denizen is in a kind of middle ſtate, between an alien and natural-born ſubject, and partakes of both of them. He may take lands by purchaſe or deviſe, which an alien may not; but cannot take by inheritance[9]: for his parent, through whom he muſt claim, being an alien, had no inheritable blood; and therefore could convey none to the ſon. And, upon a like defect of

5 Cro. Car. 601. Mar. 91. Jenk. Cent. 3.

6 7 Ann. c. 5. 4 Geo. II. c. 21. and 13 Geo. III. c. 21.

7 Jenk. Cent. 3. cites *treſure françois*. 312.

8 7 Rep. Calvin's caſe. 25.

9 11 Rep. 67.

hereditary blood, the iſſue of a denizen, born *before* denization, cannot inherit to him; but his iſſue born *after*, may [o]. A denizen is not excuſed [1] from paying the alien's duty, and ſome other mercantile burthens. And no denizen can be of the privy council, or either houſe of parliament, or have any office of truſt, civil or military, or be capable of any grant of lands, &c. from the crown [2].

Naturalization cannot be performed but by act of parliament: for by this an alien is put in exactly the ſame ſtate as if he had been born in the king's ligeance; except only that he is incapable, as well as a denizen, of being a member of the privy council, or parliament, holding offices, grants, *&c* [3]. No bill for naturalization can be received in either houſe of parliament, without ſuch diſabling clauſe in it [4]: nor without a clauſe diſabling the perſon from obtaining any immunity in trade thereby, in any foreign country; unleſs he ſhall have reſided in Britain for ſeven years next after the commencement of the ſeſſion in which he is naturalized [5], neither can any perſon be naturalized or reſtored in blood, unleſs he hath received the ſacrament of the lord's ſupper within one month before the bringing in of the bill: and unleſs he alſo takes the oaths of allegiance and ſupremacy in the preſence of the parliament [6]. But theſe proviſions have been uſually diſpenſed with by ſpecial acts of parliament, previous to bills of naturalization of any foreign princes or princeſſes [7].

Theſe are the principal diſtinctions between aliens, denizens, and natives: diſtinctions, which it hath been frequently endeavoured ſince the commencement of this century to lay almoſt totally aſide, by one general naturalization-act for all foreign proteſtants. An attempt which was once carried into execution by the ſtatute 7 Ann. c. 5. but this, after

[o] Co. Litt. 8. Vaugh. 285.
[1] Stat. 22 Hen. VIII. c. 8.
[2] Stat. 12 W. III. c. 2.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Stat. 1 Geo. I. c. 4.
[5] Stat. 14 Geo. III. c. 84.
[6] Stat. 7 Jac. I. c. 2.
[7] Stat. 4 Ann. c. 1. 7 Geo. II. c. 3. 9 Geo. II. c. 24. 4 Geo. III. c. 4.

three years experience of it, was repealed by the ſtatute 10 Ann. c. 5. except one clauſe, which was juſt now mentioned, for naturalizing the children of Engliſh parents born abroad. However, every foreign ſeaman, who in time of war ſerves two years on board an Engliſh ſhip by virtue of the king's proclamation, is *ipſo facto* naturalized under the like reſtrictions as in ſtatute 12 W. III. c. 2.[8]; and all foreign proteſtants, and Jews, upon their reſiding ſeven years in any of the American colonies, without being abſent above two months at a time, and all foreign proteſtants ſerving two years in a military capacity there, or being three years employed in the whale fiſhery, without afterward abſenting themſelves from the king's dominions for more than one year, and none of them falling within the incapacities declared by ſtatute 4 Geo. II. c. 21. ſhall be (upon taking the oaths of allegiance and abjuration, or in ſome caſes, an affirmation to the ſame effect) naturalized to all intents and purpoſes, as if they had been born in this kingdom; except as to ſitting in parliament or in the privy council, and holding offices or grants of lands, *&c.* from the crown within the kingdoms of Great Britain or Ireland[9]. They therefore are admiſſible to all other privileges, which proteſtants or Jews born in this kingdom are entitled to. What thoſe privileges are, with reſpect to Jews[o] in particular, was the ſubject of very high debates about the time of the famous Jew-bill[1]; which enables all Jews to prefer bills of naturalization in parliament, without receiving the ſacrament, as ordained by ſtatute 7 Jac. I. It is not my intention to revive this controverſy again; for the act lived only a few months, and was then repealed[2]: therefore peace be now to it's *manes*.

[8] Stat. 13 Geo. II. c. 3.

[9] Stat. 13 Geo. II. c. 7. 20 Geo. II. c. 44. 22 Geo. II. c. 45. 2 Geo. III. c. 25. 13 Geo. III. c. 25.

[o] A pretty accurate account of the Jews till their baniſhment in 8 Edw. I. may be found in Prynne's *demurrer*, and in Molloy *de jure maritimo*. b. 3. c. 6.

[1] Stat. 26 Geo. II. c. 26.

[2] Stat. 27 Geo. II. c. 1.

CHAPTER THE ELEVENTH.

OF THE CLERGY.

THE people, whether aliens, denizens, or natural-born ſubjects are diviſible into two kinds; the clergy and laity: the clergy, comprehending all perſons in holy orders, and in eccleſiaſtical offices, will be the ſubject of the following chapter.

This venerable body of men, being ſeparate and ſet apart from the reſt of the people, in order to attend the more cloſely to the ſervice of almighty God, have thereupon large privileges allowed them by your municipal laws: and had formerly much greater, which were abridged at the time of the reformation on account of the ill uſe which the popiſh clergy had endeavoured to make of them. For, the laws having exempted them from almoſt every perſonal duty, they attempted a total exemption from every ſecular tie. But it is obſerved by ſir Edward Coke[1], that, as the overflowing of waters doth many times make the river to loſe it's proper channel, ſo in times paſt eccleſiaſtical perſons, ſeeking to extend their liberties beyond their true bounds, either loſt or enjoyed not thoſe which of right belonged to them. The perſonal exemptions do indeed for the moſt part continue. A clergyman cannot be compelled to ſerve on a jury, nor to appear at a court-leet or view of frank pledge; which almoſt every other perſon is obliged to do[2]: but if a layman is ſummoned on a jury, and

[1] 2 Inſt. 4.

[2] F. N. B. 160. 2 Inſt. 4.

before the trial takes orders, he ſhall notwithſtanding appear and be ſworn [3]. Neither can he be choſen to any temporal office; as bailiff, reeve, conſtable, or the like: in regard of his own continual attendance on the ſacred function [4]. During his attendance on divine ſervice he is privileged from arreſts in civil ſuits [5]. In caſes alſo of felony, a clerk in orders ſhall have benefit of his clergy, without being branded in the hand; and may likewiſe have it more than once: in both which particulars he is diſtinguiſhed from a layman [6]. But as they have their privileges, ſo alſo they have their diſabilities, on account of their ſpiritual avocations. Clergymen, we have ſeen [7], are incapable of ſitting in the houſe of commons; and by ſtatute 21 Hen. VIII. c. 13. are not (in general) allowed to take any lands or tenements to farm, upon pain of 10*l.* *per* month, and total avoidance of the leaſe; nor upon like pain to keep any tanhouſe or brewhouſe; nor ſhall engage in any manner of trade, nor ſell any merchandize, under forfeiture of the treble value. Which prohibition is conſonant to the canon law.

In the frame and conſtitution of eccleſiaſtical polity there are divers ranks and degrees: which I ſhall conſider in their reſpective order, merely as they are taken notice of by the ſecular laws of England; without intermeddling with the canons and conſtitutions, by which the clergy have bound themſelves. And under each diviſion I ſhall conſider, 1. The method of their appointment; 2. Their rights and duties; and 3. The manner wherein their character or office may ceaſe.

I. An arch-biſhop or biſhop is elected by the chapter of his cathedral church, by virtue of a licence from the crown. Election was, in very early times, the uſual mode of elevation to the epiſcopal chair throughout all chriſtendom; and this was promiſcu-

[3] 4 Leon. 190.
[4] Finch. L. 88.
[5] Stat. 50 Edw. III. c. 5. 1 Ric. II. c. 16.
[6] 2 Inſt. 637. Stat. 4 Hen. VII. c. 13. & 1 Edw. VI. c. 12.
[7] page 189.

ouſly performed by the laity as well as the clergy[8]: till at length it becoming tumultuous, the emperors and other ſovereigns of the reſpective kingdoms of Europe took the appointment in ſome degree into their own hands; by reſerving to themſelves the right of confirming theſe elections, and of granting inveſtiture of the temporalties, which now began almoſt univerſally to be annexed to this ſpiritual dignity; without which confirmation and inveſtiture, the elected biſhop could neither be conſecrated nor receive any ſecular profits. This right was acknowledged in the emperor Charlemagne, *A. D.* 773, by pope Hadrian I, and the council of Lateran[9], and univerſally exerciſed by other chriſtian princes: but the policy of the court of Rome at the ſame time began by degrees to exclude the laity from any ſhare in theſe elections, and to confine them wholly to the clergy, which at length was completely effected; the mere form of election appearing to the people to be a thing of little conſequence, while the crown was in poſſeſſion of an abſolute negative, which was almoſt equivalent to a direct right of nomination. Hence the right of appointing to biſhopricks is ſaid to have been in the crown of England[10] (as well as other kingdoms in Europe) even in the Saxon times; becauſe the rights of confirmation and inveſtiture were in effect (though not in form) a right of complete donation[11]. But when, by length of time, the cuſtom of making elections by the clergy only was fully eſtabliſhed, the popes began to except to the uſual method of granting theſe inveſtitures, which was *per annulum et baculum*, by the prince's delivering to the prelate a ring, and paſtoral ſtaff or croſier;

[8] *per clerum et populum.* Palm. 25. 2 Roll. Rep. 102. M. Paris. *A. D.* 1095.

[9] *Decret.* 1 *diſt.* 63. *c.* 22.

[10] Palm. 28.

[11] "*Nulla electio prælatorum* "*(ſunt verba Ingulphi) erat* "*merè libera et canonica; ſed* "*omnes dignitates tam epiſcopo-* "*rum, quam abbatum, per an-* "*nulum et baculum regis curia* "*pro ſua complacentia confere-* "*bat.*" *Penes clericos et mo-nachos fuit electio, ſed electum a rege poſtulabant.* Selden. *Jan. Angl.* l. 1. §. 39.

pretending, that this was an encroachment on the church's authority, and an attempt by theſe ſymbols to confer a ſpiritual juriſdiction: and pope Gregory VII, towards the cloſe of the eleventh century, publiſhed a bulle of excommunication againſt all princes who ſhould dare to confer inveſtitures, and all prelates who ſhould venture to receive them [2]. This was a bold ſtep towards effecting the plan then adopted by the Roman ſee, of rendering the clergy entirely independant of the civil authority: and long and eager were the conteſts occaſioned by this papal claim. But at length, when the emperor Henry V agreed to remove all ſuſpicion of encroachment on the ſpiritual character, by conferring inveſtitures for the future *per ſceptrum* and not *per annulum et baculum*; and when the kings of England and France conſented alſo to alter the form in their kingdoms, and receive only homage from the biſhops for their temporalties, inſtead of inveſting them by the ring and croſier; the court of Rome found it prudent to ſuſpend for a while it's other pretenſions [3].

This conceſſion was obtained from king Henry the firſt in England, by means of that obſtinate and arrogant prelate, arch-biſhop Anſelm [4]: but king John (about a century afterwards) in order to obtain the protection of the pope againſt his diſcontented barons, was alſo prevailed upon to give up by a charter, to all the monaſteries and cathedrals in the kingdom, the free right of electing their prelates, whether abbots or biſhops: reſerving only to the crown the cuſtody of the temporalties during the vacancy; the form of granting a licence to elect, (which is the original of our *conge d' eſlire*) on refuſal whereof the electors might proceed without it; and the right of approbation afterwards, which was not to be denied without a reaſonable and lawful cauſe [5]. This grant was expreſsly recognized and confirmed in king John's

[2] *Decret.* 2 *cauſ.* 16. *qu.* 7. *c.* 12. & 13.

[3] Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxv. 363. xxix. 115.

[4] M. Paris. *A. D.* 1107.

[5] M. Paris. *A. D.* 1214. Raym. *Fœd.* 198.

magna carta[6], and was again eſtabliſhed by ſtatute 25 Edw. III. ſt. 6. §. 3.

But by ſtatute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 20. the ancient right of nomination was, in effect reſtored to the crown: it being enacted that, at every future avoidance of a biſhoprick, the king may ſend the dean and chapter his uſual licence to proceed to election; which is always to be accompanied with a letter miſſive from the king, containing the name of the perſon whom he would have them elect: and, if the dean and chapter delay their election above twelve days, the nomination ſhall devolve to the king, who may by letters patent appoint ſuch perſon as he pleaſes. This election or nomination, if it be of a biſhop, muſt be ſignified by the king's letters patent to the arch-biſhop of the province; if it be of an arch-biſhop, to the other arch-biſhop and two biſhops, or to four biſhops; requiring them to confirm, inveſt, and conſecrate the perſon ſo elected: which they are bound to perform immediately, without any application to the ſee of Rome. After which the biſhop elect ſhall ſue to the king for his temporalties, ſhall make oath to the king and none other, and ſhall take reſtitution of his ſecular poſſeſſions out of the king's hands only. And if ſuch dean and chapter do not elect in the manner by this act appointed, or if ſuch arch-biſhop or biſhop do refuſe to confirm, inveſt, and conſecrate ſuch biſhop elect, they ſhall incur all the penalties of a *præmunire*.

An arch-biſhop is the chief of the clergy in a whole province; and has the inſpection of the biſhops of that province, as well as of the inferior clergy, and may deprive them on notorious cauſe[7]. The arch-biſhop has alſo his own dioceſe, wherein he exerciſes epiſcopal juriſdiction; as in his province he exerciſes archiepiſcopal. As arch biſhop, he, upon receipt of the king's writ, calls the biſhops and clergy of his province to meet in convocation: but without the king's writ he cannot aſſemble them[8]. To him all appeals are made from inferior juriſdictions within

[6] *cap.* 1. *edit. Oxon.* 1759.
[7] Lord Raym. 541.
[8] 4 Inſt. 322, 323.

his province; and, as an appeal lies from the biſhops in perſon to him in perſon, ſo it alſo lies from the conſiſtory courts of each dioceſe to his archiepiſcopal court. During the vacancy of any ſee in his province, he is guardian of the ſpiritualties thereof, as the king is of the temporalties; and he executes all eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction therein. If an archiepiſcopal ſee be vacant, the dean and chapter are the ſpiritual guardians, ever ſince the office of prior of Canterbury was aboliſhed at the reformation [9]. The arch-biſhop is entitled to preſent by lapſe to all the eccleſiaſtical livings in the diſpoſal of his dioceſan biſhops, if not filled within ſix months. And the arch-biſhop has a cuſtomary prerogative, when a biſhop is conſecrated by him, to name a clerk or chaplain of his own to be provided for by ſuch ſuffragan biſhop; in lieu of which it is now uſual for the biſhop to make over by deed to the arch-biſhop, his executors and aſſigns, the next preſentation of ſuch dignity or benefice in the biſhop's diſpoſal within that ſee, as the arch-biſhop himſelf ſhall chooſe; which is therefore called his *option* [o]: which options are only binding on the biſhop himſelf who grants them, and not on his ſucceſſors. The prerogative itſelf ſeems to be derived from the legatine power formerly annexed by the popes to the metropolitan of Canterbury [1]. And we may add, that the papal claim itſelf (like moſt others of that encroaching ſee) was probably ſet up in imitation of the imperial prerogative called *primæ* or *primariæ preces*: whereby the emperor exerciſes, and hath immemorially exerciſed [2], a right of naming to the firſt prebend that becomes vacant after his acceſſion in every church of the empire [3]. A right, that was alſo exerciſed by the crown of England in the reign of Edward I [4]; and which probably gave

9 2 Roll. Abr. 22.

o Cowel's interp. tit. *option*.

1 Sherlock of options. 1.

2 Goldaſt. *conſtit. imper. tom.* 3. *page* 406.

3 Dufreſne. V. 806. Mod. Univ. Hiſt. xxix. 5.

4 *Rex, &c. ſalutem. Scribatis epiſcopo Karl quod—Roberto de Icard penſionem ſuam, quam ad preces regis prædicto Roberto conceſſit, de cætero ſolvat; et de proxima eccleſia vacatura de collatione prædicti epiſcopi, quam ipſe Robertus acceptaverit, reſpiciat.* Brev. 11 Edw. I. 3 Prynne 1264.

riſe to the royal corodies which were mentioned in a former chapter[5]. It is likewiſe the privilege, by cuſtom, of the arch-biſhop of Canterbury, to crown the kings and queens of this kingdom. And he hath alſo by the ſtatute 25 Hen. VIII. c. 21. the power of granting diſpenſations in any caſe, not contrary to the holy ſcriptures and the law of God, where the pope uſed formerly to grant them: which is the foundation of his granting ſpecial licences, to marry at any place or time, to hold two livings, and the like: and on this alſo is founded the right he exerciſes of conferring degrees, in prejudice of the two univerſities.[6].

The power and authority of a biſhop, beſides the adminiſtration of certain holy ordinances peculiar to that ſacred order, conſiſt principally in inſpecting the manners of the people and clergy, and puniſhing them in order to reformation, by eccleſiaſtical cenſures. To this purpoſe he has ſeveral courts under him, and may viſit at pleaſure every part of his dioceſe. His chancellor is appointed to hold his courts for him, and to aſſiſt him in matters of eccleſiaſtical law; who, as well as all other eccleſiaſtical officers, if lay or married, muſt be a doctor of the civil law, ſo created in ſome univerſity[7]. It is alſo the buſineſs of a biſhop to inſtitute, and to direct induction, to all eccleſiaſtical livings in his dioceſe.

Archbiſhopricks and biſhopricks may become void by death, deprivation for any very groſs and notorious crime, and alſo by reſignation. All reſignations muſt be made to ſome ſuperior[8]. Therefore a biſhop muſt reſign to his metropolitan; but the archbiſhop can reſign to none but the king himſelf.

II. A dean and chapter are the council of the biſhop, to aſſiſt him with their advice in affairs of religion, and alſo in the temporal concerns of his ſee[9]. When the reſt of the clergy were ſettled in

[5] ch. 8. page 295.

[6] See the biſhop of Cheſter's caſe. Oxon. 1721.

[7] Stat. 37 Hen. VIII. c. 17.

[8] Gibſ. cod. 822.

[9] 3 Rep. 75. Co. Litt. 103. 300.

the ſeveral pariſhes of each dioceſe (as hath formerly[o] been mentioned) theſe were reſerved for the celebration of divine ſervice in the biſhop's own cathedral; and the chief of them, who preſided over the reſt, obtained the name of *decanus* or dean, being probably at firſt appointed to ſuperintend *ten* canons or prebendaries.

All ancient deans are elected by the chapter, by *conge d' eſlire* from the king, and letters miſſive of recommendation; in the ſame manner as biſhops: but in thoſe chapters, that were founded by Henry VIII out of the ſpoils of the diſſolved monaſteries, the deanery is donative, and the inſtallation merely by the king's letters patent[1]. The chapter, conſiſting of canons or prebendaries, are ſometimes appointed by the king, ſometimes by the biſhop, and ſometimes elected by each other.

The dean and chapter are, as was before obſerved, the nominal electors of a biſhop. The biſhop is their ordinary and immediate ſuperior; and has, generally ſpeaking, the power of viſiting them, and correcting their exceſſes and enormities. They had alſo a check on the biſhop at common law: for till the ſtatute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 28. his grant or leaſe would not have bound his ſucceſſors, unleſs confirmed by the dean and chapter[2].

Deaneries and prebends may become void, like a biſhoprick, by death, by deprivation, or by reſignation to either the king or the biſhop[3]. Alſo I may here mention, once for all, that if a dean, prebendary, or other ſpiritual perſon be made a biſhop, all the preferments of which he was before poſſeſſed are void; and the king may preſent to them in right of his prerogative royal. But they are not void by the election, but only by the conſecration[4].

III. An arch-deacon hath an eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction, immediately ſubordinate to the biſhop,

[o] page 114, 115.
[1] Gibſ. cod. 173.
[2] Co. Lit. 103.
[3] Plowd. 498.
[4] Bro. *Abr. t. preſentation.* 3. 61. Cro. Eliz. 542. 790. 2 Roll. Abr. 352. 4 Mod. 200. Salk. 137.

throughout the whole of his dioceſe, or in ſome particular part of it. He is uſually appointed by the biſhop himſelf; and hath a kind of epiſcopal authority, originally derived from the biſhop, but now independent and diſtinct from his[5]. He therefore viſits the clergy; and has his ſeparate court for puniſhment of offenders by ſpiritual cenſures, and for hearing all other cauſes of eccleſiaſtical cognizance.

IV. The rural deans are very ancient officers of the church[6], but almoſt grown out of uſe; though their deaneries ſtill ſubſiſt as an eccleſiaſtical diviſion of the dioceſe, or archdeaconry. They ſeem to have been deputies of the biſhop, planted all round his dioceſe, the better to inſpect the conduct of the parochial clergy, to inquire into and report dilapidations, and to examine the candidates for confirmation; and armed, in minuter matters, with an inferior degree of judicial and coercive authority[7].

V. The next, and indeed the moſt numerous, order of men in the ſyſtem of eccleſiaſtical polity, are the perſons and vicars of churches: in treating of whom I ſhall firſt mark out the diſtinction between them; ſhall next obſerve the method by which one may become a parſon or vicar; ſhall then briefly touch upon their rights and duties; and ſhall, laſtly, ſhew how one may ceaſe to be either.

A parſon, *perſona eccleſiæ*, is one that hath full poſſeſſion of all the rights of a parochial church. He is called parſon, *perſona*, becauſe by his perſon the church, which is an inviſible body, is repreſented; and he is in himſelf a body corporate, in order to protect and defend the rights of the church (which he perſonates) by a perpetual ſucceſſion[8]. He is ſometimes called the rector, or governor of the church: but the appellation of *parſon*, (however it may be depreciated by familiar, clowniſh, and indiſcriminate uſe) is the moſt legal, moſt beneficial, and moſt honourable title that a pariſh prieſt can enjoy; becauſe ſuch a one, (ſir Edward Coke obſerves) and he only, is ſaid *vicem ſeu perſonam eccleſiæ gerere*. A parſon has, dur-

[5] 1 Burn. eccl. law. 68, 69.
[6] Kennet. par. antiq. 633.
[7] Gibſ. cod. 972. 1550.
[8] Co. Litt. 300.

ing his life, the freehold in himſelf of the parſonage houſe, the glebe, the tithes, and other dues. But theſe are ſometimes *appropriated*; that is to ſay, the benefice is perpetually annexed to ſome ſpiritual corporation, either ſole or aggregate, being the patron of the living; which the law eſteems equally capable of providing for the ſervice of the church, as any ſingle private clergyman. This contrivance ſeems to have ſprung from the policy of the monaſtic orders, who have never been deficient in ſubtile inventions for the increaſe of their own power and emoluments. At the firſt eſtabliſhment of parochial clergy, the tithes of the pariſh were diſtributed in a fourfold diviſion; one for the uſe of the biſhop, another for maintaining the fabrick of the church, a third for the poor, and the fourth to provide for the incumbent. When the ſees of the biſhops became otherwiſe amply endowed, they were prohibited from demanding their uſual ſhare of theſe tithes, and the diviſion was into three parts only. And hence it was inferred by the monaſteries, that a ſmall part was ſufficient for the officiating prieſt; and that the remainder might well be applied to the uſe of their own fraternities, (the endowment of which was conſtrued to be a work of the moſt exalted piety) ſubject to the burthen of repairing the church and providing for it's conſtant ſupply. And therefore they begged and bought, for maſſes and obits, and ſometimes even for money, all the advowſons within their reach, and then appropriated the benefices to the uſe of their own corporation. But, in order to complete ſuch appropriation effectually, the king's licence, and conſent of the biſhop, muſt firſt be obtained: becauſe both the king and the biſhop may ſometime or other have an intereſt, by lapſe, in the preſentation to the benefice; which can never happen if it be appropriated to the uſe of a corporation, which never dies; and alſo becauſe the law repoſes a confidence in them, that they will not conſent to any thing that ſhall be to the prejudice of the church. The conſent of the patron alſo is neceſſarily implied,

becauſe (as was before obſerved) the appropriation can be originally made to none, but to ſuch ſpiritual corporation, as is alſo the patron of the church; the whole being indeed nothing elſe, but an allowance for the patrons to retain the tithes and glebe in their own hands, without preſenting any clerk, they themſelves undertaking to provide for the ſervice of the church[9]. When the appropriation is thus made, the appropriators and their ſucceſſors are perpetual parſons of the church; and muſt ſue and be ſued, in all matters concerning the rights of the church, by the name of parſons[o].

This appropriation may be ſevered, and the church become diſappropriate, two ways: as, firſt, if the patron or appropriator preſents a clerk, who is inſtituted and inducted to the parſonage: for the incumbent ſo inſtituted and inducted is to all intents and purpoſes complete parſon; and the appropriation, being once ſevered, can never be re-united again, unleſs by a repetition of the ſame ſolemnities[1]. And, when the clerk ſo preſented is diſtinct from the vicar, the rectory thus veſted in him becomes what is called a *ſine-cure*; becauſe he hath no cure of ſouls, having a vicar under him to whom that cure is committed[2]. Alſo, if the corporation which has the appropriation is diſſolved, the parſonage becomes diſappropriate at common law: becauſe the perpetuity of parſon is gone, which is neceſſary to ſupport the appropriation.

In this manner, and ſubject to theſe conditions, may appropriations be made at this day: and thus were moſt, if not all, of the appropriations at preſent exiſting originally made; being annexed to biſhopricks, prebends, religious houſes, nay, even to nunneries, and certain military orders, all of which were ſpiritual corporations. At the diſſolution of monaſteries by ſtatutes 27 Hen. VIII. c. 28. and 31 Hen. VIII. c. 13. the appropriations of the ſeveral

[9] Plowd. 496—500.
[o] Hob. 307.
[1] Co. Litt. 46.
[2] Sine-cures might alſo be created by other means. 2 Burn. eccl. law. 347.

parſonages, which belonged to thoſe reſpective religious houſes, (amounting to more than one third of all the pariſhes in England [3]) would have been by the rules of the common law diſappropriated; had not a clauſe in thoſe ſtatutes intervened, to give them to the king in as ample a manner as the abbots, &c. formerly held the ſame, at the time of their diſſolution. This, though perhaps ſcarcely defenſible, was not without example; for the ſame was done in former reigns, when the alien priories (that is, ſuch as were filled by foreigners only) were diſſolved and given to the crown [4]. And from theſe two roots have ſprung all the lay appropriations or ſecular parſonages, which we now ſee in the kingdom; they having been afterwards granted out from time to time by the crown [5].

Theſe appropriating corporations, or religious houſes, were wont to depute one of their own body to perform divine ſervice, and adminiſter the ſacraments, in thoſe pariſhes of which the ſociety was thus the parſon. This officiating miniſter was in reality no more than a curate, deputy, or vicegerent of the appropriator, and therefore called *vicarius* or *vicar*. His ſtipend was at the diſcretion of the appropriator, who was however bound of common right to find ſomebody, *qui illi de temporalibus, epiſcopo de ſpiritualibus, debeat reſpondere* [6]. But this was done in ſo ſcandalous a manner, and the pariſhes ſuffered ſo much by the neglect of the appropriators, that the legiſlature was forced to interpoſe: and accordingly it is enacted by ſtatute 15 Ric. II. c. 6. that in all appropriations of churches, the diocеſan biſhop ſhall ordain (in proportion to the value of the church) a competent ſum to be diſtributed among the poor pariſhioners annually; and that the vicarage ſhall be *ſufficiently* endowed. It ſeems the pariſh were frequently ſufferers, not only by the want of divine ſer-

3 Seld. review of tith. c. 9. Spelm. Apology. 35.

4 2 Inſt. 584.

5 Sir H. Spelman (of tithes, c. 29.) ſays theſe are now called impropriations, as being *improperly* in the hands of laymen.

6 Seld. tith. c. 11. 1.

vice, but alſo by withholding thoſe alms, for which, among other purpoſes, the payment of tithes was originally impoſed: and therefore in this act a penſion is directed to be diſtributed among the poor parochians, as well as a ſufficient ſtipend to the vicar. But he, being liable to be removed at the pleaſure of the appropriators, was not likely to inſiſt too rigidly on the legal ſufficiency of the ſtipend: and therefore by ſtatute 4 Hen. IV. c. 12. it is ordained, that the vicar ſhall be a ſecular perſon, not a member of any religious houſe; that he ſhall be vicar perpetual, not removeable at the caprice of the monaſtery; and that he ſhall be canonically inſtituted and inducted, and be ſufficiently endowed, at the diſcretion of the ordinary, for theſe three expreſs purpoſes, to do divine ſervice, to inform the people, and to keep hoſpitality. The endowments in conſequence of theſe ſtatutes have uſually been by a portion of the glebe, or land, belonging to the parſonage, and a particular ſhare of the tithes, which the appropriators found it moſt troubleſome to collect, and which are therefore generally called privy or ſmall tithes; the greater, or predial, tithes being ſtill reſerved to their own uſe. But one and the ſame rule was not obſerved in the endowment of all vicarages. Hence ſome are more liberally, and ſome more ſcantily, endowed: and hence the tithes of many things, as wood in particular, are in ſome pariſhes rectorial, and in ſome vicarial tithes.

The diſtinction therefore of a parſon and vicar is this: the parſon has for the moſt part the whole right to all the eccleſiaſtical dues in his pariſh; but a vicar has generally an appropriator over him, entitled to the beſt part of the profits, to whom he is in effect perpetual curate, with a ſtanding ſalary. Though in ſome places the vicarage has been conſiderably augmented by a large ſhare of the great tithes; which augmentations were greatly aſſiſted by the ſtatute 29 Car. II. c. 8. enacted in favour of poor vicars and curates, which rendered ſuch temporary augmentations (when made by the appropriators) perpetual.

The method of becoming a parſon or vicar is much the ſame. To both there are four requiſites neceſſary: holy orders; preſentation; inſtitution; and induction. The method of conferring the holy orders of deacon and prieſt, according to the liturgy and canons[7], is foreign to the purpoſe of theſe commentaries; any farther than as they are neceſſary requiſites to make a complete parſon or vicar. By common law, a deacon, of any age, might be inſtituted and inducted to a parſonage or vicarage: but it was ordained by ſtatute 13 Eliz. c. 12. that no perſon under twenty-three years of age, and in deacon's orders, ſhould be preſented to any benefice with cure; and if he were not ordained prieſt within one year after his induction, he ſhould be *ipſo facto* deprived: and now, by ſtatute 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 4. no perſon is capable to be admitted to any benefice, unleſs he hath been firſt ordained a prieſt; and then he is, in the language of the law, a clerk in orders. But if he obtains orders, or a licence to preach, by money or corrupt practices (which ſeems to be the true, though not the common, notion of ſimony) the perſon giving ſuch orders forfeits[8] 40*l.* and the perſon receiving 10*l.* and is incapable of any eccleſiaſtical preferment for ſeven years afterwards.

Any clerk may be preſented[9] to a parſonage or vicarage; that is, the patron, to whom the advowſon of the church belongs, may offer his clerk to the biſhop of the dioceſe to be inſtituted. Of advowſons, or the right of preſentation, being a ſpecies of private property, we ſhall find a more convenient place to treat in the ſecond part of theſe commentaries. But when a clerk is preſented, the biſhop may refuſe him upon many accounts. As, 1. If the patron is excommunicated, and remains in contempt forty days[10]. Or, 2. If the clerk be unfit[11]: which unfitneſs is of ſeveral kinds. Firſt, with regard to

[7] See 2 Burn eccl. law. 103.

[8] Stat. 31 Eliz. c. 6.

[9] A layman may alſo be preſented; but he muſt take prieſt's orders before his admiſſion. 1 Burn. 103.

[10] 2 Roll. Abr. 355.

[11] Glanv. *l.* 13 *c.* 20.

his perſon; as if he be a baſtard, an outlaw, an excommunicate, an alien, under age, or the like[2]. Next, with regard to his faith or morals; as for any particular hereſy, or vice that is *malum in ſe*: but if the biſhop alledges only in generals, as that he is *ſchiſmaticus inveteratus*, or objects a fault that is *malum prohibitum* merely, as haunting taverns, playing at unlawful games, or the like; it is not good cauſe of refuſal[3]. Or, laſtly, the clerk may be unfit to diſcharge the paſtoral office for want of learning. In any of which caſes the biſhop may refuſe the clerk. In caſe the refuſal is for hereſy, ſchiſm, inability of learning, or other matter of eccleſiaſtical cognizance, there the biſhop muſt give notice to the patron of ſuch his cauſe of refuſal, who, being uſually a layman, is not ſuppoſed to have knowledge of it; elſe he cannot preſent by lapſe: but, if the cauſe be temporal, there he is not bound to give notice[4].

If an action at law be brought by the patron againſt the biſhop for refuſing his clerk, the biſhop muſt aſſign the cauſe. If the cauſe be of a temporal nature and the fact admitted, (as, for inſtance, outlawry) the judges of the king's courts muſt determine it's validity, or, whether it be ſufficient cauſe of refuſal: but if the fact be denied, it muſt be determined by a jury. If the cauſe be of a ſpiritual nature, (as, hereſy, particularly alledged) the fact if denied ſhall alſo be determined by a jury; and if the fact be admitted or found, the court upon conſultation and advice of learned divines ſhall decide it's ſufficiency[5]. If the cauſe be want of learning, the biſhop need not ſpecify in what points the clerk is deficient, but only alledge that he is deficient[6]: for the ſtatute 9 Edw. II. ſt. 1. c. 13. is expreſs, that the examination of the fitneſs of a perſon preſented to a benefice belongs to the eccleſiaſtical judge. But be-

[2] 2 Roll. Abr. 356. 2 Inſt. 632. Stat. 3 Ric. II. c. 3. 7 Ric. II. c. 12.
[3] 5 Rep. 58.
[4] 2 Inſt. 632.
[5] 2 Inſt. 632.
[6] 5 Rep. 58. 3 Lev. 313.

cauſe it would be nugatory in this caſe to demand the reaſon of refuſal from the ordinary, if the patron were bound to abide by his determination, who has already pronounced his clerk unfit: therefore, if the biſhop returns the clerk to be *minus ſufficiens in literatura*, the court ſhall write to the metropolitan, to re-examine him, and certify his qualifications; which certificate of the archbiſhop is final[7].

If the biſhop hath no objections, but admits the patron's preſentation, the clerk ſo admitted is next to be inſtituted by him; which is a kind of inveſtiture of the ſpiritual part of the benefice: for by inſtitution the care of the ſouls of the pariſh is committed to the charge of the clerk. When a vicar is inſtituted, he (beſides the uſual forms) takes, if required by the biſhop, an oath of perpetual reſidence; for the maxim of law is, that *vicarius non habet vicarium*: and, as the non-reſidence of the appropriators was the cauſe of the perpetual eſtabliſhment of vicarages, the law judges it very improper for them to defeat the end of their conſtitution, and by abſence to create the very miſchief which they were appointed to remedy: eſpecially as, if any profits are to ariſe from putting in a curate and living at a diſtance from the pariſh, the appropriator, who is the real parſon, has undoubtedly the elder title to them. When the ordinary is alſo the patron, and *confers* the living, the preſentation and inſtitution are one and the ſame act, and are called a collation to a benefice. By inſtitution or collation the church is full, ſo that there can be no freſh preſentation till another vacancy, at leaſt in the caſe of a common patron; but the church is not full againſt the king, till induction: nay, even if a clerk is inſtituted upon the king's preſentation, the crown may revoke it before induction, and preſent another clerk[8]. Upon inſtitution alſo the clerk may enter on the parſonage houſe and glebe, and take the tithes; but he cannot grant or let them, or bring an action for them, till induction.

[7] 2 Inſt. 632.

[8] Co. Litt. 3 4.

Induction is performed by a mandate from the biſhop to the arch-deacon, who uſually iſſues out a precept to other clergymen to perform it for him. It is done by giving the clerk corporal poſſeſſion of the church, as by holding the ring of the door, tolling a bell, or the like; and is a form required by law, with intent to give all the pariſhioners due notice, and ſufficient certainty of their new miniſter, to whom their tithes are to be paid. This therefore is the inveſtiture of the temporal part of the benefice, as inſtitution is of the ſpiritual. And when a clerk is thus preſented, inſtituted, and inducted into a rectory, he is then, and not before, in full and complete poſſeſſion, and is called in law *perſona imperſonata*, or parſon imparſonee [9].

The rights of a parſon or vicar, in his tithes and eccleſiaſtical dues, fall more properly under the ſecond book of theſe commentaries: and as to his duties, they are principally of eccleſiaſtical cognizance; thoſe only excepted which are laid upon him by ſtatute. And thoſe are indeed ſo numerous, that it is impracticable to recite them here with any tolerable conciſeneſs or accuracy. Some of them we may remark, as they ariſe in the progreſs of our inquiries, but for the reſt I muſt refer myſelf to ſuch authors as have compiled treatiſes expreſsly upon this ſubject [o]. I ſhall only juſt mention the article of reſidence, upon the ſuppoſition of which the law doth ſtile every parochial miniſter an incumbent. By ſtatute 21 Hen. VIII. c. 13. perſons wilfully abſenting themſelves from their benefices, for one month together, or two months in the year, incur a penalty of 5*l.* to the king, and 5*l.* to any perſon that will ſue for the ſame: except chaplains to the king, or others therein

[9] Co. Litt. 300.

[o] Theſe are very numerous: but there are few which can be relied on with certainty. Among theſe are biſhop Gibſon's *codex*, Dr. Burn's *eccleſiaſtical law*, and the earlier editions of the *clergyman's law*, publiſhed under the name of Dr. Watſon, but compiled by Mr. Place a barriſter.

mentioned[1], during their attendance in the houſhold of ſuch as retain them: and alſo except[2] all heads of houſes, magiſtrates, and profeſſors in the univerſities, and all ſtudents under forty years of age reſiding there, *bona fide*, for ſtudy. Legal reſidence is not only in the pariſh, but alſo in the parſonage houſe, if there be one: for it hath been reſolved[3], that the ſtatute intended reſidence, not only for ſerving the cure, and for hoſpitality; but alſo for maintaining the houſe, that the ſucceſſor alſo may keep hoſpitality there: and, if there be no parſonage houſe, it hath been holden that the incumbent is bound to hire one, in the ſame or ſome neighbouring pariſh (*p*), to anſwer the purpoſes of reſidence. For the more effectual promotion of which important duty among the parochial clergy, a proviſion is made by the ſtatute 17 Geo. III. c. 53. for raiſing money upon eccleſiaſtical benefices, to be paid off by annually decreaſing inſtallments, and to be expended in rebuilding or repairing the houſes belonging to ſuch benefices.

We have ſeen that there is but one way, whereby one may become a parſon or vicar: there are many ways, by which one may ceaſe to be ſo. 1. By death. 2. By ceſſion, in taking another benefice. For by ſtatute 21 Hen. VIII. c. 13. if any one having a benefice of 8*l. per annum*, or upwards (according to the preſent valuation in the king's books[4],) accepts any other, the firſt ſhall be adjudged void, unleſs he obtains a diſpenſation; which no one is entitled to have, but the chaplains of the king and others therein mentioned, the brethren and ſons of lords and knights,

[1] Stat. 25 Hen. VIII. c. 16. 13. 33 Hen. VIII. c. 28.
[2] Stat. 28 Hen. VIII. c.
[3] 6 Rep. 21.
[4] Cro. Car. 456.

(*p*) [In the caſe of Wilkinſon *qui tam* againſt Allot, Eaſter term, 16 Geo. III. *B. R.* reported in Cowper's Reports, 429, it was adjudged, that if there be no parſonage-houſe, *that* is no excuſe for the incumbent's reſiding *out* of the pariſh;—that the ſtatute of non-reſidence is a beneficial law, and, though a penal one, has received a ſtrict conſtruction againſt ſuch as have offended;—and that, though there be no parſonage-houſe, yet the proviſion of the ſtatute muſt be performed *cy près*; and therefore he muſt *reſide ſomewhere in the pariſh*.]

and doctors and bachelors of divinity and law, *admitted by the univerſities* of this realm. And a vacancy thus made, for want of a diſpenſation, is called ſeſſion. 3. By conſecration; for, as was mentioned before [5], when a clerkis promoted to a biſhoprick, all his other preferments are void the inſtant that he is conſecrated. But there is a method, by the favour of the crown, of holding ſuch livings *in commendam*. *Commenda*, or *eccleſia commendata*, is a living commended by the crown to the care of a clerk, to hold till a proper paſtor is provided for it. This may be temporary for one, two, or three years; or perpetual: being a kind of diſpenſation to avoid the vacancy of the living, and is called a *commenda retinere*. There is alſo a *commenda recipere*, which is to take a benefice *de novo*, in the biſhop's own gift, or the gift of ſome other patron conſenting to the ſame; and this is the ſame to him as inſtitution and induction are to another clerk [6]. 4. By reſignation. But this is of no avail, till accepted by the ordinary; into whoſe hands the reſignation muſt be made [7]. By deprivation; either, firſt, by ſentence declaratory in the eccleſiaſtical courts, for fit and ſufficient cauſes allowed by the common law; ſuch as attainder of treaſon or felony [8], or conviction of other infamous crime in the king's courts; for hereſy, infidelity [9], groſs immorality, and the like: or, ſecondly, in purſuance of divers penal ſtatutes, which declare the benefice void, for ſome nonfeaſance or neglect, or elſe ſome malefeaſance or crime. As, for ſimony [10]; for maintaining any doctrine in derogation of the king's ſupremacy, or of the thirty-nine articles, or of the book of common-prayer [1]; for neglecting after the inſtitution to read the liturgy and articles in the church, or make the declarations againſt popery, or take the abjuration oath [2]; for uſing any other form of prayer than the liturgy of

[5] page 404.
[6] Hob. 144.
[7] Cro. Jac. 198.
[8] Dyer. 108. Jenk. 210.
[9] Fitz. *Abr.* t. *Trial.* 54.
[10] Stat. 31 Eliz. c. 6. 12 Ann. c. 12.
[1] Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 1. & 2. 13 Eliz. c. 12.
[2] Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 12. 14 Car. II. c. 4. 1 Geo. I. c. 6.

the church of England[3]; or for abſenting himſelf ſixty days in one year from a benefice belonging to a popiſh patron, to which the clerk was preſented by either of the univerſities[4]; in all which and ſimilar caſes[5] the benefice is *ipſo facto* void, without any formal ſentence of deprivation.

VI. A curate is the loweſt degree in the church; being in the ſame ſtate that a vicar was formerly, an officiating temporary miniſter, inſtead of the proper incumbent. Though there are what are called *perpetual* curacies, where all the tithes are appropriated, and no vicarage endowed, (being for ſome particular reaſons[6] excepted from the ſtatute of Hen. IV.) but, inſtead thereof, ſuch perpetual curate is appointed by the appropriator. With regard to the other ſpecies of curates, they are the objects of ſome particular ſtatutes, which ordain, that ſuch as ſerve a church during it's vacancy ſhall be paid ſuch ſtipend as the ordinary thinks reaſonable, out of the profits of the vacancy; or, if that be not ſufficient, by the ſucceſſor within fourteen days after he takes poſſeſſion[7]: and that, if any rector or vicar nominates a curate to the ordinary to be licenced to ſerve the cure in his abſence, the ordinary ſhall ſettle his ſtipend under his hand and ſeal, not exceeding 50l. *per annum*, nor leſs than 20l. and on failure of payment may ſequeſter the profits of the benefice[8].

Thus much of the clergy, properly ſo called. There are alſo certain inferior eccleſiaſtical officers of whom the common law takes notice; and that, principally, to aſſiſt the eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction, where it is deficient in powers. On which officers I ſhall make a few curſory remarks.

VII. Churchwardens are the guardians or keepers of the church, and repreſentatives of the body of the pariſh[9]. They are ſometimes appointed by the

1 Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 2.
4 Stat. 1 W. & M. c. 26.
5 6 Rep. 29, 30.
6 1 Burn. eccl. law. 427.
7 Stat. 28 Hen. VIII. c. 11.
8 Stat. 12 Ann. ſt. 2. c. 12.
9 In Sweden they have ſimilar officers, whom they call *kiorckiowariandes*. Stiernhook. l. 3. c. 7.

miniſter, ſometimes by the pariſh, ſometimes by both together, as cuſtom directs. They are taken, in favour of the church, to be for ſome purpoſes a kind of corporation at the common law; that is, they are enabled by that name to have a property in goods and chattels, and to bring actions for them, for the uſe and profit of the pariſh. Yet they may not waſte the church goods, but may be removed by the pariſh, and then called to account by action at the common law; but there is no method of calling them to account, but by firſt removing them; for none can legally do it, but thoſe who are put in their place. As to lands or other real property, as the church, church-yard, *&c.* they have no ſort of intereſt therein; but if any damage is done thereto, the parſon only or vicar ſhall have the action. Their office alſo is to repair the church, and make rates and levies for that purpoſe: but theſe are recoverable only in the eccleſiaſtical court. They are alſo joined with the overſeers in the care and maintenance of the poor. They are to levy [o] a ſhilling forfeiture on all ſuch as do not repair to church on ſundays and holidays, and are empowered to keep all perſons orderly while there; to which end it has been held that a churchwarden may juſtify the pulling off a man's hat, without being guilty of either an aſſault or treſpaſs [1]. There are alſo a multitude of other petty parochial powers committed to their charge by divers acts of parliament [2].

VIII. Pariſh clerks and ſextons are alſo regarded by the common law; as perſons who have freeholds in their offices; and therefore though they may be puniſhed, yet they cannot be deprived, by eccleſiaſtical cenſures [3]. The pariſh clerk was formerly very frequently in holy orders, and ſome are ſo to

[o] Stat. 1 Eliz. c. 2.

[1] 1 Lev. 196.

[2] See Lambard of churchwardens, at the end of his *circarcha*; and Dr. Burn. tit. *church, churchwardens, viſitations.*

[3] 2 Roll. Abr. 234.

this day. He is generally appointed by the incumbent, but by cuſtom may be choſen by the inhabitants; and if ſuch cuſtom appears, the court of king's bench will grant a *mandamus* to the archdeacon to ſwear him in, for the eſtabliſhment of the cuſtom turns it into a temporal or civil right [4].

[4] Cro. Car. 589.

CHAPTER THE TWELFTH.

OF THE CIVIL STATE.

THE lay part of his majesty's subjects, or such of the people as are not comprehended under the denomination of clergy, may be divided into three distinct states, the civil, the military, and the maritime.

That part of the nation which falls under our first and most comprehensive division, the civil state, includes all orders of men from the highest nobleman to the meanest peasant, that are not included under either our former division, of clergy, or under one of the two latter, the military and maritime states: and it may sometimes include individuals of the other three orders; since a nobleman, a knight, a gentleman, or a peasant, may become either a divine, a soldier, or a seaman.

The civil state consists of the nobility and the commonalty. Of the nobility, the peerage of Great Britain, or lords temporal, as forming (together with the bishops) one of the supreme branches of the legislature, I have before sufficiently spoken: we are here to consider them according to their several degrees, or titles of honour.

All degrees of nobility and honour are derived from the king as their fountain[1]: and he may in-

[1] 4 Inst. 363.

ſtitute what new titles he pleaſes. Hence it is that all degrees of nobility are not of equal antiquity. Thoſe now in uſe are dukes, marqueſſes, earls, viſcounts and barons[2].

1. A *duke*, though he be with us, in reſpect of his title of nobility, inferior in point of antiquity to many others, yet is ſuperior to all of them in rank; his being the firſt title of dignity after the royal family[3]. Among the Saxons the Latin name of dukes, *duces*, is very frequent, and ſignified, as among the Romans, the commanders or leaders of their armies, whom in their own language they called Þeneroza[4]; and in the laws of Henry I (as tranſlated by Lambard) we find them called *heretochii*. But after the Norman conqueſt, which changed the military polity of the nation, the kings themſelves continuing for many generations *dukes* of Normandy, they would not honour any ſubjects with the title of duke, till the time of Edward III; who, claiming to be king of France, and thereby loſing the ducal in the royal dignity, in the eleventh year of his reign created his ſon, Edward the black prince, duke of Cornwall: and many of the royal family eſpecially, were afterwards raiſed to the like honour. However, in the reign of queen Elizabeth, *A. D.* 1572[5], the whole order became utterly extinct; but it was revived about fifty years afterwards by her ſucceſſor, who was remarkably prodigal of honours, in the perſon of George Villiers duke of Buckingham.

2. A *marqueſs*, *marchio*, is the next degree of nobility. His office formerly was (for dignity and duty were never ſeparated by our anceſtors) to guard the frontiers and limits of the kingdom; which were called the marches, from the teutonic word, *marche*, a limit: ſuch as, in particular, were the marches of

[2] For the original of theſe titles on the continent of Europe, and their ſubſequent introduction into this iſland, ſee Mr. Selden's *titles of honour*.

[3] Camden. Britain. *tit. ordines.*

[4] This is apparently derived from the ſame root as the German HERTZOG, the ancient appellation of dukes in that country. Seld. tit. hon. 2. 1. 12.

[5] Camden Britain. *tit. ordines.* Spelman. *Gloſſ.* 191.

Wales and Scotland, while each continued to be an enemy's country. The perſons, who had command there, were called lords marchers, or marqueſſes; whoſe authority was aboliſhed by ſtatute 27 Hen. VIII. c. 27: though the title had long before been made a mere enſign of honour; Robert Vere, earl of Oxford, being created marqueſs of Dublin, by Richard II in the eighth year of his reign[6].

3. An *earl* is a title of nobility ſo ancient, that it's original cannot clearly be traced out. Thus much ſeems tolerably certain: that among the Saxons they were called *ealdormen*, *quaſi* elder men, ſignifying the ſame as *ſenior* or *ſenator* among the Romans; and alſo *ſcbiremen*, becauſe they had each of them the civil government of a ſeveral diviſion or ſhire. On the irruption of the Danes, they changed the name to *eorles*, which, according to Camden[7], ſignified the ſame in their language. In Latin they are called *comites* (a title firſt uſed in the empire) from being the king's attendants; "*a ſocietate nomen ſumpſerunt*, "*reges enim tales ſibi aſſociant*[8]." After the Norman conqueſt they were for ſome time called *counts* or *countees*, from the French; but they did not long retain that name themſelves, though their ſhires are from thence called counties to this day. The name of *earls* or *comites* is now become a mere title, they having nothing to do with the government of the county; which, as has been more than once obſerved, is now entirely devolved on the ſheriff, the earl's deputy, or *vice-comes*. In writs, and commiſſions, and other formal inſtruments, the king, when he mentions any peer of the degree of an earl, uſually ſtiles him "truſty and well beloved *couſin*:" an appellation as ancient as the reign of Henry IV: who being either by his wife, his mother, or his ſiſters, actually related or allied to every earl then in the kingdom, artfully and conſtantly acknowledged that connexion in all his letters and other public acts:

[6] 2 Inſt. 5.
[7] Britan. *tit. ordines.*
[8] Bracton. *l.* 1. *c.* 8. Flet. *l.* 1. *c.* 5.

from whence the uſage has deſcended to his ſucceſſors, though the reaſon has long ago failed.

4. The name of *vice-comes* or *viſcount* was afterwards made uſe of as an arbitrary title of honour, without any ſhadow of office pertaining to it by Henry the ſixth; when, in the eighteenth year of his reign, he created John Beaumont a peer, by the name of viſcount Beaumont, which was the firſt inſtance of the kind[9].

5. A *baron*'s is the moſt general and univerſal title of nobility; for originally every one of the peers of ſuperior rank had alſo a barony annexed to his other titles[10]. But it hath ſometimes happened that, when an ancient baron hath been raiſed to a new degree of peerage, in the courſe of a few generations the two titles have deſcended differently; one perhaps to the male deſcendants, the other to the heirs general; whereby the earldom or other ſuperior title hath ſubſiſted without a barony: and there are alſo modern inſtances, where earls and viſcounts have been created without annexing a barony to their other honours: ſo that now the rule doth not hold univerſally, that all peers are barons. The original and antiquity of baronies have occaſioned great inquiries among our Engliſh antiquaries. The moſt probable opinion ſeems to be, that they were the ſame with our preſent lords of manors; to which the name of court baron (which is the lord's court, and incident to every manor) gives ſome countenance. It may be collected from king John's *magna carta*[11], that originally all lords of manors, or barons, that held of the king *in capite*, had ſeats in the great council or parliament: till about the reign of that prince the conflux of them became ſo large and troubleſome, that the king was obliged to divide them, and ſummon only the greater barons in perſon; leaving the ſmall ones to be ſummoned by the ſheriff, and (as it is ſaid) to ſit by repreſentation in another houſe; which gave riſe to the ſeparation of the two houſes of parliament[12].

9 2 Inſt. 5.
10 2 Inſt. 5, 6.
11 *cap.* 14.
12 Gilb. Hiſt. of exch. c. 7. Seld. tit. of hon. 2. 5. 21.

By degrees the title came to be confined to the greater barons, or lords of parliament only; and there were no other barons among the peerage but ſuch as were ſummoned by writ, in reſpect of the tenure of their lands or baronies, till Richard the ſecond firſt made it a mere title of honour, by conferring it on divers perſons by his letters patent[3].

Having made this ſhort inquiry into the original of our ſeveral degrees of nobility, I ſhall next conſider the manner in which they may be created. The right of peerage ſeems to have been originally territorial; that is, annexed to lands, honors, caſtles, manors, and the like, the proprietors and poſſeſſors of which were (in right of thoſe eſtates) allowed to be peers of the realm, and were ſummoned to parliament to do ſuit and ſervice to their ſovereign: and, when the land was alienated, the dignity paſſed with it as appendant. Thus the biſhops ſtill ſit in the houſe of lords in right of ſucceſſion to certain ancient baronies annexed, or ſuppoſed to be annexed, to their epiſcopal lands[4]: and thus, in 11 Hen. VI, the poſſeſſion of the caſtle of Arundel was adjudged to confer an earldom on it's poſſeſſor[5]. But afterwards, when alienations grew to be frequent, the dignity of peerage was confined to the lineage of the party ennobled, and inſtead of territorial became perſonal. Actual proof of a tenure by barony became no longer neceſſary to conſtitute a lord of parliament; but the record of the writ of ſummons to him or his anceſtors was admitted as a ſufficient evidence of the tenure.

Peers are now created either by writ, or by patent: for thoſe who claim by preſcription muſt ſuppoſe either a writ or patent made to their anceſtors; though by length of time it is loſt. The creation by writ, or the king's letter, is a ſummons to attend the houſe of peers, by the ſtile and title of that barony, which the king is pleaſed to confer: that by patent

[3] 1 Inſt. 9. Seld. *Jan. Angl.* 2. § 66.
[4] Glan. *l.* 7. *c.* 1.
[5] Seld. tit. of hon. b. 2. c. 9. § 5.

is a royal grant to a ſubject of any dignity and degree of peerage. The creation by writ is the more ancient way; but a man is not ennobled thereby, unleſs he actually take his ſeat in the houſe of lords: and ſome are of opinion that there muſt be at leaſt two writs of ſummons, and a ſitting in two diſtinct parliaments, to evidence an hereditary barony[6]: and therefore the moſt uſual, becauſe the ſureſt, way is to grant the dignity by patent, which enures to a man and his heirs according to the limitations thereof, though he never himſelf makes uſe of it[7]. Yet it is frequent to call up the eldeſt ſon of a peer to the houſe of lords by writ of ſummons, in the name of his father's barony: becauſe in that caſe there is no danger of his children loſing the nobility in caſe he never takes his ſeat; for they will ſucceed to their grandfather. Creation by writ has alſo one advantage over that by patent: for a perſon created by writ holds the dignity to him *and his heirs*, without any words to that purport in the writ; but in letters patent there muſt be words to direct the inheritance, elſe the dignity enures only to the grantee for life[8]. For a man or woman may be created noble for their own lives, and the dignity not deſcend to their heirs at all, or deſcend only to ſome particular heirs: as where a peerage is limitted to a man, and the heirs male of his body by Elizabeth his preſent lady, and not to ſuch heirs by any former or future wife.

Let us next take a view of a few of the principal incidents attending the nobility, excluſive of their capacity as members of parliament, and as hereditary counſellors of the crown; both of which we have before conſidered. And firſt we muſt obſerve, that in criminal caſes a nobleman ſhall be tried by his peers. The great are always obnoxious to popular envy: were they to be judged by the people, they might be in danger from the prejudice of their judges; and would moreover be deprived of the privilege of the

6 Whitelocke of parl. ch. 114.

7 Co. Lit. 16.

8 Co. Litt. 9. 16.

meaneſt ſubjects, that of being tried by their equals, which is ſecured to all the realm by *magna carta*, c. 29. It is ſaid, that this does not extend to biſhops: who, though they are lords of parliament, and ſit there by virtue of their baronies which they hold *jure eccleſiæ*, yet are not ennobled in blood, and conſequently not peers with the nobility [9]. As to peereſſes, there was no precedent for their trial when accuſed of treaſon or felony, till after Eleanor ducheſs of Glouceſter, wife to the lord protector, was accuſed of treaſon and found guilty of witchcraft, in an eccleſiaſtical ſynod, through the intrigues of cardinal Beaufort. This very extraordinary trial gave occaſion to a ſpecial ſtatute, 20 Hen. VI. c. 9. which declares [o] the law to be, that peereſſes, either in their own right or by marriage, ſhall be tried before the ſame judicature as other peers of the realm. If a woman, noble in her own right, marries a commoner, ſhe ſtill remains noble, and ſhall be tried by her peers: but if ſhe be only noble by marriage, then by a ſecond marriage with a commoner, ſhe loſes her dignity; for as by marriage it is gained, by marriage it is alſo loſt [1]. Yet if a ducheſs dowager marries a baron, ſhe continues a ducheſs ſtill; for all the nobility are *pares*, and therefore it is no degradation [2]. A peer, or peereſs, (either in her own right or by marriage) cannot be arreſted in civil caſes [3]: and they have alſo many peculiar privileges annexed to their peerage in the courſe of judicial proceedings. A peer, ſitting in judgment, gives not his verdict upon oath, like an ordinary juryman, but upon his honour [4]: he anſwers alſo to bills in chancery upon his honour and not upon his oath [5]; but when he is examined as a witneſs either in civil or criminal caſes, he muſt be ſworn [6]: for the reſpect, which the law ſhews to the honour of a peer,

[9] 3 Inſt. 30, 31.
[o] Moor. 769. 2 Inſt. 50. 6 Rep. 52. Staundf. P. C. 152.
[1] Dyer. 79. Co. Litt. 16.
[2] 2 Inſt. 50.
[3] Finch. L. 355. 1 Ventr. 298.
[4] 2 Inſt. 49.
[5] 1 P. Wms. 146.
[6] Salk. 512.

does not extend ſo far as to overturn a ſettled maxim, that *in judicio non creditur niſi juratis*[7]. The honour of peers is however ſo highly tendered by the law, that it is much more penal to ſpread falſe reports of them and certain other great officers of the realm, than of other men: ſcandal againſt them being called by the peculiar name of *ſcandalum magnatum*, and ſubjected to peculiar puniſhments by divers ancient ſtatutes[8].

A peer cannot loſe his nobility, but by death or attainder; though there was an inſtance in the reign of Edward the fourth, of the degradation of George Nevile duke of Bedford by act of parliament[9], on account of his poverty, which rendered him unable to ſupport his dignity[10]. But this is a ſingular inſtance: which ſerves at the ſame time, by having happened, to ſhew the power of parliament; and, by having happened but once, to ſhew how tender the parliament hath been, in exerting ſo high a power. It hath been ſaid indeed[1], that if a baron waſtes his eſtate, ſo that he is not able to ſupport the degree, the *king* may degrade him: but it is expreſsly held by later authorities[2], that a peer cannot be degraded but by act of *parliament*.

The commonalty, like the nobility, are divided into ſeveral degrees; and, as the lords, though different in rank, yet all of them are peers in reſpect of their nobility, ſo the commoners, though ſome are greatly ſuperior to others, yet all are in law peers, in reſpect of their want of nobility[3].

[7] Cro. Car. 64.

[8] 3 Edw. I. c. 34. 2 Ric. II. ſt. 1. c. 5. 12 Ric. II. c. 11.

[9] 4 Inſt. 355.

[10] The preamble to the act is remarkable; "foraſmuch as oftentimes it is ſeen, that when any lord is called to high eſtate, and hath not convenient livelyhood to ſupport the ſame dignity, it induceth great poverty and indigence, and cauſeth oftentimes great extortion, embracery, and maintenance to be had; to the great trouble of all ſuch countries where ſuch eſtate ſhall happen to be: therefore, &c."

[1] Moor. 678.

[2] 12 Rep. 107. 12 Mod. 56.

[3] 2 Inſt. 29.

The first name of dignity, next beneath a peer, was anciently that of *vidames*, *vice-domini*, or *valvasors*[4]: who are mentioned by our ancient lawyers[5] as *viri magnæ dignitatis*, and sir Edward Coke[6] speaks highly of them. Yet they are now quite out of use; and our legal antiquaries are not agreed upon even their original or ancient office.

Now therefore the first personal dignity, after the nobility, is a knight of the order of St. George, or *of the garter*; first instituted by Edward III, *A. D.* 1344[7]. Next (but not till after certain *official* dignities, as privy counsellors, the chancellors of the exchequer and duchy of Lancaster, the chief justice of the king's bench, the master of the rolls, and the other English judges) follows a *knight banneret*; who indeed by statutes 5 Ric. II. st. 2. c. 4. and 14 Ric. II. c. 11. is ranked next after barons: and his precedence before the younger sons of viscounts was confirmed to him by order of king James I, in the tenth year of his reign[8]. But, in order to entitle himself to this rank, he must have been created by the king in person, in the field, under the royal banners, in time of open war[9]. Else he ranks after *baronets*; who are the next order; which title is a dignity of inheritance, created by letters patent, and usually descendible to the issue male. It was first instituted by king James the first, *A. D.* 1611. in order to raise a competent sum for the reduction of the province of Ulster in Ireland; for which reason all baronets have the arms of Ulster superadded to their family coat. Next follow *knights of the bath*; an order instituted by king Henry IV and revived by king George the first. They are so called from the ceremony of bathing, the night before their creation. The last of these inferior nobility are *knights bachelors*; the most ancient, though the lowest, order of knighthood amongst us: for we have an instance[o] of king

[4] Camden. *Britan. t. ordines.* 41
[5] Bracton. *l.* 1. *c.* 8.
[6] 2 Inst. 667.
[7] Seld. tit. of hon. 2. 5.
[8] *Ibid.* 2. 11. 3.
[9] 4 Inst. 6.
[o] Will. Malmsb. *lib.* 2.

Alfred's conferring this order on his ſon Athelſtan. The cuſtom of the ancient Germans was to give their young men a ſhield and a lance in the great council: this was equivalent to the *toga virilis* of the Romans: before this they were not permitted to bear arms, but were accounted as part of the father's houſhold; after it, as part of the community [1]. Hence ſome derive the uſage of knighting, which has prevailed all over the weſtern world, ſince it's reduction by colonies from thoſe northern heroes. Knights are called in Latin *equites aurati: aurati*, from the gilt ſpurs they wore; and *equites*, becauſe they always ſerved on horſeback: for it is obſervable [2], that almoſt all nations call their knights by ſome appellation derived from an horſe. They are alſo called in our law *milites*, becauſe they formed a part of the royal army, in virtue of their feodal tenures; one condition of which was, that every one who held a knight's fee immediately under the crown (which in Edward the ſecond's time [3] amounted to 20*l. per annum*) was obliged to be knighted, and attend the king in his wars, or fine for his non-compliance. The exertion of this prerogative, as an expedient to raiſe money in the reign of Charles the firſt, gave great offence: though warranted by law, and the recent example of queen Elizabeth: but it was by the ſtatute 16 Car. I. c. 16. aboliſhed; and this kind of knighthood has, ſince that time, fallen into great diſregard.

Theſe, ſir Edward Coke ſays [4], are all the names of *dignity* in this kingdom, eſquires and gentlemen being only names of *worſhip*. But before theſe laſt the heralds rank all colonels, ſerjeants at law, and doctors in the three learned profeſſions [5].

[1] Tac. *de Morib. Germ.* 13.
[2] Camd. *ibid.* Co. Litt. 74.
[3] Stat. *de milit.* 1 Edw. II.
[4] 2 Inſt. 667.
[5] The rules of precedence in England may be reduced to the following table: in which thoſe marked * are entitled to the rank here allotted them, by ſtatute 31 Hen. VIII. c. 10.—marked †, by ſtatute 1 W. & M. c. 21.—marked ‖, by letters patent 9, 10, and 14 Jac. I. which ſee in Seld. tit. of hon. II. 5. 46. and II. 11. 3.—marked ‡, by ancient uſage and

Eſquires and gentlemen are confounded together

eſtabliſhed cuſtom; for which ſee (among others) Camden's Britannia, *tit. ordines.* Milles's catalogue of honour, *edit.* 1610. and Chamberlayne's preſent ſtate of England. b. 3. ch. 3.

TABLE OF PRECEDENCE.

* The king's children and grandchildren.
* - - - - brethren.
* - - - - uncles.
* - - - - nephews.
* Archbiſhop of Canterbury.
* Lord chancellor or keeper, if a baron.
* Archbiſhop of York.
* Lord treaſurer.
* Lord preſident of the council.
* Lord privy ſeal.
} if barons.
* Lord great chamberlain. But ſee private ſtat. 1 Geo. I. c. 3.
* Lord high conſtable.
* Lord marſhal.
* Lord admiral.
* Lord ſteward of the houſhold.
* Lord chamberlain of the houſhold.
} above all peers of their own degree.
* Dukes.
\# Marqueſſes.
‡ Dukes' eldeſt ſons.
* Earls.
‡ Marqueſſes' eldeſt ſons.
‡ Dukes' younger ſons.
* Viſcounts.
‡ Earls' eldeſt ſons.
‡ Marqueſſes' younger ſons.
* Secretary of ſtate, if a biſhop.
* Biſhop of London.
* - - - - Durham.
* - - - - Wincheſter.
* Biſhops.
* Secretary of ſtate, if a baron.
* Barons.
† Speaker of the houſe of commons.
† Lords commiſſioners of the great ſeal.
‡ Viſcounts' eldeſt ſons.
‡ Earls' younger ſons.
‡ Barons' eldeſt ſons.
‖ Knights of the Garter.
‖ Privy counſellors.
‖ Chancellor of the exchequer.
‖ Chancellor of the duchy.
‖ Chief juſtice of the king's bench.
‖ Maſter of the rolls.
‖ Chief juſtice of the common pleas.
‖ Chief baron of the exchequer.
‖ Judges, and barons of the coif.
‖ Knights bannerets, royal.
‖ Viſcounts' younger ſons.
‖ Barons' younger ſons.
‖ Baronets.
‖ Knights bannerets.
‡ Knights of the Bath.
‡ Knights bachelors.
‖ Baronets' eldeſt ſons.
‖ Knights' eldeſt ſons.
‖ Baronets' younger ſons.
‖ Knights' younger ſons.
‡ Colonels.
‡ Serjeants at law.
‡ Doctors.
‡ Eſquires.
‡ Gentlemen.
‡ Yeomen.
‡ Tradeſmen.
‡ Artificers.
‡ Labourers.

N. B. Married women and widows are entitled to the ſame rank among each other, as their huſbands would reſpectively have born between themſelves, except ſuch rank is merely pro-

by ſir Edward Coke, who obſerves[6], that every eſquire is a gentleman, and a gentleman is defined to be one *qui arma gerit*, who bears coat armour, the grant of which adds gentility to a man's family: in like manner as civil nobility, among the Romans, was founded in the *jus imaginum*, or having the image of one anceſtor at leaſt, who had borne ſome curule office. It is indeed a matter ſomewhat unſettled, what conſtitutes the diſtinction, or who is a real *eſquire*: for it is not an eſtate, however large, that confers this rank upon it's owner. Camden who was himſelf a herald, diſtinguiſhes them the moſt accurately; and he reckons up four ſorts of them[7]: 1. The eldeſt ſons of knights, and their eldeſt ſons, in perpetual ſucceſſion[8]: 2. The eldeſt ſons of younger ſons of peers, and their eldeſt ſons in like perpetual ſucceſſion: both which ſpecies of eſquires ſir Henry Spelman entitles *armigeri natalitii*[9]. 3. Eſquires created by the king's letters patent, or other inveſtiture; and their eldeſt ſons. 4. Eſquires by virtue of their offices; as juſtices of the peace, and others who bear any offices of truſt under the crown. To theſe may be added the eſquires of knights of the bath, each of whom conſtitutes three at his inſtallation: and all foreign, nay, Iriſh peers; for not only theſe, but the eldeſt ſons of peers of Great Britain, though frequently titular lords, are only eſquires in the law, and muſt be ſo named in all legal proceedings[10]. As for *gentlemen*, ſays ſir Thomas Smith[11], they be made good cheap in this kingdom: for whoſoever ſtudieth the laws of the realm, who ſtudieth in the univerſities, who profeſſeth the liberal ſciences, and (to be ſhort) who can live idly, and without manual labour, and will bear the port, charge, and

ſeſſional or official;—and unmarried women to the ſame rank as their eldeſt brothers would bear among men, during the lives of their fathers.

6 2 Inſt. 668.
7 *Ibid.*
8 2 Inſt. 667.
9 Gloſſ. 43.
10 3 Inſt. 30. 2 Inſt. 667.
11 Commonw. of Eng. b. 1. c. 20.

countenance of a gentleman, he ſhall be called maſter, and ſhall be taken for a gentleman. A *yeoman* is he that hath free land of forty ſhillings by the year; who was anciently thereby qualified to ſerve on juries, vote for knights of the ſhire, and do any other act, where the law requires one that is *probus et legalis homo* [z].

The reſt of the commonalty are *tradeſmen*, *artificers*, and *labourers*; who, (as well as all others) muſt in purſuance of the ſtatute 1 Hen. V. c. 5. be ſtiled by the name and addition of their eſtate, degree, or myſtery, and the place to which they belong, or where they have been converſant, in all original writs of actions perſonal, appeals, and indictments, upon which proceſs of outlawry may be awarded; in order, as it ſhould ſeem, to prevent any clandeſtine or miſtaken outlawry, by reducing to a ſpecific certainty the perſon who is the object of it's proceſs.

[z] 2 Inſt. 668.

CHAPTER THE THIRTEENTH.

OF THE MILITARY AND MARITIME STATES.

THE military ſtate includes the whole of the ſoldiery; or, ſuch perſons as are peculiarly appointed among the reſt of the people for the ſafeguard and defence of the realm.

In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a diſtinct order of the profeſſion of arms. In abſolute monarchies this is neceſſary for the ſafety of the prince, and ariſes from the main principle of their conſtitution, which is that of governing by fear: but in free ſtates the profeſſion of a ſoldier, taken ſingly and merely as a profeſſion, is juſtly an object of jealouſy. In theſe no man ſhould take up arms, but with a view to defend his country and it's laws: he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp; but it is becauſe he is a citizen, and would wiſh to continue ſo, that he makes himſelf for a while a ſoldier. The laws therefore and conſtitution of theſe kingdoms know no ſuch ſtate as that of a perpetual ſtanding ſoldier, bred up to no other profeſſion than that of war: and it was not till the reign of Henry VII, that the kings of England had ſo much as a guard about their perſons.

In the time of our Saxon anceſtors, as appears from Edward the confeſſor's laws[1], the military force of this kingdom was in the hands of the dukes or heretochs, who were conſtituted through every province and county in the kingdom; being taken out of the principal nobility, and ſuch as were moſt remarkable for being "*ſapientes, fideles, et animoſi.*" Their duty was to lead and regulate the Engliſh armies, with a very unlimited power; "*prout eis "viſum fuerit, ad honorem coronæ et utilitatem regni.*" And becauſe of this great power they were elected by the people in their full aſſembly, or folkmote, in the ſame manner as ſheriffs were elected: following ſtill that old fundamental maxim of the Saxon conſtitution, that where any officer was intruſted with ſuch power, as if abuſed might tend to the oppreſſion of the people, that power was delegated to him by the vote of the people themſelves[2]. So too, among the ancient Germans, the anceſtors of our Saxon forefathers, they had their dukes, as well as kings, with an independent power over the military, as the kings had over the civil ſtate. The dukes were elective, the kings hereditary: for ſo only can be conſiſtently underſtood that paſſage of Tacitus[3], "*reges ex nobi-"litate, duces ex virtute ſumunt;*" in conſtituting their kings, the family or blood royal was regarded; in chuſing their dukes or leaders, warlike merit: juſt as Cæſar relates of their anceſtors in his time, that whenever they went to war, by way either of attack or defence, they *elected* leaders to command them[4]. This large ſhare of power, thus conferred by the people, though intended to preſerve the liberty of the ſubject, was perhaps unreaſonably detrimental to the

[1] *c. de heretochiis.*

[2] "*Iſti vero viri eliguntur per "commune conſilium, pro com-"muni utilitate regni, per pro-"vincias et patrias univerſas, et "per ſingulos comitatus, in pleno "folkmote, ſicut et vicecomites "provinciarum et comitatuum eligi "debent.*" *LL. Edw. Confeſſ. ibid.* See alſo Bede, *eccl. hiſt. l.* 5. *c.* 10.

[3] *De Moriб. Germ.* 7.

[4] "*Quum bellum civitas aut "illatum defendit aut infert, ma-"giſtratus qui ei bello præſint ae-"liguntur.*" *De bell. Gall. l.* 6. *c.* 22.

prerogative of the crown: and accordingly we find a very ill uſe made of it by Edric duke of Mercia, in the reign of king Edmund Ironſide; who, by his office of duke or heretoch, was entitled to a large command in the king's army, and by his repeated treacheries at laſt transferred the crown to Canute the Dane.

It ſeems univerſally agreed by all hiſtorians, that king Alfred firſt ſettled a national militia in this kingdom, and by his prudent diſcipline made all the ſubjects of his dominion ſoldiers: but we are unfortunately left in the dark as to the particulars of this his ſo celebrated regulation; though, from what was laſt obſerved, the dukes ſeem to have been left in poſſeſſion of too large and independent a power: which enabled duke Harold on the death of Edward the confeſſor, though a ſtranger to the royal blood, to mount for a ſhort ſpace the throne of this kingdom, in prejudice of Edgar Atheling the rightful heir.

Upon the Norman conqueſt the feodal law was introduced here in all it's rigour, the whole of which is built on a military plan. I ſhall not now enter into the particulars of that conſtitution, which belongs more properly to the next part of our commentaries; but ſhall only obſerve, that, in conſequence thereof, all the lands in the kingdom were divided into what were called knights' fees, in number above ſixty thouſand; and for every knight's fee a knight or ſoldier, *miles*, was bound to attend the king in his wars, for forty days in a year; in which ſpace of time, before war was reduced to a ſcience, the campaign was generally finiſhed, and a kingdom either conquered or victorious[5]. By this means the king had, without any expenſe, an army of ſixty thouſand men always ready at his command. And accordingly we find one, among the laws of William the con-

[5] The Poles are, even at this day, ſo tenacious of their ancient conſtitution, that their poſpolite, or militia, cannot be compelled to ſerve above ſix weeks, or forty days, in a year. Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxxiv. 12.

queror[6], which in the king's name commands and firmly enjoins the perſonal attendance of all knights and others; "*quod habeant et teneant ſe ſemper in* "*armis et equis, ut decet et oportet: et quod ſemper ſint* "*prompti et parati ad ſervitium ſuum integrum nobis ex-* "*plendum et peragendum, cum opus adfuerit, ſecundum* "*quod debent de feodis et tenementis ſuis de jure nobis* "*facere.*" This perſonal ſervice in proceſs of time degenerated into pecuniary commutations or aids, and at laſt the military part of the feodal ſyſtem was aboliſhed at the reſtoration, by ſtatute 12 Car. II. c. 24.

In the mean time we are not to imagine that the kingdom was left wholly without defence in caſe of domeſtic inſurrections, or the proſpect of foreign invaſions. Beſides thoſe, who by their military tenures were bound to perform forty days ſervice in the field, firſt the aſſiſe of arms, enacted 27 Hen. II[7], and afterwards the ſtatute of Winchester[8], under Edward I, obliged every man, according to his eſtate and degree, to provide a determinate quantity of ſuch arms as were then in uſe, in order to keep the peace: and conſtables were appointed in all hundreds by the latter ſtatute, to ſee that ſuch arms were provided. Theſe weapons were changed, by the ſtatute 4 & 5 Ph. & M. c. 2. into others of more modern ſervice: but both this and the former proviſions were repealed in the reign of James I[9]. While theſe continued in force, it was uſual from time to time for our princes to iſſue commiſſions of array, and ſend into every county officers in whom they could confide, to muſter and array (or ſet in military order) the inhabitants of every diſtrict; and the form of the commiſſion of array was ſettled in parliament in the 5 Hen. IV, ſo as to prevent the inſertion therein of any new penal clauſes[o]. But it was alſo provided[1] that no

[6] c. 58. See Co. Litt. 75, 76.
[7] Hoved. *A. D.* 1181.
[8] 13 Edw. I. c 6.
[9] Stat. 1 Jac. I. c. 25. 21 Jac I. c. 28.
[o] Ruſhworth. part. 3. page 662. 667. See 8 Raym. 374, &c.
[1] Stat. 1 Edw. III. ſt. 2. c. 5. & 7. 25 Edw. III. ſt. 5. c. 8.

man ſhould be compelled to go out of the kingdom at any rate, nor out of his ſhire but in caſes of urgent neceſſity; nor ſhould provide ſoldiers unleſs by conſent of parliament. About the reign of king Henry the eighth, or his children, lieutenants began to be introduced [2], as ſtanding repreſentatives of the crown, to keep the counties in military order; for we find them mentioned as known officers in the ſtatute 4 & 5 Ph. & M. c. 3. though they had not been then long in uſe, for Camden ſpeaks of them [3] in the time of queen Elizabeth, as extraordinary magiſtrates conſtituted only in times of difficulty and danger. But the introduction of theſe commiſſions of lieutenancy, which contained in ſubſtance the ſame powers as the old commiſſions of array, cauſed the latter to fall into diſuſe.

In this ſtate things continued, till the repeal of the ſtatutes of armour in the reign of king James the firſt; after which, when king Charles the firſt had, during his northern expeditions, iſſued commiſſions of lieutenancy and exerted ſome military powers, which, having been long exerciſed, were thought to belong to the crown, it became a queſtion in the long parliament, how far the power of the militia did inherently reſide in the king; being now unſupported by any ſtatute, and founded only upon immemorial uſage. This queſtion, long agitated, with great heat and reſentment on both ſides, became at length the immediate cauſe of the fatal rupture between the king and his parliament: the two houſes not only denying this prerogative of the crown, the legality of which perhaps might be ſomewhat doubtful; but alſo ſeiſing into their own hands the entire power of the militia, the illegality of which ſtep could never be any doubt at all.

Soon after the reſtoration of king Charles the ſecond, when the military tenures were aboliſhed, it was thought proper to aſcertain the power of the militia, to recognize the ſole right of the crown to

[2] 15 Raym. 75. [3] *Brit.* 103. Edit 1594.

govern and command them, and to put the whole into a more regular method of military ſubordination[4]: and the other, in which the militia now ſtands by law, is principally built upon the ſtatutes which were then enacted. It is true the two laſt of them are apparently repealed; but many of their proviſions are re-enacted, with the addition of ſome new regulations, by the preſent militia laws: the general ſcheme of which is to diſcipline a certain number of the inhabitants of every county, choſen by lot for (7) *three* years, and officered by the lord lieutenant, the deputy lieutenants, and other principal landholders, under a commiſſion from the crown. They are not compellable to march out of their counties, unleſs in caſe of invaſion or actual rebellion within the realm, (or any of its dominions or territories[5]) nor in any caſe compellable to march out of the kingdom. They are to be exerciſed at ſtated times: and their diſcipline in general is liberal and eaſy; but when drawn out into actual ſervice, they are ſubject to the rigours of martial law, as neceſſary to keep them in order. This is the conſtitutional ſecurity, which our laws[6] have provided for the public peace, and for protecting the realm againſt foreign or domeſtic violence.

When the nation was engaged in war, more veteran troops and more regular diſcipline were eſteemed to be neceſſary than could be expected from a mere militia. And therefore at ſuch times more rigorous methods were put in uſe for the raiſing of armies and the due regulation and diſcipline of the ſoldiery: which are to be looked upon only as temporary excreſcences bred out of the diſtemper of the ſtate, and not as any part of the permanent and per-

[4] 13 Car. II. c. 6. 14 Car. II. c. 3. 15 Car. II. c. 4.
[5] Stat. 16 Geo. III. c. 3.
[6] 2 Geo. III. c. 20. 9 Geo. III. c. 42. 16 Geo. III. c. 3. 18 Geo. III. c. 14. & 59. 19 Geo. III. c. 72. [26 *Geo.* 3. *c.* 107.]

(7) [And now for five years by ſtatute 26 Geo. III. c. 107, which has reduced into one act the laws relating to the militia.]

petual laws of the kingdom. For martial law, which is built upon no ſettled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in it's deciſions, is, as ſir Matthew Hale obſerves[7], in truth and reality no law, but ſomething indulged rather than allowed as a law. The neceſſity of order and diſcipline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace, when the king's courts are open for all perſons to receive juſtice according to the laws of the land. Wherefore, Thomas earl of Lancaſter being condemned at Pontefract, 15 Edw. II. by martial law, his attainder was reverſed 1 Edw. III. becauſe it was done in time of peace[8]. And it is laid down[9], that if a lieutenant, or other, that hath commiſſion of martial authority, doth in time of peace hang or otherwiſe execute any man by colour of martial law, this is murder; for it is againſt *magna carta*[10]. The petition of right[11] moreover enacts, that no ſoldier ſhall be quartered on the ſubject without his own conſent[12]; and that no commiſſion ſhall iſſue to proceed within this land according to martial law. And whereas, after the reſtoration, king Charles the ſecond kept up about five thouſand regular troops, by his own authority, for guards and garriſons; which king James the ſecond by degrees increaſed to no leſs than thirty thouſand, all paid from his own civil liſt; it was made one of the articles of the bill of rights[13], that the raiſing or keeping a ſtanding army within the kingdom in time of peace, unleſs it be with conſent of parliament, is againſt law.

But, as the faſhion of keeping ſtanding armies (which was firſt introduced by Charles VII in France, *A. D.* 1445[14]) has of late years univerſally prevailed over Europe, (though ſome of it's potentates,

[7] Hiſt. C. L. c. 2.
[8] 2 Brad. Append. 59.
[9] 3 Inſt. 52.
[10] *cap.* 29.
[11] 3 Car. I. See alſo Stat. 31 Car. II. c. 1.
[12] Thus, in Poland, no ſoldier can be quartered upon the gentry, the only freemen in that republic. Mod. Univ. Hiſt. xxxiv. 23.
[13] Stat. 1 W. & M. ſt. 2. c. 2.
[14] Robertſon, Cha. V. i. 94.

being unable themſelves to maintain them, are obliged to have recourſe to richer powers, and receive ſubſidiary penſions for that purpoſe) it has alſo for many years paſt been annually judged neceſſary by our legiſlature, for the ſafety of the kingdom, the defence of the poſſeſſions of the crown of Great Britain, and the preſervation of the balance of power in Europe, to maintain even in time of peace a ſtanding body of troops, under the command of the crown; who are however *ipſo facto* diſbanded at the expiration of every year, unleſs continued by parliament. And it was enacted by ſtatute 10 W. III. c. 1. that not more than twelve thouſand regular forces ſhould be kept on foot in Ireland, though paid at the charge of that kingdom; which permiſſion is extended by ſtatute 8 Geo. III. c. 13, to 16235 men, in time of peace.

To prevent the executive power from being able to oppreſs, ſays baron Monteſquieu [5], it is requiſite that the armies with which it is entruſted ſhould conſiſt of the people, and have the ſame ſpirit with the people; as was the caſe at Rome, till Marius new-modelled the legions by enliſting the rabble of Italy, and laid the foundation of all the military tyranny that enſued. Nothing then, according to theſe principles, ought to be more guarded againſt in a free ſtate, than making the military power, when ſuch a one is neceſſary to be kept on foot, a body too diſtinct from the people. Like ours, it ſhould wholly be compoſed of natural ſubjects; it ought only to be enliſted for a ſhort and limited time; the ſoldiers alſo ſhould live intermixed with the people; no ſeparate camp, no barracks, no inland fortreſſes ſhould be allowed. And perhaps it might be ſtill better, if, by diſmiſſing a ſtated number and enliſting others at every renewal of their term, a circulation could be kept up between the army and the people, and the citizen and the ſoldier be more intimately connected together.

[5] Sp. L. 11. 6.

To keep this body of troops in order, an annual act of parliament likewiſe paſſes, "to puniſh mutiny "and deſertion, and for the better payment of the ar- "my and their quarters." This regulatesthe manner in which they are to be diſperſed among the ſeveral inn-keepers and victuallers throughout the kingdom; and eſtabliſhes a law martial for their government. By this, among other things, it is enacted, that if any officer or ſoldier ſhall excite, or join any mutiny, or knowing of it, ſhall not give notice to the commanding officer: or ſhall deſert, or liſt in any other regiment, or ſleep upon his poſt, or leave it before he is relieved, or hold correſpondence with a rebel or enemy, or ſtrike or uſe violence to his ſuperior officer, or ſhall diſobey his lawful commands: ſuch offender ſhall ſuffer ſuch puniſhment as a court martial ſhall inflict, though it extends to death itſelf.

However expedient the moſt ſtrict regulations may be in time of actual war, yet, in times of profound peace, a little relaxation of military rigor would not, one ſhould hope, be productive of much inconvenience. And, upon this principle, though by our ſtanding laws[6] (ſtill remaining in force, though not attended to) deſertion in time of war is made felony, without benefit of clergy, and the offence is triable by a jury and before juſtices at the common law; yet, by our militia laws before-mentioned, a much lighter puniſhment is inflicted for deſertion in time of peace. So, by the Roman law alſo, deſertion in time of war was puniſhed with death, but more mildly in time of tranquillity[7]. But our mutiny act makes no ſuch diſtinction: for any of the faults above-mentioned are, equally at all times, puniſhable with death itſelf, if a court martial ſhall think proper. This diſcretionary power of the court martial is indeed to be guided by the directions of the crown; which, with regard to military offences, has almoſt an abſolute legiſla-

[6] Stat. 18 Hen. VI. c. 19. 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 2.

[7] *Ff.* 49. 16. 5.

tive power[8]. "His majeſty, ſays the act, may form "articles of war, and conſtitute courts martial, with "power to try any crime by ſuch articles, and inflict "penalties by ſentence or judgment of the ſame." A vaſt and moſt important truſt! an unlimitted power to create crimes, and annex to them any puniſhments, not extending to life or limb! Theſe are indeed forbidden to be inflicted, except for crimes declared to be ſo puniſhable by this act; which crimes we have juſt enumerated, and, among which, we may obſerve that any diſobedience to lawful commands is one. Perhaps in ſome future reviſion of this act, which is in many reſpects haſtily penned, it may be thought worthy the wiſdom of parliament to aſcertain the limits of military ſubjection, and to enact expreſs articles of war for the government of the army, as is done for the government of the navy: eſpecially as, by our preſent conſtitution, the nobility and gentry of the kingdom, who ſerve their country as militia officers, are annually ſubjected to the ſame arbitrary rule, during their time of exerciſe.

One of the greateſt advantages of our Engliſh law is, that not only the crimes themſelves which it puniſhes, but alſo the penalties which it inflicts, are aſcertained and notorious: nothing is left to arbitrary diſcretion: the king by his judges diſpenſes what the law has previouſly ordained; but is not himſelf the legiſlator. How much therefore is it to be regretted that a ſet of men, whoſe bravery has ſo often preſerved the liberties of their country, ſhould be reduced to a ſtate of ſervitude in the midſt of a nation of freemen! for ſir Edward Coke will inform us[9], that it is one of the genuine marks of ſervitude, to have the law, which is our rule of action, either concealed or precarious: "*miſera eſt ſervitus ubi jus* "*eſt vagum aut incognitum.*" Nor is this ſtate of ſervitude quite conſiſtent with the maxims of ſound policy obſerved by other free nations. For, the

[8] A like power over the marines is given to the lords of the admiralty, by another annual act "for the regulation of his ma- "jeſty's marine forces while on "ſhore."

[9] 4 Inſt. 332.

greater the general liberty is which any ſtate enjoys, the more cautious has it uſually been in introducing ſlavery in any particular order or profeſſion. Theſe men, as baron Monteſquieu obſerves[o], ſeeing the liberty which others poſſeſs and which they themſelves are excluded from, are apt (like eunuchs in the eaſtern ſeraglios) to live in a ſtate of perpetual envy and hatred towards the reſt of the community; and indulge a malignant pleaſure in contributing to deſtroy thoſe privileges, to which they never can be admitted. Hence have many free ſtates, by departing from this rule, been endangered by the revolt of their ſlaves: while, in abſolute and deſpotic governments where no real liberty exiſts, and conſequently no invidious compariſons can be formed, ſuch incidents are extremely rare. Two precautions are therefore adviſed to be obſerved in all prudent and free governments: 1. To prevent the introduction of ſlavery at all: or, 2. If it be already introduced, not to intruſt thoſe ſlaves with arms; who will then find themſelves an overmatch for the freemen. Much leſs ought the ſoldiery to be an exception to the people in general, and the only ſtate of ſervitude in the nation.

But as ſoldiers, by this annual act, are thus put in a worſe condition than any other ſubjects, ſo by the humanity of our ſtanding laws, they are in ſome caſes put in a much better. By ſtatute 43 Eliz. c. 3. a weekly allowance is to be raiſed in every county for the relief of ſoldiers that are ſick, hurt, and maimed: not forgetting the royal hoſpital at Chelſea for ſuch as are worn out in their duty. Officers and ſoldiers, that have been in the king's ſervice, are by ſeveral ſtatutes, enacted at the cloſe of ſeveral wars, at liberty to uſe any trade or occupation they are fit for, in any town in the kingdom (except the two univerſities) notwithſtanding any ſtatute, cuſtom, or charter to the contrary. And ſoldiers in actual military ſervice may make nuncupative wills, and diſpoſe of their goods, wages, and other perſonal chat-

[o] Sp. L. 15. 12.

tels, without thoſe forms, ſolemnities, and expences, which the law requires in other caſes [1]. Our law does not indeed extend this privilege ſo far as the civil law; which carried it to an extreme that borders upon the ridiculous. For if a ſoldier, in the article of death, wrote any thing in bloody letters on his ſhield, or in the duſt of the field with his ſword, it was a very good military teſtament [2]. And thus much for the military ſtate, as acknowledged by the laws of England.

The *maritime* ſtate is nearly related to the former: though much more agreeable to the principles of our free conſtitution. The royal navy of England hath ever been it's greateſt defence and ornament; it is it's ancient and natural ſtrength; the floating bulwarks of the iſland; an army, from which, however ſtrong and powerful, no danger can ever be apprehended to liberty: and accordingly it has been aſſiduouſly cultivated, even from the earlieſt ages. To ſo much perfection was our naval reputation arrived in the twelfth century, that the code of maritime laws, which are called the laws of Oleron, and are received by all nations in Europe as the ground and ſubſtruction of all their marine conſtitutions, was confeſſedly compiled by our king Richard the firſt, at the iſle of Oleron on the coaſt of France, then part of the poſſeſſions of the crown of England [3]. And yet, ſo vaſtly inferior were our anceſtors in this point to the preſent age, that even in the maritime reign of queen Elizabeth ſir Edward Coke [4] thinks it matter of boaſt, that the royal navy of England then conſiſted of *three and thirty* ſhips. The preſent condition of our marine is in great meaſure owing to the ſalutary proviſions of the ſtatutes, called the navigation acts: whereby the conſtant increaſe of Engliſh ſhip-

[1] Stat. 29 Car. II. c. 3. 5 W. III. c. 21. §. 6.

[2] *Si milites quid in clypeo literis ſanguine ſuo rutilantibus adnotaverint, aut in pulvere inſcripſerint gladio ſuo, ipſo tempore quo, id prælio, vitæ ſortem derelinquunt, hujuſmodi voluntatem ſtabilem eſſe oportet.* Cod. 6. 21. 15.

[3] 4 Inſt. 144. *Coutumes de la mer.* 2.

[4] 4 Inſt. 50.

ping and ſeamen was not only encouraged, but rendered unavoidably neceſſary. By the ſtatute 5 Ric. II. c. 3. in order to augment the navy of England, then greatly diminiſhed, it was ordained, that none of the king's liege people ſhould ſhip any merchandize out of or into the realm but only in ſhips of the king's ligeance, on pain of forfeiture. In the next year, by ſtatute 6 Ric. II. c. 8. this wiſe proviſion was enervated, by only obliging the merchants to give Engliſh ſhips (if able and ſufficient) the preference. But the moſt beneficial ſtatute for the trade and commerce of theſe kingdoms is that navigation-act, the rudiments of which were firſt framed in 1650[5], with a narrow partial view: being intended to mortify our own ſugar iſlands, which were diſaffected to the parliament and ſtill held out for Charles II, by ſtopping the gainful trade which they then carried on with the Dutch[6]; and at the ſame time to clip the wings of thoſe our opulent and aſpiring neighbours. This prohibited all ſhips of foreign nations from trading with any Engliſh plantations without licence from the council of ſtate. In 1651[7] the prohibition was extended alſo to the mother country: and no goods were ſuffered to be imported into England, or any of it's dependencies, in any other than Engliſh bottoms: or in the ſhips of that European nation, of which the merchandize imported was the genuine growth or manufacture. At the reſtoration, the former proviſions were continued, by ſtatute 12 Car. II. c. 18. with this very material improvement, that the maſter and three-fourths of the mariners ſhall alſo be Engliſh ſubjects (*a*).

Many laws have been made for the ſupply of the royal navy with ſeamen; for their regulation when on board; and to confer privileges and rewards on them during and after their ſervice.

5 Scobell. 132.
6 Mod. Un. Hiſt. xli. 289.
7 Scobell. 176.

(*a*) And theſe acts have been farther enforced and rendered more effectual by ſtatutes 26 Geo. III. c. 60. and 27 Geo. III. c. 19.

1. First, for their supply. The power of impressing seafaring men for the sea service by the king's commission, has been a matter of some dispute, and submitted to with great reluctance; though it hath very clearly and learnedly been shewn, by sir Michael Foster[8], that the practice of impressing, and granting powers to the admiralty for that purpose, is of very ancient date, and hath been uniformly continued by a regular series of precedents to the present time: whence he concludes it to be part of the common law[9]. The difficulty arises from hence, that no statute has expressly declared this power to be in the crown, though many of them very strongly imply it. The statute 2 Ric. II. c. 4. speaks of mariners being arrested and retained for the king's service, as of a thing well known and practised without dispute; and provides a remedy against their running away. By a later statute[o], if any waterman, who uses the river Thames, shall hide himself during the execution of any commission of pressing for the king's service, he is liable to heavy penalties. By another[1], no fisherman shall be taken by the queen's commission to serve as a mariner; but the commission shall be first brought to two justices of the peace, inhabiting near the sea coast where the mariners are to be taken, to the intent that the justices may chuse out and return such a number of able-bodied men, as in the commission are contained, to serve her majesty. And, by others[2], especial protections are allowed to seamen in particular circumstances, to prevent them from being impressed. And ferrymen are also said to be privileged from being impressed, at common law[3]. All which do most evidently imply a power of impressing to reside somewhere; and, if any where, it must from the spirit of our constitution, as well as

[8] Rep. 154.

[9] See also Comb. 245. Barr. 334.

[o] Stat. 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 16.

[1] Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 5.

[2] See Stat. 7 & 8 W. III. c. 21. 2 Ann. c. 6. 4 & 5 Ann. c. 19. 13 Geo. II. c. 17. 2 Geo. III. c. 15. 11 Geo. III. c. 38. 19 Geo. III. c. 75, &c.

[3] Sav. 14.

from the frequent mention of the king's commiſſion, reſide in the crown alone.

But, beſides this method of impreſſing, (which is only defenſible from public neceſſity, to which all private conſiderations muſt give way) there are other ways that tend to the increaſe of ſeamen, and manning the royal navy. Pariſhes may bind out poor boys apprentices to maſters of merchantmen, who ſhall be protected from impreſſing for the firſt three years; and if they are impreſſed afterwards, the maſters ſhall be allowed their wages[4]: great advantages in point of wages are given to volunteer ſeamen in order to induce them to enter into his majeſty's ſervice[5]: and every foreign ſeaman, who during a war ſhall ſerve two years in any man of war, merchantman, or privateer, is naturalized *ipſo facto*[6]. About the middle of king William's reign, a ſcheme was ſet on foot[7] for a regiſter of ſeamen to the number of thirty thouſand, for a conſtant and regular ſupply of the king's fleet; with great privileges to the regiſtered men, and on the other hand, heavy penalties in caſe of their non-appearance when called for: but this regiſtry, being judged to be ineffectual as well as oppreſſive, was aboliſhed by ſtatute 9 Ann. c. 21.

2. The method of ordering ſeamen in the royal fleet, and keeping up a regular diſcipline there, is directed by certain expreſs rules, articles, and orders, firſt enacted by the authority of parliament ſoon after the reſtoration[8]; but ſince new-modelled and altered, after the peace of Aix la Chapelle[9], to remedy ſome defects which were of fatal conſequence in conducting the preceding war. In theſe articles of the navy almoſt every poſſible offence is ſet down, and the puniſhment thereof annexed: in which reſpect the ſeamen have much the advantage over their brethren in the land ſervice; whoſe articles of war are not enacted by parliament, but framed from time to time

4 Stat. 2 Ann. c. 6.
5 Stat. 31 Geo. II. c. 10.
6 Stat. 13 Geo. II. c. 3.
7 Stat. 7 & 8 W. III. c. 21.
8 Stat. 13 Car. II. ſt. 1. c. 9.
9 Stat. 22 Geo. II. c. 33. amended by 19 Geo. III. c. 17.

at the pleaſure of the crown. Yet from whence this diſtinction aroſe, and why the executive power, which is limited ſo properly with regard to the navy, ſhould be ſo extenſive with regard to the army, it is hard to aſſign a reaſon: unleſs it proceeded from the perpetual eſtabliſhment of the navy, which rendered a permanent law for their regulation expedient; and the temporary duration of the army, which ſubſiſted only from year to year, and might therefore with leſs danger be ſubjected to diſcretionary government. But, whatever was apprehended at the firſt formation of the mutiny act, the regular renewal of our ſtanding force at the entrance of every year has made this diſtinction idle. For, if from experience paſt we may judge of future events, the army is now laſtingly ingrafted into the Britiſh conſtitution; with this ſingularly fortunate circumſtance, that any branch of the legiſlature may annually put an end to it's legal exiſtence, by refuſing to concur in it's continuance.

3. With regard to the privileges conferred on ſailors, they are pretty much the ſame with thoſe conferred on ſoldiers; with regard to relief when maimed, or wounded, or ſuperannuated, either by county rates, or the royal hoſpital at Greenwich; with regard alſo to the exerciſe of trades, and the power of making nuncupative teſtaments: and farther [o], no ſeaman aboard his majeſty's ſhips can be arreſted for any debt, unleſs the ſame be ſworn to amount to at leaſt twenty pounds; though, by the annual mutiny acts, a ſoldier may be arreſted for a debt which extends to half that value, but not to a leſs amount.

[o] Stat. 31 Geo. II. c. 10.

CHAPTER THE FOURTEENTH.

OF MASTER AND SERVANT.

HAVING thus commented on the rights and duties of perſons, as ſtanding in the *public* relations of magiſtrates and people, the method I have marked out now leads me to conſider their rights and duties in *private* œconomical relations.

The three great relations in private life are, 1. That of *maſter and ſervant*; which is founded in convenience, whereby a man is directed to call in the aſſiſtance of others, where his own ſkill and labour will not be ſufficient to anſwer the cares incumbent upon him. 2. That of *huſband and wife*; which is founded in nature, but modified by civil ſociety: the one directing man to continue and multiply his ſpecies, the other preſcribing the manner in which that natural impulſe muſt be confined and regulated. 3. That of *parent and child*, which is conſequential to that of marriage, being it's principal end and deſign: and it is by virtue of this relation that infants are protected, maintained, and educated. But, ſince the parents, on whom this care is primarily incumbent, may be ſnatched away by death before they have completed their duty, the law has therefore provided a fourth relation; 4. That of *guardian and*

ward, which is a kind of artificial parentage, in order to ſupply the deficiency, whenever it happens, of the natural. Of all theſe relations in their order.

In diſcuſſing the relation of *maſter* and *ſervant*, I ſhall, firſt, conſider the ſeveral ſorts of ſervants, and how this relation is created and deſtroyed: ſecondly, the effect of this relation with regard to the parties themſelves: and, laſtly, it's effect with regard to other perſons.

I. As to the ſeveral ſorts of ſervants: I have formerly obſerved [1] that pure and proper ſlavery does not, nay cannot, ſubſiſt in England: ſuch I mean, whereby an abſolute and unlimited power is given to the maſter over the life and fortune of the ſlave. And indeed it is repugnant to reaſon, and the principles of natural law, that ſuch a ſtate ſhould ſubſiſt any where. The three origins of the right of ſlavery, aſſigned by Juſtinian [2], are all of them built upon falſe foundations [3]. As, firſt, ſlavery is held to ariſe "*jure gentium*," from a ſtate of captivity in war; whence ſlaves are called *mancipia, quaſi manu capti*. The conqueror, ſay the civilians, had a right to the life of his captive; and, having ſpared that, has a right to deal with him as he pleaſes. But it is an untrue poſition, when taken generally, that by the law of nature or nations, a man may kill his enemy: he has only a right to kill him, in particular caſes; in caſes of abſolute neceſſity, for ſelf-defence: and it is plain this abſolute neceſſity did not ſubſiſt, ſince the victor did not actually kill him, but made him priſoner. War is itſelf juſtifiable only on principles of ſelf preſervation; and therefore it gives no other right over priſoners but merely to diſable them from doing harm to us, by confining their perſons: much leſs can it give a right to kill, torture, abuſe, plunder, or even to enſlave, an enemy, when the war is over. Since therefore the right of *making* ſlaves by captivity

[1] Page 127.

[2] *Servi aut fiunt, aut naſcuntur: fiunt jure gentium, aut jure civili: naſcuntur ex ancillis noſtris. Inſt.* 1. 3. 4.

[3] Monteſq. Sp. L. xv. 2.

depends on a ſuppoſed right of ſlaughter, that foundation failing, the conſequence drawn from it muſt fail likewiſe. But, ſecondly, it is ſaid that ſlavery may begin "*jure civili*;" when one man ſells himſelf to another. This, if only meant of contracts to ſerve or work for another, is very juſt: but when applied to ſtrict ſlavery, in the ſenſe of the laws of old Rome or modern Barbary, is alſo impoſſible. Every ſale implies a price, a *quid pro quo*, an equivalent given to the ſeller in lieu of what he transfers to the buyer: but what equivalent can be given for life, and liberty, both of which (in abſolute ſlavery) are held to be in the maſter's diſpoſal? His property alſo, the very price he ſeems to receive, devolves *ipſo facto* to his maſter, the inſtant he becomes his ſlave. In this caſe therefore the buyer gives nothing, and the ſeller receives nothing: of what validity then can a ſale be, which deſtroys the very principles upon which all ſales are founded? Laſtly, we are told, that beſides theſe two ways by which ſlaves "*fiunt*," or are acquired, they may alſo be hereditary: "*ſervi naſcuntur*;" the children of acquired ſlaves are *jure naturæ*, by a negative kind of birthright, ſlaves alſo. But this, being built on the two former rights, muſt fall together with them. If neither captivity, nor the ſale of one's ſelf, can by the law of nature and reaſon reduce the parent to ſlavery, much leſs can they reduce the offſpring.

Upon theſe principles the law of England abhors, and will not endure the exiſtence of, ſlavery within this nation: ſo that when an attempt was made to introduce it, by ſtatute 1 Edw. VI. c. 3. which ordained, that all idle vagabonds ſhould be made ſlaves, and fed upon bread and water, or ſmall drink, and refuſe meat; ſhould wear a ring of iron round their necks, arms, or legs; and ſhould be compelled by beating, chaining, or otherwiſe, to perform the work aſſigned them, were it never ſo vile; the ſpirit of the nation could not brook this condition, even in the moſt abandoned rogues; and therefore this ſtatute

was repealed in two years afterwards[4]. And now it is laid down[5], that a ſlave or negro, the inſtant he lands in England, becomes a freeman; that is, the law will protect him in the enjoyment of his perſon, and his property. Yet, with regard to any right which the maſter may have lawfully acquired to the perpetual ſervice of John or Thomas, this will remain exactly in the ſame ſtate as before: for this is no more than the ſame ſtate of ſubjection for life, which every apprentice ſubmits to for the ſpace of ſeven years, or ſometimes for a longer term. Hence too it follows, that the infamous and unchriſtian practice of withholding baptiſm from negro ſervants, leſt they ſhould thereby gain their liberty, is totally without foundation, as well as without excuſe. The law of England acts upon general and extenſive principles: it gives liberty, rightly underſtood, that is, protection to a jew, a turk, or a heathen, as well as to thoſe who profeſs the true religion of Chriſt; and it will not diſſolve a civil obligation between maſter and ſervant, on account of the alteration of faith in either of the parties: but the ſlave is entitled to the ſame protection in England before, as after, baptiſm; and, whatever ſervice the heathen negro owed of right to his American maſter, by general not by local law, the ſame (whatever it be) is he bound to render when brought to England and made a chriſtian.

1. The firſt ſort of ſervants therefore, acknowledged by the laws of England, are *menial ſervants*: ſo called from being *intra mœnia*, or domeſtics. The contract between them and their maſters ariſes upon the hiring. If the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law conſtrues it to be a hiring for a year[6]; upon a principle of natural equity, that the ſervant ſhall ſerve, and the maſter maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the reſpective ſeaſons; as well when there is work to be

[4] Stat. 3 & 4 Edw. VI. c. 16.

[5] Salk. 666.

[6] Co. Litt. 42.

done, as when there is not[7]: but the contract may be made for any larger or ſmaller term. All ſingle men between twelve years old and ſixty, and married ones under thirty years of age, and all ſingle women between twelve and forty, not having any viſible livelihood, are compellable by two juſtices to go out to ſervice in huſbandry or certain ſpecific trades, for the promotion of honeſt induſtry: and no maſter can put away his ſervant, or ſervant leave his maſter, after being ſo retained, either before or at the end of his term, without a quarter's warning; unleſs upon reaſonable cauſe to be allowed by a juſtice of the peace[8]: but they may part by conſent, or make a ſpecial bargain.

2. Another ſpecies of ſervants are called *apprentices* (from *apprendre*, to learn) and are uſually bound for a term of years, by deed indented or indentures, to ſerve their maſters, and be maintained and inſtructed by them. This is uſually done to perſons of trade, in order to learn their art and myſtery; and ſometimes very large ſums are given with them, as a premium for ſuch their inſtruction: but it may be done to huſbandmen, nay to gentlemen, and others. And[9] children of poor perſons may be apprenticed out by the overſeers, with conſent of two juſtices, till twenty-one years of age, to ſuch perſons as are thought fitting; who are alſo compellable to take them; and it is held, that gentlemen of fortune, and clergymen, are equally liable with others to ſuch compulſion[o]: for which purpoſes our ſtatutes have made the indentures obligatory, even though ſuch pariſh-apprentice be a minor[1]. Apprentices to trades may be diſcharged on reaſonable cauſe, either at the requeſt of themſelves or maſters, at the quarter-ſeſſions, or by one juſtice, with appeal to the ſeſſions[2]; who may,

[7] F. N. B. 168.
[8] Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4.
[9] Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4. 43 Eliz. c. 2. 1 Jac. I. c. 25. 7 Jac. I. c. 3. 8 & 9 W. & M. c. 30. 2 & 3 Ann. c. 6. 4 Ann. c. 19. 17 G. II. c. 5. 18 G. III. c. 47.
[o] Salk. 57. 491.
[1] Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4. 43 Eliz. c. 2. Cro. Car. 179.
[2] Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4.

by the equity of the ſtatute, if they think it reaſonable, direct reſtitution of a ratable ſhare of the money given with the apprentice[3]: and pariſh-apprentices may be diſcharged in the ſame manner, by two juſtices[4]. But if an apprentice, with whom leſs than ten pounds hath been given, runs away from his maſter, he is compellable to ſerve out his time of abſence, or make ſatisfaction for the ſame, at any time within ſeven years after the expiration of his original contract[5].

3. A third ſpecies of ſervants are *labourers*, who are only hired by the day or the week, and do not live *intra mœnia*, as part of the family; concerning whom the ſtatutes before cited[6] have made many very good regulations: 1. Directing that all perſons who have no viſible effects may be compelled to work: 2. Defining how long they muſt continue at work in ſummer and in winter: 3. Puniſhing ſuch as leave or deſert their work: 4. Empowering the juſtices at ſeſſions, or the ſheriff of the county, to ſettle their wages: and 5. Inflicting penalties on ſuch as either give, or exact, more wages than are ſo ſettled.

4. There is yet a fourth ſpecies of ſervants, if they may be ſo called, being rather in a ſuperior, a miniſterial, capacity; ſuch as *ſtewards*, *factors*, and *bailiffs*: whom however the law conſiders as ſervants, *pro tempore*, with regard to ſuch of their acts as affect their maſter's or employer's property. Which leads me to conſider,

II. The manner in which this relation, of ſervice, affects either the maſter or ſervant. And, firſt, by hiring and ſervice for a year, or apprenticeſhip under indentures, a perſon gains a ſettlement in that pariſh wherein he laſt ſerved forty days[7]. In the next place perſons, ſerving ſeven years as apprentices to any trade, have an excluſive right to exerciſe that trade in any part of England[8]. This law, with regard to

3 Salk. 67.
4 Stat. 20 Geo. II. c. 19.
5 Stat. 6 Geo. III. c. 26.
6 Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4. 6 Geo. III. c. 26.
7 See page 364.
8 Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4. §. 31.

the exclusive part of it, has by turns been looked upon as a hard law, or as a beneficial one, according to the prevailing humour of the times: which has occasioned a great variety of resolutions in the courts of law concerning it; and attempts have been frequently made for it's repeal, though hitherto without success. At common law every man might use what trade he pleased; but this statute restrains that liberty to such as have served as apprentices: the adversaries to which provision say, that all restrictions (which tend to introduce monopolies) are pernicious to trade; the advocates for it allege, that unskilfulness in trades is equally detrimental to the public, as monopolies. This reason indeed only extends to such trades, in the exercise whereof skill is required: but another of their arguments goes much farther; *viz.* that apprenticeships are useful to the commonwealth, by employing of youth, and learning them to be early industrious; but that no one would be induced to undergo a seven years servitude, if others, though equally skilful, were allowed the same advantages without having undergone the same discipline: and in this there seems to be much reason. However, the resolutions of the courts have in general rather confined than extended the restriction. No trades are held to be within the statute, but such as were in being at the making of it [9]: for trading in a country village, apprenticeships are not requisite [o] and following the trade seven years without any effectual prosecution (either as a master or a servant) is sufficient without an actual apprenticeship [1].

A master may by law correct his apprentice for negligence or other misbehaviour, so it be done with moderation [2]: though, if the master or master's wife beats any other servant of full age, it is good cause of departure [3]. But if any servant, workman, or

9 Lord Raym. 514.

o 1 Ventr. 51. 2 Keb. 583.

1 Lord Raym. 1179. Wallen *qui tam* v. Holton. Tr. 33 Geo. II. (by all the judges.)

2 1 Hawk. P. C. 130. Lamb. Eiren. 127. Cro. Car. 179. 2 Show. 289.

3 F. N. B. 168. Bro. *Abr. t. Labourers* 51. *Trespass* 349.

labourer aſſaults his maſter or dame, he ſhall ſuffer one year's impriſonment, and other open corporal puniſhment, not extending to life or limb [4].

By ſervice all ſervants and labourers, except apprentices, become entitled to wages: according to their agreement, if menial ſervants; or according to the appointment of the ſheriff or ſeſſions, if labourers or ſervants in huſbandry: for the ſtatutes for regulation of wages extend to ſuch ſervants only [5]; it being impoſſible for any magiſtrate to be a judge of the employment of menial ſervants, or of courſe to aſſeſs their wages.

III. Let us, laſtly, ſee how ſtrangers may be affected by this relation of maſter and ſervant: or how a maſter may behave towards others on behalf of his ſervant; and what a ſervant may do on behalf of his maſter.

And, firſt, the maſter may *maintain*, that is, abet and aſſiſt his ſervant in any action at law againſt a ſtranger: whereas, in general, it is an offence againſt public juſtice to encourage ſuits and animoſities, by helping to bear the expence of them, and is called in law maintenance [6]. A maſter alſo may bring an action againſt any man for beating or maiming his ſervant: but in ſuch caſe he muſt aſſign, as a ſpecial reaſon for ſo doing, his own damage by the loſs of his ſervice; and this loſs muſt be proved upon the trial [7]. A maſter likewiſe may juſtify an aſſault in defence of his ſervant, and a ſervant in defence of his maſter [8]; the maſter, becauſe he has an intereſt in his ſervant, not to be deprived of his ſervice; the ſervant, becauſe it is part of his duty, for which he receives his wages, to ſtand by and defend his maſter [9]. Alſo if any perſon do hire or retain my ſervant, being in my ſervice, for which the

4 Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4.
5 2 Jones, 47.
6 2 Roll. Abr. 115.
7 9 Rep. 113.
8 2 Roll. Abr. 546.
9 In like manner, by the laws of king Alfred, c. 38. a ſervant was allowed to fight for his maſter, a parent for his child, and a huſband or father for the chaſtity of his wife or daughter.

ſervant departeth from me and goeth to ſerve the other, I may have an action for damages againſt both the new maſter and the ſervant, or either of them: but if the new maſter did not know that he is my ſervant, no action lies; unleſs he afterwards refuſe to reſtore him upon information and demand[o]. The reaſon and foundation, upon which all this doctrine is built, ſeem to be the property that every man has in the ſervice of his domeſtics; acquired by the contract of hiring, and purchaſed by giving them wages.

As for thoſe things which a ſervant may do on behalf of his maſter, they ſeem all to proceed upon this principle, that the maſter is anſwerable for the act of his ſervant, if done by his command, either expreſsly given, or implied: *nam qui facit per alium, facit per ſe*[1]. Therefore, if the ſervant commit a treſpaſs by the command or encouragement of his maſter, the maſter ſhall be guilty of it: though the ſervant is not thereby excuſed, for he is only to obey his maſter in matters that are honeſt and lawful. If an innkeeper's ſervants rob his gueſts, the maſter is bound to reſtitution[2]: for as there is a confidence repoſed in him, that he will take care to provide honeſt ſervants, his negligence is a kind of implied conſent to the robbery; *nam, qui non prohibet, cum prohibere poſſit, jubet.* So likewiſe if the drawer at a tavern ſells a man bad wine, whereby his health is injured, he may bring an action againſt the maſter[3]: for although the maſter did not expreſsly order the ſervant to ſell it to that perſon in particular, yet his permitting him to draw and ſell it at all is impliedly a general command.

In the ſame manner, whatever a ſervant is permitted to do in the uſual courſe of his buſineſs, is equivalent to a general command. If I pay money to a banker's ſervant, the banker is anſwerable for it: if I pay it to a clergyman's or a phyſician's ſervant, whoſe uſual buſineſs it is not to receive money for his maſter, and he embezzles it, I muſt pay it

[o] F. N. B. 167, 168.
[1] 4 Inſt. 109.
[2] Noy's max. c. 43.
[3] 1 Roll. Abr. 95.

over again. If a ſteward lets a leaſe of a farm, without the owner's knowledge, the owner muſt ſtand to the bargain; for this is the ſteward's buſineſs. A wife, a friend, a relation, that uſe to tranſact buſineſs for a man, are *quoad hoc* his ſervants; and the principal muſt anſwer for their conduct: for the law implies, that they act under a general command; and without ſuch a doctrine as this no natural intercourſe between man and man could ſubſiſt with any tolerable convenience. If I uſually deal with a tradeſman by myſelf, or conſtantly pay him ready money, I am not anſwerable for what my ſervant takes up upon truſt; for here is no implied order to the tradeſman to truſt my ſervant: but if I uſually ſend him upon truſt, or ſometimes on truſt and ſometimes with ready money, I am anſwerable for all he takes up; for the tradeſman cannot poſſibly diſtinguiſh when he comes by my order, and when upon his own authority [4].

If a ſervant, laſtly, by his negligence does any damage to a ſtranger, the maſter ſhall anſwer for his neglect: if a ſmith's ſervant lames a horſe while he is ſhoeing him, an action lies againſt the maſter, and not againſt the ſervant. But in theſe caſes the damage muſt be done, while he is actually employed in the maſter's ſervice; otherwiſe the ſervant ſhall anſwer for his own miſbehaviour. Upon this principle, by the common law [5], if a ſervant kept his maſter's fire negligently, ſo that his neighbour's houſe was burned down thereby, an action lay againſt the maſter; becauſe this negligence happened in his ſervice: otherwiſe, if the ſervant, going along the ſtreet with a torch, by negligence ſets fire to a houſe; for there he is not in his maſter's immediate ſervice: and muſt himſelf anſwer the damage perſonally. But now the common law is, in the former caſe, altered by ſtatute 6 Ann. c. 3. which ordains that no action ſhall be maintained againſt any, in whoſe houſe or chamber

[4] Dr. & Stud. d. 2. c. 42. [5] Noy's max. c. 44.
Noy's max. c. 44.

any fire ſhall accidentally begin; for their own loſs is ſufficient puniſhment for their own or their ſervant's careleſſneſs. But if ſuch fire happens through the negligence of any ſervant (whoſe loſs is commonly very little) ſuch ſervant ſhall forfeit 100*l.* to be diſtributed among the ſufferers; and, in default of payment, ſhall be committed to ſome workhouſe and there kept to hard labour for eighteen months[6]. A maſter is, laſtly, chargeable if any of his family layeth or caſteth any thing out of his houſe into the ſtreet or common highway, to the damage of any individual, or the common nuſance of his majeſty's liege people[7]: for the maſter hath the ſuperintendance and charge of all his houſhold. And this alſo agrees with the civil law[8]; which holds that the *pater familias*, in this and ſimilar caſes, "*ob alterius culpam tenetur, ſive ſervi, ſive liberi.*"

We may obſerve, that in all the caſes here put, the maſter may be frequently a loſer by the truſt repoſed in his ſervant, but never can be a gainer; he may frequently be anſwerable for his ſervant's miſbehaviour, but never can ſhelter himſelf from puniſhment, by laying the blame on his agent. The reaſon of this is ſtill uniform and the ſame; that the wrong done by the ſervant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the maſter himſelf; and it is a ſtanding maxim, that no man ſhall be allowed to make any advantage of his own wrong.

[6] Upon a ſimilar principle, by the law of the twelve tables at Rome, a perſon by whoſe negligence any fire began was bound to pay double to the ſufferers; or, if he was not able to pay, was to ſuffer a corporal puniſhment.

[7] Noy's max. c. 44.

[8] *Ff.* 9. 3. 1. *Inſt.* 4. 5. 1.

CHAPTER THE FIFTEENTH.

OF HUSBAND AND WIFE.

THE ſecond private relation of perſons is that of marriage, which includes the reciprocal right and duties of huſband and wife; or, as moſt of our elder law books call them, of *baron* and *feme*. In the conſideration of which I ſhall in the firſt place inquire, how marriages may be contracted or made; ſhall next point out the manner in which they may be diſſolved; and ſhall, laſtly, take a view of the legal effects and conſequence of marriage.

I. Our law conſiders marriage in no other light than as a civil contract. The *holineſs* of the matrimonial ſtate is left entirely to the matrimonial law: the temporal courts not having juriſdiction to conſider unlawful marriages as a ſin, but merely as a civil inconvenience. The puniſhment therefore, or annulling, of inceſtuous or other unſcriptural marriages, is the province of the ſpiritual courts; which act *pro ſalute animæ* [1]. And, taking it in this civil light, the law treats it as it does all other contracts: allowing it to be good and valid in all caſes, where the parties at the time of making it were, in the firſt place, *willing* to contract; ſecondly, *able* to contract; and,

[1] Salk. 121.

laſtly, actually *did* contract, in the proper forms and ſolemnities required by law.

Firſt, they muſt be *willing* to contract. "*Conſenſus non concubitus, faciat nuptias,*" is the maxim of the civil law in this caſe[2]: and it is adopted by the common lawyers[3], who indeed have borrowed (eſpecially in ancient times) almoſt all their notions of the legitimacy of marriage from the canon and civil laws.

Secondly, they muſt be *able* to contract. In general, all perſons are able to contract themſelves in marriage, unleſs they labour under ſome particular diſabilities, and incapacities. What thoſe are, it will be here our buſineſs to inquire.

Now theſe diſabilities are of two ſorts: firſt, ſuch as are canonical, and therefore ſufficient by the eccleſiaſtical laws to avoid the marriage in the ſpiritual court; but theſe in our law only make the marriage voidable, and not *ipſo facto* void, until ſentence of nullity be obtained. Of this nature are pre-contract; conſanguinity, or relation by blood; and affinity, or relation by marriage; and ſome particular corporal infirmities. And theſe canonical diſabilities are either grounded upon the expreſs words of the divine law, or are conſequences plainly deducible from thence: it therefore being ſinful in the perſons who labour under them, to attempt to contract matrimony together, they are properly the object of the eccleſiaſtical magiſtrate's coercion; in order to ſeparate the offenders, and inflict penance for the offence, *pro ſalute animarum*. But ſuch marriages not being void *ab initio*, but voidable only by ſentence of ſeparation, they are eſteemed valid to all civil purpoſes, unleſs ſuch ſeparation is actually made during the life of the parties. For, after the death of either of them, the courts of common law will not ſuffer the ſpiritual court to declare ſuch marriages to have been void; becauſe ſuch declaration cannot now tend to the reformation of the parties[4]. And therefore when a man had

[2] *Ff.* 50. 17. 30.
[3] Co. Litt. 33.
[4] *Ibid.*

married his firſt wife's ſiſter, and after her death the biſhop's court was proceeding to annul the marriage and baſtardize the iſſue, the court of king's bench granted a prohibition *quoad hoc*; but permitted them to proceed to puniſh the huſband for inceſt[5]. Theſe canonical diſabilities being entirely the province of the eccleſiaſtical courts, our books are perfectly ſilent concerning them. But there are a few ſtatutes, which ſerve as directories to thoſe courts, of which it will be proper to take notice. By ſtatute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 38. it is declared, that all perſons may lawfully marry, but ſuch as are prohibited by God's law; and that all marriages contracted by lawful perſons in the face of the church, and conſummate with bodily knowledge, and fruit of children, ſhall be indiſſoluble. And (becauſe in the times of popery a great variety of degrees of kindred were made impediments to marriage, which impediments might however be bought off for money) it is declared by the ſame ſtatute, that nothing (God's law except) ſhall impeach any marriage, but within the Levitical degrees; the fartheſt of which is that between uncle and niece[6]. By the ſame ſtatute all impediments, ariſing from pre-contracts to other perſons, were aboliſhed and declared of none effect, unleſs they had been conſummated with bodily knowledge: in which the canon law holds ſuch contract to be a marriage *de facto*. But this branch of the ſtatute was repealed by ſtatute 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 23. How far the act of 26 Geo. II. c. 33. (which prohibits all ſuits in eccleſiaſtical courts to compel a marriage, in conſequence of any contract) may collaterally extend to revive this clauſe of Henry VIII's ſtatute, and aboliſh the impediment of pre-contract, I leave to be conſidered by the canoniſts.

The other ſort of diſabilities are thoſe which are created, or at leaſt enforced, by the municipal laws. And, though ſome of them may be grounded on natural law, yet they are regarded by the laws of the land, not ſo much in the light of any moral offence,

[5] Salk. 548. [6] Gilb. Rep. 158.

as on account of the civil inconveniences they draw after them. These civil disabilities make the contract void *ab initio*, and not merely voidable; not that they dissolve a contract already formed, but they render the parties incapable of forming any contract at all: they do not put asunder those who are joined together, but they previously hinder the junction. And, if any persons under these legal incapactiies come together, it is a meretricious, and not a matrimonial, union.

1. The first of these legal disabilities is a prior marriage, or having another husband or wife living; in which case, besides the penalties consequent upon it as a felony, the second marriage is to all intents and purposes void[7]: polygamy being condemned both by the law of the new testament, and the policy of all prudent states, especially in these northern climates. And Justinian, even in the climate of modern Turkey, is express[8], that "*duas uxores eodem* "*tempore habere non licet.*"

2. The next legal disability is want of age. This is sufficient to avoid all other contracts, on account of the imbecility of judgment in the parties contracting; *a fortiori* therefore it ought to avoid this, the most important contract of any. Therefore if a boy under fourteen, or a girl under twelve years of age, marries, this marriage is only inchoate and imperfect; and, when either of them comes to the age of consent aforesaid, they may disagree and declare the marriage void, without any divorce or sentence in the spiritual court. This is founded on the civil law[9]. But the canon law pays a greater regard to the constitution, than the age, of the parties[0]; for if they are *habiles ad matrimonium*, it is a good marriage, whatever their age may be. And in our law it is so far a marriage, that, if at the age of consent they agree to continue together, they need not be married again[1]. If the husband be of years of discretion, and the wife under

[7] Bro. *Abr. tit. Bastardy.* pl. 8.
[8] *Inst.* 1. 10. 6.
[9] *Leon. Constit.* 109.
[0] *Decretal. l.* 4. *tit*, 2. *qu.* 3.
[1] Co. Lit. 79.

twelve, when ſhe comes to years of diſcretion he may diſagree as well as ſhe may: for in contracts the obligation muſt be mutual; both muſt be bound, or neither: and ſo it is, *vice verſa*, when the wife is of years of diſcretion, and the huſband under[2].

3. Another incapacity ariſes from want of conſent of parents or guardians. By the common law, if the parties themſelves were of the age of conſent, there wanted no other concurrence to make the marriage valid: and this was agreeable to the canon law. But, by ſeveral ſtatutes[3], penalties of 100*l.* are laid on every clergyman who marries a couple either without publication of banns (which may give notice to parents or guardians) or without a licence, to obtain which the conſent of parents or guardians muſt be ſworn to. And by the ſtatute 4 & 5 Ph. and M. c. 8. whoſoever marries any woman child under the age of ſixteen years, without conſent of parents or guardians, ſhall be ſubject to fine, or five years impriſonment: and her eſtate during the huſband's life ſhall go to and be enjoyed by the next heir. The civil law indeed required the conſent of the parent or tutor at all ages; unleſs the children were emancipated, or out of the parents power[4]: and if ſuch conſent from the father was wanting, the marriage was null, and the children illegitimate[5]; but the conſent of the mother or guardians, if unreaſonably withheld, might be redreſſed and ſupplied by the judge, or the preſident of the province[6]: and if the father was *non compos*, a ſimilar remedy was given[7]. Theſe proviſions are adopted and imitated by the French and Hollanders, with this difference: that in France the ſons cannot marry without conſent of parents till thirty years of age, nor the daughters till twenty-five[8]; and in Holland, the ſons are at their own diſpoſal at twenty-five, and the daughters at twenty[9]. Thus hath ſtood, and thus at preſent ſtands the law

2 Co. Litt. 79.

3 6 & 7 Will. III. c. 6. 7 & 8 W. III. c. 35. 10 Ann. c. 19.

4 *Ff.* 23. 2. 2. & 18.

5 *Ff.* 1. 5. 11.

6 *Cod.* 5. 4. 1, & 20.

7 *Inſt.* 1. 10. 1.

8 Domat, of dowries, §. 2. Monteſq. Sp. L. 23. 7.

9 *Vinnius in Inſt. l.* 1. *t.* 10.

in other neighbouring countries. And it has lately been thought proper to introduce ſomewhat of the ſame policy into our laws, by ſtatute 26 Geo. II. c. 33. whereby it is enacted, that all marriages celebrated by licence (for banns ſuppoſe notice) where either of the parties is under twenty-one, (not being a widow or widower, who are ſuppoſed emancipated) without the conſent of the father, or, if he be not living, of the mother or guardians, ſhould be abſolutely void. A like proviſion is made as in the civil law, where the mother or guardian is *non compos*, beyond ſea, or unreaſonably froward, to diſpenſe with ſuch conſent at the diſcretion of the lord chancellor: but no proviſion is made, in caſe the father ſhould labour under any mental or other incapacity. Much may be, and much has been, ſaid both for and againſt this innovation upon our ancient laws and conſtitution. On the one hand, it prevents the clandeſtine marriages of minors, which are often a terrible inconvenience to thoſe private families wherein they happen. On the other hand, reſtraints upon marriages, eſpecially among the lower claſs, are evidently detrimental to the public, by hindering the encreaſe of the people; and to religion and morality, by encouraging licentiouſneſs and debauchery among the ſingle of both ſexes; and thereby deſtroying one end of ſociety and government, which is *concubitu prohibere vago*. And of this laſt inconvenience the Roman laws were ſo ſenſible, that at the ſame time that they forbad marriage without the conſent of parents or guardians, they were leſs rigorous upon that very account with regard to other reſtraints; for, if a parent did not provide a huſband for his daughter, by the time ſhe arrived at the age of twenty-five, and ſhe afterwards made a ſlip in her conduct, he was not allowed to diſinherit her upon that account; "*quia non ſua* "*culpa, ſed parentum, id commiſiſſe cognoſcitur* [o]."

4. A fourth incapacity is want of reaſon; without a competent ſhare of which, as no other, ſo neither can the matrimonial contract be valid [1]. It was for-

[o] *Nov.* 115. §. 11.

[1] 1 Roll. Abr. 353.

merly adjudged, that the iſſue of an idiot was legitimate, and conſequently that his marriage was valid. A ſtrange determination! ſince conſent is abſolutely requiſite to matrimony, and neither idiots nor lunatics are capable of conſenting to any thing. And therefore the civil law judged much more ſenſibly when it made ſuch deprivations of reaſon a previous impediment; though not a cauſe of divorce, if they happened after marriage[2]. And modern reſolutions have adhered to the reaſon of the civil law, by determining[3] that the marriage of a lunatic, not being in a lucid interval, was abſolutely void. But as it might be difficult to prove the exact ſtate of the party's mind at the actual celebration of the nuptials, upon this account (concurring with ſome private family[4] reaſons) the ſtatute 15 Geo. II. c. 30. has provided, that the marriage of lunatics and perſons under phrenzies (if found lunatics under a commiſſion, or committed to the care of truſtees by any act of parliament) before they are declared of ſound mind by the lord chancellor or the majority of ſuch truſtees, ſhall be totally void.

Laſtly, the parties muſt not only be willing and able to contract, but actually muſt contract themſelves in due form of law, to make it a good civil marriage. Any contract made, *per verba de praeſenti*, or in words of the preſent tenſe, and in caſe of cohabitation *per verba de futuro* alſo, between perſons able to contract, was before the late act deemed a valid marriage to many purpoſes; and the parties might be compelled in the ſpiritual courts to celebrate it *in facie eccleſiae*. But theſe verbal contracts are now of no force, to compel a future marriage[5]. Neither is any marriage at preſent valid, that is not celebrated in ſome pariſh church or public chapel, unleſs by diſpenſation from the archbiſhop of Canterbury. It muſt alſo be preceded by publication of banns, or by licence from the ſpiritual judge. Many other formalities are likewiſe preſcribed by the act; the neglect of which, though

[2] *Ff.* 23. *tit.* 1. *l.* 8. & *tit.* 2. *l.* 16.

[3] Morriſon's caſe, *coram Delegat.*

[4] See private acts 23 Geo. II. c. 6.

[5] Stat. 26 Geo. II. c. 33.

penal, does not invalidate the marriage. It is held to be alſo eſſential to a marriage, that it be performed by a perſon in orders[6]; though the intervention of a prieſt to ſolemnize this contract is merely *juris poſitivi*, and not *juris naturalis aut divini*: it being ſaid that pope Innocent the third was the firſt who ordained the celebration of marriage in the church[7]; before which it was totally a civil contract. And in the times of the grand rebellion, all marriages were performed by the juſtices of the peace; and theſe marriages were declared valid, without any freſh ſolemnization, by ſtatute 12 Car. II. c. 33. But, as the law now ſtands, we may upon the whole collect, that no marriage by the temporal law is *ipſo facto void*, that is celebrated by a perſon in orders,—in a pariſh church or public chapel (or elſewhere, by ſpecial diſpenſation)—in purſuance of banns or a licence,—between ſingle perſons,—conſenting,—of ſound mind,—and of the age of twenty-one years;—or of the age of fourteen in males and twelve in females, with conſent of parents or guardians, or without it, in caſe of widowhood. And no marriage is *void ble* by the eccleſiaſtical law, after the death of either of the parties; nor during their lives, unleſs for the canonical impediments of pre-contract, if that indeed ſtill exiſts; of conſanguinity; and of affinity, or corporal imbecility, ſubſiſting previous to the marriage.

II. I am next to conſider the manner in which marriages may be diſſolved; and this is either by death, or divorce. There are two kinds of divorce, the one total, the other partial; the one *a vinculo matrimonii*, the other merely *a menſa et thoro*. The total divorce, *a vinculo matrimonii*, muſt be for ſome of the canonical cauſes of impediment before-mentioned; and thoſe, exiſting *before* the marriage, as is always the caſe in conſanguinity; not ſupervenient, or ariſing *afterwards*, as may be the caſe in affinity or corporal imbecility. For in caſes of total divorce, the marriage is declared null, as having been abſolutely unlawful *ab initio*; and the parties are therefore ſeparated *pro ſalute anima-*

[6] Salk. 119. [7] Moor. 170.

rum: for which reaſon, as was before obſerved, no divorce can be obtained, but during the life of the parties. The iſſue of ſuch marriage as is thus entirely diſſolved, are baſtards[8].

Divorce *a menſa et thoro* is when the marriage is juſt and lawful *ab initio*, and therefore the law is tender of diſſolving it; but, for ſome ſupervenient cauſe, it becomes improper or impoſſible for the parties to live together: as in the caſe of intolerable ill temper, or adultery, in either of the parties. For the canon law, which the common law follows in this caſe, deems ſo highly and with ſuch myſterious reverence of the nuptial tie, that it will not allow it to be unlooſed for any cauſe whatſoever, that ariſes after the union is made. And this is ſaid to be built on the divine revealed law; though that expreſsly aſſigns incontinence as a cauſe, and indeed the only cauſe, why a man may put away his wife and marry another[9]. The civil law, which is partly of pagan original, allows many cauſes of abſolute divorce; and ſome of them pretty ſevere ones: (as if a wife goes to the theatre or the public games, without the knowlege and conſent of the huſband[10]) but among them adultery is the principal, and with reaſon named the firſt[11]. But with us in England adultery is only a cauſe of ſeparation from bed and board[12]; for which the beſt reaſon that can be given, is, that if divorces were allowed to depend upon a matter within the power of either the parties, they would probably be extremely frequent; as was the caſe when divorces were allowed for canonical diſabilities, on the mere confeſſion of the parties[13], which is now prohibited by the canons[14]. However, divorces, *a vinculo matrimonii*, for adultery, have of late years been frequently granted by act of parliament.

In caſe of divorce *a menſa et thoro*, the law allows alimony to the wife: which is that allowance, which is made to a woman for her ſupport out of the huſband's eſtate: being ſettled at the diſcretion of the

8 Co. Litt. 235.
9 Matt. xix. 9.
10 *Nov.* 117.
11 *Cod.* 5. 17. 8.
12 Moor. 683.
13 2 Mod. 314.
14 Can. 1603. c. 105.

eccleſiaſtical judge, on conſideration of all the circumſtances of the caſe. This is ſometimes called her *eſtovers*; for which, if he refuſes payment, there is (beſides the ordinary proceſs of excommunication) a writ at common law *de eſtoveris habendis*, in order to recover it[5]. It is generally proportioned to the rank and quality of the parties. But in caſe of elopement, and living with an adulterer, the law allows her no alimony[6].

III. Having thus ſhewn how marriages may be made, or diſſolved, I come now, laſtly, to ſpeak of the legal conſequences of ſuch making, or diſſolution.

By marriage, the huſband and wife are one perſon in law[7]: that is, the very being or legal exiſtence of the woman is ſuſpended during the marriage, or at leaſt is incorporated and conſolidated into that of the huſband: under whoſe wing, protection, and *cover*, ſhe performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-french a *feme-covert*, *foemina viro co-operta*; is ſaid to be *covert-baron*, or under the protection and influence of her huſband, her *baron*, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her *coverture*. Upon this principle, of an union of perſon in huſband and wife, depend almoſt all the legal rights, duties, and diſabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage. I ſpeak not at preſent of the rights of property, but of ſuch as are merely *perſonal*. For this reaſon, a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into covenant with her[8]: for the grant would be to ſuppoſe her ſeparate exiſtence; and to covenant with her, would be only to covenant with himſelf: and therefore it is alſo generally true, that all compacts made between huſband and wife, when ſingle, are voided by the intermarriage[9]. A woman indeed may be attorney for her huſband [•]; for that implies no ſeparation from, but is rather a repreſentation of, her lord. And a huſband may alſo bequeath any thing to his wife by will; for that cannot take ef-

5 1 Lev. 6.
6 Cowel. tit. Alimony.
7 Co. Litt. 112.
8 *Ibid.*
9 Cro. Car. 551.
• F. N. B. 27.

ſect till the coverture is determined by his death [1]. The huſband is bound to provide his wife with neceſſaries by law, as much as himſelf: and if ſhe contracts debts for them, he is obliged to pay them [2]; but, for any thing beſides neceſſaries, he is not chargeable [3]. Alſo, if a wife elopes, and lives with another man, the huſband is not chargeable even for neceſſaries [4]; at leaſt if the perſon, who furniſhes them, is ſufficiently appriſed of her elopement [5]. If the wife be indebted before marriage, the huſband is bound afterwards to pay the debt; for he has adopted her and her circumſtances together [6]. If the wife be injured in her perſon or her property, ſhe can bring no action for redreſs without her huſband's concurrence, and in his name, as well as her own [7]: neither can ſhe be ſued, without making the huſband a defendant [8]. There is indeed one caſe where the wife ſhall ſue and be ſued as a feme ſole, *viz.* where the huſband has abjured the realm, or is baniſhed [9] (*q*): for then he is dead in law; and, the huſband being thus diſabled to ſue for or defend the wife, it would be moſt unreaſonable if ſhe had no remedy, or could make no defence at all. In criminal proſecutions, it is true the wife may be indicted and puniſhed ſeparately [10]; for the union is only a civil union. But, in trials of any ſort, they are not allowed to be evidence for, or againſt, each other [11]: partly becauſe it is impoſſible their teſ-

1 Co. Litt. 112.
2 Salk. 118.
3 1 Sid. 120.
4 Stra. 647.
5 1 Lev. 5.
6 3 Mod. 186.
7 Salk. 119. 1 Roll. Abr. 347.
8 Bro. *Error.* 173. 1 Leon. 312. 1 Sid. 120. This was alſo the practice in the courts of Athens. (Pott. Antiqu. b. 1. c. 21.)
9 Co. Litt. 133.
10 1 Hawk. P. C. 3.
11 2 Hawk. P. C. 431.

(*q*) [In analogy to this principle of abjuration, it has been lately determined (Michaelmas term, 26 Geo. III. K. B. Corbet v. baron Poloenwitz and wife) that where a married woman, living ſeparate and apart from her huſband, with a ſeperate maintenance ſecured to her by deed, contracts a debt, ſhe may be ſued for it as a feme ſole.]

timony ſhould be indifferent; but principally becauſe of the union of perſon: and therefore, if they were admitted to be witneſſes *for* each other, they would contradict one maxim of law, "*nemo in propria cauſa* "*teſtis eſſe debet;*" and if *againſt* each other, they would contradict another maxim, "*nemo tenetur ſeip-* "*ſum accuſare*". But where the offence is directly againſt the perſon of the wife, this rule has been uſually diſpenſed with[2]: and therefore, by ſtatute 3 Hen. VII. c. 2. in caſe a woman be forcibly taken away, and married, ſhe may be a witneſs againſt ſuch her huſband, in order to convict him of felony. For in this caſe ſhe can with no propriety be reckoned his wife; becauſe a main ingredient, her conſent, was wanting to the contract: and alſo there is another maxim of law, that no man ſhall take advantage of his own wrong: which the raviſher here would do, if by forcibly marrying a woman, he could prevent her from being a witneſs, who is perhaps the only witneſs to that very fact.

In the civil law the huſband and the wife are conſidered as two diſtinct perſons; and may have ſeparate eſtates, contracts, debts, and injuries[3]: and therefore, in our eccleſiaſtical courts, a woman may ſue and be ſued without her huſband[4].

But, though our law in general conſiders man and wife as one perſon, yet there are ſome inſtances in which ſhe is ſeparately conſidered; as inferior to him, and acting by his compulſion. And therefore all deeds executed, and acts done, by her, during her coverture, are void; except it be a fine, or the like matter of record, in which caſe ſhe muſt be ſolely and ſecretly examined, to learn if her act be voluntary[5]. She cannot by will deviſe lands to her huſband, unleſs under ſpecial circumſtances; for at the time of making it ſhe is ſuppoſed to be under his coercion[6]. And in ſome felonies, and other inferior crimes, committed by her, through conſtraint of her huſband, the

2 State trials, vol. I. Lord Audley's caſe. Stra. 633.
3 *Cod.* 4. 12. 1.
4 2 Roll. Abr. 298.
5 Litt. §. 669, 670.
6 Co. Litt. 112.

law excuſes her[7]: but this extends not to treaſon or murder.

The huſband alſo (by the old law) might give his wife moderate correction[8]. For, as he is to anſwer for her miſbehaviour, the law thought it reaſonable to intruſt him with this power of reſtraining her, by domeſtic chaſtiſement, in the ſame moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children; for whom the maſter or parent is alſo liable in ſome caſes to anſwer. But this power of correction was confined within reaſonable bounds[9], and the huſband was prohibited from uſing any violence to his wife, *aliter quam ad virum, ex cauſa regiminis et caſtigationis uxoris ſuae, licite et rationabiliter pertinet*[10]. The civil law gave the huſband the ſame, or a larger, authority over his wife: allowing him, for ſome miſdemeſnors, *flagellis et fuſtibus acriter verberare uxorem;* for others, only *modicam caſtigationem adhibere*[11]. But, with us, in the politer reign of Charles the ſecond, this power of correction began to be doubted[12]: and a wife may now have ſecurity of the peace againſt her huſband[13]: or, in return, a huſband againſt his wife[14]. Yet the lower rank of people, who were always fond of the old common law, ſtill claim and exert their antient privilege: and the courts of law will ſtill permit a huſband to reſtrain a wife of her liberty, in caſe of any groſs miſbehaviour[15].

Theſe are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon which we may obſerve, that even the diſabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the moſt part intended for her protection and benefit. So great a favourite is the female ſex of the laws of England.

7 1 Hawk. P. C. 2.
8 *Ibid.* 130.
9 Moor. 874.
10 F. N. B. 80.
11 *Nov.* 117. c. 14. & Van Leeuwen. *in loc.*
12 1 Sid. 113. 3 Keb. 433.
13 2 Lev. 128.
14 Stra. 1207.
15 Stra. 478. 875.

CHAPTER THE SIXTEENTH.

OF PARENT AND CHILD.

THE next and the moſt univerſal relation in nature, is immediately derived from the preceding, being that between parent and child.

Children are of two ſorts; legitimate, and ſpurious, or baſtards; each of which we ſhall conſider in their order; and, firſt, of legitimate children.

I. A legitimate child is he that is born in lawful wedlock, or within a competent time afterwards. "*Pater eſt quem nuptiae demonſtrant*," is the rule of the civil law[1]; and this holds with the civilians, whether the nuptials happen before, or after, the birth of the child. With us in England the rule is narrowed, for the nuptials muſt be precedent to the birth; of which more will be ſaid when we come to conſider the caſe of baſtardy. At preſent let us inquire into, 1. The legal duties of parents to their legitimate children. 2. Their power over them. 3. The duties of ſuch children to their parents.

1. And, firſt, the duties of parents, to legitimate children: which principally conſiſt in three particulars; their maintenance, their protection, and their education.

[1] *Ff.* 2. 4. 5.

The duty of parents to provide for the *maintenance* of children, is a principle of natural law; an obligation, ſays Puffendorf [2], laid on them not only by nature herſelf, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world: for they would be in the higheſt manner injurious to their iſſue, if they only gave their children life, that they might afterwards ſee them periſh. By begetting them therefore, they have entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavour, as far as in them lies, that the life which they have beſtowed ſhall be ſupported and preſerved. And thus the children will have a perfect *right* of receiving maintenance from their parents. And the preſident Monteſquieu [3] has a very juſt obſervation upon this head: that the eſtabliſhment of marriage in all civilized ſtates is built on this natural obligation of the father to provide for his children; for that aſcertains and makes known the perſon who is bound to fulfil this obligation: whereas, in promiſcuous and illicit conjunctions, the father is unknown; and the mother finds a thouſand obſtacles in her way;—ſhame, remorſe, the conſtraint of her ſex, and the rigour of laws;—that ſtifle her inclinations to perform this duty: and beſides, ſhe generally wants ability.

The municipal laws of all well-regulated ſtates have taken care to enforce this duty; though providence has done it more effectually than any laws, by implanting in the breaſt of every parent that natural στοργη, or inſuperable degree of affection, which not even the deformity of perſon or mind, not even the wickedneſs, ingratitude, and rebellion of children, can totally ſuppreſs or extinguiſh.

The civil law [4] obliges the parent to provide maintenance for his child; and, if he refuſes, "*judex de ea* "*re cognoſcet.*" Nay, it carries this matter ſo far, that it will not ſuffer a parent at his death totally to diſinherit his child, without expreſsly giving his reaſon for ſo doing; and there are fourteen ſuch reaſons reckoned up [5], which may juſtify ſuch diſinheriſon.

[2] L. of N. l. 4. c. 11.
[3] Sp. L. b. 23. c. 2.
[4] *Ff.* 25. 3. 5.
[5] *Nov.* 115.

If the parent alledged no reaſon, or a bad, or a falſe one, the child might ſet the will aſide, *tanquam teſtamentum inofficioſum*, a teſtament contrary to the natural duty of the parent. And it is remarkable under what colour the children were to move for relief in ſuch a caſe: by ſuggeſting that the parent had loſt the uſe of his reaſon, when he made the *inofficious* teſtament. And this, as Puffendorf obſerves [6], was not to bring into diſpute the teſtator's power of diſinheriting his own offspring; but to examine the motives upon which he did it: and, if they were found defective in reaſon, then to ſet them aſide. But perhaps this is going rather too far: every man has, or ought to have, by the laws of ſociety, a power over his own property; and, as Grotius very well diſtinguiſhes [7], natural right obliges to give a *neceſſary* maintenance to children; but what is more than that they have no other right to, than as it is given them by the favour of their parents, or the poſitive conſtitutions of the municipal law.

Let us next ſee what proviſion our own laws have made for this natural duty. It is a principle of law [8], that there is an obligation on every man to provide for thoſe deſcended from his loins; and the manner, in which this obligation ſhall be performed, is thus pointed out [9]. The father, and mother, grandfather, and grandmother of poor impotent perſons ſhall maintain them at their own charges, if of ſufficient ability, according as the quarter ſeſſion ſhall direct: and [10] if a parent runs away, and leaves his children, the church-wardens and overſeers of the pariſh ſhall ſeiſe his rents, goods, and chattels, and diſpoſe of them towards their relief. By the interpretations which the courts of law have made upon theſe ſtatutes, if a mother or grandmother marries again, and was before ſuch ſecond marriage of ſufficient ability to keep the child, the huſband ſhall be charged to maintain it [11]: for this being a debt of hers, when ſingle, ſhall like others extend to charge the huſband. But at her death,

[6] *l.* 4. *c.* 11. §. 7.
[7] *de j. b. & p. l.* 2. *c.* 7. *n.* 3.
[8] Raym. 500.
[9] Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2.
[10] Stat. 5 Geo. I. c. 8.
[11] Styles. 283. 2 Bulſtr. 346.

the relation being diſſolved, the huſband is under no farther obligation.

No perſon is bound to provide a maintenance for his iſſue, unleſs where the children are impotent and unable to work, either through infancy, diſeaſe, or accident; and then is only obliged to find them with neceſſaries, the penalty on refuſal being no more than 20*s.* a month. For the policy of our laws, which are ever watchful to promote induſtry, did not mean to compel a father to maintain his idle and lazy children in eaſe and indolence: but thought it unjuſt to oblige the parent, againſt his will, to provide them with ſuperfluities, and other indulgences of fortune; imagining they might truſt to the impulſe of nature, if the children were deſerving of ſuch favours. Yet, as nothing is ſo apt to ſtifle the calls of nature as religious bigotry, it is enacted [2], that if any popiſh parent ſhall refuſe to allow his proteſtant child a fitting maintenance, with a view to compel him to change his religion, the lord chancellor ſhall by order of court conſtrain him to do what is juſt and reaſonable. But this did not extend to perſons of another religion, of no leſs bitterneſs and bigotry than the popiſh: and therefore in the very next year we find an inſtance of a jew of immenſe riches, whoſe only daughter having embraced chriſtianity, he turned her out of doors; and on her application for relief, it was held ſhe was entitled to none [3]. But this gave occaſion [4] to another ſtatute [5], which ordains, that if jewiſh parents refuſe to allow their proteſtant children a fitting maintenance ſuitable to the fortune of the parent, the lord chancellor on complaint may make ſuch order therein as he ſhall ſee proper.

Our law has made no proviſion to prevent the diſinheriting of children by will: leaving every man's property in his own diſpoſal, upon a principle of liberty in this, as well as every other, action: though perhaps it had not been amiſs, if the parent had been

[2] Stat. 11 & 12 W. III. c. 4. Mar. 1701.
[3] Lord Raym. 699.
[4] Com. jour. 18 Feb. 12
[5] 1 Ann. ſt. 1. c. 30.

bound to leave them at the leaſt a neceſſary ſubſiſtence. Indeed, among perſons of any rank or fortune, a competence is generally provided for younger children, and the bulk of the eſtate ſettled upon the eldeſt, by the marriage-articles. Heirs alſo, and children, are favourites of our courts of juſtice, and cannot be diſinherited by any dubious or ambiguous words; there being required the utmoſt certainty of the teſtator's intentions to take away the right of an heir[6].

From the duty of maintenance we may eaſily paſs to that of *protection*, which is alſo a natural duty, but rather permitted than enjoined by any municipal laws: nature, in this reſpect, working ſo ſtrongly as to need rather a check than a ſpur. A parent may, by our laws, maintain and uphold his children in their law-ſuits, without being guilty of the legal crime of maintaining quarrels[7]. A parent may alſo juſtify an aſſault and battery in defence of the perſons of his children[8]: nay, where a man's ſon was beaten by another boy, and the father went near a mile to find him, and there revenged his ſon's quarrel by beating the other boy, of which beating he afterwards unfortunately died; it was not held to be murder, but manſlaughter merely[9]. Such indulgence does the law ſhew to the frailty of human nature, and the workings of parental affection.

The laſt duty of parents to their children is that of giving them an *education* ſuitable to their ſtation in life: a duty pointed out by reaſon, and of far the greateſt importance of any. For, as Puffendorf very well obſerves[9], it is not eaſy to imagine or allow, that a parent has conferred any conſiderable benefit upon his child, by bringing him into the world; if he afterwards entirely neglects his culture and education, and ſuffers him to grow up like a mere beaſt, to lead a life uſeleſs to others, and ſhameful to himſelf. Yet the municipal laws of moſt countries ſeem to be defective in this point, by not conſtraining the parent

[6] 1 Lev. 130.
[7] 2 Inſt. 564.
[8] 1 Hawk. P. C. 131.
[9] Cro. Jac. 296. 1 Hawk. P. C. 83.
[9] L. of N. b. 6. c. 2. §. 12.

to beſtow a proper education upon his children. Perhaps they thought it puniſhment enough to leave the parent, who neglects the inſtruction of his family, to labour under thoſe griefs and inconveniencies, which his family, ſo uninſtructed, will be ſure to bring upon him. Our laws, though their defects in this particular cannot be denied, have in one inſtance made a wiſe proviſion for breeding up the riſing generation: ſince the poor and laborious part of the community, when paſt the age of nurture, are taken out of the hands of their parents, by the ſtatutes for apprenticeing poor children [1]; and are placed out by the public in ſuch a manner, as may render their abilities, in their ſeveral ſtations, of the greateſt advantage to the commonwealth. The rich indeed are left at their own option, whether they will breed up their children to be ornaments or diſgraces to their family. Yet in one caſe, that of religion, they are under peculiar reſtrictions? for [2] it is provided, that if any perſon ſends any child under his government beyond the ſeas, either to prevent it's good education in England, or in order to enter into or reſide in any popiſh college, or to be inſtructed, perſuaded, or ſtrengthened in the popiſh religion: in ſuch caſe, beſides the diſabilities incurred by the child ſo ſent, the parent or perſon ſending ſhall forfeit 100*l.* which [3] ſhall go to the ſole uſe and benefit of him that ſhall diſcover the offence. And [4] if any parent, or other, ſhall ſend or convey any perſon beyond ſea, to enter into, or be reſident in, or trained up in, any priory, abbey, nunnery, popiſh univerſity, college, or ſchool, or houſe of jeſuits, or prieſts, or in any private popiſh family, in order to be inſtructed, perſuaded, or confirmed in the popiſh religion; or ſhall contribute any thing towards their maintenance when abroad by any pretext whatever, the perſon both ſending and ſent ſhall be diſabled to ſue in law or equity, or to be executor or adminiſtrator to any perſon, or to enjoy any legacy or deed of gift,

[1] See pag. 426.
[2] Stat. 1 Jac. I. c. 4. & 3 Jac. I. c. 5.
[3] Stat. 11 & 12 W. III. c. 4.
[4] Stat. 3 Car. I. c. 2.

or to bear any office in the realm, and ſhall forfeit all his goods and chattels, and likewiſe all his real eſtate for life.

2. The *power* of parents over their children is derived from the former conſideration, their duty: this authority being given them, partly to enable the parent more effectually to perform his duty, and partly as a recompenſe for his care and trouble in the faithful diſcharge of it. And upon this ſcore the municipal laws of ſome nations have given a much larger authority to the parents, than others. The antient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and death over his children; upon this principle, that he who gave had alſo the power of taking away[5]. But the rigor of theſe laws was ſoftened by ſubſequent conſtitutions; ſo that[6] we find a father baniſhed by the emperor Hadrian for killing his ſon, though he had committed a very heinous crime, upon this maxim, that "*patria poteſtas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate, conſiſtere.*" But ſtill they maintained to the laſt a very large and abſolute authority: for a ſon could not acquire any property of his own during the life of his father; but all his acquiſitions belonged to the father, or at leaſt the profits of them for his life[7].

The power of a parent by our Engliſh laws is much more moderate; but ſtill ſufficient to keep the child in order and obedience. He may lawfully correct his child, being under age, in a reaſonable manner[8]; for this is for the benefit of his education. The conſent or concurrence of the parent to the marriage of his child under age, was alſo *directed* by our antient law to be obtained: but now it is abſolutely *neceſſary*; for without it the contract is void[9]. And this alſo is another means, which the law has put into the parent's hands, in order the better to diſcharge his duty; firſt, of protecting his children from the ſnares of artful and deſigning perſons; and, next, of ſettling them properly in life, by preventing the ill conſequences

[5] *Ff.* 28. 2. 11. *Cod.* 8. 47. 10. *Ef.* 48. 9. 5.

[7] *Inſt.* 2. 9. 1.

[8] 1 Hawk. P. C. 130.

[9] Stat. 26 Geo. II. 33

of too early and precipitate marriages. A father has no other power over his ſon's *eſtate*, than as his truſtee or guardian; for, though he may receive the profits during the child's minority, yet he muſt account for them when he comes of age. He may indeed have the benefit of his children's labour while they live with him, and are maintained by him: but this is no more than he is entitled to from his apprentices or ſervants. The legal power of a father (for a mother, as ſuch, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and reſpect) the power of a father, I ſay, over the perſons of his children ceaſes at the age of twenty-one: for they are then enfranchiſed by arriving at years of diſcretion, or that point which the law has eſtabliſhed (as ſome muſt neceſſarily be eſtabliſhed) when the empire of the father, or other guardian, gives place to the empire of reaſon. Yet, till that age arrives, this empire of the father continues even after his death; for he may by his will appoint a guardian to his children. He may alſo delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or ſchool-maſter, of his child; who is then *in loco parentis*, and has ſuch a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, *viz.* that of reſtraint and correction, as may be neceſſary to anſwer the purpoſes for which he is employed.

3. The *duties* of children to their parents ariſe from a principle of natural juſtice and retribution. For to thoſe, who gave us exiſtence, we naturally owe ſubjection and obedience during our minority, and honour and reverence ever after; they who protected the weakneſs of our infancy, are entitled to our protection in the infirmity of their age; they who by ſuſtenance and education have enabled their offspring to proſper, ought in return to be ſupported by that offspring, in caſe they ſtand in need of aſſiſtance. Upon this principle proceed all the duties of children to their parents, which are enjoined by poſitive laws. And the Athenian laws[o] carried this principle into practice with a ſcrupulous kind of nicety: obliging all chil-

[o] Potter's Antiq. b. 4. c. 15.

dren to provide for their father, when fallen into poverty; with an exception to ſpurious children, to thoſe whoſe chaſtity had been proſtituted by conſent of the father, and to thoſe whom he had not put in any way of gaining a livelyhood. The legiſlature, ſays baron Monteſquieu [1], conſidered, that in the firſt caſe the father, being uncertain, had rendered the natural obligation precarious; that, in the ſecond caſe, he had ſullied the life he had given, and done his children the greateſt of injuries, in depriving them of their reputation; and that, in the third caſe, he had rendered their life (ſo far as in him lay) an inſupportable burthen, by furniſhing them with no means of ſubſiſtence.

Our laws agree with thoſe of Athens with regard to the firſt only of theſe particulars, the caſe of ſpurious iſſue. In the other caſes the law does not hold the tie of nature to be diſſolved by any miſbehaviour of the parent; and therefore a child is equally juſtifiable in defending the perſon, or maintaining the cauſe or ſuit, of a bad parent, as a good one; and is equally compellable [2], if of ſufficient ability, to maintain and provide for a wicked and unnatural progenitor, as for one who has ſhewn the greateſt tenderneſs and parental piety.

II. We are next to conſider the caſe of illegitimate children, or baſtards; with regard to whom let us inquire, 1. Who are baſtards. 2. The legal duties of the parents towards a baſtard child. 3. The rights and incapacities attending ſuch baſtard children.

1. Who are baſtards. A baſtard, by our Engliſh laws, is one that is not only begotten, but born, out of lawful matrimony. The civil and canon laws do not allow a child to remain a baſtard, if the parents afterwards intermarry [3]: and herein they differ moſt materially from our law; which, though not ſo ſtrict as to require that the child ſhall be *begotten*, yet makes it an indiſpenſable condition, to make it legitimate, that it

1 Sp. I. b. 26. c. 5.
2 Stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2.
3 *Inſt.* 1. 10. 13. *Decret. l.* 4. *t.* 17. c. 1.

ſhall be *born*, after lawful wedlock. And the reaſon of our Engliſh law is ſurely much ſuperior to that of the Roman, if we conſider the principal end and deſign of eſtabliſhing the contract of marriage, taken in a civil light; abſtractedly from any religious view, which has nothing to do with the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the children. The main end and deſign of marriage therefore being to aſcertain and fix upon ſome certain perſon, to whom the care, the protection, the maintenance, and the education of the children ſhould belong; this end is undoubtedly better anſwered by legitimating all iſſue born after wedlock, than by legitimating all iſſue of the ſame parties, even born before wedlock, ſo as wedlock afterwards enſues; 1. Becauſe of the very great uncertainty there will generally be, in the proof that the iſſue was really begotten by the ſame man; whereas, by confining the proof to the birth, and not to the begetting, our law has rendered it perfectly certain, what child is legitimate, and who is to take care of the child. 2. Becauſe by the Roman law a child may be continued a baſtard, or made legitimate, at the option of the father and mother, by a marriage *ex poſt facto*; thereby opening a door to many frauds and partialities, which by our law are prevented. 3. Becauſe by thoſe laws a man may remain a baſtard till forty years of age, and then become legitimate, by the ſubſequent marriage of his parents; whereby the main end of marriage, the protection of infants, is totally fruſtrated. 4. Becauſe this rule of the Roman law admits of no limitations as to the time or number of baſtards ſo to be legitimated; but a dozen of them may, twenty years after their birth, by the ſubſequent marriage of their parents, be admitted to all the privileges of legitimate children. This is plainly a great diſcouragement to the matrimonial ſtate; to which one main inducement is uſually not only the deſire of having *children*, but alſo the deſire of procreating lawful *heirs*. Whereas our conſtitutions guard againſt this indecency, and at the ſame time give ſufficient allowance to the frailties of human nature. For, if a child be be-

gotten while the parents are ſingle, and they will endeavour to make an early reparation for the offence, by marrying within a few months after, our law is ſo indulgent as not to baſtardize the child; if it be born, though not begotten, in lawful wedlock; for this is an incident that can happen but once, ſince all future children will be begotten, as well as born, within the rules of honour and civil ſociety. Upon reaſons like theſe we may ſuppoſe the peers to have acted at the parliament of Merton, when they refuſed to enact that children born before marriage ſhould be eſteemed legitimate[4].

From what has been ſaid it appears, that all children born before matrimony are baſtards by our law: and ſo it is of all children born ſo long after the death of the huſband, that, by the uſual courſe of geſtation, they could not be begotten by him. But, this being a matter of ſome uncertainty, the law is not exact as to a few days[5]. And this gives occaſion to a proceeding at common law, where a widow is ſuſpected to feign herſelf with child, in order to produce a ſuppoſititious heir to the eſtate: an attempt which the rigor of the Gothic conſtitutions eſteemed equivalent to the moſt attrocious theft, and therefore puniſhed with death[6]. In this caſe with us the heir preſumptive may have a writ *de ventre inſpiciendo*, to examine whether ſhe be with child, or not[7]; and, if ſhe be, to keep her under proper reſtraint, till delivered; which is entirely conformable to the practice of the civil law[8]: but if the widow be upon due examination found not pregnant, the preſumptive heir ſhall be admitted to the inheritance, though liable to loſe it again,

4 *Rogaverunt omnes epiſcopi magnates, ut conſentirent quod nati ante matrimonium eſſent legitimi, ſicut illi qui nati ſunt poſt matrimonium, quia eccleſia tales habet pro legitimis. Et omnes comites et barones una voce reſponderunt, quod nolunt leges Angliae mutare, quae hucuſque uſitatae ſunt et approbatae.* Stat. 20 Hen. III. c. 9. See the introduction to the great charter, *edit. Oxon.* 1759. *ſub anno* 1253.

5 Cro. Jac. 541.

6 Stiernhook *de jure Goth. l.* 3. *c.* 5.

7 Co. Litt. 8. Bract. *l.* 2. *c.* 32.

8 *Ff.* 25. *tit.* 4. *per tot.*

on the birth of a child within forty weeks from the death of a huſband [9]. But if a man dies, and his widow ſoon after marries again, and a child is born within ſuch a time, as that by the courſe of nature it might have been the child of either huſband; in this caſe he is ſaid to be more than ordinarily legitimate; for he may, when he arrives to the years of diſcretion, chooſe which of the fathers he pleaſes [9]. To prevent this, among other inconveniencies, the civil law ordained that no widow ſhould marry *infra annum luctus* [1], a rule which obtained ſo early as the reign of Auguſtus [2], if not of Romulus: and the ſame conſtitution was probably handed down to our early anceſtors from the Romans, during their ſtay in this iſland; for we find it eſtabliſhed under the Saxon and Daniſh government [3].

As baſtards may be born before the coverture or marriage ſtate is begun, or after it is determined, ſo alſo children born during wedlock may in ſome circumſtances be baſtards. As if the huſband be out of the kingdom of England, (or, as the law ſomewhat looſely phraſes it, *extra quatuor maria*) for above nine months, ſo that no acceſs to his wife can be preſumed, her iſſue during that period ſhall be baſtards [4]. But, generally, during the coverture acceſs of the huſband ſhall be preſumed, unleſs the contrary can be ſhewn [5]: which is ſuch a negative as can only be proved by ſhewing him to be elſewhere: for the general rule is, *praeſumitur pro legitimatione* [6]. In a divorce, *a menſa et thoro*, if the wife breeds children, they are baſtards; for the law will preſume the huſband and wife conformable to the ſentence of ſeparation, unleſs acceſs be proved; but, in a voluntary ſeparation by agreement, the law will ſuppoſe acceſs; unleſs the negative

9 Britton. *c.* 66. *pag.* 166.
9 Co. Litt. 8.
1 *Cod.* 5. 9. 2.
2 But the year was then only ten months. Ovid. *Faſt. I.* 27.
3 *Sit omnis vidua ſine marito duodecim menſes. L. L. Edelb. A. D.* 1008. *L. L. Canut. c.* 71.
4 Co. Litt. 244.
5 Salk. 123. 3 P. W. 276. Stra. 925.
6 5 Rep. 98.

be ſhewn [7]. So alſo if there is an apparent impoſſibility of procreation on the part of the huſband, as if he be only eight years old, or the like, there the iſſue of the wife ſhall be baſtard [8]. Likewiſe in caſe of divorce in the ſpiritual court *a vinculo matrimonii*, all the iſſue born during the coverture are baſtards [9]; becauſe ſuch divorce is always upon ſome cauſe, that rendered the marriage unlawful and null from the beginning.

2. Let us next ſee the duty of parents to their baſtard children, by our law; which is principally that of maintenance. For, though baſtards are not looked upon as children to any civil purpoſes, yet the ties of nature, of which maintenance is one, are not ſo eaſily diſſolved: and they hold indeed as to many other intentions; as, particularly, that a man ſhall not marry his baſtard ſiſter or daughter [o]. The civil law, therefore, when it denied maintenance to baſtards begotten under certain atrocious circumſtances [1], was neither conſonant to nature, nor reaſon; however profligate and wicked the parents might juſtly be eſteemed.

The method in which the Engliſh law provides maintenance for them is as follows [2]. When a woman is delivered, or declares herſelf with child, of a baſtard, and will by oath before a juſtice of peace charge any perſon as having got her with child, the juſtice ſhall cauſe ſuch perſon to be apprehended, and commit him till he gives ſecurity, either to maintain the child, or appear at the next quarter ſeſſions to diſpute and try the fact. But if the woman dies, or is married before delivery, or miſcarries, or proves not to have been with child, the perſon ſhall be diſcharged: otherwiſe the ſeſſions, or two juſtices out of ſeſſions, upon original application to them, may take order for the keeping of the baſtard, by charging the mother or the reputed father with the payment of mo-

[7] Salk. 123.
[8] Co. Litt. 244.
[9] *Ibid.* 235.
[o] Lord Raym. 68. Comb. 356.
[1] *Nov.* 89. *c.* 15.
[2] Stat. 18 Eliz. c. 3. 7. Jac. I. c. 4. 3 Car. I. c. 4. 13 & 14 Car. II. *c.* 12. 6 Geo. II. c. 31.

ney or other ſuſtentation for that purpoſe. And if ſuch putative father, or lewd mother, run away from the pariſh, the overſeers by direction of two juſtices may ſeize their rents, goods, and chattels, in order to bring up the ſaid baſtard child. Yet ſuch is the humanity of our laws, that no woman can be compulſively queſtioned concerning the father of her child, till one month after her delivery: which indulgence is however very frequently a hardſhip upon pariſhes, by giving the parents opportunity to eſcape.

3. I proceed next to the rights and incapacities which appertain to a baſtard. The rights are very few, being only ſuch as he can *acquire*; for he can *inherit* nothing, being looked upon as the ſon of nobody, and ſometimes called *filius nullius*, ſometimes *filius populi* [3] (*a*). Yet he may gain a ſirname by reputation [4], though he has none by inheritance. All other children have their primary ſettlement in their father's pariſh; but a baſtard in the pariſh where born, for he hath no father [5]. However, in caſe of fraud, as if a woman be ſent either by order of juſtices, or comes to beg as a vagrant, to a pariſh which ſhe does not belong to, and drops her baſtard there; the baſtard ſhall, in the firſt caſe, be ſettled in the pariſh from whence ſhe was illegally removed [6]; or, in the latter caſe, in the mother's own pariſh, if the mother be apprehended for her vagrancy [7]. Baſtards alſo, born in any licenſed hoſpital for pregnant woman, are ſettled in the pariſhes to which the mothers belong [8]. The incapacity of a baſtard conſiſts principally in this, that he cannot be heir to any one, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being *nullius filius*,

[3] *Fort. de L. L. c.* 40.
[4] Co. Litt. 3.
[5] Salk. 427.
[6] *Ibid.* 121.
[7] Stat. 17 Geo. II. c. 5.
[8] Stat. 13 Geo. III. c. 82.

(*a*) Baſtards are within the meaning of the marriage act 26 Geo. 2. c. 33. which requires the conſent of the father, guardian, or mother, to the marriage of perſons under age, who are not married by banns. The King v Hodnett, Term. Rep. 96. — The rule that a baſtard is *filius nullius* applies only to the caſe of inheritances. Ibid. 101.

he is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no anceſtor from whom any inheritable blood can be derived. A baſtard was alſo, in ſtrictneſs, incapable of holy orders; and, though that were diſpenſed with, yet he was utterly diſqualified from holding any dignity in the church [9]: but this doctrine ſeems now obſolete; and in all other reſpects, there is no diſtinction between a baſtard and another man. And really any other diſtinction, but that of not inheriting, which civil policy renders neceſſary, would, with regard to the innocent offspring of his parents' crimes, be odious, unjuſt, and cruel to the laſt degree; and yet the civil law, ſo boaſted of for it's equitable deciſions, made baſtards in ſome caſes incapable even of a gift from their parents [o]. A baſtard may, laſtly, be made legitimate, and capable of inheriting, by the tranſcendent power of an act of parliament, and not otherwiſe [1]: as was done in the caſe of John of Gant's baſtard children, by a ſtatute of Richard the ſecond.

[9] Forteſc. *c.* 40. 5 Rep. 58.
[o] *Cod.* 6. 57. 5.
[1] 4 Inſt. 36.

CHAPTER THE SEVENTEENTH.

OF GUARDIAN AND WARD

THE only general private relation, now remaining to be diſcuſſed, is that of guardian and ward; which bears a very near reſemblance to the laſt, and is plainly derived out of it; the guardian being only a temporary parent, that is, for ſo long time as the ward is an infant, or under age. In examining this ſpecies of relationſhip, I ſhall firſt conſider the different kinds of guardians, how they are appointed, and their power and duty: next, the different ages of perſons, as defined by the law: and laſtly, the privileges and diſabilities of an infant, or one under age and ſubject to guardianſhip.

1. The guardian with us performs the office both of the *tutor* and *curator* of the Roman laws; the former of which had the charge of the maintenance and education of the minor, the latter the care of his fortune; or, according to the language of the court of chancery, the *tutor* was the committee of the perſon, the *curator* the committee of the eſtate. But this office was frequently united in the civil law [1]; as it is always in our law with regard to minors, though as to lunatics and idiots it is commonly kept diſtinct.

[1] *Ff.* 26. 4. 1.

Of the ſeveral ſpecies of guardians, the firſt are guardians *by nature:* viz. the father and (in ſome caſes) the mother of the child. For if an eſtate be left to an infant, the father is by common law the guardian, and muſt account to his child for the profits[2]. And, with regard to daughters, it ſeems by conſtruction of the ſtatute 4 and 5 Ph. & Mar. c. 8. that the father might by deed or will aſſign a guardian to any woman-child under the age of ſixteen; and, if none be ſo aſſigned, the mother ſhall in this caſe be guardian[3]. There are alſo guardians *for nurture*[4]; which are, of courſe, the father or mother, till the infant attains the age of fourteen years[5]: and in default of father or mother, the ordinary uſually aſſigns ſome diſcreet perſon to take care of the infant's perſonal eſtate, and to provide for his maintenance and education[6]. Next are guardians *in ſocage*, (an appellation which will be fully explained in the ſecond book of theſe commentaries) who are alſo called guardians *by the common law*. Theſe take place only when the minor is entitled to ſome eſtate in lands, and then by the common law the guardianſhip devolves upon his next of kin, to whom the inheritance cannot poſſibly deſcend; as, where the eſtate deſcended from his father, in this caſe his uncle by the mother's ſide cannot poſſibly inherit this eſtate, and therefore ſhall be the guardian[7]. For the law judges it improper to truſt the perſon of an infant in his hands, who may by poſſibility become heir to him; that there may be no temptation, nor even ſuſpicion of temptation, for him to abuſe his truſt[8]. The Roman laws proceed on a quite contrary principle, committing the care of the minor to him who is the next to ſucceed to the inheritance, preſuming that the next heir would take the beſt care of an eſtate, to which he has a proſpect of ſucceeding: and this they boaſt to be "*ſumma provi-*

2 Co Litt. 88.
3 3 Rep. 39.
4 Co. Litt. 88.
5 Moor. 738. 3 Rep. 38.
6 2 Jones 90. 2 Lev. 163.
7 Litt. §. 123.

8 *Nunquam cuſtodia alicujus de jure alicui remanet, de quo habeatur ſuſpicio, quod poſſe vel velit aliquod jus in ipſa haereditate clamare.* Glanv. *l.* 7. *c.* 11.

"*dentia*[9]." But in the mean time they ſeem to have forgotten, how much it is the guardian's intereſt to remove the incumbrance of his pupil's life from that eſtate for which he is ſuppoſed to have ſo great a regard[o]. And this affords Forteſcue[1], and ſir Edward Coke[2], an ample opportunity for triumph; they affirming, that to commit the cuſtody of an infant to him that is next in ſucceſſion is "*quaſi agnum commit-*"*tere lupo, ad devorandum*[3]." Theſe guardians in ſocage, like thoſe for nurture, continue only till the minor is fourteen years of age; for then, in both caſes, he is preſumed to have diſcretion, ſo far as to chooſe his own guardian. This he may do, unleſs one be appointed by the father, by virtue of the ſtatute 12 Car. II. c. 24. which, conſidering the imbecillity of judgment in children of the age of fourteen, and the abolition of guardianſhip *in chivalry* (which laſted till the age of twenty-one, and of which we ſhall ſpeak hereafter) enacts, that any father, under age or of full age, may by deed or will diſpoſe of the cuſtody of his child, either born or unborn, to any perſon, except a popiſh recuſant, either in poſſeſſion or reverſion, till ſuch child attains the age of one and twenty years. Theſe are called guardians *by ſtatute*, or *teſtamentary* guardians. There are alſo ſpecial guardians *by cuſtom* of London, and other places[4]; but they are particular exceptions, and do not fall under the general law.

The power and reciprocal duty of a guardian and ward are the ſame, *pro tempore*, as that of a father and

9 *Ff.* 26. 4. 1.

o The Roman ſatyriſt was fully aware of this danger, when he puts this private prayer into the mouth of a ſelfiſh guardian;

—*pupillum o utinam, quem proximus haeres*
Impello, expungam. Perſ. 1. 12.

1 *c.* 44.

2 1 Inſt. 88.

3 See Stat. *Hibern.* 14 Hen. III. This policy of our Engliſh law is warranted by the wiſe inſtitutions of Solon, who provided that no one ſhould be another's guardian, who was to enjoy the eſtate after his death. (Potter's Antiq. b. 1. c. 26) And Charondas, another of the Grecian legiſlators, directed that the inheritance ſhould go to the father's relations, but the education of the child to the mother's; that the guardianſhip and right of ſucceſſion might always be kept diſtinct. (Petit. *Leg. Att. l.* 6. *t.* 7.)

4 Co. Litt. 88.

child; and therefore I ſhall not repeat them: but ſhall only add, that the guardian, when the ward comes of age, is bound to give him an account of all that he has tranſacted on his behalf, and muſt anſwer for all loſſes by his wilful default or negligence. In order therefore to prevent diſagreeable conteſts with young gentlemen, it has become a practice for many guardians, of large eſtates eſpecially, to indemnify themſelves by applying to the court of chancery, acting under it's direction, and accounting annually before the officers of that court. For the lord chancellor is, by right derived from the crown, the general and ſupreme guardian of all infants, as well as idiots and lunatics; that is, of all ſuch perſons as have not diſcretion enough to manage their own concerns. In caſe therefore any guardian abuſes his truſt, the court will check and puniſh him; nay ſometimes will proceed to the removal of him, and appoint another in his ſtead[5].

2. Let us next conſider the ward or perſon within age, for whoſe aſſiſtance and ſupport theſe guardians are conſtituted by law; or who it is, that is ſaid to be within age. The ages of male and female are different for different purpoſes. A male at *twelve* years old may take the oath of allegiance; at *fourteen* is at years of diſcretion, and therefore may conſent or diſagree to marriage, may chooſe his guardian, and, if his diſcretion be actually proved, may make his teſtament of his perſonal eſtate; at *ſeventeen* may be an executor; and at *twenty-one* is at his own diſpoſal, and may alien his lands, goods, and chattels. A female alſo at *ſeven* years of age may be betrothed or given in marriage; at *nine* is entitled to dower; at *twelve* is at years of maturity, and therefore may conſent or diſagree to marriage, and, if proved to have ſufficient diſcretion, may bequeath her perſonal eſtate; at *fourteen* is at years of legal diſcretion, and may chooſe a guardian; at *ſeventeen* may be executrix; and at *twenty-one* may diſpoſe of herſelf and her lands. So that full age in male or female is twenty-one years, which

[5] 1 Sid. 424. 1 P. Will. 703.

age is completed on the day preceding the anniverſary of a perſon's birth [6]; who till that time is an infant, and ſo ſtiled in law. Among the antient Greeks and Romans *women* were never of age but ſubject to perpetual guardianſhip [7], unleſs when married "*niſi conveniſſent in manum viri:*" and, when that perpetual tutelage wore away in proceſs of time, we find that, in females as well as males, full age was not till twenty-five years [8]. Thus by the conſtitution of different kingdoms, this period, which is merely arbitrary, and *iuris poſitivi*, is fixed at different times. Scotland agrees with England in this point; (both probably copying from the old Saxon conſtitutions on the continent, which extended the age of minority "*ad annum vigeſimum primum, et eo uſque juvenes ſub tutelam reponunt* [9]") but in Naples they are of full age at *eighteen*; in France, with regard to marriage, not till *thirty*; and in Holland at *twenty-five*.

3. Infants have various privileges, and various diſabilities: but their very diſabilities are privileges; in order to ſecure them from hurting themſelves by their own improvident acts. An infant cannot be ſued but under the protection, and joining the name, of his guardian; for he is to defend him againſt all attacks as well by law as otherwiſe [o]: but he may ſue either by his guardian, or *prochein amy*, his next friend who is not his guardian. This *prochein amy* may be any perſon who will undertake the infant's cauſe; and it frequently happens, that an infant, by his *prochein amy*, inſtitutes a ſuit in equity againſt a fraudulent guardian. In criminal caſes, an infant of the age of *fourteen* years may be capitally puniſhed for any capital offence [1]: but under the age of *ſeven* he cannot. The period between *ſeven* and *fourteen* is ſubject to much uncertainty: for the infant ſhall, generally

[6] Salk. 44. 625. Lord Raym. 480. 1096. Toder v. Sanſam. *Dom. Proc.* 27 *Feb.* 1775.

[7] Pott. Antiq. b. 4. c. 11. Cic. *pro Muren.* 12.

[8] *Inſt.* 1. 23. 1.

[9] Stiernhook *de jure Sueonum. l.* 2. c. 2. This is alſo the period when the king, as well as the ſubject, arrives at full age in modern Sweden. Mod. Un. Hiſt. xxxiii. 220.

[o] Co. Litt. 135.

[1] 1 Hal. P. C. 25.

ſpeaking, be judged *prima facie* innocent; yet if he was *doli capax*, and could diſcern between good and evil at the time of the offence committed, he may be convicted and undergo judgment and execution of death, though he hath not attained to years of puberty or diſcretion [1]. And ſir Matthew Hale gives us two inſtances, one of a girl of thirteen, who was burned for killing her miſtreſs; another of a boy ſtill younger, that had killed his companion, and hid himſelf, who was hanged; for it appeared by his hiding that he knew he had done wrong, and could diſcern between good and evil: and in ſuch caſes that maxim of law is, that *malitia ſupplet aetatem*. So alſo in much more modern times, a boy of ten years old, who was guilty of a heinous murder, was held a proper ſubject for capital puniſhment, by the opinion of all the judges [2].

With regard to eſtates and civil property, an infant hath many privileges, which will be better underſtood when we come to treat more particularly of thoſe matters: but this may be ſaid in general, that an infant ſhall loſe nothing by non-claim, or neglect of demanding his right; nor ſhall any other *laches* or negligence be imputed to an infant, except in ſome very particular caſes.

It is generally true, that an infant can neither aliene his lands, nor do any legal act, nor make a deed, nor indeed any manner of contract, that will bind him. But ſtill to all theſe rules there are ſome exceptions: part of which were juſt now mentioned in reckoning up the different capacities which they aſſume at different ages: and there are others, a few of which it may not be improper to recite, as a general ſpecimen of the whole. And, firſt, it is true, that infants cannot aliene their eſtates: but infant truſtees, or mortgagees, are enabled to convey, under the direction of the court of chancery or exchequer, or other courts of equity, the eſtates they hold in truſt or mortgage, to ſuch perſon as the court ſhall appoint [3]. Alſo it is generally true, that an infant can do no legal act:

[1] 1 Hal. P. C. 26.
[2] Foſter. 72.
[3] Stat. 7 Ann. c. 19. 4 Geo. III. c. 16.

yet, an infant, who has an advowſon, may preſent to the benefice when it becomes void [4]. For the law in this caſe diſpenſes with one rule, in order to maintain others of far greater conſequence: it permits an infant to preſent a clerk (who, if unfit, may be rejected by the biſhop) rather than either ſuffer the church to be unſerved till he comes of age, or permit the infant to be debarred of his right by lapſe to the biſhop. An infant may alſo purchaſe lands, but his purchaſe is incomplete: for, when he comes to age, he may either agree or diſagree to it, as he thinks prudent or proper, without alleging any reaſon; and ſo may his heirs after him, if he dies without having completed his agreement [5]. It is, farther, generally true, that an infant, under twenty-one, can make no deed but what is afterwards voidable: yet in ſome caſes [6] he may bind himſelf apprentice by deed indented or indentures, for ſeven years; and [7] he may by deed or will appoint a guardian to his children, if he has any. Laſtly, it is generally true, that an infant can make no other contract that will bind him: yet he may bind himſelf to pay for his neceſſary meat, drink, apparel, phyſic, and ſuch other neceſſaries; and likewiſe for his good teaching and inſtruction, whereby he may profit himſelf afterwards [8]. And thus much, at preſent, for the privileges and diſabilities of infants.

[4] Co. Litt. 172.
[5] Co. Litt. 2.
[6] Stat. 5 Eliz. c. 4. 43 Eliz. c. 2. Cro. Car. 179.
[7] Stat. 12 Car. II. c. 24.
[8] Co. Lit. 172.

CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH.

OF CORPORATIONS.

WE have hitherto conſidered perſons in their natural capacities, and have treated of their rights and duties. But, as all perſonal rights die with the perſon; and, as the neceſſary forms of inveſting a ſeries of individuals, one after another, with the ſame identical rights, would be very inconvenient, if not impracticable; it has been found neceſſary, when it is for the advantage of the public to have any particular rights kept on foot and continued, to conſtitute artificial perſons, who may maintain a perpetual ſucceſſion, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.

Theſe artificial perſons are called bodies politic, bodies corporate, (*corpora corporata*) or corporations; of which there is a great variety ſubſiſting, for the advancement of religion, of learning, and of commerce; in order to preſerve entire and for ever thoſe rights and immunities, which, if they were granted only to thoſe individuals of which the body corporate is compoſed, would upon their death be utterly loſt and extinct. To ſhew the advantages of theſe incorporations, let us conſider the caſe of a college in either of our univerſities, founded *ad ſtudendum et orandum*, for the encouragement and ſupport of religion and learning. If this were a mere voluntary aſſembly, the individuals which compoſe it might indeed read, pray, ſtudy, and perform ſcholaſtic exerciſes together, as long as they could agree to do ſo: but they cou

neither frame, nor receive any laws or rules of their conduct; none at leaſt, which would have any binding force, for want of a coercive power to create a ſufficient obligation. Neither could they be capable of retaining any privileges or immunities; for, if ſuch privileges be attacked, which of all this unconnected aſſembly has the right, or ability, to defend them? And, when they are diſperſed by death or otherwiſe, how ſhall they transfer theſe advantages to another ſet of ſtudents, equally unconnected as themſelves? So alſo, with regard to holding eſtates or other property, if land be granted for the purpoſes of religion or learning to twenty individuals not incorporated, there is no legal way of continuing the property to any other perſons for the ſame purpoſes, but by endleſs conveyances from one to the other, as often as the hands are changed. But when they are conſolidated and united into a corporation, they and their ſucceſſors are then conſidered as one perſon in law: as one perſon, they have one will, which is collected from the ſenſe of the majority of the individuals: this one will may eſtabliſh rules and orders for the regulation of the whole, which are a ſort of municipal laws of this little republic; or rules and ſtatutes may be preſcribed to it at it's creation, which are then in the place of natural laws; the privileges and immunities, the eſtates and poſſeſſions, of the corporation, when once veſted in them, will be for ever veſted, without any new conveyance to new ſucceſſions; for all the individual members that have exiſted from the foundation to the preſent time, or that ſhall ever hereafter exiſt, are but one perſon in law, a perſon that never dies: in like manner as the river Thames is ſtill the ſame river, though the parts which compoſe it are changing every inſtant.

The honour of originally inventing theſe political conſtitutions entirely belongs to the Romans. They were introduced, as Plutarch ſays, by Numa; who finding, upon his acceſſion, the city torn to pieces by the two rival factions of Sabines and Romans, thought it a prudent and politic meaſure to ſubdivide theſe two into many ſmaller ones, by inſtituting ſeparate ſocie-

ties of every manual trade and profeſſion. They were afterwards much conſidered by the civil law[1], in which they were called *univerſitates*, as forming one whole out of many individuals; or *collegia*, from being gathered together: they were adopted alſo by the canon law, for the maintenance of eccleſiaſtical diſcipline; and from them our ſpiritual corporations are derived. But our laws have conſiderably refined and improved upon the invention, according to the uſual genius of the Engliſh nation: particularly with regard to ſole corporations, conſiſting of one perſon only, of which the Roman lawyers had no notion; their maxim being that "*tres faciunt collegium*[2]." Though they held, that if a corporation, originally conſiſting of three perſons, be reduced to one, "*ſi univerſitas ad unum redit*," it may ſtill ſubſiſt as a corporation, "*et ſtet nomen univerſitatis*[3]."

Before we proceed to treat of the ſeveral incidents of corporations, as regarded by the laws of England, let us firſt take a view of the ſeveral ſorts of them; and then we ſhall be better enabled to apprehend their reſpective qualities.

The firſt diviſion of corporation is into *aggregate* and *ſole*. Corporations aggregate conſiſt of many perſons united together into one ſociety, and are kept up by a perpetual ſucceſſion of members, ſo as to continue for ever: of which kind are the mayor and commonalty of a city, the head and fellows of a college, the dean and chapter of a cathedral church. Corporations ſole conſiſt of one perſon only and his ſucceſſors, in ſome particular ſtation, who are incorporated by law, in order to give them ſome legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural perſons they could not have had. In this ſenſe the king is a ſole corporation[4]: ſo is a biſhop: ſo are ſome deans, and prebendaries, diſtinct from their ſeveral chapters: and ſo is every parſon and vicar. And the neceſſity, or at leaſt uſe, of this inſtitution will be very apparent, if we conſider the caſe of

[1] *Ff.* l. 3. t. 4. *per tot.*
[2] *Ff.* 50. 16. 8.
[3] *Ff.* 3, 4, 7.
[4] Co. Litt. 43.

a parſon of a church. At the original endowment of pariſh churches, the freehold of the church, the church-yard, the parſonage houſe, the glebe, and the tithes of the pariſh, were veſted in the then parſon by the bounty of the donor, as a temporal recompenſe to him for his ſpiritual care of the inhabitants, and with intent that the ſame emoluments ſhould ever afterwards continue as a recompenſe for the ſame care. But how was this to be effected? The freehold was veſted in the parſon; and, if we ſuppoſe it veſted in his natural capacity, on his death it might deſcend to his heir, and would be liable to his debts and incumbrances: or, at beſt, the heir might be compellable, at ſome trouble and expenſe, to convey theſe rights to the ſucceeding incumbent. The law therefore has wiſely ordained, that the parſon, *quatenus* parſon, ſhall never die, any more than the king; by making him and his ſucceſſors a corporation. By which means all the original rights of the parſonage are preſerved entire to the ſucceſſor: for the preſent incumbent, and his predeceſſor who lived ſeven centuries ago, are in law one and the ſame perſon; and what was given to the one was given to the other alſo.

Another diviſion of incorporations, either ſole or aggregate, is into *eccleſiaſtical* and *lay*. Eccleſiaſtical corporations are where the members that compoſe it are entirely ſpiritual perſons; ſuch as biſhops: certain deans, and prebendaries; all archdeacons, parſons, and vicars; which are ſole corporations: deans and chapters at preſent, and formerly prior and convent, abbot and monks, and the like, bodies aggregate. Theſe are erected for the furtherance of religion, and perpetuating the rights of the church. Lay corporations are of two ſorts, *civil* and *eleemoſynary*. The civil are ſuch as are erected for a variety of temporal purpoſes. The king, for inſtance, is made a corporation to prevent in general the poſſibility of an *interregnum* or vacancy of the throne, and to preſerve the poſſeſſions of the crown entire; for, immediately upon the demiſe of one king, his ſucceſſor is, as we have formerly ſeen, in full poſſeſſion of the legal rights and dignity. Other lay corporations are erected for the

good government of a town or particular diſtrict, as a mayor and commonalty, bailiff and burgeſſes, or the like: ſome for the advancement and regulation of manufactures and commerce; as the trading companies of London, and other towns: and ſome for the better carrying on of divers ſpecial purpoſes; as churchwardens, for conſervation of the goods of the pariſh; the college of phyſicians and company of ſurgeons in London, for the improvement of the medical ſcience: the royal ſociety, for the advancement of natural knowledge; and the ſociety of antiquaries, for promoting the ſtudy of antiquities. And among theſe I am inclined to think the general corporate bodies of the univerſities of Oxford and Cambridge muſt be ranked: for it is clear they are not ſpiritual or eccleſiaſtical corporations, being compoſed of more laymen than clergy: neither are they eleemoſynary foundations, though ſtipends are annexed to particular magiſtrates and profeſſors, any more than other corporations where the acting officers have ſtanding ſalaries; for theſe are rewards *pro opera et labore*, not charitable donations only, ſince every ſtipend is preceded by ſervice and duty: they ſeem therefore to be merely civil corporations. The eleemoſynary ſort are ſuch as are conſtituted for the perpetual diſtribution of the free alms, or bounty, of the founder of them to ſuch perſons as he has directed. Of this kind are all hoſpitals for the maintenance of the poor, ſick, and impotent; and all colleges, both *in* our univerſities and *out*[5] of them: which colleges, are founded for two purpoſes; 1. For the promotion of piety and learning by proper regulations and ordinances. 2. For imparting aſſiſtance to the members of thoſe bodies, in order to enable them to proſecute their devotion and ſtudies with greater eaſe and aſſiduity. And all theſe eleemoſynary corporations are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, lay and not eccleſiaſtical, even though compoſed of eccleſiaſtical perſons[6], and although they in ſome things partake of the nature, privileges, and reſtrictions of eccleſiaſtical bodies.

[5] Such as at Mancheſter, Eton, Winchester, *&c.*

[6] 1 Lord Raym. 6.

Having thus marshalled the several species of corporations, let us next proceed to consider, 1. How corporations, in general, may be created. 2. What are their powers, capacities, and incapacities. 3. How corporations are visited. And 4. How they may be dissolved.

I. Corporations, by the civil law, seem to have been created by the mere act, and voluntary association of their members; provided such convention was not contrary to law, for then it was *illicitum collegium*[7]. It does not appear that the prince's consent was necessary to be actually given to the foundation of them; but merely that the original founders of these voluntary and friendly societies (for they were little more than such) should not establish any meetings in opposition to the laws of the state.

But, with us in England, the king's consent is absolutely necessary to the erection of any corporation, either impliedly or express given[8]. The king's implied consent is to be found in corporations which exist by force of the *common law*, to which our former kings are supposed to have given their concurrence; common law being nothing else but custom, arising from the universal agreement of the whole community. Of this sort are the king himself, all bishops, parsons, vicars, churchwardens, and some others; who by common law have ever been held (as far as our books can shew us) to have been corporations, *virtute officii*: and this incorporation is so inseparably annexed to their offices, that we cannot frame a complete legal idea of any of these persons, but we must also have an idea of a corporation, capable to transmit his rights to his

[7] *Ff.* 47. 22. 1. *Neque societas, neque collegium, neque hujusmodi corpus passim omnibus habere conceditur; nam et legibus, et senatus consultis, et principalibus constitutionibus ea res coercetur. Ff.* 3. 4. 1.

[8] Cities and towns were first erected into corporate communities on the continent, and endowed with many valuable privileges, about the eleventh century: (Robertson. Cha. V. i. 30.) to which the consent of the feodal sovereign was absolutely necessary, as many of his prerogatives and revenues were thereby considerably diminished.

ſucceſſors, at the ſame time. Another method of implication, whereby the king's conſent is preſumed, is as to all corporations by *preſcription*, ſuch as the city of London, and many others[9], which have exiſted as corporations, time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary; and therefore are looked upon in law to be well created. For though the members thereof can ſhew no legal charter of incorporation, yet in caſes of ſuch high antiquity the law preſumes there once was one; and that by the variety of accidents, which a length of time may produce, the charter is loſt or deſtroyed. The methods by which the king's conſent is expreſsly given, are either by act of parliament or charter. By act of parliament, of which the royal aſſent is a neceſſary ingredient, corporations may undoubtedly be created[o]; but it is obſervable, that (till of late years) moſt of thoſe ſtatutes, which are uſually cited as having created corporations, do either confirm ſuch as have been before created by the king; as in the caſe of the college of phyſicians erected by charter 10 Hen. VIII.[1], which charter was afterwards confirmed in parliament[2]; or, they permit the king to erect a corporation *in futuro* with ſuch and ſuch powers; as is the caſe of the bank of England[3], and the ſociety of the Britiſh fiſhery[4]. So that the immediate creative act was uſually performed by the king alone, in virtue of his royal prerogative[5].

All the other methods therefore whereby corporations exiſt, by common law, by preſcription, and by act of parliament, are for the moſt part reducible to this of the king's letters patent, or charter of incorporation. The king's creation may be performed by the words "*creamus*, *erigimus*, *fundamus*, *incorporamus*," or the like. Nay it is held, that if the king grants to a ſet of men to have *gildam mercatoriam*, a mercantile

9 2 Inſt. 330.
o 10 Rep. 29. 1 Roll. Abr. 512.
1 8 Rep. 114.
2 14 & 15 Hen. VIII. c. 5.
3 Stat. 5 & 6 W. & M. c. 20.
4 Stat. 23 Geo. II. c. 4.
5 See page 272.

meeting or aſſembly [6], this is alone ſufficient to incorporate and eſtabliſh them for ever [7].

The parliament, we obſerved, by its abſolute and tranſcendent authority, may perform this, or any other act whatſoever: and actually did perform it to a great extent, by ſtatute 39 Eliz. c. 5. which incorporated all hoſpitals and houſes of correction founded by charitable perſons, without farther trouble: and the ſame has been done in other caſes of charitable foundations. But otherwiſe it has not formerly been uſual thus to intrench upon the prerogative of the crown, and the king may prevent it when he pleaſes. And, in the particular inſtance before mentioned, it was done, as ſir Edward Coke obſerves [8], to avoid the charges of incorporation and licences of mortmain in ſmall benefactions; which in his days were grown ſo great, that they diſcouraged many men from undertaking theſe pious and charitable works.

The king (it is ſaid) may grant to a ſubject the power of erecting corporations [9], though the contrary was formerly held [0]: that is, he may permit the ſubject to name the perſons and powers of the corporation at his pleaſure; but it is really the king that erects, and the ſubject is but the inſtrument: for though none but the king can make a corporation, yet *qui facit per alium, facit per ſe* [1]. In this manner the chancellor of the univerſity of Oxford has power by charter to erect corporations; and has actually often exerted it, in the erection of ſeveral matriculated companies, now ſubſiſting, of tradeſmen ſubſervient to the ſtudents.

When a corporation is erected, a name muſt be given to it; and by that name alone it muſt ſue, and be

[6] *Gild* ſignifies among the Saxons a fraternity, derived from the verb ʒ ɪ ldan to pay, becauſe every man paid his ſhare towards the expences of the community. And hence their place of meeting is frequently called the *Guild* or *Guild-hall*.

[7] 10 Rep. 30. 1 Roll. Abr. 513.

[8] 2 Inſt. 722.

[9] Bro. *Abr. tit. Prerog.* 53. Viner. *Prerog.* 88. pl. 16.

[0] Yearbook, 2 Hen. VII. 13.

[1] 10 Rep. 33.

ſued, and do all legal acts; though a very minute variation therein is not material [2]. Such name is the very being of it's conſtitution; and, though it is the will of the king that erects the corporation, yet the name is the knot of it's combination, without which it could not perform it's corporate functions [3]. The name of incorporation, ſays ſir Edward Coke, is as a proper name, or name of baptiſm; and therefore when a private founder gives his college or hoſpital a name, he does it only as a godfather; and by that ſame name the king baptizes the incorporation [4].

II. After a corporation is ſo formed and named, it acquires many powers, rights, capacities, and incapacities, which we are next to conſider. Some of theſe are neceſſarily and inſeparably incident to every corporation; which incidents, as ſoon as a corporation is duly erected, are tacitly annexed of courſe [5]. As, 1. To have perpetual ſucceſſion. This is the very end of it's incorporation: for there cannot be a ſucceſſion for ever without an incorporation [6]; and therefore all aggregate corporations have a power neceſſarily implied of electing members in the room of ſuch as go off [7]. 2. To ſue or be ſued, implead or be impleaded, grant or receive, by it's corporate name, and do all other acts as natural perſons may. 3. To purchaſe lands, and hold them, for the benefit of themſelves and their ſucceſſors; which two are conſequential to the former. 4. To have a common ſeal. For a corporation, being an inviſible body, cannot manifeſt it's intentions by any perſonal act or oral diſcourſe; it therefore acts and ſpeaks only by it's common ſeal. For, though the particular members may expreſs their private conſents to any act, by words, or ſigning their names, yet this does not bind the corporation: it is the fixing of the ſeal, and that only, which unites the ſeveral aſſents of the individuals, who compoſe the community, and makes one joint aſſent of the whole [8]. 3. To make by-laws, or

[2] *Ibid.* 122.
[3] Gilb. Hiſt. C. P. 182.
[4] 10 Rep. 28.
[5] *Ibid.* 30. Hob. 211.
[6] 10 Rep. 26.
[7] 1 Roll. Abr. 514.
[8] Dav. 44. 48.

private ſtatutes for the better government of the corporation; which are binding upon themſelves, unleſs contrary to the laws of the land, and then they are void. This is alſo included by law in the very act of incorporation [9]: for, as natural reaſon is given to the natural body for the governing it, ſo by-laws or ſtatutes are a ſort of political reaſon to govern the body politic. And this right of making by-laws for their own government, not contrary to the law of the land, was allowed by the law of the twelve tables at Rome [a]. But no trading company is, with us, allowed to make by-laws, which may affect the king's prerogative, or the common profit of the people, under penalty of 40*l.* unleſs they be approved by the chancellor, treaſurer, and chief juſtices, or the judges of aſſiſe in their circuits: and, even though they be ſo approved, ſtill if contrary to law they are void [1]. Theſe five powers are inſeparably incident to every corporation, at leaſt to every corporation *aggregate:* for two of them, though they may be practiſed, yet are very unneceſſary to a corporation *ſole; viz.* to have a corporate ſeal to teſtify his ſole aſſent, and to make ſtatutes for the regulation of his own conduct.

There are alſo certain privileges and diſabilities that attend an aggregate corporation, and are not applicable to ſuch as are ſole; the reaſon of them ceaſing, and of courſe the law. It muſt always appear by attorney; for it cannot appear in perſon, being, as ſir Edward Coke ſays [2], inviſible, and exiſting only in intendment and conſideration of law. It can neither maintain, or be made defendant to, an action of battery or ſuch like perſonal injuries: for a corporation can neither beat, nor be beaten, in it's body politic [3]. A corporation cannot commit treaſon, or felony, or other crime, in it's corporate capacity [4]: though it's members may, in their diſtinct individual

[9] Hob. 211.

[a] *Sodales legem quam volent, dum ne quid ex publica lege corrumpant, ſibi ferunto.*

[1] Stat. 19 Hen. VII. c. 7. 11 Rep. 54.

[2] 10 Rep. 32.

[3] Bro. *Abr. tit. Corporation.* 63.

[4] 10 Rep. 32.

capacities [5]. Neither is it capable of ſuffering a traitor's or felon's puniſhment, for it is not liable to corporal penalties, nor to attainder, forfeiture, or corruption of blood. It cannot be executor or adminiſtrator, or perform any perſonal duties; for it cannot take an oath for the due execution of the office. It cannot be ſeiſed of lands to the uſe of another [6]; for ſuch kind of confidence is foreign to the end of it's inſtitution. Neither can it be committed to priſon [7]; for it's exiſtence being ideal, no man can apprehend or arreſt it. And therefore alſo it cannot be outlawed; for outlawry always ſuppoſes a precedent right of arreſting, which has been defeated by the parties abſconding, and that alſo a corporation cannot do: for which reaſons the proceedings to compel a corporation to appear to any ſuit by attorney are always by diſtreſs on their lands and goods [8]. Neither can a corporation be excommunicated; for it has no ſoul, as is gravely obſerved by ſir Edward Coke [9]; and therefore alſo it is not liable to be ſummoned into the eccleſiaſtical courts upon any account; for thoſe courts act only *pro ſalute animae*, and their ſentences can only be inforced by ſpiritual cenſures: a conſideration, which, carried to it's full extent, would alone demonſtrate the impropriety of theſe courts interfering in any temporal rights whatſoever.

There are alſo other incidents and powers, which belong to ſome ſort of corporations, and not to others. An aggregate corporation may take goods and chattels for the benefit of themſelves and their ſucceſſors, but a ſole corporation cannot [10]: for ſuch moveable property is liable to be loſt or imbezzled, and would raiſe a multitude of diſputes between the ſucceſſor and executor; which the law is careful to avoid. In eccleſiaſtical and eleemoſynary foundations, the king or the founder may give them rules, laws, ſtatutes, and or-

[5] The civil law alſo ordains that for the miſbehaviour of a body corporate, the directors only ſhall be anſwerable in their perſonal capacities. *Ff.* 4. 3. 15.

[6] Bro. *Abr. tit. Feoffm. al. uſe.* 40. Bacon of uſes, 347.

[7] Plowd. 538.

[8] Bro. *Abr. tit. Corporation.* 11. *Outlawry.* 72.

[9] 10 Rep. 32.

[10] Co. Lit. 46.

dinances, which they are bound to obſerve: but corporations merely lay, conſtituted for civil purpoſes, are ſubject to no particular ſtatutes; but to the common law, and to their own by-laws, not contrary to the laws of the realm [1]. Aggregate corporations alſo, that have by their conſtitution a head, as a dean, warden, maſter, or the like, cannot do any acts during the vacancy of the headſhip, except only appointing another: neither are they then capable of receiving a grant; for ſuch corporation is incomplete without a head [2]. But there may be a corporation aggregate conſtituted without a head [3]: as the collegiate church of Southwell in Nottinghamſhire, which conſiſts only of prebendaries; and the governors of the Charterhouſe, London, who have no preſident or ſuperior, but are all of equal authority. In aggregate corporations alſo, the act of the major part is eſteemed the act of the whole [4]. By the civil law this major part muſt have conſiſted of two-thirds of the whole; elſe no act could be performed [5]: which perhaps may be one reaſon why they required three at leaſt to make a corporation. But, with us, *any* majority is ſufficient to determine the act of the whole body. And whereas, notwithſtanding the law ſtood thus, ſome founders of corporations had made ſtatutes in derogation of the common law, making very frequently the unanimous aſſent of the ſociety to be neceſſary to any corporate act; (which king Henry VIII found to be a great obſtruction to his projected ſcheme of obtaining a ſurrender of the lands of eccleſiaſtical corporations) it was therefore enacted by ſtatute 33 Hen. VIII. c. 27. that all private ſtatutes ſhall be utterly void, whereby any grant or election, made by the head, with the concurrence of the major part of the body, is liable to be obſtructed by any one or more, being the minority: but this ſtatute extends not to any negative or neceſſary voice, given by the founder to the head of any ſuch ſociety.

[1] Lord Raym. 8.
[2] Co. Litt. 263, 264.
[3] 10 Rep. 30.
[4] Bro. *Abr. tit. Corporation.* 31, 34.
[5] *Ff.* 3. 4. 3.

We before obſerved that it was incident to every corporation, to have a capacity to purchaſe lands for themſelves and ſucceſſors: and this is regularly true at the common law [6]. But they are excepted out of the ſtatute of wills [7]: ſo that no deviſe of lands to a corporation by will is good: except for charitable uſes, by ſtatute 43 Eliz. c. 4. [8]: which exception is again greatly narrowed by the ſtatute 9 Geo. II. c. 36. And alſo, by a great variety of ſtatutes [9], their privilege even of purchaſing from any living grantor is much abridged: ſo that now a corporation, either eccleſiaſtical or lay, muſt have a licenſe from the king to purchaſe [o]; before they can exert that capacity which is veſted in them by the common law: nor is even this in all caſes ſufficient. Theſe ſtatutes are generally called the ſtatutes of *mortmain*: all purchaſes made by corporate bodies being ſaid to be purchaſes in *mortmain*, *in mortua manu*: for the reaſon of which appellation ſir Edward Coke [1] offers many conjectures; but there is one which ſeems more probable than any that he has given us: *viz.* that theſe purchaſes being uſually made by eccleſiaſtical bodies, the members of which (being profeſſed) were reckoned dead perſons in law, land therefore, holden by them, might with great propriety be ſaid to be held in *mortua manu*.

I ſhall defer the more particular expoſition of theſe ſtatutes of mortmain till the next book of theſe commentaries, when we ſhall conſider the nature and tenures of eſtates; and alſo the expoſition of thoſe diſabling ſtatutes of queen Elizabeth, which reſtrain ſpiritual and eleemoſynary corporations from aliening ſuch lands as they are at preſent in legal poſſeſſion of: only mentioning them in this place, for the ſake of regularity, as ſtatutable incapacities incident and relative to corporations.

[6] 10 Rep. 30.

[7] 34 Hen. VIII. c. 5.

[8] Hob. 136.

[9] From *magna carta*, 9 Hen. III. c. 36. to 9 Geo. II. c. 36.

[o] By the civil law a corporation was incapable of taking lands, unleſs by ſpecial privilege from the emperor: *collegium, ſi nullo ſpeciali privilegio ſubnixum ſit, haereditatem capere non poſſe, dubium non eſt.* *Cod.* 6. 24. 8.

[1] 1 Inſt. 2.

The general *duties* of all bodies politic, conſidered in their corporate capacity, may, like thoſe of natural perſons, be reduced to this ſingle one, that of acting up to the end or deſign, whatever it be, for which they were created by their founder.

III. I proceed therefore next to inquire, how theſe corporations may be *viſited*. For corporations being compoſed of individuals, ſubject to human frailties, are liable, as well as private perſons, to deviate from the end of their inſtitution. And for that reaſon the law has provided proper perſons to viſit, enquire into, and correct all irregularities that ariſe in ſuch corporations, either ſole or aggregate, and whether eccleſiaſtical, civil, or eleemoſynary. With regard to all eccleſiaſtical corporations, the ordinary is their viſitor, ſo conſtituted by the canon law, and from thence derived to us. The pope formerly, and now the king, as ſupreme ordinary, is the viſitor of the archbiſhop or metropolitan; the metropolitan has the charge and coercion of all his ſuffragan biſhops; and the biſhops in their ſeveral dioceſes are in eccleſiaſtical matters the viſitors of all deans and chapters, of all parſons and vicars, and all other ſpiritual corporations. With reſpect to all lay corporations, the founder, his heirs, or aſſigns, are the viſitors, whether the foundation be civil or eleemoſynary; for in a lay incorporation the ordinary neither can nor ought to viſit [2].

I know it is generally ſaid, that civil corporations are ſubject to no viſitation, but merely to the common law of the land; and this ſhall be preſently explained. But firſt, as I have laid it down as a rule that the founder, his heirs, or aſſigns, are the viſitors of all lay corporations, let us inquire what is meant by the *founder*. The founder of all corporations in the ſtricteſt and original ſenſe is the king alone, for he only can incorporate a ſociety; and in civil incorporations, ſuch as mayor and commonalty, &c. where there are no poſſeſſions or endowments given to the body, there is no other founder but the king: but in

[2] 10 Rep. 31.

eleemoſynary foundations, ſuch as colleges and hoſpitals, where there is an endowment of lands, the law diſtinguiſhes, and makes two ſpecies of foundation; the one *fundatio incipiens*, or the incorporation, in which ſenſe the king is the general founder of all colleges and hoſpitals; the other *fundatio perficiens*, or the dotation of it, in which ſenſe the firſt gift of the revenues is the foundation, and he who gives them is in law the founder: and it is in this laſt ſenſe that we generally call a man the founder of a college or hoſpital [3]. But here the king has his prerogative: for, if the king and a private man join in endowing an eleemoſynary foundation, the king alone ſhall be the founder of it. And, in general, the king being the ſole founder of all civil corporations, and the endower the perficient founder of all eleemoſynary ones, the right of viſitation of the former reſults, according to the rule laid down, to the king; and of the latter to the patron or endower.

The king being thus conſtituted by law viſitor of all civil corporations, the law has alſo appointed the place, wherein he ſhall exerciſe this juriſdiction: which is the court of king's bench; where, and where only, all miſbehaviours of this kind of corporations are inquired into and redreſſed, and all their controverſies decided. And this is what I underſtand to be the meaning of our lawyers, when they ſay that theſe civil corporations are liable to no viſitation; that is, that the law having by immemorial uſage appointed them to be viſited and inſpected by the king their founder, in his majeſty's court of king's bench, according to the rules of the common law, they ought not to be viſited elſewhere, or by any other authority [4]. And this is ſo ſtrictly true, that though the

3 10 Rep. 33.

4 This notion is perhaps too refined. The court of king's bench, (it may be ſaid) from it's general ſuperintendent authority, where other juriſdictions are deficient, has power to regulate all corporations where no ſpecial viſitor is appointed. But not in the light of viſitor: for, as it's judgments are liable to be reverſed by writs of error, it may be thought to want one of the eſſential marks of viſitatorial power.

king by his letters patent had ſubjected the college of phyſicians to the viſitation of four very reſpectable perſons, the lord chancellor, the two chief juſtices, and the chief baron; though the college had accepted this charter with all poſſible marks of acquieſcence, and had acted under it for near a century; yet in 1753, the authority of this proviſion coming in diſpute, on an appeal preferred to theſe ſuppoſed viſitors, they directed the legality of their own appointment to be argued: and, as this college was merely a civil and not an eleemoſynary foundation, they at length determined, upon ſeveral days ſolemn debate, that they had no juriſdiction as viſitors; and remitted the appellant (if aggrieved) to his regular remedy in his majeſty's court of king's bench.

As to eleemoſynary corporations, by the dotation the founder and his heirs are of common right the legal viſitors, to ſee that ſuch property is rightly employed, as might otherwiſe have deſcended to the viſitor himſelf: but, if the founder has appointed and aſſigned any other perſon to be viſitor, then his aſſignee ſo appointed is inveſted with all the founder's power, in excluſion of his heir. Eleemoſynary corporations are chiefly hoſpitals, or colleges in the univerſities. Theſe were all of them conſidered, by the popiſh clergy, as of mere eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction: however, the law of the land judged otherwiſe; and, with regard to hoſpitals, it has long been held [5], that if the hoſpital be ſpiritual, the biſhop ſhall viſit; but if lay, the patron. This right of lay patrons was indeed abridged by ſtatute 2 Hen. V. c. 1. which ordained, that the ordinary ſhould viſit *all* hoſpitals founded by ſubjects; though the king's right was reſerved, to viſit by his commiſſioners ſuch as were of royal foundation. But the ſubject's right was in part reſtored by ſtatute 14 Eliz. c. 5. which directs the biſhop to viſit ſuch hoſpitals only, where no viſitor is appointed by the founders thereof: and all the hoſpitals founded by virtue of the ſtatute 39 Eliz. c. 5.

[5] Yearbook, 8 Edw. III. 28. 8 Aſſ. 29. 2 Inſt. 725.

are to be viſited by ſuch perſons as ſhall be nominated by the reſpective founders. But ſtill, if the founder appoints nobody, the biſhop of the dioceſe muſt viſit [6].

Colleges in the univerſities (whatever the common law may now, or might formerly, judge) were certainly conſidered by the popiſh clergy, under whoſe direction they were, as *eccleſiaſtical*, or at leaſt as *clerical*, corporations: and therefore the right of viſitation was claimed by the ordinary of the dioceſe. This is evident, becauſe in many of our moſt antient colleges, where the founder had a mind to ſubject them to a viſitor of his own nomination, he obtained for that purpoſe a papal bulle to exempt them from the juriſdiction of the ordinary; ſeveral of which are ſtill preſerved in the archives of the reſpective ſocieties. And in ſome of our colleges, where no ſpecial viſitor is appointed, the biſhop of that dioceſe, in which Oxford was formerly comprized, has immemorially exerciſed viſitatorial authority; which can be aſcribed to nothing elſe, but his ſuppoſed title as ordinary to viſit this, among other eccleſiaſtical foundations. And it is not impoſſible, that the number of colleges in Cambridge, which are viſited by the biſhop of Ely, may in part be derived from the ſame original.

But, whatever might be formerly the opinion of the clergy, it is now held as eſtabliſhed common law, that colleges are lay corporations, though ſometimes totally compoſed of eccleſiaſtical perſons; and that the right of viſitation does not ariſe from any principles of the canon law, but of neceſſity was created by the common law [7]. And yet the power and juriſdiction of viſitors in colleges was left ſo much in the dark at common law, that the whole doctrine was very unſettled till the famous caſe of *Philips and Bury* [8]. In this the main queſtion was, whether the ſentence of the biſhop of Exeter, who (as viſitor) had deprived

[6] 2 Inſt. 725.
[7] Lord Raym. 8.
[8] Lord Raym. 5. 4 Mod. 106. Show. 35. Skinn. 407. Salk. 403. Carthew. 180.

doctor Bury the rector of Exeter College, could be examined and redreſſed by the court of king's bench. And the three puiſne judges were of opinion, that it might be reviewed, for that the viſitor's juriſdiction could not exclude the common law; and accordingly judgment was given in that court. But the lord chief juſtice Holt was of a contrary opinion; and held, that by the common law the office of viſitor is to judge according to the ſtatutes of the college, and to expel and deprive upon juſt occaſions, and to hear all appeals of courſe: and that from him, and him only, the party grieved ought to have redreſs: the founder having repoſed in him ſo entire a confidence, that he will adminiſter juſtice impartially, that his determinations are final, and examinable in no other court whatſoever. And, upon this, a writ of error being brought into the houſe of lords, they concurred in ſir John Holt's opinion, and reverſed the judgment of the court of king's bench. To which leading caſe all ſubſequent determinations have been conformable. But, where the viſitor is under a temporary diſability, there the court of king's bench will interpoſe, to prevent a defect of juſtice [9]. Alſo it is ſaid [10], that if a founder of an eleemoſynary foundation appoints a viſitor, and limits his juriſdiction by rules and ſtatutes, if the viſitor in his ſentence exceeds thoſe rules, an action lies againſt him; but it is otherwiſe, where he miſtakes in a thing within his power.

IV. We come now, in the laſt place, to conſider how corporations may be diſſolved. Any particular member may be diſfranchiſed, or loſe his place in the corporation, by acting contrary to the laws of the ſociety, or the laws of the land: or he may reſign it by his own voluntary act [1]. But the body politic may alſo itſelf be diſſolved in ſeveral ways; which diſſolution is the civil death of the corporation: and in this caſe their lands and tenements ſhall revert to the perſon, or his heirs, who granted them to the corporation

[9] Stra. 797.
[10] 2 Lutw. 1566.
[1] 11 Rep. 98.

for the law doth annex a condition to every ſuch grant, that if the corporation be diſſolved, the grantor ſhall have the lands again, becauſe the cauſe of the grant faileth [2]. The grant is indeed only during the life of the corporation; which *may* endure for ever: but, when that life is determined by the diſſolution of the body politic, the grantor takes it back by reverſion, as in the caſe of every other grant for life. The debts of a corporation, either to or from it, are totally extinguiſhed by it's diſſolution; ſo that the members thereof cannot recover, or be charged with them, in their natural capacities [3]: agreeable to that maxim of the civil law [4], "*ſi quid univerſitati debetur, ſingulis non* "*debetur; nec, quod debet univerſitas, ſinguli debent.*"

A Corporation may be diſſolved. 1. By act of parliament, which is boundleſs in it's operations. 2. By the natural death of all it's members, in caſe of an aggregate corporation. 3. By ſurrender of it's franchiſes into the hands of the king, which is a kind of ſuicide. 4. By forfeiture of it's charter, through negligence or abuſe of it's franchiſes; in which caſe the law judges that the body politic has broken the condition upon which it was incorporated, and thereupon the incorporation is void. And the regular courſe is to bring an information in nature of a writ of *quo warranto*, to inquire by what warrant the members now exerciſe their corporate power, having forfeited it by ſuch and ſuch proceedings. The exertion of this act of law, for the purpoſes of the ſtate, in the reigns of king Charles and king James the ſecond, particularly by ſeiſing the charter of the city of London, gave great and juſt offence; though perhaps, in ſtrictneſs of law, the proceedings in moſt of them were ſufficiently regular: but the judgment againſt that of London was reverſed by act of parliament [5] after the revolution; and by the ſame ſtatute it is enacted, that the franchiſes of the city of London ſhall never more be forfeited for any cauſe whatſoever. And, becauſe

[2] Co. Litt. 13.
[3] 1 Lev. 237.
[4] *Ff.* 3. 4. 7.
[5] Stat. 2 W. & M. c. 8.

by the common law corporations were diſſolved, in caſe the mayor or head officer was not duly elected on the day appointed in the charter or eſtabliſhed by preſcription, it is now provided[6], that for the future no corporation ſhall be diſſolved upon that account; and ample directions are given for appointing a new officer, in caſe there be no election, or a void one, made upon the preſcriptive or charter day.

[6] Stat. 11 Geo. I. c. 4.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

E. 12/16/14
C. M.